Europe

Economics Europe Globalization Society and Culture The International Economy

So you want to be European? A challenge to the perceived success of the European model over the U.S. model in leftist discourse.

Imagine life in Switzerland: an idyllic alpine country in which gun ownership is legalized, immigration and multilateralism are frowned upon, healthcare is privatized and costly, and military service is compulsory. Staunchly independent and conservative, Switzerland is a right wing paradise. Yet, it is often liberal politicians and voters that yearn for a more European America, citing the success of “democratic socialism” in European societies. However, given the example of Switzerland, albeit extreme, the notion that Europe is necessarily “socialist,” and the success of existing “socialist” policies, should be challenged.

Bernie Sanders, former presidential candidate and arguably the most celebrated socialist in America, stated that the future of American democratic socialism “should look to countries like Denmark, like Sweden and Norway.” The Danish Prime Minister retorted that Denmark “is far from a planned a socialist economy,” and “it is a market economy.” The dissonance here relates to two different definitions of the word socialism. Socialism can connote a system of increased government administration of public goods, rather than private sector administration of public goods, as well as a robust social safety net. Infrequently, socialism can be used to refer to communism, a system of complete government control over the economy. This article will contend with the former, focusing on socialism as European government intervention in the market and social services.

When it comes to economic policy, the Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, actually have greater economic freedom than the United States and are in this respect even more market driven or “capitalist” economies. A study by JP Morgan Chase, using data from the World Bank, found that on average these nations have a greater degree of business freedom. Greater business freedom means these economies protect property rights more aggressively, exercise less control over private enterprise, allow for greater concentration in the banking sector, and distribute a smaller share of total earnings to workers than the U.S.. As well, the Nordics have minimal corporate taxation and no wealth taxes. The U.S. in comparison boasted the highest corporate tax rate in the developed world, 40%, prior to the 2017 Trump tax cut, at which point the corporate tax rate was slashed to 21%, still above the European average. The reputation of high taxes in Nordic countries comes from the high value added taxes (VAT), similar to sales taxes, which are in their nature, regressive taxes. VATs disproportionately impact the lower and middle classes because these groups spend a higher proportion of their income than the upper class does. Thereby, it is the lower and middle classes which finance the generous social safety nets present in these countries. The essential takeaway here is that operation of the economy is extremely market friendly, and social benefits are being paid for not by the wealthy or corporations, but by their beneficiaries.

Yet these bountiful social safety nets, rather than actual economic policy, are generally what politicians and everyday people mean when they refer to European socialism. It is undeniable that in the Nordic countries, as well as Europe more generally, there are greater government transfers as a share of GDP. This takes the form of free or low-cost college, healthcare, child care and favorable unemployment benefits. However, these policies come at a cost. Not only are they financed primarily by the middle class as aforementioned, but these social programs are sometimes inefficient or even ineffective in comparison to alternatives.

For example, the European healthcare system, enviable for it’s widespread accessibility, is unfortunately often not the same quality or even necessarily always more cost effective than the U.S.. The healthcare policies in Europe range from country to country, from nationalized systems to health care mandates similar to the Affordable Care Act (ACA). However, the perception of healthcare as “free” is a fallacy across the board. In Sweden, where healthcare is significantly nationalized, average out-of -pocket cost is 15%, the U.S. average in contrast is 11%. In other European nations, such as the Netherlands, which have mandates similar to the ACA, they end up paying less than nationalized systems, 11% out of pocket as well. Moreover, the problem with single payer healthcare, especially in larger and more diverse economies, is that the health systems do not reach a satisfactory quality, so citizens end up bearing a double burden of paying for the nationalized system through taxation and private healthcare when they get sick. In France for instance, 95% of the population has private insurance to help pay the deductibles and copayments of the public system. In the UK, 11% of citizens have private insurance in addition to public insurance in order to gain faster access to specialists and elective procedures such as hip replacements. Commendably, nearly all European countries provide some form of universal basic coverage, yet to say a “medicare for all” system reflects the European model is inaccurate.

European universities present a similar story. While they are more authentically “free” than healthcare, they sometimes can not provide the same quality of education or versatility of degree as an American university. American universities’ high tuition (though arguably exorbitant), allows them the financial resources to attract the best faculty, research, technology, and top students from around the globe. Eight of the ten best universities in the world according to 2021 U.S. News’ edition of Best Global Universities, are in the United States. The London-based Times Higher Education, placed 16 of the World’s top 25 universities in America and the Shanghai-based Academic Ranking of World Universities placed 18 of the top 25 universities in America. The high costs of healthcare and education in the United States, while admittedly having distinct disadvantages, make U.S. institutions world class.

And can the United States afford these costs? Yes. The American middle class is comparatively richer than the European middle class. Even after the significant costs paid in the United States for healthcare, education, child care, etc. the average disposable income of Americans is much higher than Europeans. In fact, the United States has the highest average disposable income of any OECD country. The United States is also among the most highly ranked when it comes to housing and employment opportunities, not to mention more consistent and robust GDP growth, while Europe lags with stalling competitiveness.

Europe could possibly improve GDP growth and international competitiveness through decreasing state spending and encouraging the private sector; the direct antithesis to their “socialist” reputation. Sweden has successfully done this before. In the period the 1970s to the 1990s, Sweden had a much more “socialized” economy. During these years the country’s growth lagged far behind most other OECD countries. In 1990 and 1991, Sweden introduced tax cuts and business incentives to boast the economy, which was highly effective and allowed for the regionally impressive growth and economic strength that is present today. However in this period inequality in Sweden also rose significantly, the highest percentage growth in inequality in the world at the time, yet it was matched by a boast in the overall economy. This is not to say that cutting social programs and taxes will always increase productivity and growth, or that the increase in growth will be distributed fairly, but simply that there is a trade off with growth and productivity on one side and government social benefits on the other. Each country must decide where they feel comfortable within this trade off and what sacrifices they are willing to make. It seems that Americans want the lifestyle of southern Europe, the social benefits of northern Europe, at the level of prosperity of the United States, which is unrealistic.

However even if the U.S. wanted to accept the bargain of low growth for benefits, many European countries are able to maintain these systems based on historical and institutional reasons that would not apply to the United States. Europeans are capable of having expensive social programs in part because of their reliance on American defense spending. As of 2017, the United States contributes a greater proportion of GDP to NATO than any other country at 3.3%. 23 of the 28 countries in NATO fail to meet even the 2% of GDP goal. Many former presidents inducing George W. Bush and Barack Obama took issue with this, with Obama stating “Free riders aggravate me.” As well the comparatively smaller size of European countries allows for more centralized and efficient government distribution of benefits. Not to mention some countries, like Norway, have become very wealthy through natural resource extraction.

All of this is not to reflect a personal political agenda, in fact quite the opposite. I do not advocate for cutting social safety nets, but it must be acknowledged that these safety nets, aside from their many quality of life benefits, often fuel costly and inefficient bureaucracies and hurt international competitiveness. It is even more important to remember that the U.S. is not, and never will be, Europe. We shouldn’t strive to blindly emulate an imperfect system especially in a country facing such different conditions.

Additional Discussion….

A quick digression to social and political issues; it is often argued that Europe’s political spectrum is shifted further to the left than the U.S.. However, on social issues such as the legalization of gay marriage many European nations lagged behind the U.S.. Germany didn’t legalize gay marriage until 2017, and gay marriage is still illegal in large European countries such as Italy and Greece. Abortion similarly is not universally accessible in Europe, and some countries have only just recently legalized it. Ireland, a county with a strong religious tradition, most notably legalized abortion in 2018.

Politically, Europe has suffered from the same issues with right wing populism and xenophobia as the U.S.. From the infamous Brexit protest vote, to the rise of right wing governments in Austria, Italy, and other large countries, attitudes in Europe have been increasingly conservative. The illusion that the far left holds control in Europe may be attributable to many countries’ parliamentary systems giving fringe political parties a voice. Overall, Europe has a diverse array of political landscapes from country to country and region to region. Just like the U.S., Europe as a monolith cannot be characterized as necessarily liberal or conservative.

