Author

Holt Alden

Photo: Ret. General Wesley K. Clark addresses the conference. Holt Alden via Holt Alden

Featured Security and Conflict Terrorism

President Obama’s Unfinished Drone Legacy

The abundance of news focused on the U.S. presidential election has left little room for the discussion of President Obama’s national security legacy. This intense spotlight on the controversial candidates limited projections of the long-term repercussions of President Obama’s policies and the precedents they have set for the next president. Two weeks ago, UCLA’s Burkle Center for International Relations, in conjunction with the Center for Near Eastern Studies and the International and Comparative Law Program, hosted a conference on President Obama’s drone legacy that specifically focused on the use of weaponized drones against terrorists. The conference consisted of two panels hosting, among others, distinguished Georgetown Law Professor Marty Lederman and Ret. General Wesley K. Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Europe. The panelists spoke at length about international humanitarian law, human rights and the Bush Administration, tying each to President Obama’s foreign policy and national security framework.

Two very different, although not mutually exclusive, perspectives on President Obama were developed throughout the day. The first President Obama was depicted by Lederman and, to some extent, Ret. General Clark, describing President Obama’s use of drones against terrorists as responsible and restrained. They maintained that President Obama has only used weaponized drones in specific armed conflicts, restricting their use under the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) and maintaining the strikes’ legality in terms of international and domestic law. The other President Obama cut a darker figure, described by British attorney and human rights expert Alex Moorhead as a continuation of the Bush Administration’s secrecy and disregard for human rights. Moorehead chastised President Obama’s drone policies as blurring the lines between war and peace, setting dangerous precedents for drone strikes to be unrestricted in terms of geography and temporal scope.

Despite the two characterizations of President Obama, nearly all the panelists agreed on one thing: President Obama’s current drone policies must be amended by his successor. Most of the panelists also concurred that a Congressional oversight committee on drone use would perform an adequate check on presidential power. Moorhead went further, supporting the concretization of PPG into actual law, rather than just policy. Currently, the PPG will only act as a guide for future administrations and can be easily ignored or changed, whereas making it law would codify restrictions on future presidents’ drone use. President Obama’s drone legacy has now moved beyond his control. President-elect Trump must implement Congressional oversight and support new domestic laws restricting the use of weaponized drones to armed conflicts in specific countries for limited periods of time. These steps would protect a positive legacy for President Obama’s drone program, keeping executive power restrained.

Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have pursued counterterrorism policies that are designed to keep Americans safe. Weaponized drone use by the president is governed by two legal frameworks: international humanitarian law (IHL) and domestic statutes. IHL, also known as the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict, legalizes the killing of enemy combatants in an armed conflict. Cardozo Law Professor Deborah Pearlstein specified that killing as a first resort is only legitimate in this context. The classification of terrorists under IHL is key to placing limitations on drone strikes, as some argue that, as “unlawful combatants”, IHL does not apply to terrorists. Pearlstein laid the basic foundation of how terrorists fit into IHL, explaining that conflicts between state and non-state actors are called non-international armed conflicts, or NIACs. Both President Bush and President Obama were able to define and characterize American conflict with terrorist groups through a global NIAC paradigm, controlling the story around its interaction with relatively new legal frameworks and, crucially, new technology. The lack of accountability and transparency regarding drone strikes has kept government policy hidden from American citizens, while rapidly developing technology has kept it from being restricted by domestic legislation or international law. Although the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda, and now ISIS, seems to fit into the legal NIAC framework, the U.S. insistence on a global NIAC makes U.S. drone strike capabilities dangerously unrestricted in terms of location and time period, leaving questions concerning a timeline for the end of the war on terror and its current global reach unanswered. Pearlstein also argued that as the reach of IHL grows, supplanting domestic criminal law in more situations, the space for human rights law shrinks due to the further enabling and legitimizing of state power over individuals. President Obama’s persistent use of weaponized drones has set dangerous precedents for future administrations and other national governments that may support more extreme use.

Not all the panelists agreed that President Obama has continued the global NIAC against terrorist groups, and used the PPG as a specific example of his restraint. Conor Friedersdorf of The Atlantic stated that drone use is deliberative and discriminate, meaning it can pick out targets with little or no collateral damage. He and Lederman assert that the PPG does enhance these restrictions, setting barriers that further regulate the strikes. While the panelists agreed that the publishing of the PPG improved transparency within the Obama Administration, Moorehead focused on its limitations as a policy guideline, rather than domestic law. President-elect Trump could–and likely will–reject the PPG completely and follow his own interpretations of IHL and domestic law. Pearlstein also argued that transparency is less important than the lack of legal and political accountability. She emphasized the significance of scrutinizing the justifications for using weaponized drones in areas where legitimate and capable government does exist, such as Pakistan.

