Author

Katarina Kosmala-Dahlbeck

Environmental Change Featured Geopolitics Immigration

Climate Refugees: From Abstraction to Reality

The United Nations defines a refugee as “a person forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, violence or war”. This definition arises from the UN Refugee Convention, which was signed in 1951 by its 145 member states. In the decades following this decision, refugees came to be commonly understood as people fleeing “ethnic, tribal and religious violence”, and these groups have been legally protected under international law. However, this post-World War II understanding of what constitutes a refugee has recently been the subject of criticism by scholars throughout the international community. In focusing specifically on persons fleeing persecution, international law fails to include protections for migrants fleeing numerous other threats. And, as the Earth’s climate continues to warm throughout the 21st century, the most powerful threat facing vulnerable communities is not violence or war, but rather climate-induced environmental disaster.

The International Organization for Migration predicts that climate change will displace up to 250 million people around the world by 2050. This poses enormous complications worldwide, especially considering the rise of anti-immigration policy in many Western democracies. Crop failure, drought, rising sea levels, stronger storms, and disease pose significant threats to people’s homes and livelihoods throughout the Global South. Climate-induced natural disasters have already caused irreparable harm in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, and as the Earth’s climate is expected to warm far beyond the Paris threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius, this could well spread to other parts of the world as well. Most poignantly, the populations most vulnerable to these changes are the developing world, rural and indigenous communities, and the poor: those who hold the least responsibility for industrialized fossil fuel production in the first place. Although the largest population shifts are expected to take place in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, hurricanes and fires have even caused migration in the United States.

Still, climate migration is a relatively new phenomenon, and misunderstandings abound as to what conditions accurately describe a ‘climate refugee’. Although the term has gained prominence in academia in recent years, the meaning behind it rings empty as no international framework yet exists to address the issue. Additionally, the inherent complications of climate change often cross national borders and international institutions are thus unfit to handle climate migration under their existing framework. No action has been taken to amend the UN definition of a refugee, and no legal protections exist for environmental migrants. To further complicate this, the World Bank estimates that the majority of climate-displaced people will not be refugees at all, but rather be internally displaced, or forced to resettle within their country of origin. Internally displaced people (IDP’s) are not granted refugee status by the UN, but instead fall under the legal obligation of their own governments.

Cases invoking international refugee status for migrants fleeing climate stress have already been heard by national courts, most notably in New Zealand with mixed results. Ioane Teitiota sought refugee status from New Zealand in 2014 on the basis of rising sea levels endangering his home country of Kiribati. The case was dismissed by the New Zealand Supreme Court, however, because he could not prove persecution and therefore was not offered protection under international law. Even though the court conceded that Teitiota’s case met the “sociological definition” of a refugee, it did not meet the legal one. On the other hand, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal ruled in the same year to accept the refugee application of Siego Alesana, a migrant from the island nation of Tuvalu also fleeing rising sea levels. The court accepted him and his family on humanitarian grounds, claiming that the adverse impacts climate change would have on his young children classified as a human rights violation should he return to Tuvalu. Neither court, however, accepted land disappearance due to rising sea levels as legitimate in proving refugee status.

Our understanding of refugee status has to evolve past its outdated definition of simply those fleeing ethnic, tribal and religious persecution. Humanitarian crises in the 21st century are more likely to be caused by environmental factors than by violent conflict, and international law must develop in accordance with this. The UN declared in September that “climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods and security… of the peoples of the Pacific”, as Pacific Island nations continue to face some of the world’s highest levels of displacement. If

emissions continue at their current rate, however, even cities such as New York and Tokyo can expect to be under water by the end of the century. The era of climate migration is upon us, and it is essential that leaders establish an international legal framework to address the issue. The international community not only needs a paradigm shift in its understanding of the term ‘refugee’, but it also must translate that understanding into action before it is too late.

