Author

Andreas Papoutsis

Featured Print Article Society and Culture Women's Rights

The State of Women’s Soccer in the World

Andreas Papoutsis’ article is additionally featured in The Generation’s Spring 2022 Digital Print Edition: Women. Coming June 1st 2022.

There is still much more work ahead to achieve gender equality in the world of soccer. In the United States alone, more than 70% of professional soccer athletes are men, one of several indications that suggest participation among amateurs and youth can be hardly close to even among genders.¹ For women looking to enter the sport, whether it be in the grand pursuit of a professional career or merely for leisurely purposes, a stark difference in pay rates for men’s and women’s national teams is a head scratcher considering the sport’s reputation as a game that welcomes egalitarianism.

The debate for equal pay reared its head most forcefully in the United States, with stars such as Megan Rapinoe advocating on behalf of female athletes everywhere, only to be met with harsh criticism from certain factions of the American public. After years of activism and drawn-out legal proceedings, courts in the United States ruled that the national soccer federation must pay both teams, regardless of gender, equally for representing their country in international competition.

Where does the United States stand in terms of progress on the matter? The agreement to offer equal pay to female athletes made the United States just the eighth country to enact such a policy, joining Ireland, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, England, and Brazil. FIFA officially recognizes 168 different women’s soccer federations, meaning only 3.5% of female professionals representing their countries earn the same pay as men. In fact, FIFA recognizes 211 men’s soccer federations, meaning entire regions only have infrastructure and pathways to international athletic competition and recognition for men.

Of the other seven countries that beat the United States in the race to offer female athletes equal pay, many of them have been known to afford women more equality in several aspects of life beyond soccer. In the U.S. News and World Report rankings of the best countries for women to live in, Norway checks in at third, the Netherlands at fifth, New Zealand at eighth, Australia at 10th, Ireland at 13th, England at 14th, and Brazil in 42nd, whereas the United States checks in at 18th.² With that being said, there seems to be a pretty direct correlation in determining which countries are most likely to offer equal pay to female soccer players, which is bad news for the current state of affairs since many of the world’s countries lag distantly behind in women’s rights. Since living standards for women typically correlate with a country having more infrastructure for women’s athletics, it is therefore all the more concerning that the United States, which is in the top 10% in terms of the rankings, falls so far behind in providing women with access to the same sporting opportunities it provides its men. In other countries where women experience even more unfavorable standards of living, their access to sports like soccer is restricted to an exponentially larger degree. The gross lack of sports infrastructure for women across the world is also a direct harm to women’s standard of living. A Rasmussen poll found that 82% of American parents viewed sports as important to the development of their children.³ Without equal access to opportunities across sports, many young girls are robbed of crucial development opportunities that are abundantly afforded to their male counterparts.

Outside of the global north, women’s access to the sport is often far more reduced. In 2013, Uganda’s government pulled its U-20 women’s soccer team from world cup qualification matches because of a supposed lack of funds.⁴ If the men’s team were in a position to contend for a spot in the World Cup, it is difficult to imagine that the government wouldn’t have done more on their behalf. In Iran, women face substantial barriers in accessing the sport where Muslim clerics have often dictated that women should not even be allowed to attend games, making it substantially more difficult for the sport to grow among the female population. Only recently have women been allowed into stadiums, while women competing for the national team often face hostility and discrimination that transcends the issue of equal pay.⁵ Khalida Popal, a woman who sought to create women’s soccer leagues in Afghanistan, was forced to seek asylum in Denmark after receiving countless extremist threats.⁶ In Brazil, it wasn’t until 1979 that women’s soccer was even legally sanctioned; cultural narratives up until that point suggested the sport was incompatible with “female nature”.⁷ In countless other countries across the world, women face extensive cultural (and oftentimes legal) barriers to access a sport that derives its beauty from being accessible to humans from all walks of life.

