National Security

A drone buzzes over a tumultuous warzone, scanning over dusty ruins and disarrayed troops. Unlike the human fighters, who are forced to deal with threats coming at them from every direction, this drone seems more single-minded, at peace with its duty of finding and eliminating a single target. When it finally locates its quarry, the next actions are simple mechanics: lock. Load. Shoot.

While the involvement of such advanced technology in warfare once seemed to be a figment of science fiction, leaps and bounds in artificial intelligence, used in fields such as facial recognition, risk processing, and many others, mean that it has become an inevitable reality. As with many other areas of innovation, the policy and treaties governing it have been left in the rearview, with only weak predictions and insubstantial precedents existing to regulate the usage of such measures. The beauty of AI technology is also its most dangerous aspect: anyone can access it up to a certain point, meaning it has already found its way into the hands of the most powerful governments and far out radicals. Terrorist groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda have long been “early adopters” of newer technologies, resorting to less-tested methods in hopes of obtaining any sort of strategic advantage.

To understand the risks posed by AI, one must first understand how it works. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “AI refers to the ability of machines to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence, such as recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions or generating recommendations.” The capacity to do so comes from a system known as machine learning, which is exactly what it sounds like: computers are “trained” to perform certain operations on known datasets, through which they “learn” how to apply this knowledge to external variables. The more data a machine processes, the more experience it accrues, and the more intelligent it gets. These capabilities are commonly thought of as innocuous; at this point, AI can be used in mainstream applications such as Instagram and Whatsapp to generate custom emoticons, and ChatGPT has become every student’s best friend, regardless of what they study.

Military AI is on an entirely different level. It can include drones equipped with the ability to locate and eliminate individuals of interest, such as the Israeli Harpy Drone, which can be assigned to a certain area to hunt down opponents and dispatch them using a powerful explosive. Such devices have existed for a few years now; in 2018, two small autonomous drones were used to carry out an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Venezuela’s president, Nicolas Maduro. Less spoken-about but equally impactful is AI’s ability to aid in military strategy, as its capacity to process historical and real-time data and recognize recurring patterns makes it a valuable tool for decision-making.

On a surface level, it seems as though AI is capable of doing anything humans can, but on a more efficient level. What, then, makes it so dangerous, to the point where many argue it should merit its own set of governing principles beyond those that currently exist to overlook mechanized defense instruments? The answer can be found in the same science fiction tropes that predicted the rise of the machines far before humanity had the means to actualize it: they lack the humanity–and by extension, ethics–needed to self-regulate. Whereas even the cruelest militant has the capacity to stop themselves from carrying out an operation due to some level of moral apprehension, autonomous artificial intelligence is literally programmed to carry out its task by any means necessary, through the most optimal pathways. Even though their deployment is often governed by human users, the actual execution of their objectives is triggered instantly once an algorithm has obtained the input necessary (the identification of an enemy base, for instance) to produce its desired output, regardless of potential mitigating factors. This loss of subjectivity is what creates humanitarian concerns, and the widespread nature of the technology makes it a global issue.

Currently, the main piece of policy designed to temper the effects of such unprecedented innovation is the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, an initiative launched by the United States government in February of last year during the Military Domain Summit, which is held in the Hague. Endorsed by 56 states thus far, the Declaration includes measures that encourage responsibility in the usage of AI technologies, through “legal reviews”, “proactive steps to minimize unintended bias”, and “transparent” and “auditable” development processes. The document does not address humanitarian concerns brought up by many human rights groups, and also does not account for controlling terrorist exploitation of such devices. At the moment, the American Department of Defense remains at the forefront of transparency measures, publishing numerous policy briefs and strategies over recent months; however, it is unclear if this forthcomingness stems from a desire to procure rights to rapid, unfettered innovation or merely Good Samaritan concerns.

Opponents of AI have suggested multiple means to oversee the rapid growth of the industry. These include standardization of technology to ensure that no country has an unfair advantage, posing a risk to privatized intellectual property laws as well as the regulation of datasets used in machine learning in order to prevent harmful biases from finding their way into computer programming. It is clear that this issue is a nuanced one: AI is the newest step in military technology, following the lines of biochemical warfare and nuclear missiles, for example. However, its accessibility and rapidly evolving nature make it harder to regulate and, by extension, harder to morally police. Unlike other weapons technology, this represents the shift to a new era of mechanical autonomy and a secession from human sentiments. It is clear that new policies must be put into place not only to facilitate the usage of AI, but to police it.

January 30, 2024 0 comment

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East Asia Featured History Japan Military National Security Security

An Army All But in Name: The Recent Push for Japanese Military Independence

written by Nathan Akiyoshi

The Japanese Army, characterized in World War II as one of the fiercest forces in the world, was unwilling to surrender and battled to the last man to protect the Land of the Rising Sun. The imperialistic nature of the Japanese army, along with their brutality during World War II, was cited as one of the key justifications for Allied occupation and U.S. written constitutional reform of the Japanese Constitution in the years that followed.

General Douglass MacArthur incorporated the consequential Article 9, which stated that Japan could not settle international disputes through violent means such as war and ensured that any domestic force would be strictly under civilian control. These restrictions mean that Japan officially does not have an army, but a “Self-Defense Force,” (SDF) which could be considered an army in all but name. The primary purpose of the SDF is stated within its name: to allow Japan to defend itself. As such, it lacks many aspects that a standard military would have and is largely focused on humanitarian response such as assisting in the cleanup of the Fukushima Nuclear disaster in 2011. The SDF’s humanitarian efforts in Japan have gained the support of the public, which was initially hostile.

Public opinion of the SDF has changed over time and still varies today. However, modern Japan is not the same Japan that went to war 80 years ago. Many citizens believe it is time for the Japanese government to amend its constitution and take another step toward military independence in some capacity. Constitutional reform would benefit both Japan and the United States, allowing the East Asian country to defend its interests in the region while also reducing expensive American commitments.

Although the Japanese public initially feared that the creation of a stronger military force would remind the world of the lasting effects of World War II, it is clear that the territorial disputes between China and South Korea have caused public support for the SDF to increase. With conflict much closer to their shores, the Japanese people’s concern rose and is likely to rise further with the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Support for expanding the SDF comes from conservative Japanese citizens who are angry at having a constitution written by a foreign government. In light of the heated debates about the Japanese constitution, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made it clear that he wanted to amend Article 9 to cement the SDF in the constitution. Although cementing the SDF in the Japanese constitution is not the same as expanding the Japanese army, it would set the precedent to allow potential military expansion in the future. A change to the constitution would allow a potentially greater military force, especially in light of the growing economy of neighboring China and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Abe argued that the “SDF is already so active that a constitutional amendment wouldn’t really change anything.” While an amendment would not bring about an immediate transformation, it would set a precedent allowing Japan to take steps toward military independence.

Currently, the Japanese would still be heavily reliant on their allies to defend them, should another country set its sights on Japan. If Japan is attacked by another nation, the United States would be responsible for defending them militarily. If the United States does not defend Japan they are essentially giving up peace and stability in the East Asian region, especially with unstable relations with China and North Korea. In addition, Japan does not have nuclear capabilities and is thus dependent on U.S. nuclear deterrence. The current structure of the SDF relies heavily on stronger neighbors such as the United States to protect them from international threats.

