Author

Samriddhi Sapkota

Asia Economics Featured Global Health Human Rights Print Article Women's Rights

Human Trafficking in Nepal: The Push Factors and Pushback

Samriddhi Sapkota’s article is additionally featured in The Generation’s Spring 2022 Digital Print Edition:Women. Coming June 1st 2022.

When Nepal signed the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India in 1950, the nation certainly was not expecting to face one of the greatest human rights crises in the South Asian region. Intended to reflect their long-standing friendly diplomatic relations and act as a strategic security alliance, the treaty opened up the almost 1,100-mile border between Nepal and India and enabled citizens of each respective country to pass freely.¹ This agreement was fundamental to the socio-economic development of Nepal, providing the nation with vital resources from India to develop many of its economic and social sectors including basic infrastructure, healthcare, education, and human resource development.² Yet, even with the treaty’s efforts to establish the border between Nepal and India as a symbol of peace, the agreement ultimately opened the door to grave atrocities towards women and children. The vast area that the border covers, combined with limited border resources and security capabilities, has created the perfect formula to orchestrate the trafficking of women and girls from Nepal to India with greater ease.

The NGO ABC Nepal first raised awareness of the phenomenon occurring at the border in the 1980s, when they discovered that countless women and girls were being taken from Nepal and sold into sex trafficking, labor trafficking, and organ trafficking in India.³ Today, the Nepal-India border is considered to be one of the busiest human trafficking gateways in the world, with approximately 30,000 women and girls trafficked each year.⁴ Because traveling across the border between these two nations does not require any visa or documentation, border security tends to be extremely weak. A large portion of the border cuts through the Tarai region of Nepal, an area that has a large population of people of Indian origin due to the proximity to the border. Yet, the Tarai region only has 22 check posts that generally monitor international trade rather than surveillance of people, making it one of the easiest places to traffick innocent women who travel to the area for work.⁵ Moreover, Nepali girls are considered to be especially attractive in India due to their lighter skin tone, alongside the perception that Nepali virgins can ‘cure’ AIDS.⁶

Although the open border certainly contributes to the trafficking rates, the issue of human trafficking in Nepal is a result of many more complex factors besides border security. In recent years, trafficking has only been exacerbated by degrading circumstances in Nepal, including poverty, social discrimination, natural disasters, and political instability, which has tied the hands of the government to address human trafficking at its roots. Ultimately, with the government at a standstill, local organizations have begun to take matters into their own hands.

Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a GDP per capita of $1155.14.⁷ As such, the most common push factors for human trafficking are poverty and unemployment. Though rich in natural resources, particularly in its water resources, Nepal has still not been able to utilize these assets and establish any large industry on which to base its economy. And while the nation has the land and capability to mass-produce agricultural products, outdated farming practices make it difficult to establish a widescale agricultural industry. Without a representative industry, Nepal has a difficult time attracting foreign direct investment, the key to kickstarting economic growth. Consequently, Nepal relies on other countries, particularly India, to acquire the majority of its goods. With a stagnant economy and an overreliance on imported goods, poverty and unemployment rates remain high. It is estimated that in 2019, 17.4% of Nepali people, around 5 million individuals, were considered to be multidimensionally poor, which includes lacking access to housing, clean cooking fuel, nutrition, and years of schooling.⁸ Additionally, according to the World Bank, the unemployment rate in 2020 was 4.7%, a sharp increase from the previous year’s rate of 3.09%.⁹

Given these dire economic prospects, it is not unusual for many Nepali women and girls to either look for work outside of the country or be sent by their families to make extra income. Common tactics used by traffickers include promises of work, opportunities, marriage, and other good fortunes available abroad, which is usually enough to convince the women or their families that opportunities outside of the country are better than prospects at home.¹⁰ Women and girls who face domestic violence at home, lack familial support, or live in rural areas are at even greater risk of falling victim to these tactics, as their desperation to escape their circumstances at home and their general lack of resources make them even more likely to believe the promises made by traffickers.¹¹

Poverty and unemployment are worsened by ongoing natural disasters at home. In 2015, Nepal experienced one of the most devastating earthquakes in its history, which killed almost 9,000 people and severely disrupted the nation’s social and economic structures.¹² The earthquake left many women and children without homes or a livelihood. Numerous children who were orphaned or left without work were forced to move further away from home in search of employment. This made them even more vulnerable to tactics used by traffickers to lure them into lucrative practices abroad. It is estimated that around 12,000 children are trafficked into India every year, mainly for sexual exploitation but are also often sent to work in fisheries, construction sites, circuses, sweatshops, and sometimes even sent into the illegal organ trade.¹³ The market for organ trafficking, in fact, was found to have expanded as a result of the 2015 earthquake and the subsequent worsening of poverty.¹⁴