February 17, 2021 0 comment

Europe Globalization Human Rights Humanitarian Aid Immigration Populism Syrian Civil War

Greece’s Migrant Crisis: A Combination of EU Policy Failures & Populism

written by Caroline Mendoza

On September 8, Moria, a refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, was engulfed in flames that burned down a majority of the camp and left more than 12,000 Syrian refugees sleeping on the streets of Greece. Although the destruction of the camp initiated promises from European Union officials for new measures to prevent refugee influxes in Greece, it also sparked conversation around the EU’s ineffective policies and Europe’s increase in populist sentiment.

While Syria’s civil war has raged on since 2011, the over 5.6 million refugees that have fled the country exist in a state of limbo between the jurisdiction of multiple countries, perhaps most notably Greece and Turkey. In 2015, the EU experienced a mass influx of close to 100,000 refugees fleeing predominately from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, prompting the bloc to form the 2016 EU-Turkey deal- to prevent the entrance of refugees at Greece’s shores, the EU bargained with neighboring Turkey to provide monetary aid in return for Turkey accepting all refugees attempting to seek asylum in Greece. Turkey received 6 billion Euros (6.7 billion USD) to aid the now 3.6 million Syrian refugees registered in the nation.

While the deal worked in Greece’s favor for several years succeeding its conception, recent dynamics have changed- Turkey has expressed that the monetary support from the EU is insufficient compared to the burden of millions of Syrian refugees as well as migrants from Afghanistan. In March 2020, Turkey opened its borders with Greece and openly bused refugees to the nations’ shared northwestern border as a means of exerting pressure on Greece and showcasing the threat of additional refugees. Many have accused Turkey of utilizing the struggling refugees as political pawns, prompting the EU to reassert that the bloc would not be “blackmailed” into exacerbating the migrant crisis for Greece.

While the current situation remains politically fragile and is only heightened with the threat of COVID-19, the challenges Greece is facing as its camps crowd with thousands of desperate migrants are reflective of the EU’s overall structural issues and policies on asylum-seekers. The EU’s Dublin Regulations, which mandates that the first nation an asylum seeker enters must process the asylum seeker’s registration, disproportionately places large responsibilities on Mediterranean states whose borders are common points of entry for those leaving North Africa and the Middle East. While the Regulations were originally conceived to ensure that those registering do not apply to multiple member states, nations, including Italy and Greece, have led the growing opposition to the Dublin Regulations.

In an attempt to create responsibility-sharing and ease pressures off of Italy and Greece, the EU initiated yet another lacking migration policy 一 the EU’s relocation scheme, devised after the 2015 influx of asylum seekers, planned to relocate over 160,000 asylum seekers across member states over two years. By the time 2017 arrived, a mere 29,144 people had been relocated.

In an attempt to remedy this, the EU released a new plan to improve its handling of Greece’s refugees following the incineration of Moria. The EU’s most recent migration pact will expedite pre-entry screening at borders by taking a maximum of five days while increasing responsibility sharing amongst member states by having nations contribute based on their populations and GDPs. Poland, Austria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, however, expressed a staunch opposition to the plan in stating that the borders of the EU should remain “perfectly sealed.”

While the EU’s policymaking and failure to prioritize the rights of asylum seekers are to blame for situations like Moria, the EU’s member states have experienced a recent rise in populism that hinder the success of any relocation or migration plans. Poland, Austria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic’s anti-immigrant stance is a trend across western Europe. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party has introduced multiple policies to cut back on welfare for migrants- one law requires that migrant children, or those of a “non-Western” background, take Danish language classes for their families to receive welfare. In the Netherlands, a burqa ban was put in place in August 2019 that restricts face-covering clothing from being worn in areas including public transport, government facilities, and healthcare centers. Similar laws exist in Denmark, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, and France, and are representative of xenophobic and discriminatory policymaking implemented to highlight migrants as “outsiders.”

A similar sentiment was also seen in many “Brexiteers”一 for members of the UK’s conservative party, an incentive to leave the EU was that the UK would no longer be part of the EU’s “free movement of persons” right, which allows individuals to move and reside freely amongst the EU member states. The conservative argument promoted leaving the EU to prevent refugees who entered through eastern Europe from residing in the UK. Now that Brexit has passed, the UK has already begun implementing policies to prevent immigrants from entering. A new set of laws will close the UK’s borders to immigrants who do not speak English and are unskilled laborers.

While the EU itself has a history of failed migration plans, there is only so much the commission can do; with raging anti-immigrant sentiment and an increase in European populism, member states are increasingly unwilling to welcome any new migrants, much less carry out responsibility-sharing plans released by the EU. Close to 12,000 asylum seekers will be left on the shoulders of Greece and perhaps exacerbate the already tense relations with Turkey. As the European Commission has already begun financing the construction of new camps to replace Moria, the futures of many refugees may be in cramped, under-resourced camps while the EU attempts to persuade nativist leaders and member states or bribe neighboring states to ease some of Greece’s burdens. Either way, the EU has much work to be done to handle this migrant crisis adequately and humanely, perhaps starting with urgency for more tolerant and inclusive policies in its own member states.

November 9, 2020 0 comment

Europe Geopolitics Russia Security and Conflict Vladimir Putin

Will Putin Rescue Lukashenko from the Jaws of Death?

written by Alex Choy

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

Authoritarian leader of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, is currently confronted with massive protests over accusations of winning a rigged election. Previously praised by Belarusians for bringing stability to their former Soviet republic, as Lukashenko enters his sixth consecutive term in office, Belarusians rallied by political challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya have demanded new, free and fair elections.

In response, an embattled Lukashenko announced that protesters would have to kill him first.

Mr. Lukashenko, often referred to as Europe’s last dictator, was elected in 1994 as part of Belarus’ first national election post-Soviet dissolution. A year after taking office, he won a questionable referendum that gave him the power to dissolve the legislature, and in the following year, created a legislature and judiciary subordinate to himself, essentially giving his decrees the force of law. As a result, except for the 1994 election, Belarusian democracy has not seen the light of day.

Not only did Lukashenko consolidate his power domestically early on, but he also sought closer ties with Russia. In 1999, Lukashenko and then Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a treaty intended to reintegrate the two nations by creating a confederation known as the Union State, in which the two nations would remain sovereign but would share a government. Although the date when full integration would occur was left unspecified, on a visceral level, the Belarusian flag and national seal had already been altered to reflect Soviet-era designs, borders were opened, and the Russian language was elevated, while Belarusian was suppressed. In the power-political arena, ‘oil was traded for kisses,’ as Russia granted Belarus significant energy subsidies to prop up its anemic economy, in exchange for its geopolitical loyalty as a strategic buffer against NATO.

However, let us get one thing straight: Belarus is not a Russian client state, at least not from Lukashenko’s perspective. He has long played Russia and NATO against each other, taking part in NATO programs to alleviate Western sanctions, while welcoming Russian assistance, much to Putin’s dismay. As a result, Belarusian-Russian relations have soured. The Union State remains unfulfilled, and as Lukashenko continues to demonstrate his willingness to stray from the Kremlin’s expectation that he be a willing Russian stooge, Putin’s frustration towards him has naturally increased.

For instance, concerning Russia’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Lukashenko has refused to side with Russia, citing Article 18 of the Belarusian Constitution, which stipulates Belarus’ goal of neutrality. In retaliation, Putin slashed subsidies, making their return contingent on the Union State’s fruition. Recently, Lukashenko has accused Russia of attempting to bully Belarus into full integration, and in July, Russian mercenaries were arrested in Minsk, accused by Lukashenko of being a part of a Kremlin plot to install Tikhanovskaya in power. However, Lukashenko’s accusations are nonsensical, since Tikhanovskaya herself opposes closer ties with Russia.

So why is Putin so interested in creating a Union State?