On the domestic level, pay discrepancies can be even more severe. Even in the United States, a sizable amount of professional female soccer players are paid no higher the poverty line. The minimum six-month salary for a woman competing professionally in the NASL is $6,842 whereas the poverty line in the United States is demarcated at $11,880 per individual. A blue-collar worker earning minimum wage would generate more than some female professional soccer players. Such low salaries understandably reduce interest in the sport and foment a discriminatory environment for prospective female athletes. For context, the minimum salary in Major League Baseball is $500,000 per year. The lack of fair pay at the club level only amplifies the harsh effects of financial discrimination seen at the international level. For the women have been able to break through such pervasive cultural and legal barriers to earn selections to their national teams (assuming their country sanctions one), and represent their nations in the World Cup Finals, they too find themselves at a great pay disadvantage to their male counterparts. In the men’s World Cup, competing teams fight for their share of a prize pot of roughly $400 million, while the women’s teams are forced to scrap for a pot of just $30 million.⁸

In the United States, however, the women’s national soccer team generated more revenue than their male counterparts, strengthening their argument for equal pay from both an ethical and economic perspective. In 2016, US Women’s soccer generated revenue of $50.8 million in comparison to $49.9 million produced by their male counterparts. If anything, it’s confounding that they aren’t paid more than their male counterparts.⁹ The counterargument to the equal pay initiative suggests that women athletes should earn pay equivalent to the size of the fiscal market associated with their sport, and since female sports don’t generate nearly the same revenue as male sports, they should not be paid equally. The 2018 men’s World Cup Final brought in over 1.1 billion television viewers.¹⁰The women’s World Cup final, by comparison, drew in a total of 263.6 million viewers. While the women’s numbers might fall short in comparison, they are by no means anything to scoff at. Over the course of the entire women’s World Cup, roughly 414 million viewers tuned in. The UCLA-Gonzaga Final Four thriller, by comparison, saw about 15 million viewers. It speaks to the immense growth of women’s sports and the cultural revolution that has taken place, albeit too slowly in most places and at a snail’s pace in other areas.

The economic argument, however, must be interpreted in context. Men’s sports typically do, on average, generate far higher viewership than women’s sports. But women’s sports also suffer from a lack of exposure to several media markets. When UCLA women’s basketball squared off against UConn in the first ever women’s basketball game broadcast on ABC, they broke the record for the most-viewed regular season women’s college basketball game of all time. The match brought in 839,000 viewers, which was 302,000 more than the amount who tuned in for a top ten men’s matchup between Villanova and Baylor the following day. Villanova and Baylor are two of the most venerated programs currently in men’s college basketball; to eclipse their viewership ratings by a wide margin speaks to the potential women’s sports possesses. Hence the economic argument should be understood in the context of inequitable exposure to media markets. When women’s sports are broadcasted on television and advertised across different mediums, they generally have no problem in attracting fans or viewers.

I would suggest that the ethical argument trumps the economic argument anyway.

Representing your country should not be viewed differently on the basis of gender. It takes immense sacrifice on the part of female athletes to represent their nations at the highest levels of the sport, and the message sent by paying them woefully less than their male counterparts is deeply damaging to young girls and young women seeking to pursue a career or even a hobby in soccer.

What can be done to remedy the problem? That would require a complex solution, since the issue of gender inequality is one that transcends soccer and intersects nearly every fabric of society. But the easiest first step that can be taken is for other soccer federations to follow the lead of countries like Australia and guarantee equal pay to female athletes who represent their country at international soccer competitions. FIFA should also step in and incentivize federations to make equal pay a hallmark of their governing structure. One such way to do so could involve penalizing countries that are clearly apathetic to the notion of gender equality, whether that be through financial penalties or outright bans from male competitions until some verifiable progress is shown that a given national federation is taking steps to ensure a more equal landscape for a sport that prides itself on equality. If a country’s soccer federation refuses to pay women equally for their service in competition, perhaps their men’s teams should not be afforded access to the glory of competition either.

The beauty of the sport lies in its ability to not discriminate across socioeconomic spectrums. That same equality should be demonstrated across genders.

Endnotes

1.“Professional Soccer Player Demographics and Statistics in the US,” Zippia. https://www.zippia.com/professional-soccer-player-jobs/demographics

2.“Best Countries for Women,” U.S. News and World Report. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/best-countries-for-women

3.“Americans Say Sports Are Important For Kids,” Rasmussen Reports. July 20, 2017. https://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/sports/july_2017/americans_say_sports_are_important_for_kids

4.Oryada, Andrew. “Uganda Withdraws Team From U-20s Women’s World Cup Qualifiers,” Uganda Radio Network. November 27, 2013. https://ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=58478

5.Merhi, Karim Abou. “Women allowed to attend soccer game at Tehran stadium, a first in nearly 3 years,” The Times of Israel. January 27, 2022.