Social discrimination against women is another consequential push factor that forces women and girls out of their homes and into dangerous work abroad. More specifically, caste-based and gender-based discrimination continues to be a major problem in Nepal today, despite strides made by the government to eradicate such practices in public and private settings. This is because instances of discrimination are generally not enforced to the highest degree.¹⁵ As a result, women and those from the Dalit class, formerly referred to as the “untouchable” caste, remain considerably behind the majority groups in Nepal both in terms of their economic prospects and representation in politics.¹⁶ The intersectionality of these identities also has a large impact on the vulnerability of women and girls to trafficking. NGOs in Nepal report that low-caste girls living in the Terai region of Nepal and in early and forced marriages were significantly more vulnerable to sex traffickers.¹⁷

Finally, political instability and corruption within the government make it difficult to punish traffickers even if they are caught. For one, even though the Nepali government has passed anti-trafficking laws, they generally have not been strictly enforced. Most notably, Nepal became the 176th country to ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking Persons, especially Women and Children, also referred to as the Palermo Protocol, in June 2020.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the government has yet to make serious changes to its existing laws to implement the conditions of the protocol, which most importantly includes promoting cooperation with other states that have also ratified the protocol to combat trafficking.¹⁹ Because most of the trafficking that occurs out of Nepal entails foreign employment, implementation of the Palermo Protocol into the existing anti-trafficking laws in Nepal is a vital first step that the government must take to protect the women and girls who are sent to work across the border.

Moreover, many individuals who are in charge of trafficking women and girls have deep political connections within the government. Several NGOs in Nepal have claimed that there are many police officers and political party leaders that are complicit in sex trafficking and the adult entertainment sector establishments where women and girls are forced to work.²⁰ Hence, even when traffickers are arrested for their crimes against women and children, they can call upon their political connections and prevent any prosecution. The government has not made any significant efforts to investigate or prosecute any individuals for bonded labor and instead continues to misidentify the bulk of transnational labor trafficking cases simply as labor violations, which are generally resolved without a criminal investigation and result in short and insufficient sentences.²¹

Furthermore, some actions that have been taken by the government have actually created more problems for female migrant workers. In reaction to the rising cases of trafficking and sexual abuse, the Nepali government has continually passed measures to ban women under the age of 40 from traveling abroad to work without the consent of their families and local ward offices.²² This proposal has been met with intense public backlash, as it targets the already vulnerable women instead of attempting to dismantle the systems and trafficking networks in place that perpetuate the issue.²³ The mandate fuels existing systems of oppression against women, who are already disadvantaged in social and economic circles and thus have difficulties finding work. Moreover, women who are unable to legally migrate out of the country for work might resort to illegal pathways to support themselves or their families, providing an even easier gateway for traffickers to take advantage of their dire circumstances.

As evident from the push factors that increase the risk of falling victim to trafficking tactics to the lack of closure they receive even if their perpetrators are caught, Nepali women and girls are being underserved in every possible avenue. However, unlike the government, local communities are not simply sitting back and watching these atrocities unfold. Even though the government has been unable to make any notable progress to address human trafficking, countless numbers of NGOs in Nepal have stepped up to the job and been quite successful in their work to combat trafficking. These NGOs do a wide array of work including monitoring the Nepal-India border, collaborating with police officials to intercept women at the border or working in lucrative businesses in India, operating safe homes, and providing the necessary tools for rehabilitation.²⁴ The majority of NGOs provide education and access to vocational skills for rescued women and children, such as sewing, cooking, housekeeping, and beauty, that they can utilize to find and establish a stable income.²⁵ There are also a number of rescued women that have themselves assumed roles in anti-trafficking NGOs to address the problem. Survivors are often seen stationed at monitoring booths set up by NGOs at the Nepal-India border questioning suspicious individuals and cross-checking information to determine whether women and girls who are traveling to India are indeed safe.²⁶ There is also an NGO established in 1996 called Shakti Samuha which became the world’s first organization that was established and run by women who were survivors of human trafficking.²⁷

In addition to the work done on the ground, many NGOs have also taken the initiative to research and document trafficking. Nepal does not yet have a centralized database system for trafficking on a governmental level and the illegal nature of the act makes it that much more difficult to track. Thus, the majority of information regarding trafficking in Nepal comes directly from NGO publications, hence why there is a lack of concrete figures and numbers on the issue. NGO publications are also limited in their scope, as they tend to include anecdotal cases, newspaper reports, and commentaries from the agencies that are conducting the research.²⁸Despite the shortcomings of the research that NGOs have done, the extent to which trafficking has been documented through these organizations has played an essential role in bringing light to the issue of trafficking. NGO publications are a pivotal reason why the government has begun to act on trafficking in Nepal, even if these actions have not been quite effective.