“What is a refugee?” United Nations Refugee Agency. https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/what-is-a-refugee/
Ibid.
“Global Migration Trends”. International Organization for Migration, 2017. https://www.iom.int/global-migration-trends
Gonzales, Carmen. “Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and the Global South”. Seattle University School of Law, 2015.
Climate change killing trees across the Sahel, says study”. The Guardian, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/20/climate-change-killing-trees-sahel
Sarkar, Soumya. “South and Southeast Asia most at risk by climate change”. Eco-Business, 6 Dec. 2018. https://www.eco-business.com/news/south-and-southeast-asia-most-at-risk-by-climate-change/
Gleick, Peter. “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria”. AMS Journals, 1 July 2014. https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/full/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1
“November Global Temperature Change”. CO2 Earth, Nov. 2018. https://www.co2.earth/global-warming-update
Ibid.
Ibid.
Anderson, Charles. “New Zealand considers creating climate change refugee visas”. The Guardian, October 31, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/31/new-zealand-considers-creating-climate-change-refugee-visas
Curtis, Kimberly. “Climate Refugees Explained”. UN Dispatch, April 24, 2017. https://www.undispatch.com/climate-refugees-explained/
Anderson, Charles. “New Zealand considers creating climate change refugee visas”. The Guardian, October 31, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/31/new-zealand-considers-creating-climate-change-refugee-visas
“Pacific Islands on the front line of climate change: UN Chief”. UN News, September 28, 2018. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1021342
“Future Climate Change”. Australian Department of the Environment and Energy, 2018. http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/climate-science-data/climate-science/climate-change-future

April 27, 2019 0 comment

Featured Globalization Human Rights Military Security Technology

Borders, Bodies, and Biometrics

written by Katarina Kosmala-Dahlbeck

The camera does not flash as it scans your face. Instead, a green check appears on the screen as the turnstile opens smoothly to let you through. Boarding pass proven useless, you walk through the gate and board the plane hassle-free. “So quick [you] couldn’t believe it”, quips the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s website. It cites the use of facial recognition as a way to make air travel a seamless experience for both travelers and officers. It also attributes its decision to adopt this technology in part to the growing popularity of biometric identification in unlocking cellphones and other everyday devices.

Biometrics refer to digital data on any biological characteristics unique to an individual. This can include fingerprints, face, voice, retina, or iris recognition technology, as well as information on a person’s hand geometry, gait, body movements, and even DNA. The accuracy of comprehensive biometric data is unparalleled by other technology, far surpassing traditional methods of identification such as photo IDs. Recent advances have spurred massive growth of biometrics in public, private, and commercial sectors, with global market size expected to reach USD 59.31 billion by 2025. Biometrics have become most widely used to prove identity in citizenship, personal technology, and surveillance, and have proven to be the most infallible way to counter security threats both in the physical world and online.

At the same time, the development of biometrics has raised legal and ethical questions surrounding data privacy in a globalized world. Article 12 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights lists the right to privacy as fundamental, stating that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence”. This sentiment is echoed in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and specifically in General Comment 16, which states that personal information held on “computers, data banks, and other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals, must be regulated by law”. The European Union has espoused the most stringent regulations on privacy to date with the passing of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016, which has since taken effect in all EU member states. Citing concerns about infringing on the “rights and freedoms of citizens”, GDPR has prohibited the use of biometrics for identification purposes, except in the case of extenuating circumstances and with an individual’s explicit consent.

No such regulations exist in the United States, with only three states adopting legislation ensuring privacy over biometric data. Illinois, Texas, and Washington have passed various versions of biometric privacy laws, noting pervasive data sharing by tech giants and the critical nature of biometric information. Large-scale legislation has yet to gain support in the U.S., as biometrics have proliferated technology markets and become a familiar part of security authentication in apps, banks, workplaces, and airports.

Even with the success of biometrics in the private sector, some of its most impactful applications are in intelligence and national security. Capital investments in biometrics skyrocketed after 9/11, as security launched to the forefront of American consciousness. The Patriot Act, passed in October 2001, gave the government a green light on surveillance of suspected terrorist activity and tightened border security measures. As the War on Terror dominated American foreign policy, biometrics began to expand the reach of American intelligence both at home and abroad. Today, the U.S. government spends over $700 million a year on biometric research, and any person who crosses an American border must provide biometric information to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services upon entry. This allows officers to conduct criminal background checks, as well as monitor immigration status depending on a person’s country of origin.

