Europe

“France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts,”

This hostile and controversial statement was leveraged by Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s populist deputy Prime Minister, in a counterproductive attempt to deflect shared responsibility for Europe’s migrant crisis. However the currency in question should be a part of the larger discussion on globalization and post-colonial institutions. If European leaders were to earnestly evaluate the CFA franc not from their perspective but from the perspective of the affected Africans, they may find some unsettling similarities to the eurozone.

The CFA franc represents two distinct multinational currencies in Western and Central Africa. The currencies are effectively the same, as both have an exchange rate pegged to the euro (1 euro = 655, 957 francs), however they are not interchangeable. The logic behind the fixed exchange rate is to prevent inflation and promote investor security in nations where poor governance may otherwise threaten market stability. However, this comes at a very steep price for the nations involved. In return, they must keep 50% of their reserves in the French Treasury, follow the strict monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), and attempt to develop their economies with an inevitably overvalued currency.

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In the current economic landscape, African nations should seriously consider if the sacrifice of sovereignty necessitated by the franc is worth the supposed increase in prosperity. The crux of the problem is that the CFA franc is essentially a version of the euro, and relatively weak economies using a strong currency is counterproductive to economic development. The strength of the franc encourages imports and makes exports less competitive on the global market, stagnating the development of member nations. Additionally, the main priority of the ECB is to maintain stable prices, with inflation at a maximum of 2%. This policy makes sense for the top members of the European Union (EU), but a developing nation should be focused on high employment rates and exports, ideally with inflation rates of up to 8%. Moreover, the 50% reserve requirement of the franc zone countries greatly limits their investment options. The French treasury gives them a return rate of only .75%, which sometimes does not even match the level of inflation, much less provide a desperately needed return on investment.

The franc becomes even less attractive when considering the performance of other African economies. Former French colonies that abandoned the franc, such as Morocco and Algeria, are more successful economically, despite using an independent currency. Overall income per capita, adjusted for inflation, has grown 1.4% in the franc zone and 2.5% in the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the line of credit extended to the franc zone is pitiful. In the western franc zone (see map) the credit to GDP ratio is 25% and in the central franc zone it is only 13%! This is in comparison with the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa around 60%.

So why keep the CFA franc? The franc is known to benefit a small percentage of upper and middle class African citizens by providing easy access to imports and the ability to invest abroad, while by and large disadvantaging the 75% of the citizenry who are working class. To exacerbate things further, France and other foreign interests greatly benefit from the franc zone as an export market, and France is granted special access to African resources as a part of the agreement. Furthermore, the franc’s status as a multinational currency provides greater benefit to outside nations wanting to facilitate trade, than the internal member states. The franc is after all very poorly integrated, with intra-regional trade accounting for only 15% of total trade, while trade with Europe accounts for 60%. The French, along with the remainder of the eurozone, clearly profit off of the CFA franc.

Many African economists and politicians acknowledge these flaws, yet the question of how to move forward still remains. The French have responded to the protestations of their former colonies by supporting the creation of a new multinational African currency independent of the euro, that will incorporate more– and larger–African states, including but not limited to Nigeria. However, this still appears self-serving. There is minimal justification for the existence of a new multinational currency in Sub-Saharan Africa, and as aforementioned, it primarily benefits outsiders. The best interest of the franc zone may be to follow the advice of former World bank director Carlos Lopes. He believes the CFA franc should be tied to a basket of other currencies, including the notoriously undervalued Chinese yuan, or to hover around a target exchange rate with the euro, both which will help to mitigate the overvaluation of the franc, while maintaining the currency as a pillar of stability.

The tragic irony is that France, along with a number of Southern European states, are the victim of the euro in much the same way that the CFA franc is. The euro is too strong for the economies of Southern Europe. Estimates peg overvaluation at 5% in France and 7% in Greece. Furthermore, the emphasis on low inflation within the eurozone is really to the benefit of the booming German bloc, at the expense of countries such as Italy and Greece that desperately need stimulus spending. In terms of real GDP, Italy was the same size in 2016 as it was in 2001. Much like the franc zone, Italy, among other countries, needs to focus on improving employment rates, infrastructure projects, and competitive exports, to ensure growth in coming years.

When comparing eurozone countries to those that chose not to adopt the currency, such as Sweden and Hungary, the results are disappointing at best. National Gross Income (NGI) per capita in the eurozone grew at a rate of 1.65% in 2015, whereas Sweden saw growth rates around 2.72%. Additionally, Hungary, an emerging European economy, witnessed even higher growth rates, with NGI per capita reaching 3.06% in 2015. The success of independent Eastern European economies makes evident the disadvantage Southern Europe suffers being a part of the euro. Furthermore, when examining the eurozone within the global context, it is evident that as a whole they have fallen behind other developed countries. The US economy was just 13% bigger than the eurozone at it’s genesis, but now it is over 27% larger.

So why keep the euro? This question is obviously more nuanced in light of the highly integrated European economy and greater cultural and political ties of the EU, than are present in the franc zone. Brexit, despite not having a monetary element, should be evidence enough that disintegration is not a feasible option for Europe at this point. However, the shortcomings of the euro must still be recognized. The euro, rather than being of overt benefit to a neocolonial power as the franc is, does disproportionately benefit Germany. The significant undervaluation of the euro in Germany (about 17%) makes its exports extremely competitive and creates greater economic prosperity. Unfortunately, this leads to a vicious cycle where Germany becomes more and more prosperous and the ECB creates tighter monetary policies to adjust for German strength (ie higher interest rates), all while neglecting the needs of the weaker economies in the eurozone. For the benefit of not only the European project, but the 147 million people who use the CFA franc, the Germans should ease their tyrannical monetary policy and cozy relationship with the ECB.

Realistically however, the prospects of Germany doing this are unfavorable, and as a result the euro’s most likely fate seems to be an eventual phase out. The currency once intended to unite Europe, has since contributed to the very economic stagnation and rise of isolationism that will eventually be its demise. But perhaps this is to be expected when inflicting stringent monetary policy on nations with diverse economic needs and dissonant fiscal policies. It may be time to reconsider multinational currencies as a whole.

March 15, 2019 0 comment

Environmental Change Europe Featured

Models for Reducing Food Waste

written by Sareen Ishanyan

Throughout the world, food waste accounts for a significant percentage of carbon emissions. From the production, packaging, and decomposition, food and food waste are important to consider amid efforts to combat climate change. In recent years, legislation in France and South Korea have sought to address the matter of food waste in different ways. French legislation passed in 2016 seeks to address the matter by eliminating food waste from grocery stores. Grocery stores serve as the focal point of this effort as they have typically been major sites of waste. Meanwhile, South Korean laws aim to recycle household food waste through a ban on discarding food waste into landfills. Such efforts, which have been found to significantly reduce food waste in the respective regions, offer good models for the rest of the world. And while major US cities such as San Francisco and New York City have attempted to implement their own programs to target food waste, there is currently no national legislation in the United States which strongly targets food waste. As the United States, which wastes a third of its food, is the largest producer of food waste in the world, considering recent food waste legislation in France and South Korea can offer insight on the ways in which the US can tackle its struggles with food waste.

In 2016, the French government introduced a law aimed at reducing food waste across the nation. In a unanimous decision, the French parliament agreed to issue fines to grocery stores that throw away edible food. According to the law, edible food must either be donated to local charities or used as animal feed. Those markets in violation of this legislation run the risk of facing financial penalties. This legislation seeks to tackle food waste at the ‘consumption stage,’ which is the stage at which wealthier nations such as France typically waste much of their food. Further, the successes of this legislation, which is the first of its kind to set punitive damages for food waste, has rendered France a leader of global food sustainability.