For many Nepali women and girls who have been victims of trafficking, the work that is being done by NGOs to raise awareness for and combat the problem provides a small glimmer of hope for their futures. Even so, the process of reintegrating back into society following their rescue still presents its own difficulties. Women who had been able to earn money before returning to their homes are more readily accepted and more likely to be able to marry than those who return still carrying their debt or have become sick.²⁹ Social stigma surrounding trafficked girls has also been an incredible hurdle in the lives of women and girls who try to start a new life in their communities. Specifically, women who had previously been involved in sex work are often perceived as being ‘tainted,’ suggesting that their communities have already labeled them to be a lost cause.³⁰

Evidently, Nepal is still quite far from combating all of the factors that produce the conditions in which trafficking thrives. Nevertheless, the actions being taken by local organizations proves that Nepali people truly seek to address human trafficking, even if this means that they must take on the responsibility alone. NGO work has been pivotal to bringing the issue of human trafficking to the forefront of general discourse, shedding a light on the dangerous repercussions of Nepal’s current economic and political environment on women and girls. That being said, there is still much more work to be done. Because the issue finds roots in larger and much more complex problems that the country faces, it will require major changes in the government to dismantle the social, political, and economic inequities for women and girls. Anti-trafficking initiatives need to not only be more heavily enforced, but they should also be targeted towards supporting women when they look for work outside of the country instead of finding ways to prevent them from doing so. Domestically, security and economic opportunities for impoverished women and girls must improve so that they are not forced into situations where they can be taken advantage of by traffickers. Lastly, further education is necessary in vulnerable communities on the tactics commonly used by traffickers to lure women, alongside the impacts that gender-based discrimination has on increasing the risk of trafficking to occur.

Endnotes

Maxine Betteridge-Moes. “Human trafficking persists during Covid at Indo-Nepal border.” University of London, November 26, 2020. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://study.soas.ac.uk/indo-nepal-border-human-trafficking-persists-amid-pandemic/.
Embassy of Nepal – New Delhi, India. “Economic Relation.” Accessed February 20, 2022, https://in.nepalembassy.gov.np/economic-relation/.
Maxine Betteridge-Moes. “Human trafficking persists during Covid at Indo-Nepal border.” University of London, November 26, 2020. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://study.soas.ac.uk/indo-nepal-border-human-trafficking-persists-amid-pandemic/.
Friends of WPC Nepal. “Trafficking in Nepal.” Accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.friendsofwpcnepal.org/nepal/.
Geetanjali Sharma. Indo-Nepal Cross-Border Human Trafficking: A Rising Concern: International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts 6, no. 1 (2018): 1345-1354. https://ijcrt.org/papers/IJCRT1802174.pdf.
Human Rights Watch. “Rape For Profit: Trafficking of Nepali Girls and Women to India’s Brothels.” 1995. Accessed February 20, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/India.htm.
The World Bank. “GDP per capita (current US$ – Nepal).” 2020. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2020&locations=NP&start=2020&view=bar.
OPHI, UNDP, UNICEF. “Nepal Multidimensional Poverty Index 2021: Report.” September 2021. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.unicef.org/nepal/reports/nepal-multidimensional-poverty-index-2021-report#:~:text=In%202019%2C%2017.4%20percent%20of,schooling%2C%20assets%2C%20and%20nutrition.
The World Bank. “Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) – Nepal.” February 2022. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=NP.
Maxine Betteridge-Moes. “Human trafficking persists during Covid at Indo-Nepal border.” University of London, November 26, 2020. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://study.soas.ac.uk/indo-nepal-border-human-trafficking-persists-amid-pandemic/.
ibid.
Violeta Santos Moura. “Spirit Me Away: The women and girls lost to trafficking in Nepal.” Al Jazeera, March 8, 2021. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2020/3/8/spirit-me-away-the-women-and-girls-lost-to-trafficking-in-nepal.
ibid.
Dom Gallogly, Layla Hart, and Georgina Kassim. “Human Trafficking in Nepal.” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=8088&file=EnglishTranslation.
The World Bank. “Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste, and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal.” 2006. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/745031468324021366/pdf/379660v20WP0Un00Box0361508B0PUBLIC0.pdf.
ibid.
U.S. Department of State. “2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Nepal.” 2020. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/nepal/
Chandan Kumar Mandal. “Nepal needs to amend human trafficking laws to fully enforce Palermo Protocol, experts say.” The Kathmandu Post, February 21, 2021. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://kathmandupost.com/national/2021/02/21/nepal-needs-to-amend-human-trafficking-laws-to-fully-enforce-palermo-protocol-experts-say.
ibid.
U.S. Department of State. “2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Nepal.” 2021. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/nepal/.
ibid.
Lekhanath Pandey. “Nepal’s bid to deter women’s job migration draws fury.” DW, February 25, 2021. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/nepal-women-migration-exploitation/a-56696325.
ibid.
Violeta Santos Moura. “Spirit Me Away: The women and girls lost to trafficking in Nepal.” Al Jazeera, March 8, 2021. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2020/3/8/spirit-me-away-the-women-and-girls-lost-to-trafficking-in-nepal.
Maxine Betteridge-Moes. “Human trafficking persists during Covid at Indo-Nepal border.” University of London, November 26, 2020. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://study.soas.ac.uk/indo-nepal-border-human-trafficking-persists-amid-pandemic/.
Violeta Santos Moura. “Spirit Me Away: The women and girls lost to trafficking in Nepal.” Al Jazeera, March 8, 2021. Accessed February 20, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2020/3/8/spirit-me-away-the-women-and-girls-lost-to-trafficking-in-nepal.
Shakti Samuha. “Introduction.” Accessed February 20, 2022, http://shaktisamuha.org.np/about-us/introduction/.
Padam Simkhada. Life Histories and Survival StrategiesAmongst Sexually Trafﬁcked Girls in Nepal: Children & Society 22, no. 3 (2008): 235-248. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1099-0860.2008.00154.x.
ibid.
ibid.

