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One of the World’s Most Silent Genocides: the Yezidis

written by Taylor Fairless

In August of 2014, ISIS fighters invaded the Iraqi city of Sinjar, the former home to about 8 million Yazidis.1 Today, their population in Iraq stands at about 500,000.2

Who are the Yezidis? Perhaps one of the more violently-targeted, yet lesser-known groups, the Yezidis are ethno-religious minorities concentrated in Iraq. This group’s struggles with deportation, human trafficking, and terrorism are all too compelling, and articulates a wider, global phenomenon of inaction towards acts of genocide.

Discrimination and persecution of the Yezidis lies within their association with devil worship. This derives from their praise of the “Peacock Angel,” which in Islamic mythology is believed to be the Devil. Though in Yezidism, this is a God-like creature who manifests both good and evil traits, which Yezidis believe are integral parts of a whole.3 Violent militia groups, such as ISIS, have used this to justify Yezidi-extraction from Iraq or forced conversion to Islam.4  With the latter, many Yezidis have been executed for resisting conversion, and this push back helped to catalyze the 2014 invasion by ISIS which the United Nations identifies this as an act of genocide and a crime against humanity.5

The extremists aimed to eliminate the Yezidi population by murdering their men and taking their women as sex slaves.6 Many of these women and girls are still missing today, and are only returned if ISIS members decide to sell them back to their families at a costly rate most cannot afford.7 Mosques and churches were continuously destroyed for almost a decade, meanwhile those who survived the attacks were forced into Arab and Suni assimilation, which often resulted in their deportation.8 About 40,000 Yezidis who managed to escape the encircling jihadists fled to the mountains of Sinjar, where some remained for years after this initial contact.9 To add to this, the Yedizis do not have a military to defend themselves, which makes it easier for terrorist groups to target their population. 


Following the ISIS takeover of Sinjar, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia sponsored air drops of food and water to the captive Yezidi people.10 Although the Yezidis have now begun to construct their own army, they are still heavily reliant on foreign aid and makeshift militias who are sparsely manned and under-armed. Out of desperation, they’ve recently created an all-female militia, called Êzîdxan Women’s Units. For these reasons, they still remain a weak target in the eyes of violent extremist groups looking to rid the Middle East of their presence.11 

The ethnic cleansing of the Yezidis is only a short bit of their long history of oppression and discrimination. While suffering from unemployment, poverty, and violence motivates the Yezidis to seek safer grounds, they are unable to relocate due to their citizenship being tied to their homeland. To exacerbate these problems, variances within the Yezidi community itself have also factored into this group’s deteriorating stance. Disunity arises from differences in political affiliation, religious beliefs, language, and even discrepancies over their origins.12

Their confrontations with ISIS underscores two prominent components of discrimination. The first deals with how identity is projected onto minority groups and how groups respond to that encroachment. Members of ISIS or other ethno-religious majorities in the Middle East have identified the Yezidis as “devil worshipers,” despite limited and incomplete evidence, alongside the group’s steadfast denial. This projection of identity is inextricably linked to hostile ideas about character, merit, intellect, and civility, which have been used to justify malicious behavior towards the Yezidis. Their history of violence and discrimination, furthermore, have led to a pressing refugee and humanitarian crisis that continue to affect Syria, Turkey, Russia, and Greece. In recent years, this violence and migration have caused the Yezidis to focus more on creating an army. Yet, Iraqi-crackdowns on their illegitimate militias means the Yezidis have to operate covertly to fight ISIS, which extremely limits their capabilities to garner weapons and train their citizens.

The second point deals with domestic intervention into instances of discriminatory violence. The Yezidi genocide is only one of dozens of genocides that have taken place in Iraq.13 Iraqi officials have turned a blind eye to the Yezidis and have failed to effectively persecute any member of ISIS that participated in the 2014 attacks.14 This point ties to the falters of the Iraqi penal code in which crevasses have allowed for minority communities to not be granted the same protection under the law. Today, officials have restricted aid to Yezidi refugee camps, which face poor sanitation, food scarcity, and, perhaps worse, are even booby-trapped by ISIS fighters.15 The many who have been born in the refugee camps and will now grow in a territory that has stripped away their education, voting rights, and freedom of speech.16 Even more pressing, they will grow up in one of the most insecure and deadly regions in the world.


Although the Yezidis may be a lesser-known group for many Westerners, their history may still come across as familiar. Violence and oppression against minority groups transcends national borders. Just this past year, for example, Christian minorities in Sri Lanka were the targets of a deadly ISIS bombing. Smiliar events took place in Canada and New Zealand in 2017 and 2019, respectively, where Muslim minorities were mass-murdered for their beliefs. And, of course, other minority groups in the Middle East, such as the Armenians during their genocide, have faced similar acts of violent discrimination. The history of the Yezidis, although distinct in many ways, in its most rudimentary form is certainly not unique to this group, or even unique to the Middle East.

Now, Iraq must invest heavily into peace-building measures and a sustainable end to violence. Key challenges that arise post-conflict include rebuilding Yezidi communities, which comes with reconstructing the psychological idea of “community,” addressing grievances, and more importantly, providing adequate protection against another, and somewhat inevitable, invasion by extremist groups.

On a positive note, their story has captured attention by domestic and international NGOs who are now working to support Yezidi refugees and are focusing on locating and returning their captured women. These NGOs are now targeting the government and demanding that they improve legal rights and protection for this minority community. Importantly, other countries and global organizations, such as the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund, must amplify their disapproval of the Iraqi government’s furthering of this issue, and take measures to pressure their government to make improvements for these civilians.

E N D N O T E S :

[1] Katharine Holstein, author of “Shadow on the Mountain: A Yazidi Memoir of Terror, Resistance and Hope,” interviewed by Taylor Fairless. February 25, 2020.
[2] Raya Jalabi. Who are the Yazidis and Why is Isis Hunting Them? The Guardian. August 11, 2014.
[3]  Devdutt Pattanaik. The Peacock Angel of the Yazidis. Articles World Mythology. 4 December, 2017
[4] Razan Rashidi. UN Human Rights Panel Concludes ISIL is Committing Genocide Against Yazidis. The United Nations. June 16, 2016.
[5]  Birgul Acikyildiz-Sengul. The Yezidis: An Ancient People, Tragedy, and Struggle for Survival. Chapter 11. p. 149
[6]  Ibid. p. 147, 149
[7]  Ibid. p. 153
[8]  Ibid.
[9] Raya Jalabi. Who are the Yazidis and Why is Isis Hunting Them? The Guardian. August 11, 2014.
[10] Birgul Acikyildiz-Sengul, p. 153.
[11] Birgul Acikyildiz-Sengul. p. 153
[12] Katharine Holstein, interviewed by Taylor Fairless.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.

March 18, 2020 2 comments
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FeaturedGeopoliticsIsraelMiddle EastMilitarySecurity and ConflictUnited States

Water Politics: The United States’ Role in Israeli Water Security

written by Abdus Najmi

Part 1: Research Question 

Located on the border between Israel and Jordan, the Dead Sea is a natural body of water high in salinity – in fact, the levels are so high that one can easily float on the surface. As a frequently visited tourist site, the Dead Sea holds is famous among the wonders of the Middle East. However, this reality is soon coming to an end. Scientists have noted that the “surface area has almost halved,” bringing the water elevation level to a new low.[i] Though Israel and Jordan have agreed to combat this impending environmental disaster, little work has been done. Despite words of affirmation, the Red Sea-Dead Sea project is stuck at a standstill, as relations between the two countries “are at a historic low.”[ii] As the crisis looms closer and closer, policymakers have been attempting to grapple with new and innovative modes of effective diplomacy over water resources. 

New responses are not necessarily better responses. It is critical to examine the past to help illuminate previous mistakes administrations have made in the realm of water politics. This paper will examine the history of US-Israel relations in regards to water security and management. The amount of literature on the role of the US in Israel’s water policies is actually surprisingly large.

My analysis will focus specifically on Israeli-Jordanian cooperation and conflict, and the role of the US in mediating the allocation of water resources. I will focus specifically on the Johnston Plan in the early 1950s and the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Jordan and Israel. The question I will answer is: What conditions lead to the failure of Israeli-Jordanian water cooperation? In the conclusion, I will answer potential counterarguments and explain how understanding the conditions of failure and success over water security can help provide insights to policymakers for dealing with current failures of Israeli-Jordanian water projects, such as joint-desalination and the Red Sea-Dead Sea project discussed in the introduction. 