South Korea, meanwhile, has taken a different approach to food waste. Beginning in the late 1990s, the South Korean government began to organize efforts to recycle and decrease food waste. South Korean households are charged for the amount of food waste that they produce a month, and are banned from discarding food waste into landfills. South Koreans are required to separate food waste from other forms of garbage that will ultimately end up in landfills. Since 2012, adoption of the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system has led to the proliferation of high-technology trash bins which accept food waste. When parting with their food waste at such depositories, South Koreans are required to scan identification cards which keep track of the amount of food waste that they produce. This stock of food waste is then turned into animal feed or biogas, the latter of which provides a good source of electricity for the power plants which recycle such waste. Thus, this legislation seeks to both recycle food waste, by diverting it from decaying and emitting greenhouse gases in landfills, and also encourage South Koreans to decrease their food waste. And much like the successes of French legislation, this South Korean law has led to decreases in food waste across the nation.

Furthermore, in spite of the lack of comprehensive national legislation, many American cities have still been increasingly involved in attempts to reduce food waste. For example, San Francisco has been a forerunner in food composting. The city passed legislation for such a program in 1996. By 2000, San Francisco was able to meet the California-wide goal of diverting half of its waste from landfills Then, in 2009, San Francisco established a mandatory program which requires residents and businesses to compost food waste. Even tourists to the city are required to separate their trash between recycle, landfill, and compost bins. This food composting program has succeeded in decreasing food waste, and also has allowed for conversion of food waste into productive composting materials which provide nutrients to the soil. Similarly, beginning under the Bloomberg administration in 2013, New York City began its own attempts to divert food waste from landfills. NYC implemented a program for residential organic collection, thus providing an increasing number of city residents with a convenient way to recycle food and yard waste.

Food waste is an important issue amid the widening concern for climate change. Countries such as France and South Korea, and American cities such as San Francisco and NYC have taken meaningful strides in reducing the food waste produced by their residents. Each has tackled the matter in a slightly different way and while these efforts have proven successful, no state has yet effectively addressed food waste at all levels of the food system. Still, these varying efforts offer good models for policymakers around the globe. Given the amount of food waste produced by the United States, it is particularly important that American policymakers at the national level consider and possibly adopt such models. Such is especially the case in light of the implications that food waste has on the environment.

January 9, 2019 0 comment

Europe Featured Immigration International Trade Populism The International Economy

State of the European Union

written by Grayson Peters

Two years after the British people narrowly voted for a “Brexit” referendum to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European Union, the EU is more threatened than ever. Trade and customs negotiations between the British government and the European Union are at a standstill, nationalist parties blame the EU’s open border policy for enabling the passage of Syrian and and African refugees into Europe, and support for pan-European internationalism appears to be in decline. Political pressure from emboldened Eurosceptics like former London Mayor Boris Johnson and ardent Europeanists like French President Emmanuel Macron complicates the already fraught negotiations between the EU and UK. How these negotiations unfold may well determine whether or not the European system endures or succumbs to nationalist revolts in its member states.

At 11 PM on March 29, 2019, the United Kingdom is scheduled to exit the European Union. In the event of a “No-Deal” Brexit – that is, an exit without any trade or customs agreements with the European Union – the UK will be left without a legal framework for trade or border controls with the EU. In the short term, the result would be absolute pandemonium.

At present, EU-UK negotiations are deadlocked. Despite UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s insistence that a deal on border controls and other contentious issues such as aviation rules and fishing rights is still possible, disagreements persist without a resolution in sight. More critically, however, is the potential for a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which concluded the Troubles – decades of sectarian violence between Irish supporters of the United Kingdom and those desiring an independent Irish state – established a ceasefire between Irish Republican guerillas and the United Kingdom. The division between British-governed Northern Ireland and its southern neighbor, the Republic of Ireland remained. As a compromise, citizens of Northern Ireland were given the option of being both Irish and British citizens, and the border between the two Irish states was softened to allow greater freedom of movement.

In 2016, Northern Ireland, still a part of the United Kingdom, overwhelmingly opposed the Brexit referendum and voted to remain in the European Union, but was outvoted by the rest of the UK. If the UK is unable to reach an agreement with the EU that includes free movement of citizens (akin to the existing Schengen Area), a political crisis may result. A hard border between a non-EU Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, still an EU member state, could undo the fragile peace and inflame Irish nationalist and unionist passions.

While talks between the British government and the European Union stall, internal political pressure from hard-line Brexiteers like Boris Johnson, who demand a more complete withdrawal than even Prime Minister May is proposing, threatens the likelihood of a deal. Johnson and other proponents of total disengagement from European institutions are fomenting an internal revolt within the UK’s Conservative Party, claiming that Prime Minister May’s “Chequers Plan” preserves unacceptably close ties with the EU and fails to “take back control” from European customs and trade regulatory agencies. Johnson resigned his cabinet post in July in protest of the Chequers Plan, sending May’s government into a tailspin and renewing concerns about the feasibility of a Brexit deal. Any agreement reached between May’s government and the EU will likely be seen as too moderate by Johnson and other strict Brexiteers, but the EU is unlikely to accept a “Hard Brexit” akin to what Johnson proposes.

To further complicate matters, French President Emmanuel Macron has taken a noticeably tougher stance on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, labeling Brexit proponents “liars” and rejecting May’s insistence that the EU accept the Chequers Plan as a framework for ongoing negotiations. For Macron, this hard-line stance on Brexit negotiations is not motivated by any pragmatic concern for the fine print of an eventual UK-EU deal, but by an overarching desire to preserve the integrity of the European system.

The European Union is extremely vulnerable, more so than at any previous time since it was founded by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The Greek bailout, in which the EU (mostly Germany and France) were obliged to extend credit to a fiscally-irresponsible and oft-corrupt Greek government, concluded on August 20th of this year, but financial instability in neighboring Italy, whose populist government under the Five Star Movement is violating EU fiscal rules as it increases welfare spending, has experts worried that another sovereign debt crisis is on the horizon. Nationalist movements are ascendant across Europe; along with the Five Star Movement, Germany’s AfD, France’s National Rally (formerly National Front), and others have capitalized on their constituencies’ opposition to the liberal democratic order, internationalism, and immigration embodied by the European Union.

Macron’s stance on Brexit should be read as an intentional show of force to impress upon other nations the costs of exiting the European Union. If the UK were allowed to exit the EU with favorable terms, this would likely embolden other Eurosceptics like France’s own National Rally. If other European nations believed that they could free-ride and keep the benefits of EU membership, such as the tariff-free common market, while avoiding the dues, restrictions, and open-border policy, they would likely follow in the UK’s example. Macron is thus determined to make the UK’s exit from the European Union difficult either to dissuade continental Eurosceptics in the event of a “Hard Brexit” or to encourage the UK to reverse course in face of the likely costs.

Even though France continues to insist that a Brexit deal is achievable, the French government has begun drawing up contingency plans, pointing to a real fear that no deal will be finalized before the March 2019 deadline. The French Parliament published a draft bill, which can be quickly passed in the event of a “No-Deal” Brexit, to address issues including work permits and residency visas for British nationals. According to French minister of European Affairs Nathalie Loiseau, the Eurostar train which connects England and France underneath the English channel might be barred from entering French soil, and British planes could be denied access to French airspace if no Brexit deal is finalized.

This would be a dramatic departure from the current state of affairs, which is essentially a state of open borders between the UK and continental Europe. At present, the journey from France to England is a 35 minute train ride under the English Channel, so brief that so-called “Eurocommuters” can live in one country but work in the other. Next year, that same train may be turned away by armed police at the French border.

The potential economic costs of Brexit are severe for both the United Kingdom and European Union nations like France. The Center for European Progress estimates that, even though the UK has not yet officially left the European Union, wary European investors and reduced cross-channel trade have already made a dent in the British economy, to the tune of “€26 billion [$29.49 billion] per annum – or €500 million [$567 million] a week.” The Center’s study projected that as a result of the passage of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the British economy is 2.5% smaller than it otherwise would have been. When the UK actually exits the EU, the economic repercussions will be even more severe, especially in the event of a “Hard” or “No-Deal” Brexit which results in significant barriers to trade and investment. The International Monetary Fund projects that a “No-Deal” Brexit would cost the EU around $250 billion, or about 1.5% of the EU’s GDP.