Previously, the fruition of the Union State would have created a new powerful leadership post, a position that Putin, who was barred by term limits from remaining as Russia’s President after 2024, could have filled legally, thereby exerting dominance over both nations. However, in July, Putin was able to win a questionable referendum, allowing him to skirt the term limit restriction and remain in power until 2036.

From a balance of power standpoint, his interest lies in creating a consolidated Russian Eurasia, a motive in line with Russia’s previous annexations of Crimea and Georgia. Consequently, having secured access to the Black Sea, Putin set his eyes on the Baltics and the strategic Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is cut off from Belarus, and by extension, the Russian mainland; by a narrow sliver of the Polish-Lithuanian border known as the Suwalki Gap. Should Putin attempt to forcefully ‘bridge the Suwalki Gap’ to reconnect Kalinigrad to the Russian mainland, Russian troops would have to travel through Belarusian territory. Therefore, such a scenario is contingent on Belarusian acquiescence, or Russian ability to ensure compliance through a unified government.

Map of the ‘Suwalki Gap’ THE WASHINGTON POST

Regarding the Suwalki Gap, LTGEN (Ret.) Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army Europe, asserts: “Deterring any potential action [by Russia] — or even the threat of action — against Suwalki is therefore essential for NATO’s credibility and Western cohesion.” Through a military Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics and Poland, NATO can reassure its defensive commitment while deterring Russia. On the other hand, should NATO fail to counter Russia’s move to ‘bridge the gap,’ such a scenario would drastically undermine NATO’s credibility to provide collective security, essentially rendering the alliance meaningless. This in turn, would invite further brazen Russian aggression. Therefore, the risk of Russia’ bridging the gap’ not only lies with the Baltics being cut off from the rest of NATO, but threatens the very existence of the organization itself; a possibility which no doubt entices Putin.

Polish president Andrzej Duda meets with soldiers assigned to the Tennessee Army National Guard’s 2nd Squadron, 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s Task Force Raider, during a visit to Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, March 6, 2019. SARAH KIRBY/US ARMY

As part of EFP, the Trump Administration recently announced the redeployment of 1000 soldiers, and the relocation of V Corps Headquarters from Germany to Poland. In response, Lukashenko placed his military on ‘high alert,’ citing the ‘threat’ to Belarusian territorial integrity. According to Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, Lukashenko’s efforts are “to divert attention from Belarus’s internal problems … with totally baseless statements about imaginary external threats.”

As boasted by Belarusian state news media, Lukashenko was able to secure Putin’s promise that “comprehensive [military] assistance will be provided to “ensure the security of Belarus in the event of external military threats.” However, it is essential to note that this ‘comprehensive assistance’ falls under the premises of Belarus’ membership in The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military alliance, and Putin has not explicitly expressed his endorsement of Lukashenko remaining in power if he cannot deliver on the Union State.

But the real question remains: Given the imminent risk posed to the Lukashenko, will Putin intervene in Belarus?

The short answer is, probably not, unless a change in Belarusian leadership involves an abrupt shift towards the West and away from Russia. The current spate of protests are primarily anti-Lukashenko and lack the anti-Russian sentiment present during the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. While Putin has leveraged hyper-nationalist ethnic Russian ‘compatriots abroad’ to undermine sovereignty in ex-Soviet Bloc nations in the past, given the existing semi-union, it is far less costly for Putin to achieve a Union State through soft power alone, rather than through military force. Therefore, if Putin chooses to send his ‘little green men’ to Belarus to prop up the existing government, Belarusian public opinion will turn solidly against Russia, viewing such an attempt as an effort to silence the voice of the people.

Having said that, should Tikhanovskaya continue to rise in popularity and place the possibility of a Union State in jeopardy, Putin’s best option would not be to intervene militarily, and certainly not to call for new elections (that Tikhanovskaya could win). Instead, he should attempt to back a transfer of power from Lukashenko to a member of the Belarusian elite, such as pro-Russian Viktor Babariko. Babariko, who intended to run for president in the 2020 Election, was arrested by Lukashenko in July. According to an unofficial internet poll conducted by popular Belarusian news site Tut.by, over half of respondents were ready to support Babariko over Lukashenko.

Presidential candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya casts her ballot in Minsk. AFP/Sergei GAPON

On the off chance that Putin chooses to intervene militarily and back Lukashenko, there is no doubt that he will expect Lukashenko’s full and unbridled cooperation towards achieving Belarusian-Russian integration. Putin certainly has not been subtle in signaling these wishes, recently telling Lukashenko: “I expect that your statesmanship will facilitate the further development of mutually beneficial Russian-Belarusian relations … as well as the further enhancement of cooperation within the Union State.”

Given his motivations, Putin’s cost-benefit calculus is no doubt firing on full cylinders. As a result, as events continue to unfold, one can only wonder if he will choose his course of action wisely, and if he does not; how NATO forces will counter if faced with a potential Suwalki Gap scenario.

September 4, 2020 0 comment

Environmental Change Europe

Paris on Fire: Lessons from France’s Yellow Vest Movement

written by Grayson Peters

“There is no Planet B.” In April 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron addressed¹ a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress, staked out a hard-line position on climate leadership, and exhorted the United States to reaffirm its commitment to “make our planet great again.” Hopes² were high that Macron would not only overhaul French domestic climate policy, but that he would also fill the void left by America’s apparent abdication of international climate leadership. However, a lack of recent progress in French policy, little international pressure, and dissatisfaction expressed by environmental advocacy organizations suggest that Macron is failing to follow through on both fronts. The Macron administration’s recent and highly public gilet jaune³ embarrassment – a series of mass street protests that garnered international press coverage – holds the answers for France’s sluggish progress on climate policy and serves as a stark warning of the populist pitfalls that can befall climate advocates whose policies may, even unintentionally, reinforce existing inequalities.

Since the Paris Climate Conference in 2017, Macron’s France has made little measurable progress in the fight against global warming. This past August, French Environment Minister Nicolas Hulot dramatically resigned⁴ on live television, claiming that Macron’s government was unwilling to push for real change in environmental policy. Hulot claimed that lobbyist influence and political cowardice had hamstrung decision-makers in the French government such that only “mini-steps,” not the sweeping changes Macron promised, had been achieved. Tellingly, the day before Hulot unexpectedly resigned, both he and President Macron met with the National Hunting Association, laying the groundwork for a liberalization of hunting laws despite opposition⁵ from bird conservation groups. Hulot’s resignation, apparently well-justified, was a red flag for environmental advocates.

Additionally, despite the Macron administration’s vocal push to lower carbon emissions, France has so far been unsuccessful⁶. In January 2018, France admitted that it had surpassed its emissions target by 3.6%, an embarrassing result for the French government. Ironically, despite the U.S.’s exit from the Paris Agreements, American GHG emissions declined⁷ more than those of any other country when measured in 2017. This unexpected result was likely caused by America’s increasing reliance on natural gas, which, although a fossil-fuel, produces fewer emissions than coal. The French Environment Ministry, meanwhile, blamed low oil prices for an increase in energy consumption and cited transportation and winter-time heating as the two top culprits.

Seeing the gulf between Macron’s tough talk on global warming and his failures to curb domestic emissions, one might have fairly assumed before November of 2018 that the French president’s words were hollow. This would, however, have been a mistake.

Following the Macron government’s decision to raise the fuel tax, a national sales tax on all gasoline purchases, in the new year, as had been done consistently in prior years, chaos broke out. Mass demonstrations by yellow-vested protesters broke out in major French cities such as Paris, Nice, and Lyon as well as overseas territories like the island Réunion east of Madagascar. The protests were named for the gilets jaunes (yellow safety vests) they wore, which all French motorists are required to keep in their cars and wear in the event of road emergencies. These yellow vests, ubiquitous and associated with emergency situations, became the uniform and symbol of the growing unrest.