Part 2: Thesis

My thesis is two-fold: first, I argue that a realist approach to water politics falls short of explaining historical collaboration between Israel and Jordan. Current realist approaches approach water as a commodity, arguing that the reason why cooperation is unsuccessful is because water security is seen as a zero-sum game, where the other opponent is reluctant to cooperate due to fears of losing out on greater access to that resource. In addition, the realist approach looks at that time period as a battle of competing influences between the United States and Russia.

Thus, cooperation fails insofar that policy decisions over water allocation affect the regional hegemonies of the United States and Russia respectively. However, I posit that a constructivist approach better explains the failure of cooperation, specifically focusing on Israeli/Arab identities as social constructs, including discussions of Zionism, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and the Syrian conflict. Amity and enmity are determined by identity. 

Part 3: Current/Main Approaches 

Current approaches to water security have mainly centered around a realist approach. The approach is as follows: water, in and of itself, cannot be divided. For example, if two people are dying of thirst in a desert, and there is only one cup of water left, it either has to be shared or given to only one person. It’s a non-negotiable good in the sense that it is a rare commodity that directly necessitates a trade-off. If someone receives water, it is inherently at the expense of the other. For many international relations scholars, this is why water cooperation over the Jordan and Yarmouk river fail. Israel and Jordan lose if the other defects, as the scenario is depicted as “a zero-sum game in the national discourses and as a situation of interdependence and possible mutual gains.”[iii] Scholars cite numerous empirical examples to demonstrate this. For example, after the Johnston plan negotiations failed, the Hashemite Kingdom “announced plans to divert the Yarmouk river […] through the construction of the East Ghor Canal,”[iv] while Israel attempted to retaliate back by beginning the “construction of a National Water Carrier to transport the water of the Sea of Galilee to its arid South.”[v]Water was seen as a resource that was mutually exclusive – just as nations race to proliferate for nuclear weapons, states race to secure the most amount of water. In fact, escalation from the rush to securitize water has actually produced conflict between these two states. Israel “bombed the East Ghor Canal,”[vi] believing that Jordan had malicious intent and was bent on overusing the canal. Furthermore, realists also examine the status quo division of water to prove their theory as well, showing that negotiations focus on the nitty gritty details of water allocations. Post the Madrid talks that ushered in the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, Jordan was able to secure most of its water from the Yarmouk river, while Israel keeping most of the Jordan river.[vii] Small caveats were made, with the treaty allowing the allocation “from the other river to each country […] Israel receives 25 million cubic meters (mcm) from the Yarmouk, and Jordan receives 30 mcm from the Jordan.”[viii]  

Additionally, realists would point to the way in which Israel and Jordan conduct and view water policies, especially in how they sell water to each other. The buying and selling of “water at a discounted rate to its neighbor […] reflects an understanding that the price of water is not just the marginal cost of its production but […] a political stability dividend.”[ix] Water compromise is political compromise – political stability hinges on the zero-sum transaction of water allocation. However, I will argue that though these details may be true, the over-focus on the specifics of water allocation ignores the root causes of identity formation in constructivist theory which prevent effective compromise in the first place. 

In addition, the realist approach prides itself in understanding this conflict in the context of the pursuit of hegemony. Because states pursue policies that maximize their self-interest, the US wanted to properly negotiate a solution to the water conflict between Israel and Jordan as a way to counter “communist influence spilling over to Jordan and spreading in the region.”[x]   Especially after the Soviets had managed to establish “a foothold in Egypt and Syria by supplying weapons to both countries,”[xi] the US began to fear a growing Soviet Union presence in the Middle East writ large. The US attempted to expand its influence by appearing as a broker and friend between both parties, Israel and Jordan. This is why it initially attempted to broker the Johnston plan and provide “funding for both the Israeli National Water Carrier and the Jordanian East Ghor Canal Project.”[xii] The US wanted to appease both sides, ultimately playing a balancing act between the favoritism of the Arabs and Israelis, but to no avail. Realists also look at the way the Soviet Union approached this conflict as well to see if the theory could be supported by the actions of both actors. When examining the actions of the Soviets, they found deep evidence of a Soviet pursuit of regional hegemony and establishment of a sphere of influence in Israeli-Jordanian water politics as well. For example, upon arrival of US ambassador Eric Johnston to the Middle East region, the Soviets “attempted to spread anti-Johnston mission propaganda and labeled the Main Plan US imperialism,”[xiii] even going so far as to tell the Arabs that he is a “well-known Zionist.”[xiv] 

The battle of regional hegemonies and the idea of water cooperation as a zero-sum game clearly lend credibility to the realist approach. However, I will argue that though much of the theory is warranted, it falls short in explaining in entirety why cooperation fails, specifically in the context of the failure of the Johnston plan and the success of the Madrid talks. Identity formation and social constructions function as better explanations for the eventual demise of water cooperation. 

Part 4: Discussion 

Groups function as imagined communities, constantly constructing different identities which function as in and out groups. In a sense, there remains no possibility for the construction of one group without another; in order to first exist, something must exist in opposition to it. For example, many view the rise of Islam and the West as imagined communities; there is nothing that inherently makes them enemies besides constructions of what an enemy is and what interests they have. The same phenomenon happened during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. However, these constructions can be dangerous since “interests are neither primordial nor rational; instead, they emerge from the perceptions and interpretations of the respective groups.”[xv] That framework is critical when thinking about what cooperation means in the context of constructivism. For the realist, cooperation over water would be about attempting to maximize one’s own self interests and power. For the constructivist, cooperation functions “as a social continuity, since cooperative – like conflictive – behavior is enabled and shaped by hegemonic discourses.” [xvi] Cooperation is thus about managing behavior in regards to identity negotiation, almost like negotiating which parts of social construction the other side is willing to cave in on. Seemingly, conflict is described by how dearly a group plans to stick to its social construction.

This actually manifests itself in a problematic manner – if this theory holds true, then cooperation is an extremely difficult process. It requires societal attitudes towards that social construction to change, easily proven true by these exact same water disputes. It took almost forty to fifty years after the Johnston Plan in 1953 for there to be any real progress on water management (since the Israeli-Jordanian peace settlement was in 1994). Identities naturally “cannot easily be manipulated by elites,”[xvii] which illuminates why a realist approach of attempting to strike a balance of interests in water disputes doesn’t really make sense. It’s not necessarily about maximizing which side secures the most resources; it’s about how strong identities attempt to exist in opposition to each other.  

This framework of identity formation is critical when examining water disputes between Israel and Jordan. Firstly, it’s important to understand the importance of the concept of water for Israeli/Jewish identity. For Jews, water is intertwined deeply with “the creation of a Jewish state and the Israeli identity […] water’s ideological meaning […] [lies] in political Zionism.”[xviii] Driven out of their land starting with the Babylonian Exile to the Holocaust, Jewish people have linked water to their own survival, and naturally so. The ability to access water “is a question of existence for the Jewish state,”[xix] as over half of the resources are “located outside its internationally recognized borders.”[xx]Securitization of water is thus necessary for the security of Jewish existence. Especially given the track record of water used as a weapon in Israel’s past, securitization seems inevitable. For example, 1964 was the year in which Arab states “tried to divert the tributaries of the Jordan River,”[xxi] which Israel responded to by regaining access during the Six Day War. Negotiations and questions of peace are necessarily tied to Israel’s access to water. Images of future Zionist possibilities also demarcated the securitization of water, since much of the discourse was filled with phrases like “making the desert bloom.”[xxii] This gave credibility to the notion of Jews making Israel an agricultural paradise and settling the land permanently. Zionist propaganda and government statements supported this settlement ethos as well, as they mentioned the importance of “irrigating the deserts of southern Palestine.”[xxiii] Statements by important figures such as Chaim Weizmann even stress the importance of linking water and security for Israel. For him, it was paramount that “the future Jewish state would […] ensure its control over […] water.”[xxiv]  He even wrote to the Prime Minister about the necessity to “ensure claims to territory in the North.”[xxv] Water and security were framed as top issues in Zionist discourse, constructing Israeli identities in direct opposition to Arab access to water resources. 