It is a very real possibility that, in the event of a “No-Deal” withdrawal from the European Union, the United Kingdom will become immediately isolated from the European continent and excluded from the European body politic for the first time in twenty years. If that comes to pass, continental nationalist parties will no doubt be emboldened, and the European experiment of free trade, free movement, and free people may find itself in mortal danger. At a time when illiberal sentiments such as hyper-nationalism, xenophobia, and distrust of globalism appear to be in vogue, the survival or disintegration of the European Union will likely determine whether or not the liberal international order can endure.

What does all this mean for confused American spectators? Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S has greatly benefited from this liberal order, built on rules-based international organizations, free trade agreements, and, ideally, respect for human rights. In large part, this is because the United States was the de-facto leader of the postwar West, hence the moniker “Leader of the Free World,” and has therefore traditionally held great sway over the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and similar institutions.

Nationalist movements which threaten the European Union are in many ways identical to the post-2016 American Right which calls for immigration restrictions, trade protectionism, and a withdrawal of American support for international institutions like NATO. With the U.S. itching to abdicate these responsibilities, if the European Union falls, so too may the international system upon which American hegemony has rested for the last 70 years.

November 5, 2018 0 comment

A Tetanus, Diphtheria, Pertussis vaccination is prepared for a patient in the clinic at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., May 29, 2012. The Tdap vaccine protects against those viruses that can cause illness like lockjaw and whooping cough. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Alexxis Pons Abascal)

Europe Featured Global Health Immigration Populism

Measles: Europe’s Underreported Epidemic

written by Andrea Zachrich

Worldwide, measles cases have been declining for decades, but in Europe there has been a dangerous reversal of that trend throughout the last several years. In 2016, there were 5,273 cases of measles recorded in Europe, an all-time low. Yet, in 2017, the number of cases jumped to 23,927. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in the first 6 months of 2018, there were over 41,000 recorded cases and 37 fatalities, and that number continues to grow.

Measles is a highly contagious infectious disease spread through airborne particles exhaled by an infected individual. About 1 percent of all cases are fatal and the disease can cause permanent harm. In some cases, the disease can result in permanent hearing loss or affect brain functioning and development. Although Europe’s recent measles outbreak is a seemingly insignificant issue that’s consequences are often ignored, its roots can be traced in part to other, more notable European phenomenons such as populism, disruption of healthcare due to Russia’s invasion of Crimea and poor funding, and massive waves of immigration.

Over the last several years, Europe has witnessed a resurgence of right-wing populism and ethno-nationalism in many countries, embodied by the politics of Viktor Orban of Hungary, Beppe Grillo of Italy, and Marine Le Pen of France, among others. Many of these populist politicians show a deep distrust of the scientific community and their research, including those regarding vaccines. As such, many have claimed that vaccines are harmful in spite of vast amounts of evidence to the contrary. Some, such as Grillo, founder of Italy’s Five Star Movement, have explicitly linked vaccines and autism. In July, Italy passed a law reversing their parliament’s earlier requirement that parents have documentation of 10 vaccines before sending their children to school. The popular myth that there is a link between vaccines and autism can be traced back to a now-debunked 1998 study by British gastroenterologist Andrew Wakefield. The study was shown to have used falsified data and Wakefield has since lost his medical license. Moreover, numerous studies since have found no link between the MMR vaccine and autism. Despite this, many still cite Wakefield’s paper to support their opposition to vaccines. Marine Le Pen, the French right-wing politician and 2017 presidential candidate, voiced her opposition to a bill in parliament requiring school-aged children to be vaccinated, citing a lack of long-term evidence of the effects of vaccines, despite the fact that such evidence exists. Additionally, in France, the trust citizens have in vaccines is alarmingly low; 41 percent of people surveyed in France disagree that vaccines are safe. Other European countries hit hard by the recent measles outbreak, such as Ukraine and Greece, also show low levels of trust, and having high ranking members of globally powerful governments discussing the links between vaccines and diseases certainly won’t help. This political rhetoric and the distrust of a once widely-respected scientific community by populist politicians is already having- and therefore likely will continue to have- dire effects on global health.

In addition, another cause of the spike in measles cases in Europe can be traced to Ukraine and the disruption of its healthcare system due to violence. Ukraine was home to over half the measles cases from 2018. Experts have blamed Russia’s invasion of the Crimea, a small peninsula on the Black Sea, for the disruption of health care services that have prevented many Ukrainians from receiving vaccinations. In addition to the invasion, the Ukrainian healthcare system requires individuals to pay higher out of pocket fees for services than those in other European countries. Ukraine’s share of healthcare spending out of pocket is the second-highest in Eastern Europe at around 50 percent. Cost to the patient is thus a strong motivator for Ukrainians not to get vaccinated. While there are plans to reform this system, Ukrainians continue to pay more than their Eastern European counterparts in the meantime. With a healthcare system that disincentivizes vaccinations for many through high out of pocket fees and a war that has prohibited it for others, it’s no wonder the European measles outbreak has hit Ukraine particularly hard.

The final piece of Europe’s measles puzzle can be traced to the continent’s ongoing migrant crisis. Between 2013 and 2016 the number of applications for asylum in Europe jumped from 354,000 to 1.1 million per year, with a peak of 1.23 million in 2015. Since these migrants- most of whom are of Middle Eastern and North African descent- are escaping violence in their home countries, many of them haven’t received the measles vaccine like their European neighbors have. This has led to huge outbreaks of the disease in popular refugee destinations such as Greece, which had 173,000 migrants living in reception centers or camps in 2016. At the time, Greece was not routinely offering vaccines to adult migrants (although they were giving them to children). Greece also waits to offer vaccines until migrants are living at the holding or the community level, thus missing the opportunity to vaccinate people as they arrive. Italy– another migrant haven due to its location on the Mediterranean- has exhibited similar problems with vaccinating migrants entering the country. This influx of unvaccinated adult migrants combined with the existing population’s low vaccination rate has too been partially responsible for the measles flare-up in Europe.

The often ignored measles outbreak can therefore best be understood as a symptom of the larger, more reported trends in Europe such as right-wing populism, Russia’s invasion of the Crimea, and the high level of Muslim immigrants entering the continent. With these cultural and political shifts unlikely to change anytime soon, it is of the utmost importance that European countries, the EU, or even the WHO pursue tactics to address the disease and become more aggressive in their vaccination efforts. Possible solutions include education campaigns for new parents or for young school children, a push for stronger vaccination laws, and vaccination requirements for all immigrants – not just the children. Vaccines have extraordinarily high success rates and have saved countless lives, but they require upwards of 95 percent of the population to be vaccinated in order to prevent an outbreak of the disease. In September of 2017, measles was declared dead in England, meaning that it had low enough case numbers for three years to determine that it was not spreading through the population. This decision was reversed earlier this year. It should be a public health goal to declare measles dead in all of Europe. With vaccines being the only tool we have at our disposal, it is of the utmost importance that governments, the EU, and GNO’s alike make widespread vaccination a priority.

October 4, 2018 0 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics History Military Russia Security and Conflict Territorial disputes Vladimir Putin

The Russo-Georgian War, 10 Years Later

written by Conor McDonald

On August 7th, 2008, the leaders of the Russian Federation shocked the world and made the controversial decision to mobilize and invade Georgia, a small, sovereign nation located in the Caucasus Mountains just south of Russia. The Georgian military had been engaged with separatists from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for just under a week, yet by the time a large batch of Russian military personnel entered their territory through the mountainous Roki tunnel at 11:00 PM, it was too late. Despite what any news outlets would later report, the international community knew that Georgia had just lost a major chunk of its territory to this aggressor from the north. What no one knew, however, was that this seemingly minor excursion would begin a decade’s worth of continued Russian belligerence and adventurism toward its neighbors. But why start with Georgia?