May 3, 2022 0 comment

Asia Economics Featured Geopolitics Globalization Print Article The International Economy

Bangladesh: The Cost of Democracy

written by Samriddhi Sapkota

“Bangladesh: The Cost of Democracy” was originally published in our Fall 2021 Print Edition: Authoritarianism.

When Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan in 1971, most did not expect the nation to become one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Then-U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger went so far as to name Bangladesh a “basket case,” as rampant poverty and deprivation made it seem as though the country could never catch up to its neighbors in South Asia. However, notably in the last few years, Bangladesh’s economic growth has given the country an image of unexpected and exceptional success. Before the COVID-19 pandemic contracted economies worldwide, Bangladesh’s GDP growth rates surpassed 7% for four consecutive years, outpacing Pakistan, India, and even China.¹ Even after the onset of the pandemic in 2020, Bangladesh was still able to achieve a 5.24% growth.²

Yet, behind this veil of economic growth, Bangladesh has simultaneously been facing serious challenges to its democracy. Since coming into power, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her party Awami League have been accused of presiding over a slew of human rights violations, including forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary arrests, including those of political opponents. The government is also considerably intolerant of any criticism or dissent, from both the media and the general public. As democratic institutions deteriorate and the nation slowly slips towards authoritarianism under Hasina, it is becoming clear that Bangladesh’s economic success has occurred despite political developments in the country, not owing to it.

An Economic ‘Miracle’

As Kissinger initially predicted, Bangladesh’s economy heavily struggled in the first few decades of independence. Such was the case that when Bangladesh’s GDP growth rate surpassed that of Pakistan’s in 2006, it was dismissed as a fluke.³ Despite the dire expectations, Bangladesh’s GDP growth rate has continued to exceed Pakistan’s, and since 2020, also exceeds India’s. Bangladesh is now classified as a lower-middle-income economy and is set to graduate from the UN’s Least Developed Countries list by 2026, according to the World Bank.⁴

Bangladesh’s sustained economic growth can be attributed to several factors. One of the most important contributing factors has been the exemplary success of the garment industry, which employs about 4 million people and accounts for 84% of the country’s total exports.⁵ The garment industry has been a vital source of income and employment, particularly for Bangladeshi women. Unlike India and Pakistan, where cultural conservatism has stood as a long-time barrier to female participation, Bangladesh has made incredible efforts to encourage women to participate in the workforce. Since Bangladesh’s independence, the share of women in the workforce has risen from 3% to 36%.⁶ Female participation is especially high within garment manufacturing, as 80% of all workers are women.⁷

A key force for bringing about this effort is Grameen Bank, a renowned NGO that notably decided to give microfinance credits to the senior female member of each household. Investing in the country’s women has proven to be beneficial in many ways. The strides made in educating women and amplifying their voices have helped to redirect household expenditures to child welfare. As such, development factors such as average life expectancy and literacy rates have significantly improved, while malnutrition has decreased.⁸

Remittances have also served as a critical agent in Bangladesh’s growth. Bangladeshi migrant workers, most of whom work as low-skilled laborers in the Persian Gulf, send an average of $15 billion per year in remittances,⁹ accounting for over 6% of the nation’s total GDP.¹⁰ Remittances have proven to be a crucial source of income to ease both poverty and unemployment rates at home. While Bangladesh’s economic growth has seen abundant benefits as a result of these factors, there is also an imminent danger that progress may be reversed due to deteriorating political conditions in the nation’s government.