Moreover, as much as Zionist discourse stood in opposition to Arab control of water, Jordanian discourse equally advanced an anti-Israeli doctrine in terms of water policy, ultimately leading to the demise of the Johnston Plan of 1953-1955. Jordanians saw themselves as part of a broader Arab identity, which greatly hindered any progress on Johnston’s proposals. They followed the decision-making of the Arab League Council, who told them that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a conditional issue on which Israel needed to resolve before any agreement. Johnston’s shuttle diplomacy ultimately failed, as “two political considerations stood in the way of ratification.”[xxvi] The first was the “plight of the Palestinian refugees, […] the other was the fact that cooperation with Israel could be interpreted as political recognition of Israel.”[xxvii] For Jordan, Arab identity superseded any form of negotiation, no matter if the Johnston Plan would have actually been better for Jordan’s access to the water supplies of both the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers. Even though Jordan’s government may not have even liked the Palestinians, Arab constructions of identity were more influential than incentives to negotiate with the Israelis. Negotiation with Israel would also imply an acceptance of Israel as a nation-state. Media reports highlight that this wasn’t a favorable opinion among the people, as Jordanian “editorials went on to argue that it was better for Jordan to develop water within its own boundaries than ‘to cooperate with Israel.”[xxviii]

As mentioned before, cooperation is difficult because it requires whole populations to shift their orientations about the social constructs they have created. This is clearly witnessed in the failure of the Johnston agreement. There were vast tensions between the Jordanians and Israelis, “notably at the level of the population.”[xxix] The Jordanian people themselves felt as if the “treaty [was] unfavourable to them,” and when coupled with the “violence between Israelis and Palestinians,” it’s easy to understand the “lack of trust of Jordanians [have] towards Israel.”[xxx] However, one can notice that these identities become problematic, especially considering the fact that the Johnston Plan would have actually been beneficial for the Jordanians. The plan would have allowed “Israel […] 30 per cent of the total water, Jordan 63 per cent, Lebanon 3 per cent, and Syria 4 per cent.”[xxxi] This disproves the realist notion that states act in their own self-interest – if that were true, Jordan would have maximized their own access to water resources. It also disproves the notion that water security is a zero-sum game. Jordan would seek to attain the most amount of water, which they would have gotten with this plan, if it was at the expense of Israel. In addition, scholars note that the conflict should not be understood “as a zero-sum game […] if both parties were to apply joint management the potential benefits would be huge.”[xxxii] Arab identity clearly took precedent over rational claims of maximizing self-interest. The fact that the Lebanese parliament speaker said that “rapprochement with Israel” would cause leaders to “be assassinated, as was Jordan’s King Abdullah,” really highlights how groups view opposing identities.[xxxiii] Constructivism provides a better framework to understand the failed negotiations of the Johnston Plan. 

Likewise, the evidence is bidirectional – the Israelis saw Jordanian support and sympathy with Palestine as a reason to forestall and hinder water cooperation post-Johnston plan. Specifically, in 1969, Israel failed to cooperate with the Jordanians under the banner of Jordanian support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Israelis went ahead and “bombed the East Ghor Canal […] scholars also point out that this attack was […] linked to the fact that Jordan was supporting the PLO.”[xxxiv]  The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a huge concern for both sides in terms of cooperation, as Israeli-Jordanian cooperation is contingent on the way that Jordanians see themselves as the direct allies of Palestinians, just as Israelis see themselves as part of an exclusive, Zionist project. The same thing happened with the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.  Though the agreement was successful, Arab versus Israeli identity became a central factor that severely hampered full-blown cooperation. The treaty included discussion of Palestinian refugees, but “left [it] for final-status negotiations.”[xxxv] The issue of Palestinian refugees has yet to be resolved, however it bodes that any type of future water conflict is “instrinsically linked to the central issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict […] a regional water agreement will depend on the resolution of the entire conflict.”[xxxvi]

My argument falls short when Syria enters the picture. If constructivism is about group identity, then why do Syria and Jordan also fail to cooperate when it comes to water allocation? Syria and Jordan are both Arab nations, yet both of them failed to properly divide water resources right after the Johnston plan. Surprisingly, “Jordan’s relations with Syria have not been very brotherly.”[xxxvii] Syria violated a 1951 treaty between the two nations in regards to water security, by “constructing earthen dams on the Yarmouk tributaries inside its borders.”[xxxviii] Even after that, Syria and Jordan remained even more divided as both supported “opposite sides in the Iraq-Iran War.”[xxxix]  Arab identity was not enough to illicit proper diplomacy – even to this day. Currently, Syrian attitudes towards Jordan regarding water policy “in the Yarmouk catchment did not change, and Jordan continues to be adversely affected.”[xl] Further research will have to be done to understand what other factors besides identity are at play here. Constructivism may be able to explain why the Israeli-Jordanian cooperation over the Johnston plan failed, however falls short when it discusses conflicts among the same identity group. 

The realist argument that water cooperation fails due to the pursuit of hegemony between the US and Russia definitely has strong backing, but it falls short very quickly when we examine how cooperation becomes a success during the Madrid Peace talks. If it was about rivalries and the pursuit of hegemony, then why do the Soviets and US end up collaborating to put on the Madrid Peace talks? By 1991, the Soviet Union leadership under Gorbachev changes drastically, so much so that the “Soviet transformation […]  in the mid-1980s” ends up making “Russia a much more acceptable partner for joint conflict resolution in the Middle East.”[xli] The Soviet Union switches over from competition to cooperation before their collapse at the end of the year, which realism can’t explain well enough. The sudden ideological shift does not make sense given the Soviet Union’s previous drive towards revisionism. If all states exist to maximize their hegemonic influence, then it makes even less sense that the Soviet Union would do this when it was still considered to be the United States’ greatest competitor at the time. 

Part 5: Conclusion 

Current approaches to understanding Israeli-Jordanian water security fall short because most of the discourse assumes a realist approach to IR. Policymakers tend to view water security as a zero-sum game, which treats water as a mutually exclusive good. The realist idea of states pursuing hegemony to expand their spheres of influence can offer some explanatory potential but not all. Instead, policymakers should adopt a constructivist approach that centers decision-making around issues of identity and social construction. This will help explain the failure of the Johnston Plan as a broader Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than a Jordanian-Israeli one. My research falls short when it comes to discussing the failure of cooperation between Jordan and Syria, but I believe that as a short-term heuristic, policymakers can adopt a constructivist approach to understand Arab conflicts with non-Arab actors. We may need to develop a new framework when it comes to in-group vs. in-group violence. Further research needs to be done on the role of water conflict and scarcity from an Arab identity perspective. My future research will examine why cooperation among Arab states fails in the realm of water security. This may be due to sectarian differences in faith, essentially creating out-groups within the in-groups. Given the analysis in this research paper, it is critical for the US to realize that if it wants to play any role in resolving the Red Sea-Dead Sea canal project, it needs to address the broader issue of Israel-Palestine first. 

[i] Surkes, Sue. “Sinking Israel-Jordan Relations Leave Dead Sea, a Natural Wonder, Low and Dry.” The Times of Israel, November 7, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/sinking-israel-jordan-relations-leave-dead-sea-a-natural-wonder-low-and-dry/.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Tobias Ide and Christiane Fröhlich, “Water conflict or water cooperation? A discursive understanding of water conflict and cooperation in Israel and Palestine,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Politics (2014): 17.

[iv] ECC. “Jordan and Israel: Tensions and Water Cooperation in the Middle-East: ECC Factbook.” ECC Library, Jan. 2018, library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/jordan-and-israel-water-cooperation-middle-east.

[v] Ibid. 

[vi] Ibid. 

[vii] Mitha, Farooq. “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of ‘Cooperation.’” Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (September 2010): 105–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2010.00442.x.

[viii] Ibid. 

[ix] Shay, Shaul. “Regional Water Security: Challenges and Opportunities in the Middle East .” IDC Herzliya: Institute for Policy and Strategy, (2017), www.idc.ac.il/he/research/ips/Documents/publication/5/ShaulShayWaterSecurity2.pdf.

[x] Haddadin , M.J. “The Jordan River Basin: A Conflict Like No Other.” Edited by Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama. Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 1 (2014): 250. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849775809.