The outbreak of violence between demonstrators and police led to thousands of injuries on both sides and the deaths⁸ of 10 civilians. After three weeks of escalating violence, President Macron backed down and suspended⁹ the fuel tax increase for six months.

What went wrong? It is worth examining the complexities of climate politics in the French context to understand why Macron’s fuel tax increase, which would have arguably reduced vehicle-based greenhouse gas emissions, provoked such a popular and violent response.

In effect, Macron’s fuel tax is a regressive policy which would have disproportionately punished an already economically disadvantaged population. Because the fuel tax is calculated on a cents-per-litre basis and does not take into account the socio-economic status of the individual taxed, it taxes a greater percentage of low-income and working-class individuals’ incomes and so disproportionately hurts those who are already struggling in a stagnant economy¹⁰ with a staggering unemployment rate of over 9%. For context, peak unemployment in the U.S. during the Great Recession of 2008 reached 10%¹¹. It is understandable why the French people would react so angrily to a tax increase on those with little to give, especially as the Macron administration commits to lowering¹² corporate tax rates. We can extrapolate an important lesson for other policy makers from Macron’s fuel tax failure.

In American politics and elsewhere, politicians, lobbyists, and climate activists must be careful that their commitment to environmental social engineering is not implemented in such a way that the financial burden of such policies falls on the most vulnerable. Without a doubt, a serious climate policy will force individuals to restructure their lives and consumption habits, but this must be done carefully. If, for instance, the United States were to institute a federal ban on the use of combustion-engine motor vehicles, that policy would no doubt benefit the environment and drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But, those without the capital to purchase pricier electric cars and unable to use alternative transportation would be well within their rights to oppose such a measure. Instead of writing clumsily-designed laws that financially penalize vulnerable individuals who lack viable climate-friendly alternatives to their behavior, legislators should instead consider a corporate carbon tax or equivalent cap-and-trade system to incentivize industries to self-regulate their emissions and redirect this tax revenue into subsidies for renewable energy and invest in climate-friendly public infrastructure like urban mass transit and bike lanes, protect and expand government-funded nature reserves, and create job-training programs to transition workers away from dying fossil fuel industries like the American coal mines. It is therefore important that climate policies be not only effective but popular; after all, angry voters can always rebel against poorly-designed laws and, in doing so, set back the entire environmentalist movement.

Almost everyone agrees climate change is a real and existential threat to human society, but no one wants to foot the bill themselves. If world leaders are serious about preserving a habitable Earth for future generations, they must tread carefully when designing laws intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Handing the bill to the already-marginalized is just bad policy.

Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Macron Critiques Trump’s Policies in Speech to Congress,” New York Times, Published April 25, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/us/politics/macron-congress-speech-trump.html

David Livingston, “Macron takes on climate change mantle in address to Congress,” Axios, Published April 26, 2018

https://www.axios.com/as-us-cedes-leadership-on-climate-change-macron-takes-up-the-torch-bb683940-9aef-4edf-87ee-7d79dd4edbbe.html

Angelique Chrisafis, “Who are the gilets jaunes and what do they want,” The Guardian, Published December 7, 2018.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/03/who-are-the-gilets-jaunes-and-what-do-they-want

James McAuley, “French environment minister quits with criticism of Macron,” Washington Post, Published August 28, 2018.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/french-environment-minister-quits-with-criticism-of-macron/2018/08/28/2a39e8e0-aaca-11e8-9a7d-cd30504ff902_story.html?utm_term=.6b8f67f8835b

Angelique Chrisafis, “French environment minister quits live on radio with anti-Macron broadside,” The Guardian, Published August 28, 2018.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/28/french-environment-minister-quits-live-on-radio-with-anti-macron-broadside

“France to revise carbon emissions target after missing 2016 goal,” Reuters, Published January 22, 2018.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-carbon-emissions/france-to-revise-carbon-emissions-target-after-missing-2016-goal-idUSKBN1FB2W0

“CO2 Emissions,” BP.com, Published June 13, 2018. https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/co2-emissions.html

“Driver killed in accident at Yellow Vest roadblock in southern France,” The Telegraph, Published December 22, 2018.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/22/driver-killed-accident-yellow-vest-roadblock-southern-france/

9. Adam Nossiter, “France Suspends Fuel Tax Increase That Spurred Violent Protests,” New York Times, Published December 4, 2018.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/world/europe/france-fuel-tax-yellow-vests.html

Liz Alderman, “These 5 Numbers Explain Why the French Are in the Streets,” New York Times, Published December 4, 2018.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/world/europe/france-economy-protests.html

“The Recession of 2007-2009,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Published February 2012.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.pdf

Stacy Meichtry, “France Unveils Billions in Tax Cuts as Support for Macron Ebbs,” Wall Street Journal, Published September 24, 2018.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/france-unveils-billions-in-tax-cuts-as-support-for-macron-ebbs-1537794588

April 29, 2019 0 comment

Source

Europe Featured

The Malignancy of Multinational Currency

written by Katie Jones

“France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts,”

This hostile and controversial statement was leveraged by Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s populist deputy Prime Minister, in a counterproductive attempt to deflect shared responsibility for Europe’s migrant crisis. However the currency in question should be a part of the larger discussion on globalization and post-colonial institutions. If European leaders were to earnestly evaluate the CFA franc not from their perspective but from the perspective of the affected Africans, they may find some unsettling similarities to the eurozone.

The CFA franc represents two distinct multinational currencies in Western and Central Africa. The currencies are effectively the same, as both have an exchange rate pegged to the euro (1 euro = 655, 957 francs), however they are not interchangeable. The logic behind the fixed exchange rate is to prevent inflation and promote investor security in nations where poor governance may otherwise threaten market stability. However, this comes at a very steep price for the nations involved. In return, they must keep 50% of their reserves in the French Treasury, follow the strict monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), and attempt to develop their economies with an inevitably overvalued currency.

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In the current economic landscape, African nations should seriously consider if the sacrifice of sovereignty necessitated by the franc is worth the supposed increase in prosperity. The crux of the problem is that the CFA franc is essentially a version of the euro, and relatively weak economies using a strong currency is counterproductive to economic development. The strength of the franc encourages imports and makes exports less competitive on the global market, stagnating the development of member nations. Additionally, the main priority of the ECB is to maintain stable prices, with inflation at a maximum of 2%. This policy makes sense for the top members of the European Union (EU), but a developing nation should be focused on high employment rates and exports, ideally with inflation rates of up to 8%. Moreover, the 50% reserve requirement of the franc zone countries greatly limits their investment options. The French treasury gives them a return rate of only .75%, which sometimes does not even match the level of inflation, much less provide a desperately needed return on investment.

The franc becomes even less attractive when considering the performance of other African economies. Former French colonies that abandoned the franc, such as Morocco and Algeria, are more successful economically, despite using an independent currency. Overall income per capita, adjusted for inflation, has grown 1.4% in the franc zone and 2.5% in the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the line of credit extended to the franc zone is pitiful. In the western franc zone (see map) the credit to GDP ratio is 25% and in the central franc zone it is only 13%! This is in comparison with the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa around 60%.

So why keep the CFA franc? The franc is known to benefit a small percentage of upper and middle class African citizens by providing easy access to imports and the ability to invest abroad, while by and large disadvantaging the 75% of the citizenry who are working class. To exacerbate things further, France and other foreign interests greatly benefit from the franc zone as an export market, and France is granted special access to African resources as a part of the agreement. Furthermore, the franc’s status as a multinational currency provides greater benefit to outside nations wanting to facilitate trade, than the internal member states. The franc is after all very poorly integrated, with intra-regional trade accounting for only 15% of total trade, while trade with Europe accounts for 60%. The French, along with the remainder of the eurozone, clearly profit off of the CFA franc.