Politics is A Dirty Game

The decline in Bangladesh’s democracy began during a two-year political crisis from 2006 to 2008, in which a military-backed caretaker government assumed control to address rampant corruption and political tension occurring during the election cycle.¹¹ Under the 13th Amendment of the nation’s constitution, parliamentary elections are overseen by a non-partisan caretaker government that has power over state affairs for the 90 days in which the elections occur. The head of this caretaker government is the Chief Advisor, who is appointed by the President and is typically given to the last retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.¹²

During the 2007 election cycle, violence broke out after the Awami League, under Sheikh Hasina, set off a series of protests against the appointment of Justice K.M. Hasan as Chief Advisor. Hasan had a history of affiliation with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), the Awami League’s main political opposition as well as the incumbent party at the time. The Awami League made claims that the BNP had been attempting to sway the election in their favor to maintain their control over the government.¹³

Because the two parties were not able to agree on a candidate for Chief Advisor, the position devolved to the president at the time, Iajuddin Ahmed.¹⁴ Yet, even President Ahmed was unsuccessful in abating the tension between the two parties to hold the elections. In fact, the Awami League eventually boycotted the elections altogether in early January 2007. The dire situation led military representatives to urge, and ultimately convince, President Ahmed to declare a state of emergency, step down from the Chief Advisor position, and relinquish power of the government.

Under the military-backed caretaker government, several fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution were suspended and various politicians were arrested on suspicion of involvement in corruption.¹⁵ This included Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was arrested on charges of extortion, as well as former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, head of the BNP, who was arrested on charges of corruption. Hasina was eventually released on parole in 2008 and went on to run in the 2009 elections after the military had relinquished power over the caretaker government. Prime Minister Hasina and the Awami League went on to win a landslide victory, winning 288 of the 300 seats in parliament, though this came along with widespread accusations of voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, and restrictions on opposition polling agents.¹⁶

The Awami League in Power

Since the conclusion of the 2006-2008 political crisis, the rivalry between the Awami League and the BNP has only intensified. The tactics utilized during the crisis to undermine the elections have not only set a precedent for all succeeding elections but also have enabled the Awami League to maintain its power over Bangladesh.

Since assuming office, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has removed almost all checks to her power. Amongst the greatest changes that she has made is her abolishment of the impartial caretaker government in 2011.¹⁷ Hasina claimed that the system was no longer beneficial to the Bangladeshi democracy, for the preceding military-backed caretaker government remained past the three months it was originally mandated. However, many viewed her actions as a method for which she and her party could directly intervene in the outcome of the elections. The lack of a caretaker government intensified political tensions during the 2014 parliamentary elections when the Awami League and the BNP could not agree on the appropriate mechanism to hold the election. As a consequence, the BNP boycotted elections, leaving more than half of the nation’s parliamentary seats uncontested. Voter turnout hit a record low due to the boycott and resulting violence. In the end, the Awami League won 232 of the 300 seats in parliament.¹⁸

Following the 2014 elections, the Awami League has also cracked down on its political opposition. Law enforcement officers have illegally detained, tortured, and killed thousands of activists from the opposition party, many times in secret for weeks at a time before formally arresting them. The government has also jailed many of its political opponents; most notably, the former prime minister and leader of the BNP, Khaleda Zia, was arrested once again on charges of corruption in 2018.¹⁹ This action severely damaged the BNP during the 2018 elections, when the party could not find an alternative candidate to run against Hasina. Consequently, the Awami League was able to once again achieve a landslide victory, winning 288 of the 300 seats.²⁰

Alongside the crackdown of political opponents, the Awami League has also denied freedom of expression and association. In 2018, the government passed the Digital Security Act, granting law enforcement officials to arrest any individual that they believe has been or has the possibility of committing a crime or destroying evidence of a crime.²¹ The law also allows up to 10 years of imprisonment for digitally disseminating propaganda against Bangladesh’s Liberation War, the national anthem, or the national flag. Bangladeshi authorities have utilized the law to harass journalists, activists, and any other individual that criticizes the current government.²² In one case, a writer was arrested, denied bail six times, and finally died in prison when he criticized the Bangladeshi government for its response to the COVID-19 pandemic on his social media.²³

Developments made in women’s rights are also at risk. While Bangladesh’s constitution provides religious freedom, Islamic fundamentalist groups within the country have continuously pressured the government to make strides towards becoming a “theo-democracy.” Particularly, BNP has a deep history of alliance with the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, notorious for encouraging sexual separation.²⁴ Although the ruling Awami League is founded upon the principles of secularism, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has, nonetheless, also been seen cozying up to other fundamentalist groups like Hefazat-e-Islam, which does not support the secularism that the Awami League supposedly advocates for.²⁵ Adding onto this is the fact that the increase in women’s participation in the workforce has slowed in recent years. Women’s participation in the workforce increased by an average of 1.7% per year between 2005 and 2010, but that number has decreased to a 0.7% increase since then.²⁶

Looking Ahead…

So what does this shift towards authoritarianism mean for Bangladesh’s economic growth? Given the fierceness of the rivalry between the Awami League and the BNP, and the overall disregard the government has in upholding democratic values, Bangladesh’s economy is at serious risk.