[xi] Ibid. 

[xii] ECC. “Jordan and Israel: Tensions and Water Cooperation in the Middle-East: ECC Factbook.” ECC Library, Jan. 2018, library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/jordan-and-israel-water-cooperation-middle-east.

[xiii] Sosland, Jeffrey. Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin. Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2007. Page 46. 

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Tobias Ide and Christiane Fröhlich, “Water conflict or water cooperation? A discursive understanding of water conflict and cooperation in Israel and Palestine,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Politics (2014): 4-5.

[xvi] Ibid. 

[xvii] Ibid. 

[xviii] Ibid, page 7. 

[xix] Renger J. “The Middle East Peace Process: Obstacles to Cooperation over Shared Waters.” In: Scheumann W., Schiffler M. (eds) Water in the Middle East. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (1998): 50. 

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] Morag, Nadav. “Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 3 (2001): 179-98. www.jstor.org/stable/4284179.

[xxiii] Ibid. 

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] Ibid, page 191. 

[xxvi] Haddadin , M.J. “The Jordan River Basin: A Conflict Like No Other.” Edited by Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama. Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 1 (2014): 252-253. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849775809.

[xxvii] Ibid. 

[xxviii] Wishart, David M. “The Breakdown of the Johnston Negotiations over the Jordan Waters.” Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 4 (1990): 542. www.jstor.org/stable/4283397.

[xxix] ECC. “Jordan and Israel: Tensions and Water Cooperation in the Middle-East: ECC Factbook.” ECC Library, Jan. 2018, library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/jordan-and-israel-water-cooperation-middle-east.

[xxx] Ibid. 

[xxxi] Morag, Nadav. “Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 3 (2001): 194-195. www.jstor.org/stable/4284179.

[xxxii] Jägerskog A. (2007) “Why States Co-operate over Shared Water: The Water Negotiations in the Jordan River Basin.” In: Shuval H., Dweik H. (eds) Water Resources in the Middle East. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2007): 116.

[xxxiii] Sosland, Jeffrey. Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin. Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2007. Page 40.

[xxxiv] Ibid. 

[xxxv] Mitha, Farooq. “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of ‘Cooperation.’” Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (September 2010): 110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2010.00442.x.

[xxxvi] Renger J. “The Middle East Peace Process: Obstacles to Cooperation over Shared Waters.” In: Scheumann W., Schiffler M. (eds) Water in the Middle East. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (1998): 54. 

[xxxvii] Haddadin , M.J. “The Jordan River Basin: A Conflict Like No Other.” Edited by Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama. Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 1 (2014): 253-254. 

[xxxviii] Ibid. 

[xxxix] Ibid. 

[xl] Ibid. 

[xli] Jägerskog A. (2007) “Why States Co-operate over Shared Water: The Water Negotiations in the Jordan River Basin.” In: Shuval H., Dweik H. (eds) Water Resources in the Middle East. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2007): 87-88.

February 5, 2020 0 comment
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FeaturedGlobalizationHuman RightsMilitarySecurityTechnology

Borders, Bodies, and Biometrics

written by Katarina Kosmala-Dahlbeck

The camera does not flash as it scans your face. Instead, a green check appears on the screen as the turnstile opens smoothly to let you through. Boarding pass proven useless, you walk through the gate and board the plane hassle-free. “So quick [you] couldn’t believe it”, quips the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s website. It cites the use of facial recognition as a way to make air travel a seamless experience for both travelers and officers. It also attributes its decision to adopt this technology in part to the growing popularity of biometric identification in unlocking cellphones and other everyday devices.

Biometrics refer to digital data on any biological characteristics unique to an individual. This can include fingerprints, face, voice, retina, or iris recognition technology, as well as information on a person’s hand geometry, gait, body movements, and even DNA. The accuracy of comprehensive biometric data is unparalleled by other technology, far surpassing traditional methods of identification such as photo IDs. Recent advances have spurred massive growth of biometrics in public, private, and commercial sectors, with global market size expected to reach USD 59.31 billion by 2025. Biometrics have become most widely used to prove identity in citizenship, personal technology, and surveillance, and have proven to be the most infallible way to counter security threats both in the physical world and online.

At the same time, the development of biometrics has raised legal and ethical questions surrounding data privacy in a globalized world. Article 12 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights lists the right to privacy as fundamental, stating that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence”. This sentiment is echoed in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and specifically in General Comment 16, which states that personal information held on “computers, data banks, and other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals, must be regulated by law”. The European Union has espoused the most stringent regulations on privacy to date with the passing of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016, which has since taken effect in all EU member states. Citing concerns about infringing on the “rights and freedoms of citizens”, GDPR has prohibited the use of biometrics for identification purposes, except in the case of extenuating circumstances and with an individual’s explicit consent.

No such regulations exist in the United States, with only three states adopting legislation ensuring privacy over biometric data. Illinois, Texas, and Washington have passed various versions of biometric privacy laws, noting pervasive data sharing by tech giants and the critical nature of biometric information. Large-scale legislation has yet to gain support in the U.S., as biometrics have proliferated technology markets and become a familiar part of security authentication in apps, banks, workplaces, and airports.

Even with the success of biometrics in the private sector, some of its most impactful applications are in intelligence and national security. Capital investments in biometrics skyrocketed after 9/11, as security launched to the forefront of American consciousness. The Patriot Act, passed in October 2001, gave the government a green light on surveillance of suspected terrorist activity and tightened border security measures. As the War on Terror dominated American foreign policy, biometrics began to expand the reach of American intelligence both at home and abroad. Today, the U.S. government spends over $700 million a year on biometric research, and any person who crosses an American border must provide biometric information to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services upon entry. This allows officers to conduct criminal background checks, as well as monitor immigration status depending on a person’s country of origin.

As a result, growing concern exists as to the implications of this for international norm and even policy. If biometrics are so widely used on a national level, what does a world filled with biometric information look like? Due to the reach of the digital economy today, individuals have little control over where their data goes should it be compromised. Cybersecurity presents a significant threat worldwide, and surveillance states such as China systematically deploy biometric technology to suppress minority populations. Chen Quanguo, Communist Party Secretary and the architect behind Muslim internment camps in China, rose to power through his implementation of a “grid management” surveillance system that uses facial recognition to police the movement of Uighur Muslims. Security checkpoints on roads and train stations, cellphone confiscation, and the withdrawal of passports prevent Uighurs from leaving these centers or traveling abroad. China claims that the purpose of detainment is to counter terrorism and religious radicalization, but the mass imprisonment of its Muslim minority has received international condemnation for human rights violations. Even though biometric technology has the potential to strengthen national security, it can also legitimize ethnic discrimination and racial profiling in many cases.

The use of biometrics in these contexts has redefined the role of biology in questions of political legitimacy. Rather than focusing on an individual’s record, biometrics place identity at the forefront of questions of national security. When a traveler, immigrant, or refugee is asked “who are you?” before they are asked “what have you done?”, their biological self begins to determine their geopolitical status. This creates an environment ripe for biases, explicit or implicit, to creep in and drive policy. For example, the U.S. has long treated people of Middle Eastern descent with suspicion because of risks associated with terrorism. However, the entrance of biometrics into the public sphere allows this discrimination to be systematized and legitimized under the law. President Trump’s Muslim travel ban itself cut the admission of Muslim refugees to the U.S. by 91 percent, and visa approvals for immigrants from majority Muslim countries have fallen 30 percent since 2016. 155,000 fewer tourists, students, and guest workers from the Muslim world entered the U.S. in 2017 than in 2016. The combination of Islamophobic policy with advances in biometrics have made the U.S. an unwelcome and even dangerous destination for applicants from many Muslim countries. The way that biometrics combine biological identity with political status creates a system that, by definition, makes some people more secure at the expense of others.

The concept of embodying citizenship has changed the face of international migration and surveillance. Instead of having to be a member of a biological tribe to belong, one now has to be a part of a state’s biometric tribe that determines acceptance based on the geopolitical status of identity alone. And because technology invariably develops faster than the law, the world is woefully unprepared to address the legal and ethical questions raised by these developments. The European Union’s GDPR is the most extensive data regulation law in the world, but even it has limits in its scope to manage the use of biometrics internationally. Most biometric research is conducted in the United States, and until national legislation is enacted to address it, this technology will continue to drive intelligence and border security initiatives, as well as flourish in the private sector. The lack of international legal precedent concerning biometric data also poses a serious obstacle to justice. Until these questions are addressed in an international court, biometric data proliferation in the public and private sector will continue to press against the fine line of the human right to privacy.