The creation of a Congressional oversight committee that monitors drone strikes and proposes legislation restricting the use of weaponized drones would create a necessary check on executive power. It would also allow Congress to contribute to the debate concerning the legality of weaponized drone usage outside of traditional battlefields and in sovereign states like Pakistan. Although President-elect Trump will likely reject any transfer of power to Congress, allowing greater congressional oversight would ensure respect for human rights and potentially spread the negative political ramifications of strikes with heavy civilian casualties and those targeting American citizens. A congressional oversight committee is a critical step towards reining in America’s weaponized drone usage. President Obama and other Commanders-in-Chief prefer drone strikes because they pose no risk to the soldiers involved, meaning the political risks of these killings are also lessened. This can incentivize leaders to use deadly force more frequently, an executive power that must be checked immediately. President-elect Trump must also support the codification of the PPG into domestic law, permanently restricting weaponized drone use and cementing a drone legacy of restraint and responsibility. The creation of checks and shared responsibility with respect to weaponized drone use may lead to political gains for both the president and Congress, while also creating spaces for human rights and legal weapons use. President Obama’s drone legacy depends on it.

November 16, 2016 0 comment

A candlelight vigil was held on June 2nd mourning the two deaths from the previous day.

Featured UCLA and the World

Letter From the Editor: A Response to the Events on June 1st

written by Holt Alden

The Generation is, first and foremost, a foreign affairs magazine. After the painful events that occurred on campus yesterday, however, I realized that it is a magazine built on educating others through the written word, especially UCLA students and faculty. Normally the golden rule of articles published to The Generation is that the topic must cross at least one border, making the subject of each article international in scope. In this instance, I would argue that feelings of grief and sadness do more than cross borders; they are an integral part of the human condition. Rather than including comments regarding shootings, violence or death in other parts of the world, I believe it is our duty at The Generation to post this statement as it is. If the writing here helps even one person from the UCLA community move through this tragedy, or supports others who have dealt with similar violence, we will have done our job as journalists.

Yesterday morning, UCLA and the surrounding community was struck by news of danger and death. Many, including myself, felt a deep sense of insecurity that manifested itself in adrenaline and fear. After the active situation on campus had ended, I was overcome with sadness and empathy for the two who lost their lives in the Engineering IV building. My mind also jumped to the near future: news headlines connecting the words UCLA, murder, suicide, shooter, and death; articles written about the motives and how it could have been prevented. The events may be politicized and linked to national conversations concerning gun violence, security and mental health. They may also be compared to similar tragedies at schools across the country and the globe, though all those connected to violence here and elsewhere will recognize that fear cannot always be broken down into levels or degrees.

But for the students, faculty and alumni of UCLA these conversations will feel disaffected and cold. Yesterday two humans lost their lives in terrible circumstances. Two people who were like us in more ways than we can imagine. To speak about gun control issues or national politics now would be to ignore the tragedy that forced those at UCLA to recognize how alike we all are, and dilute the importance of telling those around us that we care and are grateful for their presence.

Yesterday was not about whether or not the gun used was purchased legally and with a background check. I am a staunch advocate of gun control and a national gun registry, yet yesterday morning I spent frantic moments texting with a close friend who believes in the opposite, making sure she was safe and alive. I spent hours reaching out to family members, telling everyone I was alright, and responding to calls from friends or extended family whose phone numbers I did not recognize. I texted with an ex-girlfriend I had not spoken to in over a year, who had reached out to make sure I was in a secure place. Students across campus did the same, returning calls and messages through the afternoon. We revitalized connections that had meaning to us, implicitly recognizing our feelings for those around us.

Those of us at UCLA, and others reading news headlines or twitter feeds, must see this as an opportunity to reach out to others we care deeply about. Reach out to those who we have not spoken to in weeks or months or years. Reach out to those around us everyday who we sit next to and share classrooms with, those that we connect with on campus but do not always have the chance to speak with, or get to know. The idea that the UCLA community will be brought closer together through this tragedy is not something that occurs naturally. It materializes through individuals who are willing to reach out to one another and recognize the importance of others we take for granted everyday.

Today we can be thankful of our opportunity to live and connect. I believe the following quote from Viktor Frankl is extremely relevant: “Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and freedom.” Many may choose to respond to yesterday’s events by advocating for new gun laws that further restrict ownership. Others will spend energy pushing back against those laws, or praying with their congregations, or being thankful that their family members are safe. But all of us should empathize with the two who lost their lives, their families and their communities.

It is up to those who work or study at UCLA, and our extended family, to remember yesterday’s events and think about those who are grieving for a lost loved one. It is up to us to reach to the person next to us, grab their hand, and say that we love and appreciate them. It is up to us to support one another however possible. Most importantly, it is up to us to reach out to those we disagree with, or who have different perspectives, and find common ground. Often each of us feels as though we are alone, either at UCLA or in our journeys through the world. Now is the time to connect and lean on one another. Bruins must reach out to Bruins, and to Hokies and Gauchos, and to the communities of Garissa University College in Nigeria, the Army Public School in Pakistan, and the Beslan school in Russia, and anyone else with similar experiences. It is up to individuals to show each other and themselves what it means to be a part of a caring community such as UCLA. It is up to each and every person who hears about yesterday’s tragic events to show what it means to be human by empathizing with the victims and with one another.