For one, the economic progress that the nation has made, while extraordinary, is not sustainable. Although the garment industry has been successful, extreme dependence on a single category of exports poses a dangerous risk to the economy. If any nation that imports garments were unable to continue purchasing from Bangladesh, the industry as a whole would suffer significant losses. Moreover, remittances are dependent on the availability of work for migrant workers. As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, work availability can decline rapidly according to the job environment. Finally, Bangladesh has faced difficulty in attracting foreign direct investment, which is key for sustainable growth. According to the World Bank, Bangladesh does not perform well in terms of compliance, quality, and reliability, which it considers to be essential for attracting foreign investment.²⁷

The solution to these issues lies in attracting foreign direct investment, which would expedite the process of diversification into more complex products and decrease Bangladesh’s reliance on remittances, but this might be difficult given the political circumstances of the nation. This is because the act of silencing dissent, as the current government has done, often gives way to corruption and cronyism. News outlets may fear to report on suspicious practices, providing those willing to cozy up to the government countless opportunities to find protection despite not necessarily following ethical standards. With such great inequities in the system, the country risks losing all reliability, warding off foreign direct investment, and threatening to stunt the momentum that Bangladesh has accomplished in its economy.

There is already evidence that demonstrates that such inequities exist in the current system. While the Awami League has been silencing its opposition, the party has simultaneously been providing its cronies with various benefits. Those with close ties to the party are easily able to secure bail, even for serious crimes, and are almost guaranteed to win if a case were to go to court. Moreover, the tax code is skewed in favor of rich and well-connected individuals, even though it is intended to depend on consumption rather than wealth. Corruption is so rampant in the nation that Transparency International gave Bangladesh a score of 26 out of 100 in its Corruption Perception Index in 2020, a measure that indicates the level of corruption within the public sector.²⁸

Economic data is beginning to reflect these inequities. The wealth gap has been exceptionally exacerbated by corruption under the Awami League, providing additional evidence that the economy is in jeopardy under the party. Between 2010 and 2016, the income of the richest households increased by a quarter, whereas the poorest household found theirs to decrease by a third.²⁹ Large wealth gaps not only inhibit social mobility and equal opportunity but are also indicative of health and social problems. Nations that have severe class disparities also experience inequalities in public health and education, as these resources are more readily available to the rich than the poor.

Wealth disparity is also associated with lower GDP growth rates in the long term. It is estimated that corruption knocks off an average of two percentage points from Bangladesh’s GDP growth every year.³⁰ Considering the Awami League’s tight grasp on the government and the unjust practices it has utilized to maintain this power, cronyism can only be expected to worsen, leading to greater inequality and larger losses to Bangladesh’s growth.

Democratic Backsliding in Asia

The phenomenon of declining democracy is not limited to Bangladesh, however. This event seems to be a part of a larger trend observable in democracies throughout Asia. While Asia experienced widespread democratization during the 1980s and 1990s, the region has experienced an apparent shift away from democracy and towards rising authoritarianism in recent years. Even while general support for democracy and democratic principles continues to be high, forces such as inequality and elite corruption, domestic polarization, and restrictions on civil liberties are affecting democratic institutions in many contemporary Asian democracies.³¹

As seen in Bangladesh, rising wealth in countries such as Malaysia and South Korea has been accompanied by inequality and corruption. Not only has this led to a decay in the perceived legitimacy of democratic institutions throughout the Indo-Pacific, but it has also encouraged a rise in populist leaders that undermine democratic principles to consolidate power. Domestic polarization is also not limited to Bangladesh. Throughout Asia, polarization is observable across religious, ethnic, and political lines, which has increasingly been used by national leaders for their own political advantages. Lastly, civil liberties, such as freedom of assembly, formation of civil society organizations, religious institutions, and freedom of the press, have been heavily restricted.³² A 2018 study of the civil society sustainability in nine Asian democracies, which included Bangladesh, found that all similarly had recently passed restriction laws on the formation of new NGOs, arrested local activists, and had placed tight restrictions on freedom of speech.³³

This trend is a serious cause for concern for democracy in Asia. Because democratic backsliding has been gradual rather than sudden, it often fails to ignite a call to action from the general public.³⁴ Furthermore, this phenomenon occurs where opposition forces are already weakened by the party in power, which makes it increasingly difficult to gather a majority and fight back against the controlling party. For Bangladesh, this puts at stake not only the rights of its citizenry but also its economic development. The lack of available options to oppose the Awami League means that the Bangladeshi people may completely lose a voice in their government. Simultaneously, if power continues to consolidate under the current government, this leaves the nation’s economic development in grave danger of reversal.