Many African economists and politicians acknowledge these flaws, yet the question of how to move forward still remains. The French have responded to the protestations of their former colonies by supporting the creation of a new multinational African currency independent of the euro, that will incorporate more– and larger–African states, including but not limited to Nigeria. However, this still appears self-serving. There is minimal justification for the existence of a new multinational currency in Sub-Saharan Africa, and as aforementioned, it primarily benefits outsiders. The best interest of the franc zone may be to follow the advice of former World bank director Carlos Lopes. He believes the CFA franc should be tied to a basket of other currencies, including the notoriously undervalued Chinese yuan, or to hover around a target exchange rate with the euro, both which will help to mitigate the overvaluation of the franc, while maintaining the currency as a pillar of stability.

The tragic irony is that France, along with a number of Southern European states, are the victim of the euro in much the same way that the CFA franc is. The euro is too strong for the economies of Southern Europe. Estimates peg overvaluation at 5% in France and 7% in Greece. Furthermore, the emphasis on low inflation within the eurozone is really to the benefit of the booming German bloc, at the expense of countries such as Italy and Greece that desperately need stimulus spending. In terms of real GDP, Italy was the same size in 2016 as it was in 2001. Much like the franc zone, Italy, among other countries, needs to focus on improving employment rates, infrastructure projects, and competitive exports, to ensure growth in coming years.

When comparing eurozone countries to those that chose not to adopt the currency, such as Sweden and Hungary, the results are disappointing at best. National Gross Income (NGI) per capita in the eurozone grew at a rate of 1.65% in 2015, whereas Sweden saw growth rates around 2.72%. Additionally, Hungary, an emerging European economy, witnessed even higher growth rates, with NGI per capita reaching 3.06% in 2015. The success of independent Eastern European economies makes evident the disadvantage Southern Europe suffers being a part of the euro. Furthermore, when examining the eurozone within the global context, it is evident that as a whole they have fallen behind other developed countries. The US economy was just 13% bigger than the eurozone at it’s genesis, but now it is over 27% larger.

So why keep the euro? This question is obviously more nuanced in light of the highly integrated European economy and greater cultural and political ties of the EU, than are present in the franc zone. Brexit, despite not having a monetary element, should be evidence enough that disintegration is not a feasible option for Europe at this point. However, the shortcomings of the euro must still be recognized. The euro, rather than being of overt benefit to a neocolonial power as the franc is, does disproportionately benefit Germany. The significant undervaluation of the euro in Germany (about 17%) makes its exports extremely competitive and creates greater economic prosperity. Unfortunately, this leads to a vicious cycle where Germany becomes more and more prosperous and the ECB creates tighter monetary policies to adjust for German strength (ie higher interest rates), all while neglecting the needs of the weaker economies in the eurozone. For the benefit of not only the European project, but the 147 million people who use the CFA franc, the Germans should ease their tyrannical monetary policy and cozy relationship with the ECB.

Realistically however, the prospects of Germany doing this are unfavorable, and as a result the euro’s most likely fate seems to be an eventual phase out. The currency once intended to unite Europe, has since contributed to the very economic stagnation and rise of isolationism that will eventually be its demise. But perhaps this is to be expected when inflicting stringent monetary policy on nations with diverse economic needs and dissonant fiscal policies. It may be time to reconsider multinational currencies as a whole.

March 15, 2019 0 comment

Environmental Change Europe Featured

Models for Reducing Food Waste

written by Sareen Ishanyan

Throughout the world, food waste accounts for a significant percentage of carbon emissions. From the production, packaging, and decomposition, food and food waste are important to consider amid efforts to combat climate change. In recent years, legislation in France and South Korea have sought to address the matter of food waste in different ways. French legislation passed in 2016 seeks to address the matter by eliminating food waste from grocery stores. Grocery stores serve as the focal point of this effort as they have typically been major sites of waste. Meanwhile, South Korean laws aim to recycle household food waste through a ban on discarding food waste into landfills. Such efforts, which have been found to significantly reduce food waste in the respective regions, offer good models for the rest of the world. And while major US cities such as San Francisco and New York City have attempted to implement their own programs to target food waste, there is currently no national legislation in the United States which strongly targets food waste. As the United States, which wastes a third of its food, is the largest producer of food waste in the world, considering recent food waste legislation in France and South Korea can offer insight on the ways in which the US can tackle its struggles with food waste.

In 2016, the French government introduced a law aimed at reducing food waste across the nation. In a unanimous decision, the French parliament agreed to issue fines to grocery stores that throw away edible food. According to the law, edible food must either be donated to local charities or used as animal feed. Those markets in violation of this legislation run the risk of facing financial penalties. This legislation seeks to tackle food waste at the ‘consumption stage,’ which is the stage at which wealthier nations such as France typically waste much of their food. Further, the successes of this legislation, which is the first of its kind to set punitive damages for food waste, has rendered France a leader of global food sustainability.

South Korea, meanwhile, has taken a different approach to food waste. Beginning in the late 1990s, the South Korean government began to organize efforts to recycle and decrease food waste. South Korean households are charged for the amount of food waste that they produce a month, and are banned from discarding food waste into landfills. South Koreans are required to separate food waste from other forms of garbage that will ultimately end up in landfills. Since 2012, adoption of the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system has led to the proliferation of high-technology trash bins which accept food waste. When parting with their food waste at such depositories, South Koreans are required to scan identification cards which keep track of the amount of food waste that they produce. This stock of food waste is then turned into animal feed or biogas, the latter of which provides a good source of electricity for the power plants which recycle such waste. Thus, this legislation seeks to both recycle food waste, by diverting it from decaying and emitting greenhouse gases in landfills, and also encourage South Koreans to decrease their food waste. And much like the successes of French legislation, this South Korean law has led to decreases in food waste across the nation.

Furthermore, in spite of the lack of comprehensive national legislation, many American cities have still been increasingly involved in attempts to reduce food waste. For example, San Francisco has been a forerunner in food composting. The city passed legislation for such a program in 1996. By 2000, San Francisco was able to meet the California-wide goal of diverting half of its waste from landfills Then, in 2009, San Francisco established a mandatory program which requires residents and businesses to compost food waste. Even tourists to the city are required to separate their trash between recycle, landfill, and compost bins. This food composting program has succeeded in decreasing food waste, and also has allowed for conversion of food waste into productive composting materials which provide nutrients to the soil. Similarly, beginning under the Bloomberg administration in 2013, New York City began its own attempts to divert food waste from landfills. NYC implemented a program for residential organic collection, thus providing an increasing number of city residents with a convenient way to recycle food and yard waste.

Food waste is an important issue amid the widening concern for climate change. Countries such as France and South Korea, and American cities such as San Francisco and NYC have taken meaningful strides in reducing the food waste produced by their residents. Each has tackled the matter in a slightly different way and while these efforts have proven successful, no state has yet effectively addressed food waste at all levels of the food system. Still, these varying efforts offer good models for policymakers around the globe. Given the amount of food waste produced by the United States, it is particularly important that American policymakers at the national level consider and possibly adopt such models. Such is especially the case in light of the implications that food waste has on the environment.

January 9, 2019 0 comment

Europe Featured Immigration International Trade Populism The International Economy

State of the European Union

written by Grayson Peters

Two years after the British people narrowly voted for a “Brexit” referendum to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European Union, the EU is more threatened than ever. Trade and customs negotiations between the British government and the European Union are at a standstill, nationalist parties blame the EU’s open border policy for enabling the passage of Syrian and and African refugees into Europe, and support for pan-European internationalism appears to be in decline. Political pressure from emboldened Eurosceptics like former London Mayor Boris Johnson and ardent Europeanists like French President Emmanuel Macron complicates the already fraught negotiations between the EU and UK. How these negotiations unfold may well determine whether or not the European system endures or succumbs to nationalist revolts in its member states.

At 11 PM on March 29, 2019, the United Kingdom is scheduled to exit the European Union. In the event of a “No-Deal” Brexit – that is, an exit without any trade or customs agreements with the European Union – the UK will be left without a legal framework for trade or border controls with the EU. In the short term, the result would be absolute pandemonium.