6.Lourim, Jake. “How Close Is The Rest Of The World To Catching The U.S.?” FiveThirtyEight. June 11, 2019. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-close-is-the-rest-of-the-world-to-catching-the-u-s/

7.Ackerman, Xanthe & Asquith, Christina. “Soccer is Still Out of Reach for Half the World’s Women,” Time Magazine. July 8, 2015. https://time.com/3949377/world-cup-women-global-equality/

8.Weber, Joe. “The Status of Equal Pay for Women Soccer Players Worldwide,” Girls Soccer Network. September 22, 2021. https://girlssoccernetwork.com/the-status-of-equal-pay-for-women-soccer/

9.Hess, Abigal Johnson. “US women’s soccer games now generate more revenue than men’s – but the player still earn less,” CNBC. June 19, 2019.

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/19/us-womens-soccer-games-now-generate-more-revenue-than-mens.html

10.Glass, Alana. “FIFA Women’s World Cup Breaks Viewership Records,” Forbes. October 21, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanaglass/2019/10/21/fifa-womens-world-cup-breaks-viewership-records/?sh=40e6191a1884

May 31, 2022 0 comment

Authoritarianism Economics Europe Featured National Security Print Article Russia Uncategorized Vladimir Putin

Why Angela Merkel’s Tenure has Emboldened Authoritarians

written by Andreas Papoutsis

Angela Merkel has often been likened to the replacement leader of the free world in the absence of active American leadership, particularly during the isolationist years of the Trump administration. Logically, her departure from the international stage is considered an imminent loss for the prosperity and security of the free world, though her legacy on the international stage should not be remembered fondly by those who truly support global democracies. Despite the occasional victory notched for neighboring democracies or domestic German society, Merkel’s legacy as a diplomat should be defined by the several inconsistencies in the values she chose to defend and the failures she has notched when standing up to autocrats.

Despite a whopping 16 years spent in office as the German Chancellor, Merkel has failed to raise German defense spending to the 2% of GDP threshold as required by NATO doctrine, instead of shrugging off the disregard for defense expenditures as a matter that should not be the worry of NATO allies. She will have left public office with a military budget that amounts to a meager 1.36% of the country’s GDP in 2019 before the pandemic-induced recession led to a sharp downtick in GDP that raised the figure to 1.57% in 2020.¹ Indifference to defense expenditures has forced the issue of foreign NATO missions to be disproportionately shouldered by other allies such as the United States. The issue of German defense spending has also left Europe in a strategically vulnerable position in the face of a revanchist Russian adversary in Vladimir Putin, whom she has seemingly cozied up to. What meaningful military response can be taken by Berlin in the event that the Kremlin’s juggernaut military invades Finland or Ukraine? At this point, the answer is clear: hardly anything of consequence. If Putin’s 2014 invasion of Crimea or repeated scares of Russian military buildup along Europe’s borders isn’t convincing enough of the very real possibility of an attack orchestrated by Moscow, we could simply turn to the leaders of Russia’s neighboring democracies, who constantly warn of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship.²

Perhaps one of the most disruptive and troublemaking authoritarian governments in the world, Russia has relied largely on its oil economy to project power and support the financial needs of its military proliferation. Amid a decline in European demand for fossil fuels, the Kremlin has been handicapped by a changing energy environment. Where would the Kremlin possibly find a lifeline? Perhaps from like-minded authoritarian governments such as the one seen in Beijing? Contrary to what logic would dictate, the helping hand was instead extended by Germany under the leadership of Angela Merkel, against the wishes of close allies such as the United States and the frantic warning of Eastern European countries like Ukraine.³ No amount of diplomacy, sanctions, or common sense could convince Germany otherwise of completing the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline despite its blatantly conspicuous strategic repercussions.