United States aid to Japan is also called into question. According to statements made by former President Trump, “if someone attacks Japan, we go after them and we are in a battle, full force, in effect.” He also points out the one-sidedness of this arrangement, adding, “If somebody should attack the United States, they don’t have to do that. That’s unfair.” Should the United States choose to withdraw its military support before Japan has amended its constitution and is prepared to more adequately defend itself, they leave the country vulnerable to international threats. United States is spread thin throughout the world and if the Japanese were to become self-sufficient, it would be a key ally in the East without the United States having to sacrifice military forces elsewhere in the world.

A militarily independent Japan would be beneficial to the United States. This way, the United States would not have to spread its forces even thinner than what they already are. Thanks to U.S. involvement in the political unrest in the Middle East, their navy is split between East Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. The formation of a more powerful SDF would allow them to take over many of the tasks that the U.S. military regularly performs. The Japanese should be relied upon to defend themselves and by defending their interests, they will also defend the United States’ interests in East Asia. Although Japanese and United States military interests are not identical, their close alignment with the United States and NATO indicates similar goals. Despite the Japanese moving for increased military independence, it is still in Japan’s best interests to cooperate with the United States. The Japanese and the United States are both concerned over military power, especially with China, Russia, and the United States locked in an arms race to produce hypersonic missiles, which will be extremely difficult to block with conventional interceptor missiles. The Japanese technology would aid the United States in the defense of both countries.

Eighty years ago, the threat of a Japanese army would have been a threat to the United States, but, now the Japanese are an essential part of global defense and collective security. Japan is a key ally of the United States and if they were to withdraw military support, it would show trust between the two nations has developed after the fallout of the Second World War.

The Japanese Security Defense Force is an army in all but name. If the Japanese government were to amend its constitution, it would not only become more independent of the United States, but a more important ally as its military resources would bolster the United States instead of drain them from where they are needed.

April 12, 2023 0 comment

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Featured National Security Security Security and Conflict Terrorism United States

Lessons From the War on Terror

written by Jack Hill

History has demonstrated that nations often compromise on guaranteeing civil rights to their citizens as they mobilize against threats to national security. In combating global terrorism after the scourge of September 11th, the US too fell victim to this perennial fate.

The 9/11 attacks marked an inflection point in American and, ultimately, world history. The hijacking of commercial airplanes to be used in the killing of 3000 American citizens laid bare the devastating capabilities of modern terrorist organizations and wrought a massive US-led counterterrorism offensive spanning twenty years. Yet, the US led campaign, while aimed at deterring the new threat terrorism posed, exceeded its security mandate through various domestic policies and actions committed abroad. Through privacy-breaching legislation such as the Patriot Act, prejudicial executive branch programs towards Muslim Americans, and the grossly inhumane treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo and Abu Graihb Prisons, US counterterrorism efforts infringed upon the civil rights of American citizens and prisoners of war. As a result, these actions seriously stained the US’s reputation for upholding the rule of law which in turn hindered their counterterrorism efforts abroad.

However, confronting global terrorism now occupies less attention from states than it has for the last two decades as new security concerns take centerstage in the international political theater. The recent passing of the 21^st anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, along with the one-year anniversary of the US military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, serves as a glaring reminder of the new geopolitical reality. With war raging in Ukraine, tensions escalating between the US and China over the fate of Taiwan, and the ever-present climate dilemma, the international community has redirected its efforts away from combating terrorism, which many critics alleged were excessive in the first place for what they perceived as an exaggerated threat. Today, states’ counterterrorism efforts rely less on physical ground forces operating in foreign countries, but instead primarily employ modern military technology to neutralize terrorist threats. This is clearly evidenced through the US’s recent killing of top Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, through a precision drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan in August of 2022.

As the world transitions away from counterterrorism to face these mounting challenges, the US is increasingly trying to revive the liberal international order and reassert itself as the leader thereof to overcome the new post-9/11 struggles. Yet, in order to do so, the aforementioned stumbles made during the war on terror must be acknowledged and avoided in the US’s renewed efforts, due to their fundamental incongruence with the principles that guide the coalition the US seeks to lead. Particularly, the necessity of protecting civil rights in the midst of conflict cannot be disregarded, but instead must be firmly apprehended by a reinvigorated liberal international order. Absent this, an American-led response will lack the legitimacy necessary to surmount the obstacles ahead.

As previously mentioned, the US exceeded in its efforts to combat terrorist threats in several instances following the 9/11 attacks, one of the most infamous being the passing of the USA/PATRIOT Act. Enacted by Congress in order to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes,” the Patriot Act was passed at a time of intense public anxiety over the threat of another terrorist attack on American soil. Indeed, the Patriot Act’s massive expansion of government surveillance on American citizens reflected the fear experienced in the wake of 9/11 and constituted one of the most significant threats to civil rights in contemporary American history. Legislators substantially rewrote the nation’s surveillance laws by enhancing the government’s authority to collect information on individuals through searching private property and monitoring personal third party interaction without notice. Additionally, the Patriot Act did not require the government to provide evidence that the information seized was done so on suspicion of criminal activity, but could justify their conduct by stating that they were searching for information “related to an ongoing terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation.” Along with other expansions of government surveillance authority, the Patriot Act undermined the guarantees of the US Constitution’s Fourth Amendment which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by the state. In trampling upon the liberties codified by the Fourth Amendment, this legislation undermined the US’s global image as a steadfast steward of civil rights.

Further, the war on terror saw the civil rights of minority groups threatened as well, particularly those of Muslim Americans. In a wave of Islamophobic violence following September 11^th, the FBI reported that 481 anti-Muslim hate crimes were committed in 2001, a staggering increase from only 28 reported in 2000. Further, hate crimes against Muslims increased exponentially by 500% between 2000 and 2009 even as the total number of hate crimes being committed in the US decreased by 18% during this same period.

Muslim Americans also faced encroachments on their civil rights through various executive branch policies, the most brazen of which being the 2002 Special Registration Program announced by then Attorney General John Ashcroft. Under this program, visitors to the US were singled out from men ages 16 and over from thirty-three majority Muslim countries to register with US immigration authorities in order to be fingerprinted, photographed, questioned, and subjected to routine reports. These policies imposed discriminative legal burdens on Muslims which the majority of Americans did not face, showing little regard towards their guarantee to equal protection under the law. Additionally, the inherent prejudice of these policies portrayed Muslims as the enemy in American society which contributed to their further stigmatization. However, it should be noted that the Bush and Obama Administrations did make efforts towards bettering relations with Muslim Americans through partnerships with civil society groups to promote Muslim advancement. Nonetheless, the treatment Muslims endured following 9/11 resulted in their misrepresentation as anti-American terrorists, in spite of the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims reject the violent extremism espoused by actual jihadists.