At present, EU-UK negotiations are deadlocked. Despite UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s insistence that a deal on border controls and other contentious issues such as aviation rules and fishing rights is still possible, disagreements persist without a resolution in sight. More critically, however, is the potential for a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which concluded the Troubles – decades of sectarian violence between Irish supporters of the United Kingdom and those desiring an independent Irish state – established a ceasefire between Irish Republican guerillas and the United Kingdom. The division between British-governed Northern Ireland and its southern neighbor, the Republic of Ireland remained. As a compromise, citizens of Northern Ireland were given the option of being both Irish and British citizens, and the border between the two Irish states was softened to allow greater freedom of movement.

In 2016, Northern Ireland, still a part of the United Kingdom, overwhelmingly opposed the Brexit referendum and voted to remain in the European Union, but was outvoted by the rest of the UK. If the UK is unable to reach an agreement with the EU that includes free movement of citizens (akin to the existing Schengen Area), a political crisis may result. A hard border between a non-EU Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, still an EU member state, could undo the fragile peace and inflame Irish nationalist and unionist passions.

While talks between the British government and the European Union stall, internal political pressure from hard-line Brexiteers like Boris Johnson, who demand a more complete withdrawal than even Prime Minister May is proposing, threatens the likelihood of a deal. Johnson and other proponents of total disengagement from European institutions are fomenting an internal revolt within the UK’s Conservative Party, claiming that Prime Minister May’s “Chequers Plan” preserves unacceptably close ties with the EU and fails to “take back control” from European customs and trade regulatory agencies. Johnson resigned his cabinet post in July in protest of the Chequers Plan, sending May’s government into a tailspin and renewing concerns about the feasibility of a Brexit deal. Any agreement reached between May’s government and the EU will likely be seen as too moderate by Johnson and other strict Brexiteers, but the EU is unlikely to accept a “Hard Brexit” akin to what Johnson proposes.

To further complicate matters, French President Emmanuel Macron has taken a noticeably tougher stance on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, labeling Brexit proponents “liars” and rejecting May’s insistence that the EU accept the Chequers Plan as a framework for ongoing negotiations. For Macron, this hard-line stance on Brexit negotiations is not motivated by any pragmatic concern for the fine print of an eventual UK-EU deal, but by an overarching desire to preserve the integrity of the European system.

The European Union is extremely vulnerable, more so than at any previous time since it was founded by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The Greek bailout, in which the EU (mostly Germany and France) were obliged to extend credit to a fiscally-irresponsible and oft-corrupt Greek government, concluded on August 20th of this year, but financial instability in neighboring Italy, whose populist government under the Five Star Movement is violating EU fiscal rules as it increases welfare spending, has experts worried that another sovereign debt crisis is on the horizon. Nationalist movements are ascendant across Europe; along with the Five Star Movement, Germany’s AfD, France’s National Rally (formerly National Front), and others have capitalized on their constituencies’ opposition to the liberal democratic order, internationalism, and immigration embodied by the European Union.

Macron’s stance on Brexit should be read as an intentional show of force to impress upon other nations the costs of exiting the European Union. If the UK were allowed to exit the EU with favorable terms, this would likely embolden other Eurosceptics like France’s own National Rally. If other European nations believed that they could free-ride and keep the benefits of EU membership, such as the tariff-free common market, while avoiding the dues, restrictions, and open-border policy, they would likely follow in the UK’s example. Macron is thus determined to make the UK’s exit from the European Union difficult either to dissuade continental Eurosceptics in the event of a “Hard Brexit” or to encourage the UK to reverse course in face of the likely costs.

Even though France continues to insist that a Brexit deal is achievable, the French government has begun drawing up contingency plans, pointing to a real fear that no deal will be finalized before the March 2019 deadline. The French Parliament published a draft bill, which can be quickly passed in the event of a “No-Deal” Brexit, to address issues including work permits and residency visas for British nationals. According to French minister of European Affairs Nathalie Loiseau, the Eurostar train which connects England and France underneath the English channel might be barred from entering French soil, and British planes could be denied access to French airspace if no Brexit deal is finalized.

This would be a dramatic departure from the current state of affairs, which is essentially a state of open borders between the UK and continental Europe. At present, the journey from France to England is a 35 minute train ride under the English Channel, so brief that so-called “Eurocommuters” can live in one country but work in the other. Next year, that same train may be turned away by armed police at the French border.

The potential economic costs of Brexit are severe for both the United Kingdom and European Union nations like France. The Center for European Progress estimates that, even though the UK has not yet officially left the European Union, wary European investors and reduced cross-channel trade have already made a dent in the British economy, to the tune of “€26 billion [$29.49 billion] per annum – or €500 million [$567 million] a week.” The Center’s study projected that as a result of the passage of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the British economy is 2.5% smaller than it otherwise would have been. When the UK actually exits the EU, the economic repercussions will be even more severe, especially in the event of a “Hard” or “No-Deal” Brexit which results in significant barriers to trade and investment. The International Monetary Fund projects that a “No-Deal” Brexit would cost the EU around $250 billion, or about 1.5% of the EU’s GDP.

It is a very real possibility that, in the event of a “No-Deal” withdrawal from the European Union, the United Kingdom will become immediately isolated from the European continent and excluded from the European body politic for the first time in twenty years. If that comes to pass, continental nationalist parties will no doubt be emboldened, and the European experiment of free trade, free movement, and free people may find itself in mortal danger. At a time when illiberal sentiments such as hyper-nationalism, xenophobia, and distrust of globalism appear to be in vogue, the survival or disintegration of the European Union will likely determine whether or not the liberal international order can endure.

What does all this mean for confused American spectators? Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S has greatly benefited from this liberal order, built on rules-based international organizations, free trade agreements, and, ideally, respect for human rights. In large part, this is because the United States was the de-facto leader of the postwar West, hence the moniker “Leader of the Free World,” and has therefore traditionally held great sway over the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and similar institutions.

Nationalist movements which threaten the European Union are in many ways identical to the post-2016 American Right which calls for immigration restrictions, trade protectionism, and a withdrawal of American support for international institutions like NATO. With the U.S. itching to abdicate these responsibilities, if the European Union falls, so too may the international system upon which American hegemony has rested for the last 70 years.

November 5, 2018 0 comment

Europe Featured Global Health Immigration Populism

Measles: Europe’s Underreported Epidemic

written by Andrea Zachrich

Worldwide, measles cases have been declining for decades, but in Europe there has been a dangerous reversal of that trend throughout the last several years. In 2016, there were 5,273 cases of measles recorded in Europe, an all-time low. Yet, in 2017, the number of cases jumped to 23,927. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in the first 6 months of 2018, there were over 41,000 recorded cases and 37 fatalities, and that number continues to grow.

Measles is a highly contagious infectious disease spread through airborne particles exhaled by an infected individual. About 1 percent of all cases are fatal and the disease can cause permanent harm. In some cases, the disease can result in permanent hearing loss or affect brain functioning and development. Although Europe’s recent measles outbreak is a seemingly insignificant issue that’s consequences are often ignored, its roots can be traced in part to other, more notable European phenomenons such as populism, disruption of healthcare due to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and poor funding, and massive waves of immigration.

Over the last several years, Europe has witnessed a resurgence of right-wing populism and ethno-nationalism in many countries, embodied by the politics of Viktor Orban of Hungary, Beppe Grillo of Italy, and Marine Le Pen of France, among others. Many of these populist politicians show a deep distrust of the scientific community and their research, including those regarding vaccines. As such, many have claimed that vaccines are harmful in spite of vast amounts of evidence to the contrary. Some, such as Grillo, founder of Italy’s Five Star Movement, have explicitly linked vaccines and autism. In July, Italy passed a law reversing their parliament’s earlier requirement that parents have documentation of 10 vaccines before sending their children to school. The popular myth that there is a link between vaccines and autism can be traced back to a now-debunked 1998 study by British gastroenterologist Andrew Wakefield. The study was shown to have used falsified data and Wakefield has since lost his medical license. Moreover, numerous studies since have found no link between the MMR vaccine and autism. Despite this, many still cite Wakefield’s paper to support their opposition to vaccines. Marine Le Pen, the French right-wing politician and 2017 presidential candidate, voiced her opposition to a bill in parliament requiring school-aged children to be vaccinated, citing a lack of long-term evidence of the effects of vaccines, despite the fact that such evidence exists. Additionally, in France, the trust citizens have in vaccines is alarmingly low; 41 percent of people surveyed in France disagree that vaccines are safe. Other European countries hit hard by the recent measles outbreak, such as Ukraine and Greece, also show low levels of trust, and having high ranking members of globally powerful governments discussing the links between vaccines and diseases certainly won’t help. This political rhetoric and the distrust of a once widely-respected scientific community by populist politicians is already having- and therefore likely will continue to have- dire effects on global health.