Conclusion

Once dubbed a ‘basket case,’ Bangladesh has dramatically improved its prospects and seen incredible economic achievements for several years. Though the economy has incredible potential, the government’s shift towards authoritarianism leaves the future of Bangladesh’s development extremely vulnerable. Intense political competition between the Awami League and the BNP has produced continuous violations of democratic ideals, a pattern that has now become standard in their fight for political power. This has opened the door for immense corruption, a direct indicator of long-term economic contraction. Furthermore, because Bangladesh’s growth is not yet sustainable, a slide towards authoritarianism means that their economic successes are likely to be reversed. If the government proceeds to undermine its democracy in favor of bolstering the political elite without allowing any space for opposition voices, this will almost certainly come at the expense of all of its economic achievements and future development.

Endnotes:

1. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.

2. Vaishali Basu Sharma. “Bangladesh’s Economy: What Did It Do Differently To Ride Out the Pandemic?” The Wire, July 18, 2021, https://thewire.in/south-asia/bangladesh-economy-pandemic-gdp.

3. Kaushik Basu. “Why Is Bangladesh Booming?” The Brookings Institution, May 1, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-is-bangladesh-booming/.

4. “The World Bank in Bangladesh: Overview.” The World Bank, October 3, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview#1.

5. Sahid Yusuf. “Bangladesh: Growth Miracle or Mirage?” Center For Global Development, June 16, 2021, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/bangladesh-growth-miracle-or-mirage.

6. “Bangladesh’s Growth Has Been Remarkable, But Is Now At Risk.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/03/27/bangladeshs-growth-has-been-remarkable-but-is-now-at-risk.

7. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.

8. Kaushik Basu. “Bangladesh at 50.” The Brookings Institution, March 26, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/bangladesh-at-50/.

9. Jason Beaubien. “They Pump $15 Billion A Year Into Bangladesh’s Economy — But At What Cost?” NPR, June 3, 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/06/03/722085193/they-pump-15-billion-a-year-into-bangladeshs-economy-but-at-what-cost.

10. Sahid Yusuf. “Bangladesh: Growth Miracle or Mirage?” Center For Global Development, June 16, 2021, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/bangladesh-growth-miracle-or-mirage.

11. “Background Note: Bangladesh.” U.S. Department of State, August 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm.

12. “Bangladesh.” U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/bangladesh/74099.htm.

13. “Background Note: Bangladesh.” U.S. Department of State, August 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm.

14. ibid.

15. ibid.

16. “Bangladesh Election: PM Sheikh Hasina Wins Landslide in Disputed Vote.” BBC, December 31, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46718393.

17. “Bangladesh Ends Caretaker Government Arrangement.” BBC, June 30, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13973576/.

18. “Bangladesh Election Violence Throws Country Deeper Into Turmoil.” The Guardian, January 6, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/06/bangladesh-election-violence-awami-league.

19. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.

20. ibid.

21. “Bangladesh: New Digital Security Act Imposes Dangerous Restrictions on Freedom of Expression.” Amnesty International, September 20, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/bangladesh-new-digital-security-act-imposes-dangerous-restrictions-on-freedom-of-expression/.

22. “Bangladesh: Repeal Abusive Law Used in Crackdown on Critics.” Human Rights Watch, July 1, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/01/bangladesh-repeal-abusive-law-used-crackdown-critics#.

23. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.

24. K. Anis Ahmed. “Bangladesh’s Choice: Authoritarianism or Extremism.” The New York Times, December 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/opinion/bangladesh-election-awami-bnp-authoritarian-extreme.html.

25. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.

26. ibid.

27. Gladys Lopez-Acevedo and Raymond Robertson. “Stitches to Riches? Apparel Employment, Trade, and Economic Development in South Asia.” The World Bank., https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/publication/stitches-to-riches-apparel-employment-trade-and-economic-development-in-south-asia.

28. “Bangladesh.” Transparency International, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bangladesh#.

29. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.

30. ibid.

31. Lindsey W. Ford and Ryan Hass. “Democracy in Asia.” The Brookings Institution, January 22, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-in-asia/.

32. ibid.

33. ibid.

34. Nancy Bermeo. On Democratic Backsliding: Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (2016): 5-19. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0012.

January 3, 2022 0 comment

Featured Global Health Human Rights Military National Security Security and Conflict Women's Rights

U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan Must Include a Plan for Women’s Access to Healthcare

written by Samriddhi Sapkota

Last April, President Biden announced his plan to withdraw all remaining U.S. troops and personnel from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, after nearly twenty years of influence in the nation. In correspondence with this proposal, other members of NATO have agreed to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan in a coordinated effort with the United States. Biden’s decision has been brought to question by many who believe that a sudden and complete withdrawal will allow the Taliban to quickly regain control of the country within an estimated two to three years following a U.S. withdrawal. The lack of U.S. influence in the nation and a subsequent takeover by the Taliban are expected to undo much of the progress made in Afghanistan within the last two decades, particularly in securing women’s rights to healthcare.