Historically, the strained relations between Russia and Georgia are nothing new, and can be traced back as early as the year 1785 when the Russian Empire violated a treaty and refused to defend the eastern Georgian Kingdom during a Persian invasion. Some decades later, in 1801, Georgia joined the Russian Empire, and it remained a protected member up until 1918 when the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia was established following the Russian Revolution and the abdication of the Russian Tsardom. This was short-lived, however, as the Bolsheviks and the Red Army overthrew the Georgian government in 1921 and forcibly annexed the region into the newly-established United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1922.

The USSR forced an era of tension, fear and powerlessness upon the citizens of Georgia. Under the first three years of Soviet control alone, approximately 50,000 Georgians were executed by the government, while an insurmountable 150,000 were purged up through 1951 by Joseph Stalin, a native Georgian himself. Additionally, basic rights to citizenship were stripped; according to Michael Parrish in The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953, Stalin forced entire Ingush, Chechen, Balkarian and Karachay populations, all native to Georgia, into deportation. Georgian territories were seized and distributed amongst various states, including Armenia and Turkey, and nearly half of the 700,000 soldiers that the country was forced to contribute toward the Red Army were killed over the course of World War II. Even when relatively progressive leaders like Nikita Khrushchev took control of the Soviet Union — “progressive” in that he succeeded Stalin — Georgian protests promoting independence from the USSR resulted in the massacring of hundreds of college students and demonstrators.

Thus, it should surprise no one that, upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Georgian officials were quick to declare sovereignty and begin holding democratic elections. Unfortunately, the radical and autocratic Georgian presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia prompted some to lose faith in their nation, and pro-Russian separatist groups gained prominence in certain regions — most notably in South Ossetia and Abkhazia — leading to a short-lasting civil war in the latter. Somewhat ironically, this forced Georgia to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to receive Russian military support, and, in 2001, Abkhazia and Georgia co-signed “an accord pledging not to use force against each other.”

After the accord’s ratification, a shaky sense of peace was established between Georgia and the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was clearly imperfect, though, as protests and skirmishes continued to break out while political tensions rose unwaveringly; South Ossetia even went so far as to hold an unofficial referendum in which 99% of the public voted in favor of independence, an act ignored by the European Union but supported by the Russia Duma. Two years later, after hearing direct pleas for support from Abkhazian and South Ossetian officials, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stated that allying with the separatist regions “is not an easy choice, but it is the only way to save the lives of people,” and pledged both political and military support to both. Several months later, after the Georgian military responded to another South Ossetian attack, Russia launched its now-infamous military invasion.

Russia’s 2008 seizure of the Ossetian and Abkhazian territories provided eerie foreshadowing for what the Federation’s neighbors had in store. Six years later, in 2014, a near-identical crisis transpired in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions, disputes which continue to the time of this article’s publication. The primary characteristic that both the Georgian and Ukrainian annexation attempts had in common is that they highlighted deep, pervading insecurities from within the highest ranks of Russian leadership. These insecurities are two-pronged, with stress placed on both military and political pressures. From a military perspective, the intimidating reach of NATO expansion is obviously considered to be a pervading, existential threat; Georgia and Ukraine were invaded while the United States and the West considered their bids to enter NATO. However, the more alarming insecurities are political, and they continue to grow increasingly problematic as democracy gains popularity within Russian spheres of influence.

During a 2005 visit, President George W. Bush proudly referred to Georgia as a beacon of liberty in a region where freedom is not always to be taken for granted. He spoke glowingly about the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, in which a peaceful change of power allied Georgia more strongly with the West. This revolution preceded and arguably inspired Ukraine’s 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, which forced the overturning of then-President Viktor Yanukovych and his corrupt, Russophilic administration in favor of the more Western-oriented candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. These so-called Color Revolutions, which also took place in post-Soviet Yugoslavia and Kyrgyzstan, sent a message to their former occupier that these nations were now independent and desirous of fair domestic representation. Seeing that his neighbors were quickly working to distance themselves from the influence of a relatively weakened Russia, it would not take a foreign affairs specialist to understand that Vladimir Putin, a longstanding disbeliever in the promises of democracy, was far from pleased with the symbolism of these revolts.

Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko began to indirectly lay the groundwork for his own country’s invasion by publicly voicing his support for Georgian independence. It is no coincidence that this controversial anti-Russian stance hurdled Ukraine toward further political crisis in November of that year, a window which Russia seized to further exacerbate political troubles. When Yanukovych successfully regained his presidency in 2013, Ukraine spiraled into yet another revolution, and this time Putin chose to involve himself on his pro-Russia counterpart’s behalf. Shortly after, the autonomous region of Crimea was annexed by Russian soldiers.

Russia had been guilty of testing Western resolve all throughout the 21st century, particularly in Eastern Europe, but the dramatic actions against Georgia in 2008 marked a critical shift in Russian foreign policy. Long gone were the days of press releases or discrete political subversion, and ushered in was an era of violent military intervention and territorial seizures. The only thing protecting Russia’s other Western-oriented, post-Soviet neighbors is their NATO membership, and the United States and its allies should not be surprised to see Russian intervention on behalf of other separatist groups from non-member states in the coming years. Ten years after the events in Georgia, the world still waits to see who will be next.

September 26, 2018 0 comment

Africa Europe Featured History Military Security and Conflict Uncategorized

La Guerre du Sahel

written by Grayson Peters

Along a desert road, a military convoy is passed by an unassuming gray car. There is a sudden explosion, then gunfire. Fifteen minutes later, four civilians are dead and eight Western soldiers are wounded. This is not the first act of terrorism in the region, nor will it be the last. The story is familiar – an Islamic terrorist attack against Western soldiers stationed in the region – but the players and setting are not. These foreign forces are not American, and the battleground is not Iraq or Afghanistan. The soldiers are French, and they are in the Sahel, a sub-Saharan strip of Africa that links the Atlantic Ocean to the west and the Red Sea to the east.

The Sahel is a vast, scarcely populated, and loosely governed region that stretches across fourteen African countries, including Mali, Chad, and Niger. In recent decades, the absence of effective governance has allowed the Sahel to become a hotbed of political violence and a safe haven for transnational terrorist organizations. Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and smaller, regional terrorist organizations have all used the Sahel as a base of operations and refuge from counter-terrorist operations. The Sahel states’ porous borders enable militant groups to travel unchecked across vast swaths of the continent and strike targets in North African nations such as Algeria and Tunisia.

Ethnic and economic tensions in the Sahel predate the arrival of transient Islamic terrorist organizations, but temporary alliances between militant groups and villagers increase the scale and danger of regional violence. The New York Times reported that France and Mali estimate that ISIS in the Greater Sahara has only 40 to 60 core members. By inflaming local passions and escalating grievances between villagers, small groups of transnational militants are able to create disproportionately large violence and chaos. For instance, Niger and Mali’s cattle-herding Tuareg people, who had previously only taken up arms to defend their cattle and on occasion engage in small-scale ethnic violence, became involved with international terrorism. Far from home, Tuareg recruits have been involved in terrorist incidents in Libya, raids in Nigeria, and “banditry” in northern Niger and southern Algeria. Ethnic grievances between the Tuareg and Fulani peoples in both Mali and Niger led to ethnic armed conflict which was dramatically escalated by the presence of Islamic militant groups. Because these ethnic grievances are often intertwined with economic concerns, especially cattle ownership, external pressures that threaten the livelihood of Sahelian villagers can catalyze conflict.