In addition, another cause of the spike in measles cases in Europe can be traced to Ukraine and the disruption of its healthcare system due to violence. Ukraine was home to over half the measles cases from 2018. Experts have blamed Russia’s invasion of the Crimea, a small peninsula on the Black Sea, for the disruption of health care services that have prevented many Ukrainians from receiving vaccinations. In addition to the invasion, the Ukrainian healthcare system requires individuals to pay higher out of pocket fees for services than those in other European countries. Ukraine’s share of healthcare spending out of pocket is the second-highest in Eastern Europe at around 50 percent. Cost to the patient is thus a strong motivator for Ukrainians not to get vaccinated. While there are plans to reform this system, Ukrainians continue to pay more than their Eastern European counterparts in the meantime. With a healthcare system that disincentivizes vaccinations for many through high out of pocket fees and a war that has prohibited it for others, it’s no wonder the European measles outbreak has hit Ukraine particularly hard.

The final piece of Europe’s measles puzzle can be traced to the continent’s ongoing migrant crisis. Between 2013 and 2016 the number of applications for asylum in Europe jumped from 354,000 to 1.1 million per year, with a peak of 1.23 million in 2015. Since these migrants- most of whom are of Middle Eastern and North African descent- are escaping violence in their home countries, many of them haven’t received the measles vaccine like their European neighbors have. This has led to huge outbreaks of the disease in popular refugee destinations such as Greece, which had 173,000 migrants living in reception centers or camps in 2016. At the time, Greece was not routinely offering vaccines to adult migrants (although they were giving them to children). Greece also waits to offer vaccines until migrants are living at the holding or the community level, thus missing the opportunity to vaccinate people as they arrive. Italy– another migrant haven due to its location on the Mediterranean- has exhibited similar problems with vaccinating migrants entering the country. This influx of unvaccinated adult migrants combined with the existing population’s low vaccination rate has too been partially responsible for the measles flare-up in Europe.

The often ignored measles outbreak can therefore best be understood as a symptom of the larger, more reported trends in Europe such as right-wing populism, Russia’s invasion of the Crimea, and the high level of Muslim immigrants entering the continent. With these cultural and political shifts unlikely to change anytime soon, it is of the utmost importance that European countries, the EU, or even the WHO pursue tactics to address the disease and become more aggressive in their vaccination efforts. Possible solutions include education campaigns for new parents or for young school children, a push for stronger vaccination laws, and vaccination requirements for all immigrants – not just the children. Vaccines have extraordinarily high success rates and have saved countless lives, but they require upwards of 95 percent of the population to be vaccinated in order to prevent an outbreak of the disease. In September of 2017, measles was declared dead in England, meaning that it had low enough case numbers for three years to determine that it was not spreading through the population. This decision was reversed earlier this year. It should be a public health goal to declare measles dead in all of Europe. With vaccines being the only tool we have at our disposal, it is of the utmost importance that governments, the EU, and GNO’s alike make widespread vaccination a priority.

October 4, 2018 0 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics History Military Russia Security and Conflict Territorial disputes Vladimir Putin

The Russo-Georgian War, 10 Years Later

written by Conor McDonald

On August 7th, 2008, the leaders of the Russian Federation shocked the world and made the controversial decision to mobilize and invade Georgia, a small, sovereign nation located in the Caucasus Mountains just south of Russia. The Georgian military had been engaged with separatists from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for just under a week, yet by the time a large batch of Russian military personnel entered their territory through the mountainous Roki tunnel at 11:00 PM, it was too late. Despite what any news outlets would later report, the international community knew that Georgia had just lost a major chunk of its territory to this aggressor from the north. What no one knew, however, was that this seemingly minor excursion would begin a decade’s worth of continued Russian belligerence and adventurism toward its neighbors. But why start with Georgia?

Historically, the strained relations between Russia and Georgia are nothing new, and can be traced back as early as the year 1785 when the Russian Empire violated a treaty and refused to defend the eastern Georgian Kingdom during a Persian invasion. Some decades later, in 1801, Georgia joined the Russian Empire, and it remained a protected member up until 1918 when the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia was established following the Russian Revolution and the abdication of the Russian Tsardom. This was short-lived, however, as the Bolsheviks and the Red Army overthrew the Georgian government in 1921 and forcibly annexed the region into the newly-established United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1922.

The USSR forced an era of tension, fear and powerlessness upon the citizens of Georgia. Under the first three years of Soviet control alone, approximately 50,000 Georgians were executed by the government, while an insurmountable 150,000 were purged up through 1951 by Joseph Stalin, a native Georgian himself. Additionally, basic rights to citizenship were stripped; according to Michael Parrish in The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953, Stalin forced entire Ingush, Chechen, Balkarian and Karachay populations, all native to Georgia, into deportation. Georgian territories were seized and distributed amongst various states, including Armenia and Turkey, and nearly half of the 700,000 soldiers that the country was forced to contribute toward the Red Army were killed over the course of World War II. Even when relatively progressive leaders like Nikita Khrushchev took control of the Soviet Union — “progressive” in that he succeeded Stalin — Georgian protests promoting independence from the USSR resulted in the massacring of hundreds of college students and demonstrators.

Thus, it should surprise no one that, upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Georgian officials were quick to declare sovereignty and begin holding democratic elections. Unfortunately, the radical and autocratic Georgian presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia prompted some to lose faith in their nation, and pro-Russian separatist groups gained prominence in certain regions — most notably in South Ossetia and Abkhazia — leading to a short-lasting civil war in the latter. Somewhat ironically, this forced Georgia to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to receive Russian military support, and, in 2001, Abkhazia and Georgia co-signed “an accord pledging not to use force against each other.”

After the accord’s ratification, a shaky sense of peace was established between Georgia and the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was clearly imperfect, though, as protests and skirmishes continued to break out while political tensions rose unwaveringly; South Ossetia even went so far as to hold an unofficial referendum in which 99% of the public voted in favor of independence, an act ignored by the European Union but supported by the Russia Duma. Two years later, after hearing direct pleas for support from Abkhazian and South Ossetian officials, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stated that allying with the separatist regions “is not an easy choice, but it is the only way to save the lives of people,” and pledged both political and military support to both. Several months later, after the Georgian military responded to another South Ossetian attack, Russia launched its now-infamous military invasion.

Russia’s 2008 seizure of the Ossetian and Abkhazian territories provided eerie foreshadowing for what the Federation’s neighbors had in store. Six years later, in 2014, a near-identical crisis transpired in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions, disputes which continue to the time of this article’s publication. The primary characteristic that both the Georgian and Ukrainian annexation attempts had in common is that they highlighted deep, pervading insecurities from within the highest ranks of Russian leadership. These insecurities are two-pronged, with stress placed on both military and political pressures. From a military perspective, the intimidating reach of NATO expansion is obviously considered to be a pervading, existential threat; Georgia and Ukraine were invaded while the United States and the West considered their bids to enter NATO. However, the more alarming insecurities are political, and they continue to grow increasingly problematic as democracy gains popularity within Russian spheres of influence.