April 8, 2019 0 comment
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EuropeFeaturedGeopoliticsHistoryMilitaryRussiaSecurity and ConflictTerritorial disputesVladimir Putin

The Russo-Georgian War, 10 Years Later

written by Conor McDonald

On August 7th, 2008, the leaders of the Russian Federation shocked the world and made the controversial decision to mobilize and invade Georgia, a small, sovereign nation located in the Caucasus Mountains just south of Russia. The Georgian military had been engaged with separatists from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for just under a week, yet by the time a large batch of Russian military personnel entered their territory through the mountainous Roki tunnel at 11:00 PM, it was too late. Despite what any news outlets would later report, the international community knew that Georgia had just lost a major chunk of its territory to this aggressor from the north. What no one knew, however, was that this seemingly minor excursion would begin a decade’s worth of continued Russian belligerence and adventurism toward its neighbors. But why start with Georgia?

Historically, the strained relations between Russia and Georgia are nothing new, and can be traced back as early as the year 1785 when the Russian Empire violated a treaty and refused to defend the eastern Georgian Kingdom during a Persian invasion. Some decades later, in 1801, Georgia joined the Russian Empire, and it remained a protected member up until 1918 when the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia was established following the Russian Revolution and the abdication of the Russian Tsardom. This was short-lived, however, as the Bolsheviks and the Red Army overthrew the Georgian government in 1921 and forcibly annexed the region into the newly-established United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1922.

The USSR forced an era of tension, fear and powerlessness upon the citizens of Georgia. Under the first three years of Soviet control alone, approximately 50,000 Georgians were executed by the government, while an insurmountable 150,000 were purged up through 1951 by Joseph Stalin, a native Georgian himself. Additionally, basic rights to citizenship were stripped; according to Michael Parrish in The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953, Stalin forced entire Ingush, Chechen, Balkarian and Karachay populations, all native to Georgia, into deportation. Georgian territories were seized and distributed amongst various states, including Armenia and Turkey, and nearly half of the 700,000 soldiers that the country was forced to contribute toward the Red Army were killed over the course of World War II. Even when relatively progressive leaders like Nikita Khrushchev took control of the Soviet Union — “progressive” in that he succeeded Stalin — Georgian protests promoting independence from the USSR resulted in the massacring of hundreds of college students and demonstrators.

Thus, it should surprise no one that, upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Georgian officials were quick to declare sovereignty and begin holding democratic elections. Unfortunately, the radical and autocratic Georgian presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia prompted some to lose faith in their nation, and pro-Russian separatist groups gained prominence in certain regions — most notably in South Ossetia and Abkhazia — leading to a short-lasting civil war in the latter. Somewhat ironically, this forced Georgia to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to receive Russian military support, and, in 2001, Abkhazia and Georgia co-signed “an accord pledging not to use force against each other.”

After the accord’s ratification, a shaky sense of peace was established between Georgia and the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was clearly imperfect, though, as protests and skirmishes continued to break out while political tensions rose unwaveringly; South Ossetia even went so far as to hold an unofficial referendum in which 99% of the public voted in favor of independence, an act ignored by the European Union but supported by the Russia Duma. Two years later, after hearing direct pleas for support from Abkhazian and South Ossetian officials, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stated that allying with the separatist regions “is not an easy choice, but it is the only way to save the lives of people,” and pledged both political and military support to both. Several months later, after the Georgian military responded to another South Ossetian attack, Russia launched its now-infamous military invasion.

Russia’s 2008 seizure of the Ossetian and Abkhazian territories provided eerie foreshadowing for what the Federation’s neighbors had in store. Six years later, in 2014, a near-identical crisis transpired in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions, disputes which continue to the time of this article’s publication. The primary characteristic that both the Georgian and Ukrainian annexation attempts had in common is that they highlighted deep, pervading insecurities from within the highest ranks of Russian leadership. These insecurities are two-pronged, with stress placed on both military and political pressures. From a military perspective, the intimidating reach of NATO expansion is obviously considered to be a pervading, existential threat; Georgia and Ukraine were invaded while the United States and the West considered their bids to enter NATO. However, the more alarming insecurities are political, and they continue to grow increasingly problematic as democracy gains popularity within Russian spheres of influence.

During a 2005 visit, President George W. Bush proudly referred to Georgia as a beacon of liberty in a region where freedom is not always to be taken for granted. He spoke glowingly about the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, in which a peaceful change of power allied Georgia more strongly with the West. This revolution preceded and arguably inspired Ukraine’s 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, which forced the overturning of then-President Viktor Yanukovych and his corrupt, Russophilic administration in favor of the more Western-oriented candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. These so-called Color Revolutions, which also took place in post-Soviet Yugoslavia and Kyrgyzstan, sent a message to their former occupier that these nations were now independent and desirous of fair domestic representation. Seeing that his neighbors were quickly working to distance themselves from the influence of a relatively weakened Russia, it would not take a foreign affairs specialist to understand that Vladimir Putin, a longstanding disbeliever in the promises of democracy, was far from pleased with the symbolism of these revolts.

Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko began to indirectly lay the groundwork for his own country’s invasion by publicly voicing his support for Georgian independence. It is no coincidence that this controversial anti-Russian stance hurdled Ukraine toward further political crisis in November of that year, a window which Russia seized to further exacerbate political troubles. When Yanukovych successfully regained his presidency in 2013, Ukraine spiraled into yet another revolution, and this time Putin chose to involve himself on his pro-Russia counterpart’s behalf. Shortly after, the autonomous region of Crimea was annexed by Russian soldiers.

Russia had been guilty of testing Western resolve all throughout the 21st century, particularly in Eastern Europe, but the dramatic actions against Georgia in 2008 marked a critical shift in Russian foreign policy. Long gone were the days of press releases or discrete political subversion, and ushered in was an era of violent military intervention and territorial seizures. The only thing protecting Russia’s other Western-oriented, post-Soviet neighbors is their NATO membership, and the United States and its allies should not be surprised to see Russian intervention on behalf of other separatist groups from non-member states in the coming years. Ten years after the events in Georgia, the world still waits to see who will be next.

September 26, 2018 8 comments
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AfricaEuropeFeaturedHistoryMilitarySecurity and ConflictUncategorized

La Guerre du Sahel

written by Grayson Peters

Along a desert road, a military convoy is passed by an unassuming gray car.  There is a sudden explosion, then gunfire.  Fifteen minutes later, four civilians are dead and eight Western soldiers are wounded. This is not the first act of terrorism in the region, nor will it be the last.  The story is familiar – an Islamic terrorist attack against Western soldiers stationed in the region – but the players and setting are not. These foreign forces are not American, and the battleground is not Iraq or Afghanistan.  The soldiers are French, and they are in the Sahel, a sub-Saharan strip of Africa that links the Atlantic Ocean to the west and the Red Sea to the east.

The Sahel is a vast, scarcely populated, and loosely governed region that stretches across fourteen African countries, including Mali, Chad, and Niger.  In recent decades, the absence of effective governance has allowed the Sahel to become a hotbed of political violence and a safe haven for transnational terrorist organizations.  Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and smaller, regional terrorist organizations have all used the Sahel as a base of operations and refuge from counter-terrorist operations.  The Sahel states’ porous borders enable militant groups to travel unchecked across vast swaths of the continent and strike targets in North African nations such as Algeria and Tunisia.

Ethnic and economic tensions in the Sahel predate the arrival of transient Islamic terrorist organizations, but temporary alliances between militant groups and villagers increase the scale and danger of regional violence.  The New York Times reported that France and Mali estimate that ISIS in the Greater Sahara has only 40 to 60 core members.  By inflaming local passions and escalating grievances between villagers, small groups of transnational militants are able to create disproportionately large violence and chaos.  For instance, Niger and Mali’s cattle-herding Tuareg people, who had previously only taken up arms to defend their cattle and on occasion engage in small-scale ethnic violence, became involved with international terrorism.  Far from home, Tuareg recruits have been involved in terrorist incidents in Libya, raids in Nigeria, and “banditry” in northern Niger and southern Algeria.  Ethnic grievances between the Tuareg and Fulani peoples in both Mali and Niger led to ethnic armed conflict which was dramatically escalated by the presence of Islamic militant groups.  Because these ethnic grievances are often intertwined with economic concerns, especially cattle ownership, external pressures that threaten the livelihood of Sahelian villagers can catalyze conflict.        