June 2, 2016 3 comments

From Left to Right: Burkle Center Director Kal Raustiala, UCLA Professor Arnold C. Harberger, Deputy-Director Alexandra Lieben, MIT Professor Esther Duflo, Holt Alden, UCLA Professor Edward Leamer, Arturo Siguenza

Featured The International Economy UCLA and the World

Randomized Approaches to Development: An Interview with Economist Esther Duflo

written by Holt Alden

Last week, Generation Editor-in-Chief Holt Alden and Editor Arturo Siguenza spoke with world-renowned economist and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Professor Esther Duflo during her visit to UCLA. Professor Duflo is the co-Founder and co-Director of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), and focuses on development economics and poverty alleviation. The interview covers a broad range of topics, including the use of randomized control trials, effective policies for governmental organizations like USAID, and advice for students looking to work in international development. The following is a transcript of the interview, edited for brevity and clarity.

Arturo Siguenza (AS): In your experience using randomized evaluations, has there been a development puzzle that has been particularly challenging, or that you consider the biggest puzzle you’ve tackled?

Esther Duflo (ED): Not really, in the sense that most things get partitioned away into smaller things that we can approach, so it’s hard to talk about one big problem. But there are things that are… if you ask me whether there are domains that I understand better after fifteen years of conducting randomized trials, than others, then that is true. For example, one key problem in developing countries is the quality of healthcare, that is really terrible, I couldn’t tell you that I have a good idea of what to do about it. I have maybe a better idea of what the nature of the issue is, but I don’t really have any idea, or the beginnings of an idea, of what solutions would be to improve the quality of healthcare. Whereas there are other domains, like for example in education, where I have a better sense of the problem and what could be done, even if I am aware that there are political constraints to implement what would be done. So there are certainly issues that are a bit thornier than others, and healthcare is certainly one of them.

Holt Alden (HA): Tied into that, you have a lot of experience with a whole host of different types of [development] variables. Are there any that have changed your perspective on poverty, specifically, or that you really want to focus on going forward?

ED: I tend to jump from question to question, partly because, as a reaction to the fact that a lot of development work, in particular in international institutions and other things, tend to be very siloed. So people are education experts, or health experts, or they are agricultural experts, but in fact when you are looking at, you know, a household as a unit, they are involved in all of these things and all of these decisions tend to be taken together. So the fact that they have health issues has impact on their business, and the fact that their business is very risky has impact on their health.

So I never really saw myself as becoming a specialist in one topic, as opposed to always trying to keep in mind how all of these things are interconnected. Because each of my projects is reasonably narrow, and one thing at a time — not to become narrow as an economist — I keep circling around, shifting perspectives, shifting projects, as a way of keeping honest.
Esther Duflo

HA: Do you feel like that has been effective for you in your studies? Have you been able to relate them together?

ED: Yeah absolutely. That is kind of what we tried to do in Poor Economics, our book, with Abhijit Banerjee. The book is structured by chapter, which are by theme, but at the end there is really an effort to say ‘what have we learned’.

AS: Your work has been focused on utilizing randomized control trials. However, it can be argued that this removes the local context and local demands from these projects by universalising the development issues. What is your take with balancing the local context with your randomized trials?

ED: So I would almost say the opposite, that the randomized control trials are extremely local because they are always conducted in one particular area. I guess you could conduct them in several particular sites together but, even then, each site you would have to know pretty well and understand pretty well. In fact, the most common criticism of randomized control trial is the opposite, that it’s very local, that being so local it loses the ability to generalize from one place to another, so it’s funny that you should ask the question the other way [laughs].

It’s basically impossible to conceive of a good project without having a very good sense of the reality in the field.

And I think that’s one thing that makes development economists, in particular people who run randomized control trials, different from many other people, in particular bureaucrats in developing countries or people who work in large organizations. We often have a much better sense of the particular realities that people confront in a particular problem.
Esther Duflo

AS: Have you ever had challenges from a local bureaucrat that is opposing what you are trying to do?

ED: Not really. The worst that can happen, and that can be really bad, is sluggishness, when you need something and it doesn’t happen. And the best that can happen is actually cooperation. We have great projects that we have done in coalition with local governments where you have people who are actually very committed to what they want to do and very creative. So one big goal of J-PAL as an organization is to nurture champions within bureaucracies, identify them, and then work with them.

So people are education experts, or health experts, or they are agricultural experts, but in fact when you are looking at, you know, a household as a unit, they are involved in all of these things and all of these decisions tend to be taken together.
Esther Duflo

HA: With the randomized control trials, similar to what happens in medicine, have you experienced any trial or variable that works so well that you’ve ended the experiment? Are there any ethical dilemmas that you’ve faced in your randomized control trials?