As global warming progresses, the increased frequency of droughts, expanding desertification of the Sahel, and dwindling resources in the area will likely worsen regional tensions and create conditions favorable for the growth of terrorist networks. In 2012, according to the State Department, droughts and failed harvests in the Sahel placed 18.7 million Africans at risk for food insecurity, further fueling instability in the region. It is no coincidence that, immediately following the outbreak of drought, cattle die-offs, and famine, relations between Mali’s Tuareg and Fulani peoples worsened. A series of escalating cattle raids led to an arms race and created an opportunity for al-Qaeda affiliates to supply villagers with automatic weapons. Within the year, the Tuareg people of northern Mali, with support from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) and rebelled against the central government of Mali.

When French military assets entered Mali in 2013, the campaign, known officially as Operation Serval, aimed to support the beleaguered Malian government and block the NMLA’s war for a Tuareg ethnostate in northern Mali. Although Mali and France decisively defeated the NMLA after only a few months, the French remained in Mali in an attempt to suppress a continued insurgency. Five years later, Operation Barkhane, France’s ongoing operation to stabilize the greater Sahel is ongoing and there are fresh casualties. As recently as July 1, a car bombing in Gao injured French soldiers and killed dozens of Malian civilians. Nusrat al-Islam, an al-Qaeda linked organization and the primary terrorist network currently operating in the Sahel, claimed responsibility.

In 2013, three-quarters of the French citizenry supported Operation Serval, the original intervention against NMLA secessionists in Mali. Today, substantial French support endures for the ongoing Operation Barkhane despite the campaign’s duration and casualties.

At first, it may seem surprising that France is leading the international effort to stamp out terrorism in the Sahel. After all, in 2003, the French government’s opposition to American intervention in Iraq was widely mocked in the United States. In protest, Los Angelenos (and even some UCLA students) publicly poured out French wine in front of the French consulate, and the U.S. House of Representatives cafeteria menu infamously renamed French fries to Freedom fries. During this wave of anti-French sentiment, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared that “France is becoming our enemy.” In 2003, France insisted on a multilateral diplomatic approach to Iraq, in opposition to U.S. President Bush’s insistence on unilateral military action. Yet, ten years later, the French army unilaterally entered Mali, touching off a protracted five-year campaign that has expanded to include the entire Sahel region.

What changed between Freedom fries and a permanent French presence in the Sahel? In reality, France’s relationships with Iraq and the Sahel are vastly different. Countries in the western Sahel such as Mali and Niger were colonized and imperialized by France during the European Scramble for Africa in the late 19th century. These Francophone African nations still bear both the trauma and cultural legacy of French rule.

Many leftist and African scholars argue that France’s reassertion of authority and military power over historic colonial possessions is best characterized as neo-imperialist. Skeptical that France’s primary concern is protecting Malian citizens from terrorism, these critics of French intervention point to plausible ulterior motives including the protection of French corporate mining interests and nearby uranium mines (in both Niger and Nigeria) on which the French energy sector relies. In February, Congolese novelist and UCLA professor Alain Mabanckou criticized la Francophonie, the informal and institutionalized network of French speaking countries, and described it not as a partnership of equals but as an instrument of French neo-imperial domination.

However, there is also evidence that the French feel a sense of obligation to and fraternity with the Francophone Africans of the Sahel. Cultural ties, a shared language, and a sense of historical interconnectedness (despite the region’s colonial past) are all factors. Arguably, elements within France feel a sense of guilt and noblesse oblige, or responsibility of the privileged, towards the nations their ancestors exploited. Whether this concern is genuine or paternalistically self-serving is a matter of debate. What is clear, however, is that the security situation in the Sahel is as of yet unresolved and that the potent mixture of ethnic conflict, Islamic terrorism, rising global temperatures, and increasingly severe droughts represents a enduring security risk for African nations and a source of serious concern for France.

September 19, 2018 0 comment

Donald Trump Environmental Change Europe Featured Geopolitics International Trade Interview Military North Korea Nuclear Deterrence Security and Conflict The International Economy United States

Adam Schiff: Bernard Brodie Lecture and Interview

written by Andrea Zachrich

Congressman Adam Schiff came to UCLA to give the Bernard Brodie Lecture on the Conditions of Peace on May 31st of this year. Before the lecture, members of The Generation were fortunate enough to sit down with Congressman Schiff and ask him questions about the House Intelligence Committee- of which he is currently the Ranking Member- his responsibility to his constituents and the American people, democratic institutions and the rule of law, and the reputation of the United States internationally. He echoed and elaborated on many of these topics during his lecture and audience questions, which we were also able to attend following the interview. While there has been a summer that has past since the time of interview, many of his comments remain relevant as we’ve watched President Trump’s antics unfold over the past few months.

Congressman Schiff has a great sense of humor. He began the lecture by telling an anecdote about when President Trump called him “sleazy”. Schiff said that he felt the need to explain to his son what had happened in case the other children at school talked about it. He told his son that “the President called your dad sleazy”, and his son, wholly unconcerned, replied, “Can I call you sleazy?” Congressman Schiff used humor frequently throughout his lecture to highlight the absurdity of some of the administration’s recent actions, such as President Trump calling Vladimir Putin to congratulate him on his win. He even went so far as to mimic how that phone conversation might have gone, which had the entire audience laughing.

In the interview with us, however, Congressman Schiff’s tone was markedly more serious. We began by asking him about the partisanship on his committee in the House of Representatives, which is the House Select Intelligence Committee. The committee has been charged with conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible connections between President Trump and members of his team and Russia. Despite the traditionally bipartisan nature of the Intelligence Committee, Schiff noted that one particular instance- what he called the “midnight run“– which divided the committee along partisan lines. The “run” occurred in March of 2017 when Republican Chairman Devin Nunes went to an undisclosed location to reportedly receive classified materials unmasking a conspiracy that claimed that the Obama administration had done surveillance on members of President Trump’s transition team. Nunes then went to the White House to present this evidence. However in a matter of days it as revealed that the supposedly undisclosed location was the White House. Schiff states, “But we learned within a matter of days that in fact the secret location he had gone too had been the White House and the materials he had received were from the White House that he was presenting to the White House.That kind of blew up the investigation because it became clear that the mission for the chairman was to protect the President at all costs rather than doing an objective investigation. The incident troubled Schiff for illustrating Nunes’ blatant disregard for the committee’s constitutional duty and for demonstrating the vastly different goals of its members.

We then asked Schiff what would change on his committee if Democrats win a majority in the House in the upcoming midterm elections and he becomes chairman. His first priority, he said, would be a return to “comity” on the committee, and blames the current chairman Nunes’ divisive actions for the current level of partisanship. When asked a similar question during the lecture, Schiff responded that he would like his committee to “get back in the oversight business”. Based on some recent special election results, Schiff may get his wish for his committee from the midterm elections. In a recent special election in Ohio, the vote came down to closer than 1 percent in a district that has had Republican representation in Congress for 35 years, the past incumbent consistently cruised to victory by 10 percentage points, and where Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a whooping 11 percent. These election results, while not representative of the entire nation, have led many to predict that Democrats may shortly regain the majority in Congress, making Congressman Schiff the leader of the House Intelligence Committee.

On a different note, one idea that Schiff kept highlighting throughout both the interview and his lecture was the breakdown of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and how this is affecting the U.S.’s reputation and negotiating power abroad. Schiff even went so far as to say “I think that the health of our democracy is very much at risk”. He mentioned numerous examples that ranged from President Trump’s tendency to ban reporters from news outlets he doesn’t like such as the New York Times and BBC from press briefings, to discussing the possibility of him pardoning himself for any possible crimes he may be charged with in the future. Additionally, the president’s constant Twitter tirades about the “fake news” press and special counsel Robert Mueller’s Investigation have led many of his supporters to distrust both the press and the Justice Department. The United States was downgraded from a full to a flawed democracy by the “Economist Intelligence Unit” the year Trump came into office, and has remained in the flawed category for its 2018 ranking, currently ranked 21 out of 167 countries for its democracy score. It seems as though Schiff may well be justified in worrying about the state of our democracy.