However, the most gruesome cases of civil rights violations resulting from counterterrorism efforts came from the treatment of prisoners at both Abu Graihb and Guantanamo Bay Prisons. At Abu Graihb, detainees were subjected to gross mistreatment including sexual abuse, beatings, and other severe forms of torture, as revealed through photographs leaked out of the facility in April 2004. Most detainees at Abu Graihb were not even associated with terrorist or insurgent forces in Iraq, but were instead civilians merely arrested at random military checkpoints. Similarly, several prisoners at Guantanamo were also civilians who were purported to be terrorists by bounty hunters being offered $5,000 by the US in Afghanistan and Pakistan in exchange for Al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects. Detainees at Guantanamo were almost always held without charge and forced to endure torture under the Bush Administration’s infamous “enhanced interrogation” program. Even today, 41 prisoners are still being held, almost all without charge or trial. Ultimately, American personnel at both prisons disregarded the legal standards of habeas corpus along with the prohibition against torture under the UN Convention Against Torture, severely infringing upon the rights of detainees.

Even though they were committed in the fight against terrorism, the previously mentioned actions against civil rights undermined US counterterrorism efforts. Privacy breaches under the Patriot Act engendered anxiety among Americans towards government surveillance, with a 2014 Pew Research study finding that 80% of respondents either “agree” or “strongly agree” that Americans should be more concerned with the government’s monitoring of phone calls and internet communications. Indeed, this sentiment contributed to a brewing lack of trust among Americans in their government and added to the dismay the public increasingly viewed the war on terror with. This disaffection was only amplified by the grievances of Muslim Americans who suffered through mistreatment and misrepresentation as a result of these actions.

Similarly, the treatment of prisoners at Abu Graihb and Guantanamo seriously stained America’s reputation for upholding the rule of law. These actions showed no respect for ensuring proper treatment of prisoners or the US’s own domestic legal standards in Middle-Eastern countries where American forces were deployed. Additionally, these violations of civil rights inadvertently aided terrorist organizations by providing them with propaganda material of US soldiers abusing prisoners that they employed to recruit new insurgents. Overall, the US’s mistreatment of prisoners added to the difficulty the US military already faced in working with security partners in Iraq and Afghanistan which ultimately hampered American counterterrorism efforts in these regions.

Yet, greater threats now present themselves in the international political arena and counterterrorism no longer receives the same degree of commitment as it had for the last twenty years. And as the US attempts to mobilize the liberal international community to confront these challenges, it appears ever more clearly why the errors of the war on terror must be acknowledged and avoided. Compromising on civil rights and disregarding the rule of law to achieve new security objectives will again be met with the same consequences that plagued American counterterrorism efforts during the war on terror. Not only will the practical effectiveness of a new American-led response be dulled, but its legitimacy in the eyes of its liberal allies will also be reduced. For how can the US claim to be the true leader of the liberal international order if it does not respect its core tenets in pursuing new security goals, and recognize where it strayed from these principles in the past as well? Even more so, the gravity of these new challenges, particularly that posed by China, means that the efforts of the US and its allies cannot afford to lack strength. No longer are primary threats posed by insurgents with AK-47s. Now, countries with advanced militaries that seek to see the liberal international order torn asunder and themselves crowned as the new global hegemon, constitute the struggles of the post-9/11 world.

Ultimately, an American-led coalition will be successful in confronting these challenges if the US adheres to the liberal values of the community that it attempts to revive, and acknowledges where it deviated from them in the past.

November 8, 2022 0 comment

Authoritarianism Economics Europe Featured National Security Print Article Russia Uncategorized Vladimir Putin

Why Angela Merkel’s Tenure has Emboldened Authoritarians

written by Andreas Papoutsis

Angela Merkel has often been likened to the replacement leader of the free world in the absence of active American leadership, particularly during the isolationist years of the Trump administration. Logically, her departure from the international stage is considered an imminent loss for the prosperity and security of the free world, though her legacy on the international stage should not be remembered fondly by those who truly support global democracies. Despite the occasional victory notched for neighboring democracies or domestic German society, Merkel’s legacy as a diplomat should be defined by the several inconsistencies in the values she chose to defend and the failures she has notched when standing up to autocrats.

Despite a whopping 16 years spent in office as the German Chancellor, Merkel has failed to raise German defense spending to the 2% of GDP threshold as required by NATO doctrine, instead of shrugging off the disregard for defense expenditures as a matter that should not be the worry of NATO allies. She will have left public office with a military budget that amounts to a meager 1.36% of the country’s GDP in 2019 before the pandemic-induced recession led to a sharp downtick in GDP that raised the figure to 1.57% in 2020.¹ Indifference to defense expenditures has forced the issue of foreign NATO missions to be disproportionately shouldered by other allies such as the United States. The issue of German defense spending has also left Europe in a strategically vulnerable position in the face of a revanchist Russian adversary in Vladimir Putin, whom she has seemingly cozied up to. What meaningful military response can be taken by Berlin in the event that the Kremlin’s juggernaut military invades Finland or Ukraine? At this point, the answer is clear: hardly anything of consequence. If Putin’s 2014 invasion of Crimea or repeated scares of Russian military buildup along Europe’s borders isn’t convincing enough of the very real possibility of an attack orchestrated by Moscow, we could simply turn to the leaders of Russia’s neighboring democracies, who constantly warn of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship.²

Perhaps one of the most disruptive and troublemaking authoritarian governments in the world, Russia has relied largely on its oil economy to project power and support the financial needs of its military proliferation. Amid a decline in European demand for fossil fuels, the Kremlin has been handicapped by a changing energy environment. Where would the Kremlin possibly find a lifeline? Perhaps from like-minded authoritarian governments such as the one seen in Beijing? Contrary to what logic would dictate, the helping hand was instead extended by Germany under the leadership of Angela Merkel, against the wishes of close allies such as the United States and the frantic warning of Eastern European countries like Ukraine.³ No amount of diplomacy, sanctions, or common sense could convince Germany otherwise of completing the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline despite its blatantly conspicuous strategic repercussions.

Trying to rationalize such a decision by pointing out political technicalities or lauding economic conveniences simply implies an apathetic attitude towards NATO security and laziness when configuring Germany’s energy structure. Even when Alexei Navalny was intentionally poisoned by the Kremlin for being an anti-corruption advocate, Berlin responded with inconsequential statements and sanctions that ignored the crown jewel of Putin’s objective in Europe: the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.⁴ Norbert Roettgen, the conservative party’s leader on the German foreign affairs committee, correctly assessed the seriousness of the situation by suggesting Germany, “must pursue hard politics, we must respond with the only language Putin understands – that is gas sales.”⁵ Despite calls from several Western countries and numerous politicians within her own country, Merkel decided against implicating the pipeline in any response levied by Germany.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas merely questioned and offered hollow consternation surrounding the future of the project in the aftermath of the Navalny poisoning, essentially demonstrating to one of the world’s most notorious authoritarians that his efforts to snuff out and assassinate pro-democracy advocates was entirely acceptable by Berlin’s standards.⁶ Germany seemed more enraged by American sanctions against the project than the assassination attempt undertaken by the Kremlin. Merkel instead figured that the wishes of her democratic allies were secondary to the desires of Vladimir Putin and the misconceived economic expediency he offered.