ED: Not really, of the first type — that things work so well we’ve had to stop the trial — because the nature of the data collection… I think it might change now with tablets and stuff like that where we get data coming back soon… but until fairly recently the only way we could get data is going out into the field and doing a survey. The data is coming in too slowly to really understand something…

HA: Or after the experiment…

ED: After the fact anyway. So I have not found myself in a situation where I have thought, “Oh geez this is working so well I should stop.” But there are particular issues of other nature that arise. There have been some projects that I haven’t done because I thought that they would be difficult to do ethically. And in these cases it’s never the fact that I randomize is a problem, but it’s the fact that we always randomized when there is some presumption that it might not work — but at least some presumption that it might work — so you have at least some uncertainty to justify the experiment. But there are cases when you feel that in the process of collecting the data you would learn things that could prompt, or should prompt immediate action, but you wouldn’t want to intervene at the time because that would jeopardize the experiment. That’s the type of situation I have avoided, where sometimes I have not done projects.

AS: In the same sphere, with ethical challenges that may arise, a lot of development projects have the tendency of going fad-to-fad. Have you had any experience dealing with this tendency? Or using methods to dissuade this?

ED: It’s about trying to get away from that, trying to generate evidence on things, things that might be fad or might not be fad. So one of the things we run into, we evaluated microcredit programs which certainly have been a fad, or at least were very popular maybe about ten years ago. We collected one evaluation, and found mediocre results, not very bad and not very good. So everybody said “Well, maybe that doesn’t generalize”, we also said “Maybe that doesn’t generalize, maybe it was just that it was not good, who knows.” So we waited and then some people generated other studies like that. When there were seven studies together, we published them all together in one place and then there was no escaping that that thing isn’t working so well. I think it did some something to the fad.

AS: Did you face any problems with people that were very invested in microfinance?

ED: Yeah, microcredit has been an issue because the people who are… it’s not the case in all programs, there are a lot of organizations that just do things because they want to make a difference but if they find out what they do doesn’t work they move to something else. That doesn’t trouble them more than that, they just want to be helpful. They are not married to one program.

But microcredit is different. A lot of people who are in microcredit are deeply invested in it and there have been two kinds of reactions. There have been reaction of organizations saying well that’s useful, we need to change what we are doing. That doesn’t mean people don’t need credit, it means that we need to restructure the offering to better meet the financial needs of the poor. And then there are people who just were upset and tried to make it go away. But it’s not going away [laughs]. I can’t make it go away.
Esther Duflo

HA: Do you normally work more with private organizations or more with governments, especially on the ground?

ED: So early on, when we just started, we worked mostly with NGOs, but now we work a lot with governments. I don’t know what the balance is across projects but certainly if you look at the most recent projects, there is a lot of government work.

HA: Have you felt that [government work] has been more or less effective, or less fast?

ED: It is less fast, it is more work. It is like pulling teeth. But I don’t know if you could call it more or less effective. Working with NGOs has a lot of advantages, in particular the fact that you can, if you have a good partnership, you can control pretty well what’s happening on the ground because they know pretty well what’s happening on the ground. So you know what you’re doing. If you’re interested in evaluating an impact of a particular action — if you manage to do it well — then working with an NGO is much better.

On the other hand, when we move to policy many things happen. The scale changes, the targeting changes, the quality of implementation changes and you’re not going learn that by working with NGOs. If you want to know the effect of policies… if you want to learn about people it might be more effective to work with an NGO and manipulate just one thing and manipulate it very well. That might be a first step in some developing-a-policy type of continuum. But if you’re interested in changing policy, that first step might be necessary but it’s not sufficient. It serves different purposes. But it’s definitely more involved by the nature of the of the exercise.

AS: In J-PAL have you focused on working more with NGOs or with government organizations?

ED: So there has been this shift. Generally we were working more with NGOs and now there is a lot of work with governments. But it is also a question of age. Younger people work more with NGOs because they need results quicker and they have less money. Once you are a little established you can take more risks and you have more time. Even within J-PAL if you looked at the age of the people who run projects, it would be pretty well correlated, I’m guessing.

AS: Have you seen a type of development project that has been receiving more funding recently? That has been more popular?

ED: There is a lot of interest in governance issues. Governance, corruption, et cetera. So that’s an area that gets easy funding. There’s a lot of interest in gender issues. There’s a lot of interest in crime and post-conflict instability, like fragile states. These are the areas that have a lot of funding lately.

HA: If you were in charge of something like USAID, or some other government agency here, is there some step that the U.S. could take in order to better support developing countries?

ED: I was a member of the President’s Global Development Council, so I can tell you what we said. There were three pillars. One was focusing on environment and climate [change], because it’s going to become a poverty issue and a lot of the problem is generated in the US. It needs international leadership, it’s not something that countries can really deal with on an individual basis. The second was public-private partnership. I have less to say about that, that’s less my area of interest. And the third one was innovation.

So it was, basically, saying look, the aid budgets are small. They are becoming smaller and smaller, both in absolute value and as a fraction of what developing countries have to spend because of how the world is going. Therefore the share of the US in the aid budget is falling, because there are countries like Brazil and China who are now spending a lot of money on other countries.