As global warming progresses, the increased frequency of droughts, expanding desertification of the Sahel, and dwindling resources in the area will likely worsen regional tensions and create conditions favorable for the growth of terrorist networks.  In 2012, according to the State Department, droughts and failed harvests in the Sahel placed 18.7 million Africans at risk for food insecurity, further fueling instability in the region.  It is no coincidence that, immediately following the outbreak of drought, cattle die-offs, and famine, relations between Mali’s Tuareg and Fulani peoples worsened.  A series of escalating cattle raids led to an arms race and created an opportunity for al-Qaeda affiliates to supply villagers with automatic weapons.  Within the year, the Tuareg people of northern Mali, with support from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) and rebelled against the central government of Mali.

When French military assets entered Mali in 2013, the campaign, known officially as Operation Serval, aimed to support the beleaguered Malian government and block the NMLA’s war for a Tuareg ethnostate in northern Mali.  Although Mali and France decisively defeated the NMLA after only a few months, the French remained in Mali in an attempt to suppress a continued insurgency. Five years later, Operation Barkhane, France’s ongoing operation to stabilize the greater Sahel is ongoing and there are fresh casualties.  As recently as July 1, a car bombing in Gao injured French soldiers and killed dozens of Malian civilians.  Nusrat al-Islam, an al-Qaeda linked organization and the primary terrorist network currently operating in the Sahel, claimed responsibility.    

In 2013, three-quarters of the French citizenry supported Operation Serval, the original intervention against NMLA secessionists in Mali.  Today, substantial French support endures for the ongoing Operation Barkhane despite the campaign’s duration and casualties.

 At first, it may seem surprising that France is leading the international effort to stamp out terrorism in the Sahel.  After all, in 2003, the French government’s opposition to American intervention in Iraq was widely mocked in the United States. In protest, Los Angelenos (and even some UCLA students) publicly poured out French wine in front of the French consulate, and the U.S. House of Representatives cafeteria menu infamously renamed French fries to Freedom fries.  During this wave of anti-French sentiment, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared that “France is becoming our enemy.”  In 2003, France insisted on a multilateral diplomatic approach to Iraq, in opposition to U.S. President Bush’s insistence on unilateral military action.  Yet, ten years later, the French army unilaterally entered Mali, touching off a protracted five-year campaign that has expanded to include the entire Sahel region.

What changed between Freedom fries and a permanent French presence in the Sahel?  In reality, France’s relationships with Iraq and the Sahel are vastly different. Countries in the western Sahel such as Mali and Niger were colonized and imperialized by France during the European Scramble for Africa in the late 19th century.  These Francophone African nations still bear both the trauma and cultural legacy of French rule.

 Many leftist and African scholars argue that France’s reassertion of authority and military power over historic colonial possessions is best characterized as neo-imperialist.  Skeptical that France’s primary concern is protecting Malian citizens from terrorism, these critics of French intervention point to plausible ulterior motives including the protection of French corporate mining interests and nearby uranium mines (in both Niger and Nigeria) on which the French energy sector relies.  In February, Congolese novelist and UCLA professor Alain Mabanckou criticized la Francophonie, the informal and institutionalized network of French speaking countries, and described it not as a partnership of equals but as an instrument of French neo-imperial domination.

However, there is also evidence that the French feel a sense of obligation to and fraternity with the Francophone Africans of the Sahel.  Cultural ties, a shared language, and a sense of historical interconnectedness (despite the region’s colonial past) are all factors. Arguably, elements within France feel a sense of guilt and noblesse oblige, or responsibility of the privileged, towards the nations their ancestors exploited.  Whether this concern is genuine or paternalistically self-serving is a matter of debate.  What is clear, however, is that the security situation in the Sahel is as of yet unresolved and that the potent mixture of ethnic conflict, Islamic terrorism, rising global temperatures, and increasingly severe droughts represents a enduring security risk for African nations and a source of serious concern for France.

September 19, 2018 0 comment
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Donald TrumpEnvironmental ChangeEuropeFeaturedGeopoliticsInternational TradeInterviewMilitaryNorth KoreaNuclear DeterrenceSecurity and ConflictThe International EconomyUnited States

Adam Schiff: Bernard Brodie Lecture and Interview

written by Andrea Zachrich

Congressman Adam Schiff came to UCLA to give the Bernard Brodie Lecture on the Conditions of Peace on May 31st of this year. Before the lecture, members of The Generation were fortunate enough to sit down with Congressman Schiff and ask him questions about the House Intelligence Committee- of which he is currently the Ranking Member- his responsibility to his constituents and the American people, democratic institutions and the rule of law, and the reputation of the United States internationally. He echoed and elaborated on many of these topics during his lecture and audience questions, which we were also able to attend following the interview. While there has been a summer that has past since the time of interview, many of his comments remain relevant as we’ve watched President Trump’s antics unfold over the past few months.

Congressman Schiff has a great sense of humor. He began the lecture by telling an anecdote about when President Trump called him “sleazy”. Schiff said that he felt the need to explain to his son what had happened in case the other children at school talked about it. He told his son that “the President called your dad sleazy”, and his son, wholly unconcerned, replied, “Can I call you sleazy?”  Congressman Schiff used humor frequently throughout his lecture to highlight the absurdity of some of the administration’s recent actions, such as President Trump calling Vladimir Putin to congratulate him on his win. He even went so far as to mimic how that phone conversation might have gone, which had the entire audience laughing.

In the interview with us, however, Congressman Schiff’s tone was markedly more serious. We began by asking him about the partisanship on his committee in the House of Representatives, which is the House Select Intelligence Committee. The committee has been charged with conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible connections between President Trump and members of his team and Russia. Despite the traditionally bipartisan nature of the Intelligence Committee, Schiff noted that one particular instance- what he called the “midnight run“– which divided the committee along partisan lines. The “run” occurred in March of 2017 when Republican Chairman Devin Nunes went to an undisclosed location to reportedly receive classified materials unmasking a conspiracy that claimed that the Obama administration had done surveillance on members of President Trump’s transition team. Nunes then went to the White House to present this evidence. However in a matter of days it as revealed that the supposedly undisclosed location was the White House. Schiff states, “But we learned within a matter of days that in fact the secret location he had gone too had been the White House and the materials he had received were from the White House that he was presenting to the White House.That kind of blew up the investigation because it became clear that the mission for the chairman was to protect the President at all costs rather than doing an objective investigation. The incident troubled Schiff for illustrating Nunes’ blatant disregard for the committee’s constitutional duty and for demonstrating the vastly different goals of its members.

We then asked Schiff what would change on his committee if Democrats win a majority in the House in the upcoming midterm elections and he becomes chairman. His first priority, he said, would be a return to “comity” on the committee, and blames the current chairman Nunes’ divisive actions for the current level of partisanship. When asked a similar question during the lecture, Schiff responded that he would like his committee to “get back in the oversight business”. Based on some recent special election results, Schiff may get his wish for his committee from the midterm elections. In a recent special election in Ohio, the vote came down to closer than 1 percent in a district that has had Republican representation in Congress for 35 years, the past incumbent consistently cruised to victory by 10 percentage points, and where Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a whooping 11 percent. These election results, while not representative of the entire nation, have led many to predict that Democrats may shortly regain the majority in Congress, making Congressman Schiff the leader of the House Intelligence Committee.

On a different note, one idea that Schiff kept highlighting throughout both the interview and his lecture was the breakdown of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and how this is affecting the U.S.’s reputation and negotiating power abroad. Schiff even went so far as to say “I think that the health of our democracy is very much at risk”. He mentioned numerous examples that ranged from President Trump’s tendency to ban reporters from news outlets he doesn’t like such as the New York Times and BBC from press briefings, to discussing the possibility of him pardoning himself for any possible crimes he may be charged with in the future. Additionally, the president’s constant Twitter tirades about the “fake news” press and special counsel Robert Mueller’s Investigation have led many of his supporters to distrust both the press and the Justice Department. The United States was downgraded from a full to a flawed democracy by the “Economist Intelligence Unit” the year Trump came into office, and has remained in the flawed category for its 2018 ranking, currently ranked 21 out of 167 countries for its democracy score. It seems as though Schiff may well be justified in worrying about the state of our democracy.