As a result, growing concern exists as to the implications of this for international norm and even policy. If biometrics are so widely used on a national level, what does a world filled with biometric information look like? Due to the reach of the digital economy today, individuals have little control over where their data goes should it be compromised. Cybersecurity presents a significant threat worldwide, and surveillance states such as China systematically deploy biometric technology to suppress minority populations. Chen Quanguo, Communist Party Secretary and the architect behind Muslim internment camps in China, rose to power through his implementation of a “grid management” surveillance system that uses facial recognition to police the movement of Uighur Muslims. Security checkpoints on roads and train stations, cellphone confiscation, and the withdrawal of passports prevent Uighurs from leaving these centers or traveling abroad. China claims that the purpose of detainment is to counter terrorism and religious radicalization, but the mass imprisonment of its Muslim minority has received international condemnation for human rights violations. Even though biometric technology has the potential to strengthen national security, it can also legitimize ethnic discrimination and racial profiling in many cases.

The use of biometrics in these contexts has redefined the role of biology in questions of political legitimacy. Rather than focusing on an individual’s record, biometrics place identity at the forefront of questions of national security. When a traveler, immigrant, or refugee is asked “who are you?” before they are asked “what have you done?”, their biological self begins to determine their geopolitical status. This creates an environment ripe for biases, explicit or implicit, to creep in and drive policy. For example, the U.S. has long treated people of Middle Eastern descent with suspicion because of risks associated with terrorism. However, the entrance of biometrics into the public sphere allows this discrimination to be systematized and legitimized under the law. President Trump’s Muslim travel ban itself cut the admission of Muslim refugees to the U.S. by 91 percent, and visa approvals for immigrants from majority Muslim countries have fallen 30 percent since 2016. 155,000 fewer tourists, students, and guest workers from the Muslim world entered the U.S. in 2017 than in 2016. The combination of Islamophobic policy with advances in biometrics have made the U.S. an unwelcome and even dangerous destination for applicants from many Muslim countries. The way that biometrics combine biological identity with political status creates a system that, by definition, makes some people more secure at the expense of others.

The concept of embodying citizenship has changed the face of international migration and surveillance. Instead of having to be a member of a biological tribe to belong, one now has to be a part of a state’s biometric tribe that determines acceptance based on the geopolitical status of identity alone. And because technology invariably develops faster than the law, the world is woefully unprepared to address the legal and ethical questions raised by these developments. The European Union’s GDPR is the most extensive data regulation law in the world, but even it has limits in its scope to manage the use of biometrics internationally. Most biometric research is conducted in the United States, and until national legislation is enacted to address it, this technology will continue to drive intelligence and border security initiatives, as well as flourish in the private sector. The lack of international legal precedent concerning biometric data also poses a serious obstacle to justice. Until these questions are addressed in an international court, biometric data proliferation in the public and private sector will continue to press against the fine line of the human right to privacy.

April 8, 2019 0 comment

Africa Environmental Change Featured Geopolitics History Security and Conflict

The Renaissance of Water Conflict

written by Katarina Kosmala-Dahlbeck

Ethiopia first announced its plan to construct the Grand Renaissance Dam in 2010, as the Arab Spring began to threaten political stability throughout the region. Upon completion, the hydropower plant on the Blue Nile River will become the largest dam in Africa, storing about 70 billion cubic meters of water and flooding 1,680 square kilometers of land. In addition to displacing 20,000 Ethiopians from their homes, the dam also poses a serious water security threat to Ethiopia’s powerful downstream neighbor, Egypt. Ethiopia’s damming of the Blue Nile will propel Egypt into absolute water scarcity, severely limiting supply to its agricultural sector and to urban residents in Cairo. Tensions regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) have consequently spanned nearly a decade as the two countries have struggled to reach a deal that will supply both of them with a desirable amount of water.

Due to colonial-era agreements, Egypt historically owns the rights to a majority of the Nile’s water. The 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and its modification in 1959 granted Egypt control over the Nile as well as veto power over any water projects upstream. These agreements were signed under British rule to maintain colonial control over Egypt’s agricultural exports and the Suez Canal, but did not take into account the needs of any other Nile Basin countries. Ethiopia, which controls the supply of 70-80% of the Nile’s water, was not included in either of these treaties and continues to deny their validity to this day. Addis Ababa has thus viewed GERD as a rightful opportunity to become the primary energy exporter in the region and lift the country out of poverty. Egypt, however, has viewed its construction as a secretive and unilateral decision to violate these treaties, escalating a conflict that has at times even threatened at military action.