Trying to rationalize such a decision by pointing out political technicalities or lauding economic conveniences simply implies an apathetic attitude towards NATO security and laziness when configuring Germany’s energy structure. Even when Alexei Navalny was intentionally poisoned by the Kremlin for being an anti-corruption advocate, Berlin responded with inconsequential statements and sanctions that ignored the crown jewel of Putin’s objective in Europe: the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.⁴ Norbert Roettgen, the conservative party’s leader on the German foreign affairs committee, correctly assessed the seriousness of the situation by suggesting Germany, “must pursue hard politics, we must respond with the only language Putin understands – that is gas sales.”⁵ Despite calls from several Western countries and numerous politicians within her own country, Merkel decided against implicating the pipeline in any response levied by Germany.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas merely questioned and offered hollow consternation surrounding the future of the project in the aftermath of the Navalny poisoning, essentially demonstrating to one of the world’s most notorious authoritarians that his efforts to snuff out and assassinate pro-democracy advocates was entirely acceptable by Berlin’s standards.⁶ Germany seemed more enraged by American sanctions against the project than the assassination attempt undertaken by the Kremlin. Merkel instead figured that the wishes of her democratic allies were secondary to the desires of Vladimir Putin and the misconceived economic expediency he offered.

The decision to finalize the pipeline despite the Navalny poisoning now puts Ukraine and several other European partners at risk, as Kiev fears that Moscow could once again cut off oil supply to the region in an attempt to punish or coerce neighboring democracies. There does not even appear to be a surefire guarantee that implementation of the pipeline would be able to increase the volume of oil transported to Europe; we only know for certain that it would change the source of said oil. Likewise, neighboring Poland finds itself incredibly vulnerable and downright shocked in this situation, since repairs to the Ukrainian-Polish pipeline would have been significantly cheaper than the construction of the Nord-Stream 2.⁷ Since the pipeline will run through the Baltic Sea, NATO allies in the area should expect additional Russian naval assets in the region, an opportunity that Moscow will surely take advantage of to intimidate its neighbors.

All of the details and nuances of the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline, however, can be boiled down to a simple rhetorical question: why would Merkel want a sizable share of Germany’s energy supply to be in the hands of one of the world’s most notorious enemies of democracy? Considering that disdain for the project emanated not just from allies, but from domestic German lawmakers and a wide array of members of Merkel’s own party, there is no valid justification.

In recent weeks, the possibility of a Russian attack on Ukraine has grown. Despite a drawdown of troops along the Ukrainian border in April this year, Russian military assets have once again accumulated in the region, alarming officials in Kiev and causing many security officials from NATO countries to warn of an invasion. With over 100,000 troops in position, defense officials in Kiev project an attack before the end of the winter. Many American officials consider it a “high probability,” including Fiona Hill, who described Putin as “deadly serious” about commencing an incursion into Ukraine.⁸ In response to what could devolve into a major European war, Merkel has merely suggested imposing sanctions against the Kremlin. Levying sanctions against Moscow after allowing the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline to be constructed, however, seems like a rather hollow threat.

Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis expects the Kremlin to divert NATO’s attention away from Ukraine by fomenting unrest along the Polish border.⁹ Over the last few months, asylum seekers and migrants primarily originating from the Middle East have flooded the Polish border after being escorted by Belarusian security forces. Moscow has employed the strategy of attempting to create a refugee crisis within a NATO country by using the Belarusian government as a smuggler of vulnerable migrants. The predicament at the Polish border has been met with condemnation from Merkel, who rightly demonstrated solidarity with her counterparts in Warsaw. This solidarity, however, has not been consistently extended to other European democracies that have experienced similar hybrid attacks by authoritarian governments.

When standing up for European Union allies, Merkel has picked and chosen when to exhibit a commitment to democratic values. Merkel has often been perceived as the de facto leader (or co-leader alongside France’s Macron) of the European Union, especially with the departure of the United Kingdom. The Union’s mission statement includes promises of promoting peace, freedom, and security, yet it has been rendered virtually useless in acting on such promises in instances where Merkel’s leadership has deemed it as inexpedient, particularly as it relates to Turkey. For 47 years now, Ankara has militarily occupied the northeastern portion of Cyprus. Seventeen years ago, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union, which means that, for 17 years, a foreign nation has militarily occupied European territory with little to no backlash whatsoever from Berlin. Last summer, when Turkish warships were escorting oil surveying vessels in Greek and Cypriot waters, leading to a tense situation that nearly devolved into armed conflict between two NATO allies, Merkel framed the situation as if it were an incidental and natural dispute between two neighbors rather than an aggressive incursion of EU territorial waters. Instead of explicitly siding with a European partner and a country committee to good neighborly relations, Merkel chose neutrality, further emboldening the strongman residing in Ankara.