On a similar note, Schiff also noted his concerns with the way the rest of the world currently views the US, stating “our America first and everyone else be damned has really left us isolated and the rest of the world deeply concerned”. As evidence, he cited examples of this poor perception of America from our allies such as a Politico article titled “Leader of the Free World meets Donald Trump” referring to Angela Merkel, and Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal. Since this interview, President Trump has continued to take actions that worry world leaders and isolate the U.S. on the world stage, such as placing tariffs on Chinese and European goods against the advice of most of the world’s economists and Trump’s troubling actions during and after June’s G7 meeting such as arriving late for the first meeting of the conference and acting outraged at Prime Minister Trudeau’s easily predictable retaliatory actions to Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs. Congressman Schiff stated in the interview that “It’s hard to imagine a time when the United States has been held in lower regard around the world than right now”, but after Trump’s antics this summer, we may be even lower in the opinion of the world than we were in May when the interview was conducted.

This interview was conducted shortly before the first North Korea negotiations had occured. Congressman Schiff was glad to hear that the negotiations were back on after being canceled for a spell, but was concerned with this administration’s approach to North Korea, calling it “erratic and at times dangerous”. He warned that North Korea’s nuclear program was not going to be an easy problem to solve stating, “If it were not a hard problem, it would have been solved by any number of presidents in the past”. This statement has proven to be true since the interview. While President Trump and Kim Jong-Un did sit down for negotiations in June, the joint statement that came out of this was widely criticized as vague. President Trump conceded an important bargaining chip by agreeing to give up military exercises in South Korea while gaining no time table for denuclearization from the North Korean leader. Additionally, on August 24th President Trump called off talks between North Korean leaders and his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, citing concerns that not enough progress has been made in regards to the country’s denuclearization. Congressman Schiff’s warning has proven true; it seems that the problem of North Korean denuclearization has shown itself to be trickier than President Trump first believed it to be.

In a time where dishonorable behavior has come to be expected from the current administration, the political backbone displayed by Congressman Adam Schiff was refreshing. He asked his audience “What’s the point of being there [in Congress] if you’re not going to do what the country needs you to do when they need you to do it?” At one point during the lecture, he received an spontaneous round of applause from the audience after declaring he believes politicians should “do the right thing and still find a way to get reelected”.

It was a pleasure speaking with the Congressman and listening to his lecture, and it will be interesting to witness any potential changes within his Committee following the November midterm elections.

schiff 8

September 10, 2018 0 comment
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Donald TrumpEuropeFeaturedMilitaryRussiaSecurity and ConflictUnited StatesVladimir Putin

The Connection Between Putin’s Chef, Global Political Interference and a Ukrainian Invasion

written by Conor McDonald

If the American dream consists of starting from scratch and, through tireless labor, building one’s assets up to formidable quantities, then it should be easy for Western capitalists to understand how certain individuals were able to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 to attain the status that they have today. Boris Yeltsin’s oligarchs with insider connections, of course, are exceptions to this; instead, the individuals being referred to include middle class contractors, mid-tier managers, and even hot dog stand owners. One stand owner in particular, Yevgeny Prigozhin, provides a particularly dramatic case study for economic success following modest origins. Prigozhin used to rob banks and sell street snacks just to pay his bills, but today, he owns a number of bustling enterprises and can be seen driving a blue Lincoln Continental. However, all is not as picture perfect as it seems for this Gatsby-esque individual.

In 2016, the United States congress imposed economic sanctions against Prigozhin alongside several other Russian political elites in an attempt to strike back at the heart of Putin’s inner circle. Just under a month ago, Prigozhin was indicted by Robert Mueller, special counsel overseeing the alleged Russian interference in the United States’ 2016 presidential election, for playing a major role in the digital manipulation of public opinion. Similarly, the international community has expressed repeated disdain toward Prigozhin for his establishment of the Wagner Group, which today stands as Russia’s premier private military corporation acting in Syria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. So, how exactly did a humble, bank-robbing hot dog stand owner such as Prigozhin manage to gain such prestige and controversy in Russia’s government?

As Russian political rebel Aleksei Navalny stated in a recent interview, Prigozhin “didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In 1998, Prigozhin opened his most famous conventional business to date: New Island, a buoyant restaurant that lies atop an adorned ferry in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Two years later, in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. Coincidence or not, Putin took a liking to Prigozhin, and the very next year he brought Jacques Chirac, the former President of France, to the very same restaurant. He also brought United States President George W. Bush in 2002, and he hosted his personal birthday party there in 2003. Putin and Prigozhin rapidly formed a unique friendship, the shady personal and economic perks of which would be seen in the years to follow.

Some of these perks included contracts to provide food for Russian public schools and the Russian military — at his peak, Prigozhin was feeding 90% of Russian service-members, a job which Vox News reports earned him over a billion dollars. Perhaps it is because of Prigozhin’s humble origins as a hot dog stand owner that he is not afraid of doing President Putin’s dirty work. Perhaps he was enraptured by the economic benefits, or perhaps he was simply too afraid to say no. Regardless, with economic favors from Putin came political and social responsibility for Prigozhin to serve his leader’s interests. A decade after Putin’s birthday party, Prigozhin was presumably advised by government sources to use his funds to create the Internet Resource Agency — also known as Glavset — a Saint Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. Glavset’s campaigns initially sought to put down domestic protests by creating fake social media accounts advocating on behalf of President Putin and disparage the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny, but, according to Mueller, it allegedly expanded to the point of interference in international elections, including the United States’ in 2016. The most prominent evidence citing Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling pertains to his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times from 2015-2016 to discuss the work being done. It’s also important to note that Glavset’s Project Lakhta, a so-called “disinformation campaign,” received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Prigozhin in 2016 alone.

Following dramatic success countering protests and slandering rivals with Glasvet, Prigozhin used his immense wealth in 2014 to found and develop ChVK Wagner, a private military corporation which has, as of late, become one of President Putin’s primary sources for military operations that Russia cannot formally be involved in. Commanded by Dmitry Utkin, an ex-Russian Special Forces brigade commander, ChVK Wagner has been involved in both the conflicts in Syria and in Ukraine’s Luhansk region. Perhaps most infamously, it was recently discovered that the Wagner Group shot down the Ukrainian Air Force’s Ilyushin Il-76 in 2014, an act which was originally attributed to rogue Russian nationalists in Ukraine and killed all 49 of the plane’s passengers. ChVK Wagner has also been involved in the recent conflict in Crimea, where their innocuous green uniforms earned them the title of “little green men.” Prigozhin’s decision to fund military bases in Ukraine’s Donbas region has been a critical component of the success of Russian encroachment. In Syria, ChVK Wagner’s shady activities include serving as “shock troops” to President Bashar al-Assad, as well as seizing ISIS-held oil fields for Russian companies, including the newly made conglomerate Evro Soyuz. The Wagner Group’s economic and military influence is easily one of the most valuable assets that Prigozhin is bringing to Putin and his oligarchs’ table.

In everywhere but Putin’s Russia, it is positively bizarre for one to imagine a world in which a hot dog stand owner with a vast criminal record can rise to a point of such prominence in one of the world’s most powerful political and military systems. Prigozhin himself once said that “Vladimir Putin saw how I built up my business from nothing,” but the roots of his success lie not in his hard work — they instead lie in the fact that Putin was a personal witness and catalyst to it. This is precisely how modern Russia has operated since Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar’s disastrous economic reforms in the early 1990s. Regardless, President Putin’s crony-infested inner circle will continue to thrive on loyalty and trust above all else, proving that even the bank robber putting mustard on a hot dog has a valid chance at fulfilling his wildest dreams.