The decision to finalize the pipeline despite the Navalny poisoning now puts Ukraine and several other European partners at risk, as Kiev fears that Moscow could once again cut off oil supply to the region in an attempt to punish or coerce neighboring democracies. There does not even appear to be a surefire guarantee that implementation of the pipeline would be able to increase the volume of oil transported to Europe; we only know for certain that it would change the source of said oil. Likewise, neighboring Poland finds itself incredibly vulnerable and downright shocked in this situation, since repairs to the Ukrainian-Polish pipeline would have been significantly cheaper than the construction of the Nord-Stream 2.⁷ Since the pipeline will run through the Baltic Sea, NATO allies in the area should expect additional Russian naval assets in the region, an opportunity that Moscow will surely take advantage of to intimidate its neighbors.

All of the details and nuances of the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline, however, can be boiled down to a simple rhetorical question: why would Merkel want a sizable share of Germany’s energy supply to be in the hands of one of the world’s most notorious enemies of democracy? Considering that disdain for the project emanated not just from allies, but from domestic German lawmakers and a wide array of members of Merkel’s own party, there is no valid justification.

In recent weeks, the possibility of a Russian attack on Ukraine has grown. Despite a drawdown of troops along the Ukrainian border in April this year, Russian military assets have once again accumulated in the region, alarming officials in Kiev and causing many security officials from NATO countries to warn of an invasion. With over 100,000 troops in position, defense officials in Kiev project an attack before the end of the winter. Many American officials consider it a “high probability,” including Fiona Hill, who described Putin as “deadly serious” about commencing an incursion into Ukraine.⁸ In response to what could devolve into a major European war, Merkel has merely suggested imposing sanctions against the Kremlin. Levying sanctions against Moscow after allowing the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline to be constructed, however, seems like a rather hollow threat.

Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis expects the Kremlin to divert NATO’s attention away from Ukraine by fomenting unrest along the Polish border.⁹ Over the last few months, asylum seekers and migrants primarily originating from the Middle East have flooded the Polish border after being escorted by Belarusian security forces. Moscow has employed the strategy of attempting to create a refugee crisis within a NATO country by using the Belarusian government as a smuggler of vulnerable migrants. The predicament at the Polish border has been met with condemnation from Merkel, who rightly demonstrated solidarity with her counterparts in Warsaw. This solidarity, however, has not been consistently extended to other European democracies that have experienced similar hybrid attacks by authoritarian governments.

When standing up for European Union allies, Merkel has picked and chosen when to exhibit a commitment to democratic values. Merkel has often been perceived as the de facto leader (or co-leader alongside France’s Macron) of the European Union, especially with the departure of the United Kingdom. The Union’s mission statement includes promises of promoting peace, freedom, and security, yet it has been rendered virtually useless in acting on such promises in instances where Merkel’s leadership has deemed it as inexpedient, particularly as it relates to Turkey. For 47 years now, Ankara has militarily occupied the northeastern portion of Cyprus. Seventeen years ago, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union, which means that, for 17 years, a foreign nation has militarily occupied European territory with little to no backlash whatsoever from Berlin. Last summer, when Turkish warships were escorting oil surveying vessels in Greek and Cypriot waters, leading to a tense situation that nearly devolved into armed conflict between two NATO allies, Merkel framed the situation as if it were an incidental and natural dispute between two neighbors rather than an aggressive incursion of EU territorial waters. Instead of explicitly siding with a European partner and a country committee to good neighborly relations, Merkel chose neutrality, further emboldening the strongman residing in Ankara.

The aforementioned “hybrid attacks” that entail the intentional funneling of asylum seekers into a neighboring country to overwhelm their immigration infrastructure is a tactic that has been regularly utilized by Turkey when confronting neighboring democracies like Greece. In fact, many of the migrants attempting to cross the Polish border made their way to Belarus through Turkish flights to Minsk, which were eventually stopped once the European Union and the United States agreed to sanction third-country airlines involved in flying asylum seekers to Belarus.¹⁰

In March 2020, several thousands of migrants attempted to cross into Greece’s Evros region after President Erdogan announced he would allow their passage into the European Union despite no mutual agreement from the Greeks. The Turkish president’s intentions were clear: to threaten Greece with an unsustainable influx of migrants while unethically generating leverage to exact a more financially lucrative immigration agreement with the European Union. His efforts were successful in generating more financial assistance from the European Union, and although Merkel condemned Turkey’s actions as unacceptable, her government did little to enact any consequences.

While Turkey has grown increasingly authoritarian, both in how it operates domestically through Erdogan’s consolidation of power and in his militaristic foreign policy that threatens regional democracies, Merkel and her government have rewarded such behavior with new arms sales that include the transaction of new German submarines. The decision lends a strategic advantage for an authoritarian government in its aggression directed towards neighboring democracies. Her indifference on such matters also strengthens Ankara’s disdain for the democratic aspirations of its people, knowing that corruption and authoritarianism will result in little backlash from its longtime German partner.

No leader is perfect, not even some of history’s most respected figures, but Merkel’s vaunted reputation is largely based on the intentional ignorance of her shortcomings in defending global democracy. Her work as a domestic politician has received praise from vast ranges of German society, evidenced by her incredibly long tenure as German Prime Minister, but her work in the international community is not particularly impressive considering the urgency of challenging authoritarianism.

Merkel’s true legacy as a diplomat should instead reflect the inconsistencies in her values and the appeasement she demonstrated to some of the world’s most notorious dictators, the likes of which have utilized Merkel’s support to advance their objectives of consolidating power and tearing down democratic institutions within their own countries while simultaneously lashing out against neighboring democracies that are struggling to ensure the free world’s future. So, when it comes to defending democracy and confronting authoritarianism, Merkel’s record will forever be far from perfect.

Endnotes:

1. Leah Carter. “Germany reports record €53 billion in NATO defense spending.” Deutsche Welle News, February 2, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-reports-record-53-billion-in-nato-defense-spending/a-56491017.

2. Micheal Phillips and James Marson. “Russian Aggression Spurs Neighbors to Rebuild Defenses.” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-aggression-spurs-neighbors-to-rebuild-defenses-11609859853.

3. “Ukrainian ambassador calls Nord Stream 2 ‘a stab in Ukraine’s back’.” Ukrinform, March 11, 2021, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3344084-ukrainian-ambassador-calls-nord-stream-2-a-stab-in-ukraines-back.html.

4. “Russia responsible for Navalny poisoning, rights experts say.” United Nations News, March 1, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086012.

5. Madeline Chambers. “Germany pressed to rethink Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Navalny poisoning.” Reuters, September 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny-germany-nord/germany-pressed-to-rethink-nord-stream-2-pipeline-after-navalny-poisoning-idUSKBN25U0UF.

6. “Germany has alternatives if it abandons Nord Stream 2 over Russia tensions: Experts.” Alarabiya News, September 7, 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/business/energy/2020/09/07/Germany-has-alternatives-if-it-abandons-Nord-Stream-2-over-Russia-tensions-experts.

7. Mark Temnycky. “The Security Implications of Nord Stream 2 for Ukraine, Poland, and Germany.” Wilson Center, March 17, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/security-implications-nord-stream-2-ukraine-poland-and-germany.