So if we don’t do anything, if we continue building a hundred schools here, and paying some beltway bandit to do some half-hearted agricultural project there… we are doomed to irrelevance. The only way to become relevant and really helpful is to take the lead on generating innovation.
Esther Duflo

Not just innovation as in widgets, but innovation as in policy innovation. How do you do that? By devoting a considerable amount of your own budget –instead of just doing things– doing things to evaluate them. Or by scaling things up that have been scientifically proven to be effective in helping countries to scale them up. Or by supporting countries to create such innovation units within their own government. So that’s sort of the things we are pushing. I think if I were in charge of USAID I would try to push on the third, on this innovation lever. There is something at USAID called the Development Lab, I think, and they are very proud of it and rightly but it’s about two people [laughs].

AS: Commenting on something you said about not just policy innovation but also tech innovation, has there been a particular technological innovation that has really come up in development?

ED: Cell phones. Generally I’m reasonably skeptical of technology but the cell phones has just… in the space of very few years, it is everywhere and it’s really changed the way that everything works. So cell phones, coming next is the smart phone. I really think it’s going to make a difference. Then, already there but for now just in Kenya, is mobile money. It’s not just in Kenya, its Kenya, Bangladesh, Pakistan, but it’s really huge in Kenya. In Kenya, however you look at it, it seems to be changing lives.

AS: Has there been a particular method of disbursing, or trying to get cell phones out there to people in developing countries? Or has it just grown on it’s own?

ED: No, you know Nokia is a very cheap phone — has very cheap phones. They just spread, people find it useful. You think of innovation that has really commercially succeeded, you think of the cell phone and mobile money and microcredit, to some extent. But microcredit, I don’t know if it has… it’s just a commercial success.

HA: Regarding the cell phones, I think that has definitely been pushed and helped by processes of globalization and has been a really positive benefit. Do you think that globalization overall has helped or hurt impoverished nations? Or is it sort of a balance?

ED: I have no idea. I’m not very good at this type of question, I don’t think anybody knows. What we do know is that there are some distinct positive benefits, like the cell phone, but we also know there are distinct negative impacts on distribution. When you’re looking at India and the districts that were most affected by the rapid liberalization in the ‘90s, these places became comparatively poorer compared to other places less affected by the removal of the trade barriers. So we do know it affects distribution in the poor countries and the rich countries. I think these are the two things we know.

I don’t know the extent to which.. people are suggesting that as countries become closer together and trade more, they grow more. This worked on the Panama Canal and the advent of plane transport, which made some countries which were previously effectively very far away now closer by, and seem to be trading more and becoming richer. So there is some indication in that sense. I think the question of trying to put this together and asking whether it’s a positive or a negative doesn’t make sense. Because whatever is negative has to be addressed anyway and in principle could be. It shows something of our inability to redistribute gains. But there is no theorem that trade produces no losers unless you are able to redistribute. That seems to have been a big lesson.

AS: Are there particular organizations that you’ve seen on the rise? Startups or organizations like USAID who have had major projects that have been making a difference lately?

ED: You want me to name specific organizations doing specific things?

AS: If you can.

ED: An organization that has gotten a lot of attention, and I think rightly, is GiveWell. It is organizing to provide cash transfers to people in Kenya using mobile money. So they are really exploiting the existing mobile money to provide cash transfer with minimal screening and no monitoring whatsoever. They have done an evaluation of that work and they show that people seem to be spending the money perfectly reasonably. So I think it was a useful result and they got a lot of attention for it, rightly.

Not up and coming, but I am actually a big fan of the World Bank. I think that they have a lot of very good economists, they are trying hard. They are a bit disparate, they are doing this and they are doing that, but at the same time they have a lot of people that know what they are doing. By and large, in particular lately, they have supported innovation so that is nice.

Very self-servingly — but I should still cite them — I’m a big fan of IPA, that’s Innovations for Poverty Action. I’m saying that self-servingly because that’s of course our very close cousin. I think they are great, they are an NGO — which we are not — helping people conduct evaluations of their program. They are working in a lot of countries in the world setting up ambitious projects. That would be my three.

I’d also cite Pratham, which is a massive education NGO in India. When I said in education we try to understand what should be done, even if there are barriers to actually do it, I think Pratham is the one who figured out how to do it. If someone can do it, they can do it.
Esther Duflo

HA: Do you have any new ideas or experiments that keep you up at night? That you think will really help innovate, like you’ve been saying, in developing countries? What’s the next step you want to dive into?

ED: I have a two year old and a four year old, and they are the ones who keep me up at night, nothing else. [Laughs all around] I try to not be bothered by other things. There are two things that interest me: one thing is very abstract, one thing is very concrete.

One thing is so concrete it’s not economics anymore, it’s really more cognitive psychology. In fact I’m working with cognitive psychologists; I’m very interested in small kids — that might be related to my having a two year old and a four year old — I’m very interested in how small kids learn mathematics. And the reason why I’m very interested in this question is because… a central problem of education in developing countries is that poor kids arrive in school with a small delay, just because they have not gone to preschool, or have not gone to a good preschool.