The aforementioned “hybrid attacks” that entail the intentional funneling of asylum seekers into a neighboring country to overwhelm their immigration infrastructure is a tactic that has been regularly utilized by Turkey when confronting neighboring democracies like Greece. In fact, many of the migrants attempting to cross the Polish border made their way to Belarus through Turkish flights to Minsk, which were eventually stopped once the European Union and the United States agreed to sanction third-country airlines involved in flying asylum seekers to Belarus.¹⁰

In March 2020, several thousands of migrants attempted to cross into Greece’s Evros region after President Erdogan announced he would allow their passage into the European Union despite no mutual agreement from the Greeks. The Turkish president’s intentions were clear: to threaten Greece with an unsustainable influx of migrants while unethically generating leverage to exact a more financially lucrative immigration agreement with the European Union. His efforts were successful in generating more financial assistance from the European Union, and although Merkel condemned Turkey’s actions as unacceptable, her government did little to enact any consequences.

While Turkey has grown increasingly authoritarian, both in how it operates domestically through Erdogan’s consolidation of power and in his militaristic foreign policy that threatens regional democracies, Merkel and her government have rewarded such behavior with new arms sales that include the transaction of new German submarines. The decision lends a strategic advantage for an authoritarian government in its aggression directed towards neighboring democracies. Her indifference on such matters also strengthens Ankara’s disdain for the democratic aspirations of its people, knowing that corruption and authoritarianism will result in little backlash from its longtime German partner.

No leader is perfect, not even some of history’s most respected figures, but Merkel’s vaunted reputation is largely based on the intentional ignorance of her shortcomings in defending global democracy. Her work as a domestic politician has received praise from vast ranges of German society, evidenced by her incredibly long tenure as German Prime Minister, but her work in the international community is not particularly impressive considering the urgency of challenging authoritarianism.

Merkel’s true legacy as a diplomat should instead reflect the inconsistencies in her values and the appeasement she demonstrated to some of the world’s most notorious dictators, the likes of which have utilized Merkel’s support to advance their objectives of consolidating power and tearing down democratic institutions within their own countries while simultaneously lashing out against neighboring democracies that are struggling to ensure the free world’s future. So, when it comes to defending democracy and confronting authoritarianism, Merkel’s record will forever be far from perfect.

Endnotes:

1. Leah Carter. “Germany reports record €53 billion in NATO defense spending.” Deutsche Welle News, February 2, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-reports-record-53-billion-in-nato-defense-spending/a-56491017.

2. Micheal Phillips and James Marson. “Russian Aggression Spurs Neighbors to Rebuild Defenses.” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-aggression-spurs-neighbors-to-rebuild-defenses-11609859853.

3. “Ukrainian ambassador calls Nord Stream 2 ‘a stab in Ukraine’s back’.” Ukrinform, March 11, 2021, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3344084-ukrainian-ambassador-calls-nord-stream-2-a-stab-in-ukraines-back.html.

4. “Russia responsible for Navalny poisoning, rights experts say.” United Nations News, March 1, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086012.

5. Madeline Chambers. “Germany pressed to rethink Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Navalny poisoning.” Reuters, September 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny-germany-nord/germany-pressed-to-rethink-nord-stream-2-pipeline-after-navalny-poisoning-idUSKBN25U0UF.

6. “Germany has alternatives if it abandons Nord Stream 2 over Russia tensions: Experts.” Alarabiya News, September 7, 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/business/energy/2020/09/07/Germany-has-alternatives-if-it-abandons-Nord-Stream-2-over-Russia-tensions-experts.

7. Mark Temnycky. “The Security Implications of Nord Stream 2 for Ukraine, Poland, and Germany.” Wilson Center, March 17, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/security-implications-nord-stream-2-ukraine-poland-and-germany.

8. John Haltiwanger. “Putin is ‘deadly serious’ about neutralizing Ukraine, and has the upper hand over the West, former US diplomats and officials warn.” Business Insider, November 26, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/puti-deadly-serious-about-ukraine-has-upper-hand-over-west-2021-11.

9. Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis. “Why it’s better than a 50-50 chance that Russia will attack Ukraine this winter.” Fox News, November 27, 2021, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/russia-attack-ukraine-winter-biden-putin-robert-maginnis.

10. Aykan Erdimir. “Swift trans-Atlantic action kept Turkey from fueling Belarus’ hybrid attacks,” DefenseNews, November 16, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/11/16/swift-trans-atlantic-action-kept-turkey-from-fueling-belarus-hybrid-attacks/.