8. John Haltiwanger. “Putin is ‘deadly serious’ about neutralizing Ukraine, and has the upper hand over the West, former US diplomats and officials warn.” Business Insider, November 26, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/puti-deadly-serious-about-ukraine-has-upper-hand-over-west-2021-11.

9. Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis. “Why it’s better than a 50-50 chance that Russia will attack Ukraine this winter.” Fox News, November 27, 2021, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/russia-attack-ukraine-winter-biden-putin-robert-maginnis.

10. Aykan Erdimir. “Swift trans-Atlantic action kept Turkey from fueling Belarus’ hybrid attacks,” DefenseNews, November 16, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/11/16/swift-trans-atlantic-action-kept-turkey-from-fueling-belarus-hybrid-attacks/.

February 7, 2022 0 comment

Economics National Security Security

The Honduras Challenge for U.S. Foreign Policy

written by Christopher López

When Joseph Biden served as Vice-President, he traveled to over 45 countries, often leading diplomatic efforts on behalf of the Obama administration. In Central America, he was often tasked with the challenge of working with Guatemalan, Salvadoran and Honduran governments to stem irregular migration. The resulting regional initiative became known as the “Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle” and was drafted in response to the over 70,000 unaccompanied minors that were apprehended at the southern border in 2014. This five-year joint regional plan was financed by the U.S. Congress’ commitment to allocate over $700 million towards development and security assistance to this specific Central American region. One of the presidents that committed to this initiative, sadly, went on to extend his rule and whose undemocratic conduct became a predicament for U.S. foreign policy in Central America.

There are many challenges Honduras poses for the U.S. and many are related to the outgoing administration of Juan Orlando Hernández. Initially, Hernández’s ascent to power was well received by Washington. His iron-fist approach towards gang networks and regional drug trafficking delighted many of his North American counterparts given that these were two factors accused in spurring unprecedented migration from the region. In 2013, shortly before coming into office, San Pedro Sula was recognized as the most dangerous city in the world not actively at war with a homicide rate of 85.5 per 100,000 inhabitants. In 2019, that rate had significantly dropped by half.

If President Hernández successfully reduced the country’s homicide rate, why has his government proven to be a predicament for the current and past two presidencies of the United States? The reasons have to do with an escalation of institutional corruption, narco-trafficking accusations and most notably, the continuous surge in irregular immigration from Honduras to North America. Two years before he was inaugurated, 513 family units were apprehended at the U.S. southern border. In 2019, the documented number rose to an alarming 188,368 apprehensions. A brief insight into how this has complicated the relation between these two countries could better convey the challenges that lie ahead for the newly-elected, first-female democratically elected president, Xiomara Castro Sarmiento.

Historically, Honduras has maintained great diplomatic relations with the United States. At the turn of the 20th century, businessmen from the United States invested heavily into the country’s mining sector, banana production, and transportation infrastructure. President John F. Kennedy nominated Honduras to become a recipient of funding from the Alliance for Progress initiative, a 10-year, multi-billion dollar aid program designed to improve U.S. relations with Latin America. During the 1980’s, Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova allowed President Ronald Reagan to utilize Honduras as a base for U.S. sponsored counterinsurgency operations. In 2019, Honduras’ gross domestic product was just over $24 billion with U.S. goods and services trades totaling an estimate of over $12 billion. Tensions momentarily flared in June 2009 when the Honduran military overthrew the democratically-elected administration of President Manuel Zelaya Rosales. Though President Obama initially condemned this to be “illegal,” then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not call for a restoration of the overthrown government but rather validated – through her display of apathy – the farce elections that would eventually cement the National Party for twelve years.

The relationship between these two governments over this period of time has established some very concerning precedents. In 2015, a wave of protests denouncing government corruption swept through Guatemala and Honduras, eventually leading to the resignation of a Guatemalan president and vice-president. While not directly implicated in a scandal regarding the siphoning of hundreds of millions of dollars from the country’s social security institute, Hernández would go on to admit, during an interview with Reuters, that his electoral campaign received money that originated from this scandal without initially recognizing this. The pressure from civil society did not achieve their desired change in government, only the establishment of an international anti-corruption commission, the Mission to Support the Fight Against Crime and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), with the help of the U.S. and the United Nations.

Juan Orlando Hernández was first elected into office in 2013 for a single four-year presidential term. Though he went on to strengthen his country’s armed forces by creating two new security forces, he weakened democracy as these efforts would prove to be smokescreens that would ultimately fail to conceal his true authoritarian lust for power. President Hernández presided as President of the Honduan National Congress that unjustly sacked four-fifths of the Supreme Court in two years before becoming president. In 2015, the new appointees approved a modification to the amendment in the Honduran Constitution that explicitly outlawed re-election and thus enabled President Hernández the ability to run once more. The 2017 presidential election was marked by a series of irregularities and violence. Social unrest was prompted by the electoral commission’s voting system shutting down for ten hours after displaying Hernández trailing his opponent by more than five percent. It took three weeks for the electoral results to become finalized and it took the Trump administration only five more days to recognize this controversial electoral victory as legitimate. The White House’s actions signified that immigration deterrence, rather than democratic values, constitutes the true concern of this diplomatic relation.

Perhaps the most condemnable event related directly to the Honduran head of state was the arrest and criminal trial of his younger brother in the United States. In March 2021, Honduran Congressman Juan Antonio “Tony” Hernández was sentenced to life in prison. The Southern District of New York’s Attorney General’s office stated that “over a 15-year period, Hernández manufactured and distributed at least 185,000 kilograms of cocaine that was imported into the United States.” The media release statement went on to detail how the president’s younger brother utilized members of the Honduran military and national police while President Hernández received electoral campaign funds from Amilcar Ardon Soriano, the second former Honduran Mayor charged with conspiring to import cocaine into the United States. President Hernández has adamantly defended his administration, highlighting his cooperation with U.S. Southern Command counter-narcotic related operations and his authorization of extraditing Honduran officials to the U.S. In the case of his younger brother, he was not extradited but rather detained by the Drug Enforcement Agency at Miami’s international airport.

President Biden is no stranger to Honduras. As one of the leading authors of Alliance for Prosperity, he had to work with Central American leaders and design economic aid programs that would discourage migration to the U.S. It clearly had many shortcomings, considering the slew of international media headlines that continue to document the grim realities of Honduran unaccompanied children and families migrating in the present day. One thing for certain is that back-to-back hurricanes Eta and Iota in November 2020 were not foreseen and in conjunction with the ongoing pandemic, forced more Hondurans to consider leaving their country. In January 2021, the Anti-National Corruption Council published a report on how corruption is a determining factor in Honduran migration, demonstrating how corruption represses access to public services and how the lack of financial transparency promotes the degradation of security, education, health and municipal services. Even during this difficult time for the nation, certain government officials misappropriated millions of dollars in public funds, promising mobile hospitals that did nothing to alleviate the country’s national health crisis. It is possible that this persistent corruption is the reason why President Biden has not yet met with his Honduran counterpart.