During a 2005 visit, President George W. Bush proudly referred to Georgia as a beacon of liberty in a region where freedom is not always to be taken for granted. He spoke glowingly about the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, in which a peaceful change of power allied Georgia more strongly with the West. This revolution preceded and arguably inspired Ukraine’s 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, which forced the overturning of then-President Viktor Yanukovych and his corrupt, Russophilic administration in favor of the more Western-oriented candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. These so-called Color Revolutions, which also took place in post-Soviet Yugoslavia and Kyrgyzstan, sent a message to their former occupier that these nations were now independent and desirous of fair domestic representation. Seeing that his neighbors were quickly working to distance themselves from the influence of a relatively weakened Russia, it would not take a foreign affairs specialist to understand that Vladimir Putin, a longstanding disbeliever in the promises of democracy, was far from pleased with the symbolism of these revolts.

Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko began to indirectly lay the groundwork for his own country’s invasion by publicly voicing his support for Georgian independence. It is no coincidence that this controversial anti-Russian stance hurdled Ukraine toward further political crisis in November of that year, a window which Russia seized to further exacerbate political troubles. When Yanukovych successfully regained his presidency in 2013, Ukraine spiraled into yet another revolution, and this time Putin chose to involve himself on his pro-Russia counterpart’s behalf. Shortly after, the autonomous region of Crimea was annexed by Russian soldiers.

Russia had been guilty of testing Western resolve all throughout the 21st century, particularly in Eastern Europe, but the dramatic actions against Georgia in 2008 marked a critical shift in Russian foreign policy. Long gone were the days of press releases or discrete political subversion, and ushered in was an era of violent military intervention and territorial seizures. The only thing protecting Russia’s other Western-oriented, post-Soviet neighbors is their NATO membership, and the United States and its allies should not be surprised to see Russian intervention on behalf of other separatist groups from non-member states in the coming years. Ten years after the events in Georgia, the world still waits to see who will be next.

September 26, 2018 8 comments

Africa Europe Featured History Military Security and Conflict Uncategorized

La Guerre du Sahel

written by Grayson Peters

Along a desert road, a military convoy is passed by an unassuming gray car. There is a sudden explosion, then gunfire. Fifteen minutes later, four civilians are dead and eight Western soldiers are wounded. This is not the first act of terrorism in the region, nor will it be the last. The story is familiar – an Islamic terrorist attack against Western soldiers stationed in the region – but the players and setting are not. These foreign forces are not American, and the battleground is not Iraq or Afghanistan. The soldiers are French, and they are in the Sahel, a sub-Saharan strip of Africa that links the Atlantic Ocean to the west and the Red Sea to the east.

The Sahel is a vast, scarcely populated, and loosely governed region that stretches across fourteen African countries, including Mali, Chad, and Niger. In recent decades, the absence of effective governance has allowed the Sahel to become a hotbed of political violence and a safe haven for transnational terrorist organizations. Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and smaller, regional terrorist organizations have all used the Sahel as a base of operations and refuge from counter-terrorist operations. The Sahel states’ porous borders enable militant groups to travel unchecked across vast swaths of the continent and strike targets in North African nations such as Algeria and Tunisia.

Ethnic and economic tensions in the Sahel predate the arrival of transient Islamic terrorist organizations, but temporary alliances between militant groups and villagers increase the scale and danger of regional violence. The New York Times reported that France and Mali estimate that ISIS in the Greater Sahara has only 40 to 60 core members. By inflaming local passions and escalating grievances between villagers, small groups of transnational militants are able to create disproportionately large violence and chaos. For instance, Niger and Mali’s cattle-herding Tuareg people, who had previously only taken up arms to defend their cattle and on occasion engage in small-scale ethnic violence, became involved with international terrorism. Far from home, Tuareg recruits have been involved in terrorist incidents in Libya, raids in Nigeria, and “banditry” in northern Niger and southern Algeria. Ethnic grievances between the Tuareg and Fulani peoples in both Mali and Niger led to ethnic armed conflict which was dramatically escalated by the presence of Islamic militant groups. Because these ethnic grievances are often intertwined with economic concerns, especially cattle ownership, external pressures that threaten the livelihood of Sahelian villagers can catalyze conflict.

As global warming progresses, the increased frequency of droughts, expanding desertification of the Sahel, and dwindling resources in the area will likely worsen regional tensions and create conditions favorable for the growth of terrorist networks. In 2012, according to the State Department, droughts and failed harvests in the Sahel placed 18.7 million Africans at risk for food insecurity, further fueling instability in the region. It is no coincidence that, immediately following the outbreak of drought, cattle die-offs, and famine, relations between Mali’s Tuareg and Fulani peoples worsened. A series of escalating cattle raids led to an arms race and created an opportunity for al-Qaeda affiliates to supply villagers with automatic weapons. Within the year, the Tuareg people of northern Mali, with support from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) and rebelled against the central government of Mali.

When French military assets entered Mali in 2013, the campaign, known officially as Operation Serval, aimed to support the beleaguered Malian government and block the NMLA’s war for a Tuareg ethnostate in northern Mali. Although Mali and France decisively defeated the NMLA after only a few months, the French remained in Mali in an attempt to suppress a continued insurgency. Five years later, Operation Barkhane, France’s ongoing operation to stabilize the greater Sahel is ongoing and there are fresh casualties. As recently as July 1, a car bombing in Gao injured French soldiers and killed dozens of Malian civilians. Nusrat al-Islam, an al-Qaeda linked organization and the primary terrorist network currently operating in the Sahel, claimed responsibility.

In 2013, three-quarters of the French citizenry supported Operation Serval, the original intervention against NMLA secessionists in Mali. Today, substantial French support endures for the ongoing Operation Barkhane despite the campaign’s duration and casualties.

At first, it may seem surprising that France is leading the international effort to stamp out terrorism in the Sahel. After all, in 2003, the French government’s opposition to American intervention in Iraq was widely mocked in the United States. In protest, Los Angelenos (and even some UCLA students) publicly poured out French wine in front of the French consulate, and the U.S. House of Representatives cafeteria menu infamously renamed French fries to Freedom fries. During this wave of anti-French sentiment, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared that “France is becoming our enemy.” In 2003, France insisted on a multilateral diplomatic approach to Iraq, in opposition to U.S. President Bush’s insistence on unilateral military action. Yet, ten years later, the French army unilaterally entered Mali, touching off a protracted five-year campaign that has expanded to include the entire Sahel region.

What changed between Freedom fries and a permanent French presence in the Sahel? In reality, France’s relationships with Iraq and the Sahel are vastly different. Countries in the western Sahel such as Mali and Niger were colonized and imperialized by France during the European Scramble for Africa in the late 19th century. These Francophone African nations still bear both the trauma and cultural legacy of French rule.

Many leftist and African scholars argue that France’s reassertion of authority and military power over historic colonial possessions is best characterized as neo-imperialist. Skeptical that France’s primary concern is protecting Malian citizens from terrorism, these critics of French intervention point to plausible ulterior motives including the protection of French corporate mining interests and nearby uranium mines (in both Niger and Nigeria) on which the French energy sector relies. In February, Congolese novelist and UCLA professor Alain Mabanckou criticized la Francophonie, the informal and institutionalized network of French speaking countries, and described it not as a partnership of equals but as an instrument of French neo-imperial domination.

However, there is also evidence that the French feel a sense of obligation to and fraternity with the Francophone Africans of the Sahel. Cultural ties, a shared language, and a sense of historical interconnectedness (despite the region’s colonial past) are all factors. Arguably, elements within France feel a sense of guilt and noblesse oblige, or responsibility of the privileged, towards the nations their ancestors exploited. Whether this concern is genuine or paternalistically self-serving is a matter of debate. What is clear, however, is that the security situation in the Sahel is as of yet unresolved and that the potent mixture of ethnic conflict, Islamic terrorism, rising global temperatures, and increasingly severe droughts represents a enduring security risk for African nations and a source of serious concern for France.

September 19, 2018 0 comment

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