February 7, 2022 0 comment

Crisis Relied Featured Geopolitics History Human Rights Middle East Security and Conflict

What Biden’s Recognition of the Armenian Genocide Reveals About Turkey and the Future of Relations With Ankara

written by Andreas Papoutsis

Fourteen American presidents have come and gone since the term “genocide” was coined in 1944, nearly 30 years after the Ottoman Empire committed unfathomable atrocities against ethnic Armenians during World War I, yet not a single commander-in-chief acknowledged the violence as genocide. For decades, the Armenian diaspora in the United States passionately advocated for recognition of an ethnic cleansing that left an estimated 1.5 million people dead, many of whom perished through massacres and death marches. Prior to Joe Biden’s presidency, a mere 30 nations formally recognized the massacres as genocide, while many other countries have been cautious in maintaining good relations with Turkey. Most historians acknowledge the genocide while the UN has demonstrated limited recognition. Even the small group of historians who disagree with a formal declaration of genocide concede that ethnic Armenians faced forced expatriation under the duress of violence.

Many American presidents have traditionally tiptoed around the subject. President Reagan, on a singular occasion, briefly referred to the a genocide in a speech, but neither he nor or any of his successors formally recognized the genocide. For decades, the United States has viewed Turkey as a critical ally in the Eastern Mediterranean, for geographical, military, and economic purposes. Its position as a gateway between the Middle East and Europe has enabled the United States to station troops and launch offensives into neighboring Syria. Its close proximity to the Soviet Union and Russia has made the deployment of American nuclear weapons a strategic headache for the Kremlin. Likewise, its control over the Bosphorus Strait has given NATO smooth accessibility to the Black Sea for the purpose of conducting military exercises on Russia’s doorstep.

For more reasons than can be listed, upsetting a nation whose government staunchly denies the occurrence of a genocide has historically been viewed as ill-advised foreign policy. That does not seem to bother Joe Biden, however, who promised on the campaign trail that he would break with previous Presidents – including his former boss – and officially recognize the Armenian Genocide. His decision, which came on the 106th anniversary of the atrocity, garnered immediate backlash from Ankara. President Recep Tayip Erdogan, who is currently juggling the volatility of runaway inflation in his own country, promptly rebuked the recognition by referring to this new era in American relations as being damaged by a “deep wound.” The Turkish president is now coming to terms with the realization that American policymakers no longer view Turkey’s strategic importance in the same light. Its military capacity is still the second largest in NATO and its GDP remains upwards of $700 billion, yet its deterioration into an authoritarian society has restrained its ability to maintain strategic influence or act in a manner that is serviceable to its allies. For Biden, there has been no better time to announce recognition of the genocide.

A man whose vindictive personality often translates into policy, Erdogan has explicitly indicated that there will be some semblance of retaliation for the recognition. The question now becomes, what can he actually do? There has been speculation by foreign policy analysts that intelligence sharing with the United States could become restrained by Ankara. In the past, Turkey has expelled diplomats and cancelled trade deals with countries that have recognized the genocide. Ankara has previously threatened to block American use of early-warning missile radars in the southeastern area of Kurecik, which is home to military installations that play a pivotal role in NATO’s ballistic missile defense systems. The United States also operates tactical nuclear weapons and other critical military assets at the Incirlik air base, the likes of which could be removed if Turkey were to force their departure. Such actions have the support of various Turkish protesters.

There are not many economic actions that can be taken against the United States considering the weakness of the Turkish economy and the disproportionate response that would be levied by Washington. One unintended manner in which Turkey has struck back, however, relates to its removal from the F-35 program; replacing engine parts that were slated to be manufactured in Turkey will now raise the price of the program for the United States.

Other forms of retaliation would be equally detrimental for Erdogan, not just because of American retaliation but because of possible self-inflicted damage. Turkey could respond by reducing its cooperation with American sanctions, specifically as they relate to Iran and China. Ankara could also decide to act more sporadically in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly as it relates to Libya, Cyprus, Israel, and Greece. While all of the aforementioned actions may constitute responsive measures taken against the United States, they will foster proportionate troubles for Turkey. When Trump took actions against Turkey early on in his term, the Turkish Lira suffered significantly; a deteriorated relationship with the United States will only exacerbate the hardship of a Turkish economy in freefall.