Xiomara Castro’s inauguration will take place towards the end of January and U.S. foreign officials have begun engaging with her transition team. The most recent development is the confirmation of U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris’ attendance at incoming President Castro’s inauguration. Juan Orlando Hernández and Xiomara Castro come from two completely different political parties and maintain a very different vision for the future of Honduras. President Hernández rejoiced in the diplomatic approval he received from the United States even as he devalued democracy and the anti-corruption struggle in Honduras. Because of this, Castro not only became the first female Honduran president, but also received the most votes in her country’s history because constituents recognize her willingness to dismantle the bureaucracy that facilitates such impunity. The restoration of trust between these two governments will be critical as their bilateral relationship enters a new era.

January 28, 2022 0 comment

Featured Global Health Human Rights Military National Security Security and Conflict Women's Rights

U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan Must Include a Plan for Women’s Access to Healthcare

written by Samriddhi Sapkota

Last April, President Biden announced his plan to withdraw all remaining U.S. troops and personnel from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021, after nearly twenty years of influence in the nation. In correspondence with this proposal, other members of NATO have agreed to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan in a coordinated effort with the United States. Biden’s decision has been brought to question by many who believe that a sudden and complete withdrawal will allow the Taliban to quickly regain control of the country within an estimated two to three years following a U.S. withdrawal. The lack of U.S. influence in the nation and a subsequent takeover by the Taliban are expected to undo much of the progress made in Afghanistan within the last two decades, particularly in securing women’s rights to healthcare.

Afghan women face a unique disadvantage in acquiring access to healthcare, a phenomenon that began with the rise of the Taliban. Almost immediately after the group came into power in 1996, the Taliban violated many basic principles of international human rights law by forbidding women the right to education, mobility, work, and healthcare, while justifying their actions with an extreme interpretation of Islamic law. These standards are specified under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, treaties that the preceding government of Afghanistan both signed and ratified. Of the numerous human rights violations committed against Afghan women by the Taliban, denial of access to healthcare has had long-lasting impacts on women and their children. Under the Taliban rule, around 16 in 100 mothers died during childbirth, while 165 in 1000 babies died before the age of one.

Following the 2001 military intervention that defeated the Taliban government, the Afghan government, with the help of many international donors, worked to develop a healthcare system that extended basic access throughout the entire country. The initiative has made some progress in women’s healthcare, as maternal and infant mortality rates significantly declined. Yet, healthcare services for women are still lacking in comparison to international standards, despite the two decades of work and hundreds of millions of dollars in aid invested into improving the healthcare system. Women still face challenges in acquiring modern forms of contraception, prenatal and postnatal care, modern cancer and fertility treatment, and even routine treatments like pap smears and mammograms.

Improvement of female healthcare services seems to be constrained by economic, political, and cultural factors. For one, healthcare is too expensive. Even services at governmental hospitals require the payment of fees, which is a luxury in a country where poverty rates are on the rise. Additionally, Afghan healthcare facilities and medical personnel are frequently victims of violent attacks. A 2018 report found that in that year alone, 140 healthcare facilities that had served two million Afghans closed due to attacks by armed groups. These attacks force women to choose between their immediate safety and their health. Large amounts of aid provided by international donors to advance women’s healthcare services have also been lost to corruption.

Finally, Afghanistan’s cultural norms dictate that women are only able to receive medical service from other women. However, high illiteracy rates━prompted by decades of war and conflict with the Taliban━have significantly limited the pool of female doctors available to treat women. This issue is even more severe in areas still controlled by the Taliban today, as women continue to be forbidden from receiving education. Furthermore, male doctors and nurses may only touch female patients above their burqas, which has dangerous consequences for cases that require more invasive examinations. Although international medical institutions like the Red Cross have been granted permission to work in the Taliban-controlled areas, they are still required to adhere to the Taliban’s rules, and thus are unable to perform procedures for women that conflict with the Taliban’s beliefs.

The limited achievements that have been seen in women’s healthcare in Afghanistan are still contingent on support from international donors. However, aid provided to the Afghan healthcare system has been declining in recent years. In 2013, countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee provided Afghanistan with $141 million to support its healthcare system. However, by 2019, aid had decreased by 26 percent to $105 million. Moreover, with the exit of the U.S. from Afghanistan, aid is further suspected to decrease. Although the withdrawal of troops does not require any conditions to be met, it will have a large impact on many international donors that distribute aid to governments on the condition that they uphold human rights, especially women’s rights. This requirement will be difficult to fulfill considering the predicted rise of the Taliban.

With the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, any further loss in foreign aid will almost certainly overburden the already struggling healthcare system. Currently, the pandemic has exacerbated preexisting issues for the Afghan healthcare system, including a lack of efficient emergency services, an insufficient number of experienced staff, low testing capacity, scarce PPE, and high rates of violence against healthcare workers and facilities.

In the current circumstances of the pandemic, women are even less likely to receive the necessary medical assistance. The combination of limited medical resources, ever-growing rates of poverty due to economic downturn, and a fear of contracting illness have deterred many women from going to the hospital, despite being in life-threatening situations. In one instance, an Afghan midwife quarantined in a tent outside of her home after contracting COVID-19 because she lacked the resources to go anywhere else.

To make matters worse, India’s ongoing second wave of COVID-19 is expected to have incredible effects on Afghanistan’s healthcare system. Many new cases that have surfaced in Afghanistan have been credited to relaxed travel restrictions, which have allowed foreign arrivals to enter the country without being screened for COVID-19. The government has yet to ban direct flights between Kabul and New Delhi. With the approaching withdrawal of U.S. troops and the underprepared healthcare system, the effects of India’s second wave are almost certainly going to devastate Afghanistan’s ability to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic alongside any security developments in the region. In this environment, ensuring healthcare access for women is in serious danger.

Now more than ever, healthcare for women is imperative for their wellbeing and prosperity. Yet, with the U.S. withdrawal, there is an impending threat that the little progress that has been made in women’s health will not only revert back to the status that existed under the Taliban, but will likely worsen as a result of COVID-19. In this state, the U.S. and international donors cannot end their support of the Afghan healthcare system and developments in women’s health. In fact, a renewed emphasis must be placed on revitalizing the healthcare system and increasing its accessibility to women. More specifically, this plan must ramp up efforts to decrease the cost of receiving medical care, advance the medical treatments available for women, and educate women in order to increase the number of experienced female doctors. Furthermore, ongoing violence and political developments in the region must be considered to ensure that these efforts are effective.

July 8, 2021 0 comment

Featured History Human Rights National Security Security and Conflict United States

Why the U.S. Could Witness a Mass Atrocity

written by Caroline Mendoza

When prompted with the question of where atrocities are occurring in the modern day, we commonly point to regions in the Global South, namely ongoing genocide in East Turkistan or Myanmar. However, it is rare that we consider the warning signs of mass atrocities and the possibility of mass violence in a country as developed and with the perceived global dominance of the United States.

The U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and Dartmouth College’s Early Warning Project rank the United States as number 66 of 162 countries at risk of a mass atrocity, having risen from number 85 in 2019. While US citizens enjoy, amongst other things, basic freedom of movement, religion, and press, in recent years, the country has seen intensified violence against minority groups, increased political tensions, and explicit expressions of white supremacy. As a collective, these factors have created conditions that historically predicate some form of mass atrocity.