But then the system in developing countries, partly because of colonial history, partly because of insistence in elite bias… it is the total opposite of “no child left behind”. It is many, many children left behind.
Esther Duflo

The teacher focuses on the top of the class and doesn’t pay attention to the children who are lagging behind. So a small lagging behind at the beginning turns into not being able to read at the end of primary school and exiting the school system.

My hope is to really harness the best of science –that’s why I went to see the psychologists and said you’ve got to work on some real problems, not just labs– to harness the best of what they know to construct the best curriculum possible for preschool. Then haul it out everywhere such that poor kids arrive with a slight leg-up compared to the richer kids, instead of a slight delay. Therefore this advantage will accumulate over time, that’s kind of my hope. So that’s one thing that I’m very, very interested in. And again, that doesn’t keep me up at night — nothing does — but it would.

On the other end of the spectrum, I’m very interested in the plumbing of public policy. That’s the one thing that might seem too abstract, literally how the government machine works. So, when I talk about plumbing, it could really be the plumbing of how money travels from point A to point B without leaking everywhere in the system. Suppose I come up with some great ideas, either they can be profitable, so market entity is going to take care of it and that’s fine, or they are not but we still want to do it because they have some social value. Then government is going to have to run it. Then the issue is, how is government going to be able to run it without destroying it in the process or losing all the money in the process, et cetera. The issue is, “Can I help government implement what they want to implement anyway?” As opposed to giving them ideas — you should do this, you should do that — how do you help government implement what they want to do anyways. Starting with fund flows, so I have a project on fund flows. Literally, how does the money go from the center to a local place and how does that affect corruption and stuff like that? And also, organizations of monitoring systems and the like. That might seem terribly unsexy but in the end the big ticket items will be there I think.

AS: One final question to wrap up, here at UCLA we also have an International Development Studies program. What advice would you give to young IDS students in pursuing a career in development?

ED: Once you finish your studies, you should find yourself a job in a developing country, if possible in the field somewhere and not in the capital. Spend a few years there and understand how things really work until you contemplate your next step. I think that would be the most important thing.

I think there are too many people who work in development that — I think there are bureaucrats in developing countries who just have absolutely no idea what it is. Get yourself out there.
Esther Duflo

AS: That’s the biggest problem that we’ve learned. There are all these organizations telling developing countries what to do when they’ve never set foot in the country.

ED: It’s not just that, it’s also bureaucrats sitting in Delhi, dreaming up some systems. Going back to the plumbing issue, I was talking about healthcare, saying the quality of healthcare is terrible. So one of the issues is the nurses in the public centers never show up to work. So you write the nurses are really bad people, but then you look at them and their job description, and its some kind of … so she’s supposed to arrive at the center at 8 o’clock and be there from 8 to 8 and do field visits in the meantime, she doesn’t have any vehicle, she has ten villages that she has to visit. It’s 50 degrees centigrade, she has to persuade people to get sterilized, which, of course, they don’t want to get sterilized. So someone has been sitting down saying what is the ideal job description for one of these nurses without thinking one thing about how hard it is. So the way we describe it in the book with Banerjee [Poor Economics] is the three I’s: policies for developing countries are plagued by ideology, ignorance, inertia. You have no idea of the realities in the field, and once that sort of thing is in place it never goes away.

May 3, 2016 0 comment

Laurent Gbagbo, President of Côte d'Ivoire, addresses the general debate of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly.
25/Sep/2009. United Nations, New York. UN Photo/Marco Castro. www.unmultimedia.org/photo/ - United Nations Photo, Flickr (CC).

Laurent Gbagbo, United Nations Photo, Flickr (CC). Source

Africa Featured Security and Conflict

Laurent Gbagbo and the Future of the International Criminal Court

written by Holt Alden

In November 2010 Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo lost the presidential election to rival Alassane Ouattara in an extremely tight and fiercely contested race. Gbagbo refused to step down, denying the results of the election, while Ouattara, as well as the Ivory Coast’s Constitutional Council and international leaders, claimed Gbagbo had lost. The stand-off continued for months as violence spread in Abidjan, the nation’s capital. Gbagbo supporters were accused of murdering civilians from the opposition party and burning people alive, while others claimed pro-Ouattara groups also engaged in human rights abuses. By April of 2011 more than 3,000 people had died and claims of crimes against humanity surfaced in the international press. Soon after, Gbagbo was arrested and extradited to The Hague where he awaited trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This January, Gbagbo’s trial began and is still ongoing. Ouattara on the other hand, has not been charged, leading to pro-Gbagbo groups joining the chorus of critical opposition to ICC indictments, its current justice process and the court itself.

The Gbagbo case marks an integral test for the ICC’s effectiveness and legitimacy, as it exemplifies both the potential importance of the ICC in prosecuting heinous crimes and the problems associated with a supranational criminal court that tries individuals. The high-profile nature of the trial is also important, as it turns international media focus to the ICC and allows for a close inspection of how the court has evolved since opening in 2002.