Conflict over the Nile is not a new phenomenon, but Ethiopia’s announcement of the dam’s construction came at a time of particular uncertainty following the Egyptian Revolution in 2010. This had significant implications for the balance of power in North Africa, and Ethiopia took the opportunity to move on a neighbor preoccupied with domestic instability. However, tensions flared regardless as Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi asserted in 2013 that “if our share of Nile water decreases”, the alternative will be “our blood”. Egypt’s dependence on the Nile goes far beyond water resources and national security. The river is frequently mythologized in Egyptian culture, and the country’s constitution even characterizes Egypt’s existence as a “gift of the Nile”. After securing peace with Israel in 1979, President Anwar Sadat famously wrote that the only issue that could bring Egypt to war again is water.

More pressing than geopolitics, however, is Egypt’s domestic water security threat. Even without the dam, overpopulation and increasing desertification have forced the government to increasingly import water-intensive crops, especially rice. 625,000 acres of arable land are currently vulnerable to drought, and hundreds of thousands of farmers face a lack of livelihood should these trends continue. GERD’s completion, expected within the next five years, will reduce Egypt’s water levels by an additional 25%, posing major challenges for the desert-ridden country as droughts only continue to lengthen. The government has taken few steps to address this issue, and has instead mitigated the problem through increasing food imports and threatening the dam’s construction in Ethiopia. While Egypt’s attachment to the Nile is understandable, military action will not guarantee Cairo its water supply. Instead, the country should take the changing status quo as an opportunity to renegotiate water rights in the region outside of colonial dependence. A deal that provides all Nile Basin countries with water would help prevent dissatisfaction in Ethiopia and set a precedent for sharing international water bodies as resources become more scarce.

Fortunately, Ethiopia’s new prime minister Abiy Ahmed reached out this May stating his intention to “aid development in Ethiopia without harming the Egyptian people”. Known as a reformer, Abiy has made it clear that he wants to collaborate with Ethiopia’s neighbors rather than threaten them. However, the country’s staunch defense of the dam’s construction has signaled that Ethiopia does intend to rival Egypt as the primary energy exporter in the region and is now bargaining from a position of strength. The best course of action for Egypt now would be to concede its regional power and resort to diplomacy rather than threatening war. Temporary lapses in GERD’s construction due to domestic corruption and infrastructure problems have slowed the dam’s progress, and Egypt would be well advised to take advantage of this opportunity to negotiate a deal with Ethiopia. A temporary reprieve in construction allows all parties to preemptively negotiate without the pressure of full development underway.

Meanwhile, Egypt can more effectively mitigate the dam’s threat through its domestic water policy. Relying more on wastewater recycling would utilize its already available water supply, and drawing from groundwater aquifers would decrease its reliance on surface water. The government can even invest in desalination plants to help support its urban populations along the coast. In the agriculture sector, the country can update its irrigation technology to more efficient techniques that require much smaller amounts of water. Smarter irrigation and a transition away from water-intensive crops will considerably decrease agricultural water demand without decreasing food output. All of these strategies can help Egypt better adapt to water shortage while preparing for resource scarcities already expected due to climate change.

Unfortunately, this kind of conflict is not uncommon, and water grabbing has become one of the most profound vestiges of colonialism around the world. Powerful countries facing a water deficit have offset their losses by acquiring water in developing countries, often without the institutional protections and regulations to guard against resource exploitation. The majority of water grabbing takes place in Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, although nearly 60% of global water appropriation is made by the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Egypt, and Israel. As water resources become more scarce, historical power structures continue to define the allocation of resources that seem to provide too little for both the rich and the poor. To make matters worse, legal agreements concerning international water bodies do not include climate adaptation policies or incorporate climate models for the future. As a result, the Grand Renaissance Dam is a powerful example of what we can expect in the coming years as water resources become increasingly limited and valuable.

The utilization of water as a national rather than a collective right has historically harmed all states involved and resulted in the power imbalances existent in the Nile Basin. All parties would be better off bargaining if they approached water as essential to their collective security rather than as the property of singular national governments. However, this requires the dismantling of centuries of unequal water distribution rights and the power hierarchies surrounding them. Until sufficient agreements can be made regarding the just allocation of water rights going forward, we can expect to see a surge in water conflict not only in Africa but throughout the world.