On a similar note, Schiff also noted his concerns with the way the rest of the world currently views the US, stating “our America first and everyone else be damned has really left us isolated and the rest of the world deeply concerned”. As evidence, he cited examples of this poor perception of America from our allies such as a Politico article titled “Leader of the Free World meets Donald Trump” referring to Angela Merkel, and Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal. Since this interview, President Trump has continued to take actions that worry world leaders and isolate the U.S. on the world stage, such as placing tariffs on Chinese and European goods against the advice of most of the world’s economists and Trump’s troubling actions during and after June’s G7 meeting such as arriving late for the first meeting of the conference and acting outraged at Prime Minister Trudeau’s easily predictable retaliatory actions to Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs. Congressman Schiff stated in the interview that “It’s hard to imagine a time when the United States has been held in lower regard around the world than right now”, but after Trump’s antics this summer, we may be even lower in the opinion of the world than we were in May when the interview was conducted.

This interview was conducted shortly before the first North Korea negotiations had occured. Congressman Schiff was glad to hear that the negotiations were back on after being canceled for a spell, but was concerned with this administration’s approach to North Korea, calling it “erratic and at times dangerous”. He warned that North Korea’s nuclear program was not going to be an easy problem to solve stating, “If it were not a hard problem, it would have been solved by any number of presidents in the past”. This statement has proven to be true since the interview. While President Trump and Kim Jong-Un did sit down for negotiations in June, the joint statement that came out of this was widely criticized as vague. President Trump conceded an important bargaining chip by agreeing to give up military exercises in South Korea while gaining no time table for denuclearization from the North Korean leader. Additionally, on August 24th President Trump called off talks between North Korean leaders and his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, citing concerns that not enough progress has been made in regards to the country’s denuclearization. Congressman Schiff’s warning has proven true; it seems that the problem of North Korean denuclearization has shown itself to be trickier than President Trump first believed it to be.

In a time where dishonorable behavior has come to be expected from the current administration, the political backbone displayed by Congressman Adam Schiff was refreshing. He asked his audience “What’s the point of being there [in Congress] if you’re not going to do what the country needs you to do when they need you to do it?” At one point during the lecture, he received an spontaneous round of applause from the audience after declaring he believes politicians should “do the right thing and still find a way to get reelected”.

It was a pleasure speaking with the Congressman and listening to his lecture, and it will be interesting to witness any potential changes within his Committee following the November midterm elections.

schiff 8

September 10, 2018 0 comment

Australia Europe Featured Human Rights LGBT Marriage Equality

The Dangerous Precedent of Marriage Equality Voting in Australia and Ireland

written by Xinong Wang

The institution of marriage in most countries around the world refers, by default, to marriage between a man and a woman. Marriage equality – the right of two persons to marry regardless of gender and sex, often equated with “same sex marriage” – is only fully legalised in 26 countries to date. In many countries, the idea of changing the laws to allow for marriage equality can be a contentious and often partisan issue. Marriage equality is inseparable from the rights of LGBTQ+ populations, therefore a largely classified as a liberal cause invoking debates on religious freedom as well as civil rights. Two countries so far, Ireland and Australia, have referred the matter directly to their citizens through a popular vote; that is, a vote which was extended to each country’s entire voting population. Ireland’s 2015 Referendum and Australia’s 2017 Postal Vote both returned majority “yes” votes, resulting in the passing of legislature that allows any two people to marry regardless of gender. Yet together, Ireland and Australia have set a dangerous precedent where a majority population was given the right to decide on equal access to human rights for an underprivileged group.

Despite being a near-universal practice, marriage is not a universal institution. Each country has its own definition of what constitutes a valid marriage under the law, canonised through laws, acts, even constitutions. Commonly, because dominant historical and cultural narratives see marriage as being between a man and a woman, it is accepted as implicit that this is also the legal definition. A country wishing to extend the right to marry to their LGBTQ+ population will often have to go through a process of legitimising it through amending existing legal texts. This is regardless of whether or not those texts explicitly forbade same-sex marriage in the first place. In countries such as the US, the sovereignty of governing bodies allowed them to determine the institution of marriage without involving the population – the Supreme Court exercised this to outlaw bans on same-sex marriage in a ruling in 2015, allowing for marriage equality to exist in all states of the US. Ireland and Australia exercised direct democracy instead.

Pre-polling in both Ireland and Australia had already indicated that the majority of those countries were overwhelmingly in favour of marriage equality. Yet the issue was forced into a popular vote in Ireland as a matter of judicial legality. Ireland has an extensive Irish-English constitution. Marriage is defined under Article 41, which was interpreted to implicitly restrict that marriage be between a man and a woman. That is, the Constitution never explicitly forbade same-sex marriage, but did not endorse it either. In order to insert the proposed 34th Amendment to the Irish Constitution which would definitively allow for marriage to be contracted “by two persons without distinction as to their sex”, there was a process stipulated by the Irish Constitution. After a bill which proposes to amend the Constitution passes parliament, it is mandatory to then seek the approval of the majority of all Irish electors (those eligible to vote in general elections) in a Constitutional Referendum. Hence overall, since the power to grant marriage equality in Ireland lay in the Irish Constitution, and a Constitutional Referendum is a necessary step in installing a Constitutional Amendment, a popular vote in Ireland was necessary. The Irish Referendum, held on the 22nd of May 2015, had a turnout of 60.5% and returned results of 62% yes and 38% no. Following its passing, the government legalised marriage equality on the 16th of November that year.

The Australian popular vote often claimed the Irish vote as precedent, but there is in fact a key distinction: there was no legal necessity for a vote in Australia. Unlike Ireland, the Australian Constitution only mentions marriage where it decrees that marriage and divorce came under the legislative power of the Australian Parliament. The Australian parliament holds discretionary powers on all matters relating to the institution of marriage in Australia, and they chose to define and parameterise marriage under the Marriage Act of 1961. The government is not obligated to seek approval directly from the people when changing Acts. Yet Australia opted for a vote because of a promise made by the Australian Liberal Party in the election of 2016 that they would refer the question of marriage equality directly to the voters (in Australia, the Liberal party is conservative and the Labor Party is liberal, though both are more centrist and less polarised than the conservative-liberal divide in the US). Hence despite having the power to circumvent this divisive popular vote, the Australian parliament essentially arbitrarily decided to conduct a survey on an issue entirely within their power of legislation, based on upholding an election-time promise.

The word “survey” is the correct one to use as a second key distinction should be made between the Australian and Irish votes: the Irish Referendum was binding, the Australian postal vote was not. The Irish Constitution states that the results of a Constitutional Referendum must be honoured. The Irish President is still required to sign the bill into law as a formality, but since the Irish public voted yes to changing the Constitution, the parliament had no power to overturn the result. However, since the Australian parliament’s legislative powers cover marriage, they could have either refused to pass the bill, or passed it anyway even if the postal vote had resulted in a “no” vote. Indeed, multiple members of parliament declined to vote in accordance with the results returned by their electorate, and a small number abstained from voting rather than vote with their electorate. If politicians who opposed marriage equality had simply outnumbered those who were for it, the conscience vote for the eventual bill could have sunk marriage equality regardless of the voting result.

The right to marriage and family is Article 16 on the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It specifies that “men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality, or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family”. (NB: while the singular form “a man and a woman” would decree that marriage be between men and women only, the plural form of “men and women” remains open to be two men, or two women, etc). It further stipulates that “the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State”. That is, governments ought to consider that discrimination in the institution of marriage based on gender is not simply a question of politics or civil liberties, but free and equal access to human rights. No other human right is, by default, curtailed by the gender of those under its protection. There is no reason, despite historical conventions, that marriage should be.