March 24, 2018 0 comment
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EuropeFeaturedMiddle EastMilitarySecessionism

The Irony of the Economic and Political Viability of Iraqi Kurdistan and Catalonia’s Independence

written by Andrea Zachrich

Iraqi Kurdistan and Catalonia have many similarities. Both held independence referendums within a week of each other earlier last year.  Additionally, they are both fairly autonomous regions in confederation with larger national governments – Iraq and Spain, respectively – and consist of an ethnic minority geographically grouped in their historic homeland. Yet, however comparable these regions appear, there is one major differentiating factor: The Kurds need their own country; the Catalans do not. In the absence of independence, the Kurds will remain politically disenfranchised, continue to have their culture banned, and will remain in harm’s way as a result of oppressive and often violent rule from their adopted countries. In contrast, absent autonomy, the Catalans will still enjoy great political freedom, retain the ability to openly celebrate their culture, and be significantly aided by Spain’s membership in the EU. It is an ironic misfortune that the Kurds, a people with an extensive history of suffering at the hands of their host nations and a future similarly bleak, find independence impossible, while the wealthy Catalans seek a plausible independence from a non-oppressive state willing to compromise on their demands. An independent Kurdistan will only be possible if the region works on diversifying the economy, democratizing the government, and gaining the support of the international economy.

In order to gain political and social freedom comparable to what the Catalans currently enjoy, the Kurds need their own nation. The Kurds are currently the largest ethnic group in the world without a formal homeland and are spread across four countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. They have their own language and culture, and do not identify as Arab or Persian, alienating them from the ethnic majority in each of the states they live in. While Kurds in Iraq have much more autonomy and freedom than Kurds in other countries, such as being allowed a fairly autonomous government, no Kurds have ever enjoyed equal rights in their adopted countries. For example, Syrian Kurds are denied citizenship, and Turkish Kurds are banned from speaking their language, using traditional names, and have been relabeled “Mountain Turks” by the government in an effort to erase their historically separate identity. Additionally, Iraqi Kurds have had numerous atrocities committed against them, most infamously when Saddam Hussein killed over 50,000 Kurds in the late 1980’s using chemical weapons and targeted shootings in an attempted genocide. With the current war against ISIS, Erdogan’s fear of a Turkish Kurd revolt, and the tenuous power Syria’s President Assad holds, this treatment of the Kurds is unlikely to improve if they do not have a nation of their own.

Starting in January, Turkey began a military offensive into Syria called the Olive Branch Campaign. The goal of this campaign is to drive the YPG out of Afrin, a group Turkey considers a terrorist organization but the US and many other UN member states do not. So far, this campaign has reportedly killed around 25 civilians and displaced thousands more. There are also allegations of war crimes, including Turkish soldiers firing their weapons indiscriminately at Kurdish civilians, and one particularly horrifying instance where Turkish-backed fighters mutilated the breasts of a female Kurdish fighter, posed for selfies with her corpse, and filmed the entire incident. Turkish officials justify this offensive as a way to secure their border against Kurdish “terrorists”. The US and other Western powers such as France have urged the de-escalation of the offensive, and the US even stated that they would not withdraw troops from one of the cities, Manbij, that Turkey wishes to attack, potentially bringing the two NATO allies into direct conflict. But, no Western power has seriously attempted to force Turkey to cease this offensive. As gruesome and objectionable as these actions by Turkey are, there may be a silver lining for the Kurds. Under international law, secession  is mainly used as a last resort when  people have been oppressed by the government they live under. There is already an argument to be made that the Kurds have been oppressed by each of the nations they live in, but this offensive by Turkey and highly publicized war crimes only strengthens the Kurdish justification for an independent state under international law.

In contrast to the Kurds’ situation in the Middle East, the Catalans not only enjoy great political and cultural freedom but are also guaranteed safety in their homeland. While it is true that Catalonian independence activists were executed under the regime of Francisco Franco in the 1940’s, it never amounted to the systematic atrocities committed against the Kurds’ under Hussein’s regime. Since Franco’s death, the region has been largely autonomous and has its own parliament and police force. Catalonia also has significant power in the national government of Spain as its representatives total nearly one-seventh of the total number of representatives in the Congress of Deputies, Spain’s National Legislature. Catalonia also gains significant advantages from Spain’s status as a member of the European Union due to their use of the Euro and access to the single market. Additionally, Catalonia owes 52 billion euros to the Spanish Government due to a program created in 2012 that loaned cash to regions who were not able to borrow money after the financial crisis. In comparison to the Kurds, Catalans are not persecuted for speaking their language or celebrating their culture; regional TV and news stations are in Catalan. While the region does hold valid complaints about the taxation policies of the national government – Catalonia currently pays 10 billion euros more in taxes annually to the national government than they receive back – Madrid has said that they are open to negotiations regarding this issue. Such accommodation is impossible to imagine from Iraq, Turkey, or Syria. Declaring independence is an unnecessary and polarizing step for a people who are already largely autonomous, reap many benefits from being a part of Spain, and whose national government is willing to negotiate on their main grievance. While it is true that the Spanish government did take control of Catalonia shortly following the independence referendum, Spain did allow new elections for the Catalonian parliament within 3 months. The Catalans can win the concessions they want without full independence.

The unfortunate irony of these two situations is that an independent Catalonia is economically viable while an independent Kurdistan would not be. Kurdistan’s main resource are its oil fields, which Iraq violently seized shortly following the referendum, and Kurdistan lacks the military power to gain back these oil fields. Turkey, Kurdistan’s main importer of oil, has threatened to stop buying their oil or even invade the region over fears of an uprising in Turkey. More so, the United States refuses to intervene on the Kurds’ behalf because they rely on their allies, Turkey and Iraq, in the war against ISIS. Syrian Kurds under attack in Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch have also seen little international support. Western powers have condemned the invasion but have undertaken no concrete actions to resolve the attack or stop Turkey. This leaves the Kurds with limited negotiating power in Baghdad. Since gaining semi-autonomy in 2006, the Iraqi Kurds have built two international airports and improved the region’s infrastructure, but the government is essentially an oligarchy run by the family and political party of recently resigned President Massoud Barzani. Barzani’s focus on building party loyalty has left other parts of the economy, such as agriculture and manufacturing, largely neglected. Left with little industry, the seizure of their main source of income, a weak military, and a lack of international support, an independent Kurdish state is not currently economically or politically viable.

In contrast, Catalonia has the economic strength necessary to support an independent state. Catalonia is one of Spain’s richest and most industrialized regions as a result of a booming tourism and manufacturing sector that garners massive amounts of revenue and creates thousands of jobs in the region. While it is true that Catalonia’s admittance into the EU could be vetoed by Spain, thus losing their access to the single market, an independent Catalonia would theoretically have an extra 10 billion dollars per year that they would no longer pay in taxes to Madrid, which  could be used to pay for access to the single market. Catalonia may even be able to continue to use the euro without the EU’s consent in the same way that Kosovo or Montenegro do, although it would lack access to the central bank. Catalonia could exploit its existing industries, large tourism revenues, and the financial surplus created from not having to pay taxes to Madrid in order to finance a newly independent nation.

In order to experience social and political freedom similar to the Catalans, the Kurds need their own nation. It is a terrible irony that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan is not currently economically or politically sustainable but an independent Catalonia would be. The US-backed Kurdish fighters have proved themselves strong allies in a fight against ISIS, and the US and other Western powers should support their campaign for independence. In addition, in order for Kurdistan to achieve the economic power to win their independence from Iraq, the region must gain the military power to win back their oil fields. While it is currently unlikely that the US would be willing to aid the Kurdistan military because they fear a resurgence of ISIS in this region and do not wish to anger Iraq, other countries with less of a stake in the region may be willing to step in. Even if the US does not provide military support, the country still may still be able to pressure the Iraqi government into some sort of deal regarding the oil fields. The region must also strive for a more democratic government by purging their current oligarchic regime and they must improve and strengthen their infrastructure. Those in connection with Barzani should step down and new elections should be held and new officials appointed. The government could possibly request loans from other countries with the purpose of improving agriculture, manufacturing, and taking advantage of their central location to trade. Lastly, Kurdistan must attain the support of the international community and powerful countries, such as the United States, who would recognize their independence, provide economic assistance, and assist and support them in negotiations. The Kurds need their own state in order to prevent the kind of persecution that has plagued their people throughout much of modern history. This state is a possibility in the future, but the Kurds have a long road ahead. They need both internal reforms and external support before this independent state could become a reality.

February 8, 2018 0 comment
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