The ICC–currently supported by 123 nations–was established through the Rome Statute with the mandate of prosecuting cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression and crimes against humanity. However, since 2002 the ICC has only completed twelve proceedings, resulting in two convictions. Gbagbo is the first former head of state to reach trial at the ICC, making this a landmark case for the court. The case’s high-profile status will test the ICC’s ability to act effectively and justly under intense scrutiny.

One of the most common issues surrounding the ICC is the possibility of political manipulation and unbalanced use of judicial power. The explicit purpose of the ICC is to fight impunity in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity; moreover, as a criminal court, it is also meant to prevent retaliatory vengeance by monopolizing legitimate justice. Gbagbo may have incited the violence in Ivory Coast by refusing to step down from the presidency, but the accusations that Ouattara groups also assaulted and murdered civilians shows that, in this instance, the ICC’s theoretical premise of preventing vengeance failed. The threat of punishment from the ICC did not stop Ouattara groups from attacking Gbagbo supporters. That being said, an increased efficiency in the court and the cooperation of international leaders in apprehending those indicted by the ICC may inhibit future groups from retaliating with violence. Prosecuting Gbagbo fairly, while also thoroughly investigating Ouattara and his actions in 2010-2011, would show the world there will not be impunity for similar crimes nor violent and heinous reactions from the victims.

Critics of the court, including pro-Gbagbo groups, also cite imbalanced investigations and prosecutions, as well as negative African bias. So far, the ICC has failed to adequately investigate Ouattara’s influence on the unrest, even as news reports claim both Gbagbo and Ouattara’s forces perpetrated extreme violence in the months following the presidential election in 2010. In this vein, the court is caught between domestic groups hoping the ICC can provide justice and others, such as African leaders, who critique neocolonial tendencies and bias. The Gbagbo case also continues the ICC’s questionable record of only indicting Africans, which must change. Much of Africa is mired in violence, as seen in the cases of Joseph Kony and others, but there are many conflicts outside the continent that deserve equal investigation. For instance, there is much evidence that Bashar al-Assad’s regime perpetrated crimes against humanity in Syria. France is currently investigating Assad’s possible war crimes, though it would show a strong commitment to unbiased justice if the ICC were to indict him as well. Each of these elements fuel claims that the ICC lacks legitimacy as an impartial justice institution.

The Gbagbo case alone will not solve these issues but a focus on thoroughness and unbiased justice for all those involved, as well as others in similar conflicts, will create an opportunity for legitimacy. Each of the previous critiques is important and relevant, yet they must not spell the closing of the ICC. Here, the importance of Gbagbo and the Ivory Coast becomes evident. Gbagbo’s trial is an important first step toward justice for those involved in the violence in Ivory Coast but it is only the beginning of a long process. The ICC’s investigation into possible violent crimes by Ouattara and his supporters groups is ongoing; investigations that involve issues of national sovereignty or that scrutinize governments currently in power are time-intensive and must be treated with patience.

Although the ICC’s negative African bias should be criticized, the court only has a short history of indictments. The method and focus of their investigations can easily be changed to incorporate trends of equality and objectiveness regarding who is charged and tried. Laws that are enforced unevenly are often illegitimate and discriminatory, which makes it imperative that the ICC broaden its gaze beyond Africa. Indicting Bashar al-Assad would be a promising step forward, showing the ICC’s commitment to equality under the law.

The ICC’s implicit narrative of vengeance prevention should also be looked at from a broader, long-term perspective. Many cases of crimes against humanity or genocide stem from intra-state conflicts or civil wars. The court will not be able to stop violent acts of retaliation by immediately indicting and trying national leaders. If the ICC gains legitimacy and more countries sign the Rome Statute, retaliation by victims in these horrific instances may be prevented. As the ICC grows into a meaningful supranational criminal court, its full body of work and unbiased effectiveness in prosecuting violent criminals should provide these incentives against vengeance. Victims of heinous crimes will feel confident that their persecutors will be brought to justice and will not think it necessary to seek out individual revenge. The successful prosecution of Gbagbo and a non-partisan investigation of Ouattara’s actions may be the first step in ending any future attempts at retribution.

The Gbagbo case allows the ICC an opportunity to prove to the world that it has grown and evolved over the past fourteen years. The international community must also pay attention, without focusing on the court’s failures or shortcomings. We must instead comment with a critical eye and support change that will allow the ICC to be more effective and just. The ICC is unlike any other criminal court or international institution created and it is still in its earliest stage. In order to reach the ultimate goal of denying impunity to warlords and leaders who commit crimes against humanity, the court must be allowed to push through growing pains and mold itself to the nuances of the world in which we currently live.