Hence Australia’s postal vote foregrounds a question which is understandable, or at least explainable in the case of Ireland – the question of why a government is allowing an entire country to vote on whether or not a historically underprivileged group can exercise their full and equal human rights. It is a dangerous precedent, especially considering that a former administration of Australian parliament had been responsible for prohibiting marriage equality in the first place. The Marriage Legislation Amendment Bill in 2004 was the first to explicitly define marriage in Australia as the “union of a man and a woman”, and was passed by policy makers alone without a popular vote. Clearly, there was precedent for parliament to alter the institution of marriage in Australia. In polling its citizens, the government asked citizens to grant a minority group rights that politicians alone had taken away. It was the government which denied its citizens access to a human right, and yet they put the responsibility on the country as a whole to restore it.

In a way, the affirmative outcome of both countries’ postal votes is ominous; this is an issue which extends beyond marriage equality or the LGBTQ+ population. It is a question of the role of government in upholding universal human rights. Underprivileged populations have a long history of appealing to the government for their rights. For example, the 19th Amendment of the US Constitution handed down by the Supreme Court mandated that states not withhold voting rights based on gender, giving (initially only white) women the vote. Australia and Ireland, intentionally or not, have set a precedent in the opposite direction. Ruling bodies now have a clear and positive precede for devolving the question of human rights to a majority population. They can now cite Ireland and Australia as examples where the will of the people was respected with the ostensible faith that history moves in the right direction. This can now be applied to many partisan political issues of the day which have an underlying foundation in human rights issues: treatment of refugees and undocumented immigrants can be linked to Article 15, the right to a nationality. Freedom of speech and buzzwords such as “politically correct” is relatable to Article 19, the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Debate on abortions and contraception tie back to Article 3, the right to life, liberty, and security of person or Article 6, the right to recognition as a person under the law.

Now the issue is not only in the intangible, hypothetical future – through putting the question of marriage equality to a vote involving not just politicians but each individual in the country, the pressure to pass or deny also falls to each individual in the country. A key and immediate issue presents itself: marginalised groups, instead of lobbying politicians who have civil and legal obligations to them as constituents, are now forced to appeal for their equal rights from every single voter. These are voters who have no constraints on how they treat political and civil issues apart from their personal beliefs. The onus now falls on individuals to prove their worthiness to equal treatment under the law. Where human rights are concerned, equal treatment should be something that is protected by governing powers and not begged for from the sum of individual opinion.

Overall, Ireland and Australia have set a positive precedent, but a dangerous one nonetheless. All citizens of Ireland and Australia now have the right to freely marry, yet this right had to be earned by convincing the majority of a voting population that a marginalised group was worthy of equal treatment. This precedent should be approached with great caution. The victories of Brexit in the UK and President Trump in the US were outcomes which shocked the world – in a world of ever increasing political partisanship, voting is increasingly turbulent and the lines between conservative and liberal are growing wider. It is a dangerous precedent to leave to sheer numbers the human rights of minorities.

April 27, 2018 0 comment

http://archive.government.ru/eng/multimedia/photo/2010/9/?page=5

Donald Trump Europe Featured Military Russia Security and Conflict United States Vladimir Putin

The Connection Between Putin’s Chef, Global Political Interference and a Ukrainian Invasion

written by Conor McDonald

If the American dream consists of starting from scratch and, through tireless labor, building one’s assets up to formidable quantities, then it should be easy for Western capitalists to understand how certain individuals were able to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 to attain the status that they have today. Boris Yeltsin’s oligarchs with insider connections, of course, are exceptions to this; instead, the individuals being referred to include middle class contractors, mid-tier managers, and even hot dog stand owners. One stand owner in particular, Yevgeny Prigozhin, provides a particularly dramatic case study for economic success following modest origins. Prigozhin used to rob banks and sell street snacks just to pay his bills, but today, he owns a number of bustling enterprises and can be seen driving a blue Lincoln Continental. However, all is not as picture perfect as it seems for this Gatsby-esque individual.

In 2016, the United States congress imposed economic sanctions against Prigozhin alongside several other Russian political elites in an attempt to strike back at the heart of Putin’s inner circle. Just under a month ago, Prigozhin was indicted by Robert Mueller, special counsel overseeing the alleged Russian interference in the United States’ 2016 presidential election, for playing a major role in the digital manipulation of public opinion. Similarly, the international community has expressed repeated disdain toward Prigozhin for his establishment of the Wagner Group, which today stands as Russia’s premier private military corporation acting in Syria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. So, how exactly did a humble, bank-robbing hot dog stand owner such as Prigozhin manage to gain such prestige and controversy in Russia’s government?

As Russian political rebel Aleksei Navalny stated in a recent interview, Prigozhin “didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In 1998, Prigozhin opened his most famous conventional business to date: New Island, a buoyant restaurant that lies atop an adorned ferry in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Two years later, in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. Coincidence or not, Putin took a liking to Prigozhin, and the very next year he brought Jacques Chirac, the former President of France, to the very same restaurant. He also brought United States President George W. Bush in 2002, and he hosted his personal birthday party there in 2003. Putin and Prigozhin rapidly formed a unique friendship, the shady personal and economic perks of which would be seen in the years to follow.

Some of these perks included contracts to provide food for Russian public schools and the Russian military — at his peak, Prigozhin was feeding 90% of Russian service-members, a job which Vox News reports earned him over a billion dollars. Perhaps it is because of Prigozhin’s humble origins as a hot dog stand owner that he is not afraid of doing President Putin’s dirty work. Perhaps he was enraptured by the economic benefits, or perhaps he was simply too afraid to say no. Regardless, with economic favors from Putin came political and social responsibility for Prigozhin to serve his leader’s interests. A decade after Putin’s birthday party, Prigozhin was presumably advised by government sources to use his funds to create the Internet Resource Agency — also known as Glavset — a Saint Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. Glavset’s campaigns initially sought to put down domestic protests by creating fake social media accounts advocating on behalf of President Putin and disparage the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny, but, according to Mueller, it allegedly expanded to the point of interference in international elections, including the United States’ in 2016. The most prominent evidence citing Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling pertains to his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times from 2015-2016 to discuss the work being done. It’s also important to note that Glavset’s Project Lakhta, a so-called “disinformation campaign,” received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Prigozhin in 2016 alone.

Following dramatic success countering protests and slandering rivals with Glasvet, Prigozhin used his immense wealth in 2014 to found and develop ChVK Wagner, a private military corporation which has, as of late, become one of President Putin’s primary sources for military operations that Russia cannot formally be involved in. Commanded by Dmitry Utkin, an ex-Russian Special Forces brigade commander, ChVK Wagner has been involved in both the conflicts in Syria and in Ukraine’s Luhansk region. Perhaps most infamously, it was recently discovered that the Wagner Group shot down the Ukrainian Air Force’s Ilyushin Il-76 in 2014, an act which was originally attributed to rogue Russian nationalists in Ukraine and killed all 49 of the plane’s passengers. ChVK Wagner has also been involved in the recent conflict in Crimea, where their innocuous green uniforms earned them the title of “little green men.” Prigozhin’s decision to fund military bases in Ukraine’s Donbas region has been a critical component of the success of Russian encroachment. In Syria, ChVK Wagner’s shady activities include serving as “shock troops” to President Bashar al-Assad, as well as seizing ISIS-held oil fields for Russian companies, including the newly made conglomerate Evro Soyuz. The Wagner Group’s economic and military influence is easily one of the most valuable assets that Prigozhin is bringing to Putin and his oligarchs’ table.

In everywhere but Putin’s Russia, it is positively bizarre for one to imagine a world in which a hot dog stand owner with a vast criminal record can rise to a point of such prominence in one of the world’s most powerful political and military systems. Prigozhin himself once said that “Vladimir Putin saw how I built up my business from nothing,” but the roots of his success lie not in his hard work — they instead lie in the fact that Putin was a personal witness and catalyst to it. This is precisely how modern Russia has operated since Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar’s disastrous economic reforms in the early 1990s. Regardless, President Putin’s crony-infested inner circle will continue to thrive on loyalty and trust above all else, proving that even the bank robber putting mustard on a hot dog has a valid chance at fulfilling his wildest dreams.