The U.S. is currently witnessing a handful of warning signs of mass atrocities. In April 2021, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) drew from experts in 11 countries worldwide to release a report highlighting police violence against Black people in the US. The IADL references a lack of accountability in police forces, excessive violence against Black people, tazing and chokeholds as forms of torture, and policies like “stop and frisk” to make a case for crimes against humanity occurring in the U.S.. The report concludes with calls for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open investigations and, more importantly, puts into writing what an atrocity prevention perspective has pointed to for years- that the U.S.’s widespread police brutality and militarized police forces should be considered a warning sign of some form of an international crime. In June 2020, University of Chicago researchers found that, of the 20 police departments studied, zero were in compliance with the bare minimum of international human rights laws. As highlighted in the report, what is perhaps equally concerning is the extent to which US police operations differ from their global counterparts. The US’s discrimination, use of lethal force, and clear targeting of Black and Brown people constitute state-sponsored violence and meet two risk factors of mass atrocities– lack of evenness of civil liberties and social group equality.

Further, the U.S.’s tinderbox political climate contributes to previous factors and works in tandem with police brutality as a warning sign that could worsen as tensions escalate. The US is experiencing arguably unprecedented levels of political polarization that make violence more likely to occur. A study published in 2018 determined that an increase in partisan identity following the 2016 election has caused “lethal mass partisanship” as individuals begin to endorse violence against those from opposing groups. The storming of the Capitol on January 6 is reflective of this extreme division that has not only resulted in violence but makes violence more likely to manifest in the future.

Any evaluation of potential atrocities in the U.S. would be incomplete without noting the country’s direct ties to genocide. The U.S. has a largely unacknowledged history of genocide against Indigenous People, an event with repercussions that have yet to fade from modern day Indigenous plight. One of the most significant predictors of a mass atrocity is if a mass atrocity has occurred in the past. The existence of such an event is not an impossible idea when we consider that the needed conditions- marginalization, discrimination, and, namely, historical precedent- are in place. Indigenous People in the US continue to be denied land back and remain subject to gilded storytelling of their history of forced assimilation, boarding schools, and genocide. Due to Indigenous Peoples’ experiences with discrimination in healthcare, the justice system, and the workplace, all of which stem from a history of mass violence, Indigenous life expectancy is an estimated 5.5 years less than the average US citizen. Indigenous plight serves as a stark reminder of an unresolved history of mass atrocities that could likely manifest in the contentious environment of today.

It is worth noting that the U.S. is surely not alone in its history of genocide- we can look to Australia for a comparable example of a country with past violence against Indigenous populations, given Australia’s history of mass killings of First Nations people. However, the U.S. differentiates itself from other Western nations given the country’s current environment of racial tensions and arguably the most extreme political polarization of the Global North. Combined with historical precedent, these conditions make the U.S. much more vulnerable to some form of a mass atrocity than its’ Western counterparts. Quantitative analyses reflect this as well- the Early Warning Project ranks Australia at 128 of 162 countries, compared to the US at 66.

The U.S. is also grappling with reports of forced sterilizations in Immigrations and Customs Enforcement detention camps that would fit the formal definition of genocide, and it is clear that the U.S. recognizes the severity of such malpractice despite the potential complicity of a federal agency. After evidence of forced sterilization of Uyghur women came to light, the Biden Administration placed additional sanctions on China- as the US actively works to condemn mass atrocity warning signs abroad, the same needs to happen domestically.

The term “mass atrocity” is not formally defined. It is a word that encompasses the legally defined crimes of ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The probability of each form of mass atrocity occurring in the U.S. varies- the term “mass atrocity” is used to generalize what could result from the mass atrocity warning signs currently seen in the U.S.. While the increasing probability of an atrocity in the U.S. is reason enough to analyze current events from an atrocity prevention point of view, this new perspective could also be an opportunity for Americans to rewire their perceptions of their own state. Violence and warning signs of mass atrocities have been and are currently taking place in the U.S., and it is well past time that they are labeled as such.

Moving forward, the U.S. should maintain the focus of the Early Warning Project and related monitoring to ensure that current warning signs do not escalate to mass violence. As for preventative policy reform, given that it is unlikely the Biden Administration will pursue police abolition, the least done should be a formal and exhaustive acknowledgment of and reparations for the genocide of Indigenous peoples and systemic violence against Black and Brown people. Also necessary are extensive investigations of ICE centers and associated medical professionals. By taking the bare minimum steps towards addressing the warning signs of mass atrocities, the US is simultaneously initiating a rebuilding of systems that will prevent mass atrocities for years to come.

June 18, 2021 0 comment

Middle East Military National Security Security and Conflict Terrorism United States

Hoodwinked: How the Bush Administration Deceived the American Public

written by Alex Choy

“Let’s keep in mind the fact that this war’s going to happen regardless of what [CURVEBALL] said or didn’t say. The Powers That Be probably aren’t terribly interested in whether [he] knows what he’s talking about.”

In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq on the pretext of preventing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from proliferating and distributing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, no evidence of a WMD program was ever found, resulting in national controversy. To quell negative public opinion, the Republican Bush Administration commissioned Judge Lawrence Silberman and Senator Charles Robb, who were also Republicans, to form the Silberman-Robb Commission (SRC) to investigate why an Iraqi WMD program was purported to exist. The SRC, along with the Republican-majority “Phase I” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) investigation, placed the blame squarely on the intelligence community.

However, with the release of additional archival documents such as the SSCI’s “Phase II” investigative report, a declassified Department of Defense (DoD) memorandum and drafts of a CIA White Paper, there is now empirical evidence that the Bush Administration manipulated intelligence ex-post-facto to justify an invasion of Iraq, and that it may have gone even one step further by attempting to influence postwar investigations in order to obfuscate its complicity.

Prior to the SRC, as a result of the United Nations’ (UN) efforts to monitor Iraqi disarmament post-Gulf War, Americans already possessed a keen awareness of Saddam’s penchant for WMD. The UN defines WMD as nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. This article is concerned with the latter two. During its investigations, the UN discovered that Saddam had fired rockets “containing botulinum toxin, anthrax simulant, and aflatoxin,” and had utilized chemical nerve agents against the Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War. Furthermore, as illustrated by a 1997 New York Times article that discussed Saddam’s lack of cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, it was widely rumored that Iraqi factories which supposedly produced household goods were being used to proliferate WMD in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. In 2003, these suspicions came to fruition when Secretary of State Colin Powell proclaimed to the UN that he had ‘credible’ evidence sourced from CURVEBALL, an Iraqi scientist turned informant, that Saddam had resumed WMD production. Powell’s costly signal, and the decade-long schema buildup that preceded it, hoodwinked many American citizens into believing that the threat of Iraqi WMD was credible.

Made publicly available by the Bush Administration, the SRC had concluded that the purported existence of Iraqi WMD proliferation was a major intelligence failure. According to their report, not only was the intelligence community unable to collect ‘good’ intelligence but it “failed to convey to policymakers … information casting serious doubt” regarding CURVEBALL’s reliability before Secretary Powell crossed the Rubicon and placed American credibility on the line.