If Erdogan were to unexpectedly reverse course and seek warmer relations with the United States, he would enter a separate dilemma, since there is little that can be done by Ankara to reverse course and detach themselves from the Kremlin. Withdrawing from the Russian S-400 program could result in harsh retaliatory sanctions against Turkey, measures that could target and deal devastating blows to its economy and tourism industry which typically sees 50 million visitors per year. Putin could also exact revenge by spurning Russian-backed forces to attack the Turkish-held Idlib province in Northern Syria, thereby troubling Erdogan with hundreds of thousands of more refugees. The Kremlin could inflict further damage by spoiling Erdogan’s strongman image — the foundation of his domestic support — by intervening in Libya and demonstrating Ankara’s inability to handle several regional crises at once. Erdogan thus finds himself in a conundrum.

It should be noted, however, that Erdogan’s retribution doesn’t necessarily need to be directed towards the United States. The contempt for ethnic Armenians spurred by Erdogan’s nativist rhetoric decisively outweighs any disdain for America. The Turkish President’s revenge could culminate in harsh actions taken against the nation that has lobbied for genocide recognition for decades. It was not long ago that Ankara made its support abundantly clear in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict by supplying arms to the Azeris and minimizing diplomatic relations with Yerevan. Any aggressive actions taken against Armenia, especially those out of spite, might garner backlash from regional powers such as France – who has been at odds with Turkey for years over Libya, Greece, and Cyprus – but will likely generate a modest response from Washington lawmakers wary of Armenia’s close security ties with Moscow. If there is any unscrupulous course of action that Erdogan could take in response to the recognition, it would likely involve aggression displayed towards Armenia. While harsh actions taken against Armenia would be morally repugnant, they would do little to inflict damage to the United States.

Prior to the November election, Biden was an outspoken critic of his Turkish counterpart, boldly suggesting that the United States support his political rivals, a highly unorthodox stance to take towards a NATO ally. The rhetoric has not changed much since. Remarkably, the President spoke with the Greek Prime Minister on a phone call a month before his first communication with Erdogan. Even before Biden took office, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo broke traditional protocol by traveling for a diplomatic visit to Greece without making the customary stop in Ankara. In many ways, Biden’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide is more of a reflection of Turkey’s diminishing strategic influence than it is of personal contempt between the American President and Erdogan.

Regardless of how much Turkey lobbies Washington, or how often Turkish leaders voice emphatic disagreement, American recognition of the Armenian Genocide is now official. Only a wildly unconventional move by a future President could revoke it. With recognition being cemented, there is very little Turkey can do to exact revenge on the United States and forge a new era of relations on its own terms. If Erdogan were to act in his nation’s best interests, he would bear the brunt of recognition and strive to maintain warm relations with Washington. Unfortunately for the United States and the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole, a diminished strongman will likely lash out instead.

May 21, 2021 1 comment

Asia China East Asia Japan United States

Abe’s Successor and the Future of Japanese-American Relations

written by Andreas Papoutsis

Shinzo Abe faced criticism at home but respect abroad. A series of scandals surrounding cronyism and an inability to fulfill every promise of his economic reforms made him domestically unpopular at times, though his commitment to the United States and proactiveness in cooperating with the European Union made him a popular figure in the foreign sphere. His departure from office thus leaves many questions for the future of global politics.

When Abe took office in 2012, in his second stint as prime minister, he enamored the Japanese populace with poetic messages of confidence, optimism, and a dedication to Japanese prosperity. This renewed sense of hope, however, was juxtaposed with a growing list of daunting issues facing the island nation. He inherited an economy that had taken a beating from the global recession, an aging population in need of a structurally-reformed system to assist them, and a region fraught with volatility stemming from North Korean nuclear proliferation and Chinese aggression. When he unexpectedly resigned from office in August 2020 for chronic health reasons, he left behind a country with many of those same issues, which were complicated by the coronavirus. Rather than departing in the wake of the Tokyo Olympics, Abe left amid a disastrous pandemic. But while his departure didn’t transpire as a fairytale ending, Japan’s Prime Minister undoubtedly left the nation in a more promising direction than when he found it. The question now becomes whether or not his successor, Yoshihide Suga, will do the same, and what that could mean for American and regional interests.

As Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister, Abe worked with presidents of both American parties to forge ironclad cooperation between the two nations, and his efforts to do so have often been described as “relentless.” In Washington’s confrontation with China, Japan has served as a distinctly reliable ally, demonstrating a desire to curb Beijing’s debt diplomacy and economic expansion in the region. Divestment from Chinese economic relations has best been demonstrated by Tokyo’s coronavirus relief packages, which offered subsidies to Japanese companies reshoring their production facilities but also allocated portions of aid to firms with intentions of relocating production from China to elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Such measures did not resonate well with Beijing but garnered considerable approval from regional neighbors experiencing difficulty in attracting Western investments. The Belt and Road Initiative might stake itself as the focal point of U.S. policy attention, but under Abe, Japan provided alternative options to Chinese infrastructure deals in the midst of receding American presence in the region. A report from Fitch Solutions found that Japanese infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia exceeded $367 billion in value, far surpassing Beijing’s tally of $255 billion. Tokyo-backed initiatives have considerably hampered Xi Jinping’s ability to execute Belt and Road projects in the region, particularly in Vietnam and the Philippines, both of whom are in stark disagreement with Beijing over territorial claims in the South China Sea. These were parts of a foreign policy strategy empowered by Abe, whose approach was described as “nationalistic, yet pragmatic.”

His successor, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, has been accused of favoring stability over innovation and is thus widely presumed to embrace many of the same policies of his predecessor. This could be both a blessing and a curse; the economic programs instituted by Abe have produced mixed results, and those issues have only been complicated by the pandemic. If the promises set forth by Abe do not culminate in tangible results under Suga, Japan’s Prime Minister could see himself serving a short term, in which case American interests could suffer. While only time will tell if Suga’s domestic policies can materialize into tangible benefits, his promises of solidarity with the United States ensure short term reliability. In his first news conference as Prime Minister, Suga promised to “beef up” relations with the United States and stressed that American ties will remain a focal point of Japanese foreign policy. This sentiment indicates a continued commitment to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (or the FOIP), a shared vision between the United States and several regional neighbors that has materialized in freedom of navigation tactics in the disputed South China Sea. The FOIP has drawn dismay from Beijing whose economic claims in the region have been met with American naval exercises designed to prevent Chinese militarization in the waters and ensure free passage for international transit.

But Suga might face domestic fallouts that could permeate into Tokyo’s relations with the United States. Japanese favorability towards the United States has drastically plummeted in recent decades, and certain trends might warrant close attention in determining the long-term extent and reliability of our alliance. According to the Pew Research Center, only 41% of Japanese people have a favorable view of the United States, down from 77% in 2000. Perhaps equally concerning, only 25% express confidence and faith in Donald Trump’s leadership abilities. While the objectives of American foreign policy shouldn’t be designed to directly please the Japanese citizenry, understanding public opinion in the island nation can be critical towards determining the long term reliability and strength of our alliance with Tokyo. While these figures might seem worrying when gauging the strength of our relationship with Japan, they are more representative of our own political deterioration.

If anything, Japan seems to be more worried about future American reliability. A 2018 poll conducted by Pew showed that Japanese citizens view China and Xi Jinping as far more concerning threats than most others in foreign relations, and Tokyo wants a dependable ally to help meet the challenge. Yoichi Funabashi, Chairman of the Asia Pacific Initiative, describes the United States presence in the region as a “diminishing dominance,” and believes that Japan must consider the “existential risks” of possible American failure to counter Chinese aggression and strengthen the Tokyo-Washington alliance. Although the incoming Biden administration will look to salvage the remnants of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the soon-to-be President will have to circumnavigate the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or the RCEP, a pact recently signed by Japan, China, and a host of other regional neighbors. China will now control the largest free trade zone in the world that includes the likes of our strongest allies, a result of the Trump administration’s isolationist and combative approach to the region. Tokyo can only wait for so long on American reliability.

With Abe gone, Suga will have a multitude of issues to resolve and a host of relations to nurture in his upcoming tenure. Economic woes, Chinese aggression, and North Korean nuclear proliferation have all been drastically complicated by the pandemic and American political volatility. In spite of all that, Tokyo has made it clear that its alliance with the United States is among the most critical components of its foreign policy. Suga’s tenure, regardless of its length, will continue to improve American strategic interests. Now it’s time for Washington to take advantage of that.

November 17, 2020 0 comment