Afghan women face a unique disadvantage in acquiring access to healthcare, a phenomenon that began with the rise of the Taliban. Almost immediately after the group came into power in 1996, the Taliban violated many basic principles of international human rights law by forbidding women the right to education, mobility, work, and healthcare, while justifying their actions with an extreme interpretation of Islamic law. These standards are specified under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, treaties that the preceding government of Afghanistan both signed and ratified. Of the numerous human rights violations committed against Afghan women by the Taliban, denial of access to healthcare has had long-lasting impacts on women and their children. Under the Taliban rule, around 16 in 100 mothers died during childbirth, while 165 in 1000 babies died before the age of one.

Following the 2001 military intervention that defeated the Taliban government, the Afghan government, with the help of many international donors, worked to develop a healthcare system that extended basic access throughout the entire country. The initiative has made some progress in women’s healthcare, as maternal and infant mortality rates significantly declined. Yet, healthcare services for women are still lacking in comparison to international standards, despite the two decades of work and hundreds of millions of dollars in aid invested into improving the healthcare system. Women still face challenges in acquiring modern forms of contraception, prenatal and postnatal care, modern cancer and fertility treatment, and even routine treatments like pap smears and mammograms.

Improvement of female healthcare services seems to be constrained by economic, political, and cultural factors. For one, healthcare is too expensive. Even services at governmental hospitals require the payment of fees, which is a luxury in a country where poverty rates are on the rise. Additionally, Afghan healthcare facilities and medical personnel are frequently victims of violent attacks. A 2018 report found that in that year alone, 140 healthcare facilities that had served two million Afghans closed due to attacks by armed groups. These attacks force women to choose between their immediate safety and their health. Large amounts of aid provided by international donors to advance women’s healthcare services have also been lost to corruption.

Finally, Afghanistan’s cultural norms dictate that women are only able to receive medical service from other women. However, high illiteracy rates━prompted by decades of war and conflict with the Taliban━have significantly limited the pool of female doctors available to treat women. This issue is even more severe in areas still controlled by the Taliban today, as women continue to be forbidden from receiving education. Furthermore, male doctors and nurses may only touch female patients above their burqas, which has dangerous consequences for cases that require more invasive examinations. Although international medical institutions like the Red Cross have been granted permission to work in the Taliban-controlled areas, they are still required to adhere to the Taliban’s rules, and thus are unable to perform procedures for women that conflict with the Taliban’s beliefs.

The limited achievements that have been seen in women’s healthcare in Afghanistan are still contingent on support from international donors. However, aid provided to the Afghan healthcare system has been declining in recent years. In 2013, countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee provided Afghanistan with $141 million to support its healthcare system. However, by 2019, aid had decreased by 26 percent to $105 million. Moreover, with the exit of the U.S. from Afghanistan, aid is further suspected to decrease. Although the withdrawal of troops does not require any conditions to be met, it will have a large impact on many international donors that distribute aid to governments on the condition that they uphold human rights, especially women’s rights. This requirement will be difficult to fulfill considering the predicted rise of the Taliban.

With the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, any further loss in foreign aid will almost certainly overburden the already struggling healthcare system. Currently, the pandemic has exacerbated preexisting issues for the Afghan healthcare system, including a lack of efficient emergency services, an insufficient number of experienced staff, low testing capacity, scarce PPE, and high rates of violence against healthcare workers and facilities.

In the current circumstances of the pandemic, women are even less likely to receive the necessary medical assistance. The combination of limited medical resources, ever-growing rates of poverty due to economic downturn, and a fear of contracting illness have deterred many women from going to the hospital, despite being in life-threatening situations. In one instance, an Afghan midwife quarantined in a tent outside of her home after contracting COVID-19 because she lacked the resources to go anywhere else.

To make matters worse, India’s ongoing second wave of COVID-19 is expected to have incredible effects on Afghanistan’s healthcare system. Many new cases that have surfaced in Afghanistan have been credited to relaxed travel restrictions, which have allowed foreign arrivals to enter the country without being screened for COVID-19. The government has yet to ban direct flights between Kabul and New Delhi. With the approaching withdrawal of U.S. troops and the underprepared healthcare system, the effects of India’s second wave are almost certainly going to devastate Afghanistan’s ability to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic alongside any security developments in the region. In this environment, ensuring healthcare access for women is in serious danger.

Now more than ever, healthcare for women is imperative for their wellbeing and prosperity. Yet, with the U.S. withdrawal, there is an impending threat that the little progress that has been made in women’s health will not only revert back to the status that existed under the Taliban, but will likely worsen as a result of COVID-19. In this state, the U.S. and international donors cannot end their support of the Afghan healthcare system and developments in women’s health. In fact, a renewed emphasis must be placed on revitalizing the healthcare system and increasing its accessibility to women. More specifically, this plan must ramp up efforts to decrease the cost of receiving medical care, advance the medical treatments available for women, and educate women in order to increase the number of experienced female doctors. Furthermore, ongoing violence and political developments in the region must be considered to ensure that these efforts are effective.

July 8, 2021 0 comment