January 13, 2019 0 comment

Featured Geopolitics Human Rights Middle East Security and Conflict

Ethnicity and Democracy: A Dangerous Mix?

written by Katarina Kosmala-Dahlbeck

In July 2018, the Israeli Knesset passed a law defining Israel as “the national home of the Jewish people”. This so-called “nation-state law” establishes Hebrew as the state’s official language, lauds Jewish settlement as a “national value”, and delineates the right to self-determination in Israel as “unique to the Jewish people”. It also demotes Arabic from an official language to a “special status” and states that Jerusalem, which both Israel and the Palestinians claim as their own, is the capital of Israel. A law that many say has turned a political reality into a legal one, the nation-state bill has generated widespread criticism and inflamed the very crux behind Israel’s identity: the tension between its Jewish and democratic nature. This dual yet contradicting truth has sparked questions about the viability of Israel’s future as a democracy – even leading scholars to term Israel as the only “ethnic democracy” in the world. The implications of the nation-state law are profound. Besides severely weakening the Palestinian narrative, the law strips away the rights of 20 percent of Israel’s population as well as introduces a concerning model for populist-leaning democracies across the West.

Supporters of the law argue that it does not effectively change the status quo but reaffirms what has always been true. Some even express frustration that the law does not do more to protect Jewish interests, especially regarding the building of settlements in the West Bank. However, the bill’s codification into Israeli Basic Law is significant because it delineates this highly contentious reality into law. The state of Israel does not have a constitution; as a result, its Basic Law is the highest law in the land. Moreover, the context and timing of the law’s passing give it a salience that has sparked controversy both in Israel and abroad. Whereas Israel’s particular brand of ethno-nationalism used to be unique in the world of Western democracies, in today’s age of rising global populism it may serve as an example to right-wing governments appealing to the racial identities of their supporters. This, combined with its effects on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, gives the nation-state law a unique potential to affect the politics of the region as well as the character of ethnic expression in democracies around the world.

Within Israel, the law has directly affected Arab citizens, many of whom feel as though the government has turned its back on their desire for civil rights. A law stating that the right to self-determination in Israel is unique to the Jewish people explicitly discriminates against Arabs, who make up over 20 percent of the country’s population and already face institutional discrimination in many ways. Additionally, some of the most outspoken opponents of the law have been members of the Israeli Druze community, a religious group that “participate[s] in nearly every aspect of Israeli society” but as a result of the law will not receive the same legal recognition as Jewish citizens. For decades the Druze have been active in the Israeli government and served in the Israeli Defense Forces, often in positions of influence and authority. Many have criticized the law for unjustly stripping them of rights when they have contributed substantially to the survival and success of their country.

In spite of the effects the law will undoubtedly have on non-Jewish citizens of Israel, some of its larger implications stretch beyond Israel’s borders. The legal establishment of Jewish self-determination over the land of Israel effectively delegitimizes the Palestinian right to self-determination, as well as to ownership over the land they claim. Yet this law is just the latest in a series of blows to the Palestinian cause from the combined leadership and close collaboration of President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The decision to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May, the withdrawal of American funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), and increased violence in Gaza has led to growing Palestinian disillusionment with Israel as well as with American ability to mediate the conflict. The Palestinian Authority recently expressed dismay at the fact that the United States had never been an unbiased mediator, but noted that at least it had been a respectable one. Now however, that reality has come into question. With the U.S unabashedly taking Israel’s side in its conflict with its Palestinian neighbors, Washington may be throwing away its ability to control events in the region and dictate terms in any future agreement.

Furthermore, some of the more lasting effects of the law may have little to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at all. In a global political climate of rising populism and appeals to race in democracies across the West, the legal establishment of ethnic superiority in Israel sets a powerful precedent. While the circumstances of Israel’s founding as a Jewish state have always differed from other Western countries, the tide of ethno-nationalism sweeping traditionally liberal democracies may lead to Israel becoming an example rather than an outlier. Conservative politicians in democracies around the world may well use Israel’s nation-state law to legitimize their own racialized legislation, endangering the very nature of liberal democracy as it exists today.

October 18, 2018 0 comment