April 4, 2016 0 comment

Ex-President Otto Molina, Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel FDI, Flikr (CC). Source

Featured Mexico and Latin America Security and Conflict

Guatemala’s Critical Turning Point

written by Holt Alden

In the past few months most international news has focused on conflicts throughout the Middle East, while little has been said about the incredible transformation the Guatemalan justice system is currently undergoing. The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is an independent UN body that has stabilized and rebuilt Guatemala’s previously failing justice system. CICIG has helped Guatemala reduce its impunity rate, democratically elect a new president and prosecute various high-level officials for corruption in “La Línea,” or “The Line,” kick-back scandal.

Guatemala has lacked a legitimate justice system since its civil war ended nearly twenty years ago. Today unpunished crime is the status quo. The Human Rights Watch released a report in 2012 that announced homicides had 95% percent impunity in 2010 (that is, 95% of homicides went unpunished) and previously, a UN-sponsored commission found the Guatemalan federal government responsible for 93% of the human rights abuses that occurred during its 36 year civil war. CICIG has made great strides towards ending the impunity that destabilizes the country, an immense accomplishment considering the violence and lack of legitimate justice that has been constant for nearly half a century. Working closely with the Attorney General’s office, CICIG arrested thirty-eight government officials tied to La Línea scandal earlier this year, including ex-President Otto Molina and former Vice-President Roxana Baldetti. The body has also successfully prosecuted other corruption scandals since 2007, actions that were non-existent before CICIG’s inception.

The most pressing questions regarding the recent success of CICIG reach across national borders: Can the commission be reproduced in other countries, such as El Salvador and Honduras? If so, under what circumstances can the commission be successful and long-lasting? Although CICIG is less than 10 years old and the long-term viability of the Guatemalan justice system remains in doubt, a progressive national leader, committed commissioner and overwhelming domestic support can effectively fight impunity within other Latin American countries.

Three main factors are responsible for the recent arrests of Guatemalan government officials that brought CICIG to the forefront of international news. The first was the willingness of Guatemalan President Óscar Berger and the Guatemalan Congress in 2007 to approve an agreement with the UN to establish CICIG. A previous attempt at creating a commission to support domestic investigations failed due to the Guatemalan Constitution’s specific declarations regarding the delegation of justice. The Guatemalan government made it a priority to work around the constitutional issue and reach an agreement on CICIG, accomplishing the most difficult step towards ending impunity. The importance of the Guatemalan state’s support of CICIG cannot be understated; this initial barrier will be the hardest to overcome in other Latin American countries due to corrupt government officials having no interest in an international body investigating their own wrongdoing.

The second factor was the appointment of Commissioner Iván Velásquez by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2013, a full six years after the body was created. Although the previous commissioner of CICIG was quietly successful— the impunity rate dropped from 95% to 70% under his term— he lacked a celebrity presence and the body’s accomplishments were not widely covered by the media. On the other hand, Velásquez is currently a domestic superstar, symbolizing hope and justice while carrying the informal label of most popular man in Guatemala. His investigation and arrests in La Línea scandal have shown Guatemalans that nobody in their government is above justice. The UN Secretary-General did not appoint Velásquez as the first commissioner of CICIG; it may take time to find the perfect leaders of future commissions against impunity in other countries. Therefore the focus must be on domestic governments’ continual support of independent commissions in order to keep renewing their short mandates (CICIG has a two-year mandate that must be renewed by the Guatemalan government).

The third factor, and perhaps the most complex of the three, is the Guatemalan domestic support for CICIG. The Guatemalan public is currently vocal in their support of CICIG, especially with the recent arrests of top government officials. The two candidates that ran for President last month both promised to keep CICIG intact, which shows the enormous value the public places in the commission. If the successful trend of CICIG investigations and arrests continue, no presidential campaigns will be successful without voicing support, which assures future extensions of the commission. The first two factors listed, agreeing to create the commission and allowing enough time for it to become effective, are reliant upon the domestic and international support of CICIG as public pressure can force other states to agree to similar independent commissions and ensure the extension of its mandate when necessary.

Those in the region and the international public sphere must also be loud in their support for such commissions in other Latin American countries, as is the case in Guatemala. The most recent CICIG arrests have thrust the commission into the public spotlight within Latin America and Commissioner Velásquez’s current popularity adds to the CICIG’s domestic support, marking the perfect time to pressure other governments into installing their own commission. That being said, creating financial incentives for the federal government may be the most effective way to incentivize states’ acceptance of anti-impunity institutions.

So far there have been some calls for implementation in El Salvador and Honduras but each state’s government has opposed a commission that replicates the mandate of CICIG. One way to overcome the reluctance of these governments is to link the creation of a similar commissions to foreign aid programs, which the United States has attempted. El Salvador and Honduras both refused to agree to a commission with similar domestic power, even with these added financial incentives. The US government and others across the globe must be more demanding of these aid recipients and it is the job of the international community, including the American public, to raise awareness and support for the implementation of CICIG-like bodies in other Latin American countries marred by government corruption. If CICIG is to truly mark a turning point in the history of Latin American corruption there must be multilateral efforts by the US, the UN and other democratic nations that pressure states like El Salvador and Honduras into implementing similar independent institutions.

December 6, 2015 0 comment