March 24, 2018 0 comment

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Womens-march-santa-cruz-2017--73.jpg

#MeToo Europe Featured United States Women's Rights

#MeToo Movement: A Comparison of French and American Gender Equality and Secularism

written by Andrea Zachrich

When film producer Harvey Weinstein was accused by dozens of women last November of sexual assault and predatory behavior, an outpouring of comparable claims and allegations arose against other high-profile men, subsequently launching the #MeToo movement. American social activist Tarana Burke, who is credited with the original hashtag, states that the goal of the movement is to let victims of sexual assault and harassment know that their experiences are not uncommon and thus they should not be shamed into remaining silent about them. After My Name is Earl actress Alyssa Milano tweeted the hashtag, the movement gained popularity and female movie stars such as Gwyneth Paltrow, Uma Thurman, and Viola Davis all expressed sympathy or shared stories of sexual exploitation. Even Senators Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and Claire McCaskill of Missouri joined in and tweeted about the movement. Women and men of all backgrounds in America have expressed support.

Conversely, the #MeToo movement has recently experienced backlash from across the Atlantic in France, where a public letter signed by over 100 prominent French women, including actress Catherine Deneuve, have criticized the movement’s “puritanism” and its claim to “promote the liberation and protection of women” when actually “enslave[ing] them to…eternal victim[hood] and reduc[ing] them to defenseless preys.” While criticism from other women, who appear as though they should be natural allies, may shock at first glance, the disagreement over proper sexual norms between French women and their American counterparts comes as no surprise when accounting for the cultural differences regarding sex and gender between the two nations. Given France’s more progressive history of gender equality as well as a proud tradition of secularism amongst its citizens, the more accepting attitude of sexual advances and unwanted intimacy expressed by Deneuve and others is, upon closer inspection, not so unexpected after all. One of the letter’s chief criticisms of #MeToo was that although the movement claims to empower women by shielding them from unwanted sexual advances, by “demand[ing]” protection, its supporters are instead suggesting that women lack the individual agency and ability to speak up for–and defend–themselves without help. This distinction between American supporters and French doubters regarding the rights and abilities of women can be traced to the countries’ differing histories on the subject.

By multiple metrics and measurements, France has achieved higher levels of gender equality than the United States. For instance, the French parliament is currently 38.6% female, with women holding 233 out of a total of 577 seats. In contrast, 21% of U.S Senators and only 19.1% of U.S Representatives are female, with women holding 106 out of 535 total seats. Additionally, while France appointed a female Prime Minister in 1991, the U.S has yet to elect a woman to its highest office, and only in the most recent 2016 election was Hillary Clinton named the first female major party presidential nominee in American history. This seemingly trivial discrepancy among representation in government should not be dismissed out of hand. Women in France may very well feel as if they have more political power because their representation in Parliament is significantly higher and because they have seen women occupy the highest offices of government.

In addition to political representation, women in France also retain a number of cultural and workplace advantages that their American counterparts lack. First, France permits up to four months of paid maternity leave, while the U.S. only allows for up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave. Furthermore, French women are allowed unrestricted access to abortion throughout the first trimester of pregnancy. In contrast, in the U.S., states are allowed to make their own decisions on abortion access so long as the regulations do not cause “undue interference.” This wording has been interpreted broadly and many states have implemented mandatory waiting periods, state-mandated counseling, and numerous other roadblocks to delay and impede access to abortion. Women’s rights have also been one of the central focuses of French President Emmanuel Macron’s campaign and presidency. The French government even pressures the media to refrain from posting sexist or demeaning images of women. Finally, the Global Gender Gap Index which measures gender inequality across economic, political, educational, and health-based criteria ranked France 12th in the world in 2018 while the U.S ranked 49th–between Bangladesh and Zimbabwe.

These significant differences in gender equality between France and the U.S. demonstrate two fundamentally unique female experiences which can help explain the backlash to the #MeToo movement expressed by Deneuve and others. In a country where women are nearly equally represented in their government, that has laws and regulations seeking to level the playing-field in the workplace, and that maintains high female educational and economic achievement, women may feel as though there is less of a disparity of power when men make unwanted sexual advances. French women would thus perceive an advance as flirtation between equals and therefore feel as though they have the agency to either continue or put a stop to such actions. In comparison, American women may feel uncomfortable with similar types of advances due to a greater power imbalance between men and women in society. Such imbalance would likely lead to women feeling as though they lack the ability to speak up about how they feel, especially if sexual advances are unwelcome. The French letter’s critique of American women seeking to be “protected” and maintain “eternal” victim status may stem from these cultural divide. Understandably, French women–coming from a culture that consistently affirms their belief of themselves as equals to men–will have a different perspective from their American counterparts, who have grown up under a political, economic, and educational imbalance that undoubtedly seeps into their sexual and romantic lives.

In addition to a demonstrable difference in gender equality between France and the United States, the variation of the role and importance of religion also helps shape distinct sexual attitudes amongst citizens of these respective nations. For instance, a Pew Research study from 2015 found that 53% of Americans say that religion is “very important” in their lives. In contrast, only 14% of French adults said the same. Moreover, the U.S is an outlier among wealthy, Western countries when it comes to the importance of religion. 21% of the populations of both Germany and the United Kingdom say that religion is “very important” in their lives, and other developed nations such as Australia and Canada also came in well below the U.S. at 18% and 27% respectively. This disparity unquestionably creates divergent societal understandings of sex.

One manifestation of this discrepancy in religious attitudes can be found in the differences between French and American sexual education programs in schools. In an analysis of sex-ed programs in the U.S., France, and several other Western nations, author Kelly Bell noted that as a result of its religious citizenry, the U.S. views sex in more “puritanical” and “moral” terms as opposed to the “open, matter-of-fact attitudes” found in the other countries studied. This perspective naturally has led to lobbying by churches and religious groups across the U.S. on behalf of abstinence-only programs, fearing that a more comprehensive education in schools will lead to promiscuity (although this fear has been proven to be false). The result is that the American school system is failing to give teens an understanding that sex and sexuality are a “normal and positive part of human development,” an understanding that sex-ed programs in Western Europe reaffirm. Again, the connection between these differences and the views expressed in the letter is clear. When there is a tendency to see sexual advances and activity as taboo due to poor sexual education, the reaction to such experiences when unwanted will unquestionably be harsher than if they were viewed as a normal and natural experience.

Another cultural difference between the two countries can be found in interpretations of flirting. Alex Giami–co-author of a study on sexuality in France and the U.S–found that French women on the whole do not view “‘flirtation and seduction and romance as a direct sexual approach, and that flirtation does not necessarily lead to sexual intercourse.” In other words, “the language of seduction is not an explicit language of sex.” This understanding differs dramatically from American attitudes which tend to view flirtation and seduction almost exclusively as sexual advances. When flirting is recognized as separate from sex, the notion that men should be “disciplined” for such actions and placed in the “same category as sex offenders” would seem troubling and puritanical.

If the disagreement between French and American women over the #MeToo movement surprised some, it shouldn’t have. As a result of a more progressive history of gender equality, the female experience in Nice is fundamentally different from that of New York. Furthermore, the variation of the importance of religion between these countries creates two profoundly different understandings of sexual activity and flirtation. Yet cultural disagreement is not unique to France and America. Instead, the French letter and the American reaction to it represent a failure of cultural relativism: The idea that one’s actions and opinions should be judged by their own culture standards rather than someone else’s. Such instances are not unique. Supporters of the movement in both countries are failing to recognize that there are clear cultural differences that led to this disagreement. They are thus making judgements and assumptions based on their own morals and standards. This misunderstanding serves as an important reminder that, given the array of cultural variation found in every corner of the globe, social movements are not always exportable, however beneficial they may be to their country of origin.

March 6, 2018 1 comment

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