According to the SRC, the intelligence community’s failure to do so was because of their tendency to promote intelligence in line with pre-existing theories and, consequently, discredit intelligence that contained contradictory information. Interestingly, the SRC also reported that they found no evidence that the intelligence community had attempted to politicize, or in other words, change its analytical judgments on intelligence in response to political pressure. Working off of this explanation, the SRC reasoned that the intelligence community’s failure to notify Secretary Powell, if not politically motivated, was perhaps an attempt to maintain cognitive consistency. Nevertheless, it is essential to realize that while the SRC was commissioned to uncover the ‘truth’ as to why an Iraqi WMD threat was purported, its investigation was not comprehensive, because it was “not authorized [by the Bush Administration] to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence assessments they received.”

The “Phase I” SSCI report, which was compiled during a Senate Republican majority, largely corroborated the SRC’s findings through oral records and internal emails to and from a CIA whistleblower who was the only American intelligence official ever to have physical contact with CURVEBALL. According to the whistleblower, he had serious concerns about CURVEBALL’s reliability, and as a result, had significant reservations with the Bush Administration using his intelligence as the backbone for an American claim regarding Iraqi WMD. However, when he attempted to bring his concerns to policymakers, his supervisors in the intelligence community were dismissive, replying in an email: “Let’s keep in mind the fact that this war’s going to happen regardless of what [CURVEBALL] said or didn’t say. The Powers That Be probably aren’t terribly interested in whether [he] knows what he’s talking about.” While many Democrats took this as evidence of politicization, the Republican-majority SSCI concluded the contrary, and claimed that “customization of [intelligence] analysis is the essence of the professional practice, not a defilement of it (i.e., politicization).” As a result, while the “Phase One” SSCI report did vaguely allude to external influences on prewar intelligence assessments, it still attributes fault solely to the intelligence community, thereby perpetuating the facade of intelligence community negligence and policymaker innocence.

On the other hand, the 2008 “Phase II” SSCI report, compiled during the Obama Administration, and a Senate Democrat majority, challenged the findings of both the SRC and “Phase I” SSCI report, by illustrating how the Bush Administration made claims regarding Iraqi WMD that were not substantiated by intelligence. Up to this point, even though the findings of the SRC had been questioned extensively by independent journalists such as Thomas Ricks in his book Fiasco, such claims were based largely on un-cited oral reports, instead of official documentation. The 2008 SSCI Report concluded that Bush Administration claims of Iraqi WMD “portrayed the intelligence as more certain than it was, and did not convey [in its public statements] the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community.” Therefore, the Bush Administration was guilty of manipulating intelligence to fit its Munich Script narrative of Saddam as an unappeasable warmonger who was hell-bent on unleashing WMD on the West.

For instance, it was determined by the “Phase II” SSCI, that statements made by the Bush Administration in 2003 regarding Saddam’s intent to give WMD to al-Qaeda, contradicted the intelligence that had been conveyed to them. The SSCI did so by comparing the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) with several Bush Administration public statements regarding Iraqi WMD. Prepared for the Bush Administration by the intelligence community, the NIE had asserted that Saddam did not have nuclear weapons and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks on the US in the fear that “doing so would give the US a stronger case for war.” Therefore, Bush Administration claims to the contrary, were unsubstantiated. In addition, regarding Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN, while Powell had asserted to the international community that “most US experts” believed that the aluminum tubes reported by CURVEBALL were for nuclear weapons, intelligence experts within the Department of State and Department of Energy were found to have repeatedly emphasized to the Bush Administration that they were “not clearly linked to a nuclear” use. Therefore, the “Phase II” SSCI was able to officially establish that the Bush Administration did have the necessary intelligence required not to go to war with Iraq over WMD, but deliberately went beyond that intelligence in public statements.

Furthermore, by comparing a recently declassified Office of the Undersecretary of the DoD for Policy (OUSDP) memorandum, to a draft of a CIA White Paper on Iraqi WMD that was a predecessor to the 2002 NIE, there is now evidence that not only did the Bush Administration ‘go beyond’ the available intelligence, but it actually politicized it. Comments made in the OUSDP memorandum match up with alterations on the White Paper drafts, suggesting that intelligence assessments were rewritten to favor a case for Iraqi WMD.

Bureaucratic politics, and the OUSDP’s status as an Executive Branch department, suggest that the White Paper was rewritten to avoid antagonizing the Bush Administration, which was inundated by the Munich Script view of Saddam. For example, the first draft of the White Paper, released in July 2002, does not include any mention of the aluminum tubes purported to be nuclear in nature, perhaps because the CIA determined CURVEBALL, who had provided the intelligence, to be unreliable. However, the OUSDP memorandum dated September 2002, does include the assessment that aluminum tubes were “to be used for the construction of high-speed centrifuges for uranium gas enrichment.” Subsequently, the final draft of the White Paper, released in October 2002, also makes a note of said aluminum tubes, commenting that “Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain [them were] of significant concern.” Therefore, while the 2008 SSCI determined that Bush Administration WMD claims were ‘somewhat’ substantiated by the final drafts of intelligence products, the recent discovery of the OUSDP memorandum and CIA White Papers begets the question:

How much of the intelligence was manipulated a priori and ex-post-facto to conform with Bush Administration narratives?

Finally, a more in-depth analysis of the addendums to the “Phase I” SSCI Report, when combined with the evidence above, suggests Bush Administration efforts to manipulate and obfuscate the postwar investigation by exerting political pressure. After the “Phase I” SSCI corroborated the SRC’s findings, SSCI Democrats and intelligence officials accused the SSCI Republican majority of prevaricating the investigation to help obfuscate Bush Administration culpability. In her statement, Senator Diane Feinstein asserted that the SSCI did not “acknowledge that the intelligence estimates were shaped by the Administration.” Subsequently, in her opinion, the issue of Bush Administration involvement would require additional investigation; sentiments which resulted in the 2008 “Phase II” SSCI.Similarly, Senator Richard Durbin considered both the SRC and “Phase I” SSCI report to be incomplete, citing that the “responsibility for problems related to prewar intelligence … should not be confined to … the intelligence community, but to … the White House.”

Given his dissatisfaction with the “Phase I” SSCI investigation, Durbin emphasized that “nor should the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress, which are supposed to scrutinize intelligence analysis as part of their oversight mandate, be excluded from criticism.”To strengthen his argument, Durbin enlisted the opinion of former CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr, who questioned: “what did [Senate Republicans] do to systematically look and see if … the subjects [of their investigation] were appropriate?”Therefore, according to Senate Democrats, by failing to investigate the Bush Administration, the SSCI failed to fulfill its duty to the American people. Because the President is not only the head of the nation, but the head of his political party, it is not unreasonable to strongly suspect that a concerted effort by his political party to obfuscate investigations that could implicate him of wrongdoing, were done at his request, or the very least, acquiescence.

In conclusion, while the recent release of select archival evidence has confirmed that the Bush Administration politicized intelligence to justify an invasion of Iraq, the available evidence only strongly alludes that it interfered with postwar investigations, because much of the empirical evidence, if it even exists, remains classified. While this means that such suspicions cannot yet be confirmed, they remain a salient issue because if true, they call into question the efficacy of checks and balances. With the ever-expanding war powers of the executive, a Presidency that wages war on false premises and then is not held accountable, has the potential to erode the fabric of our democracy.

Furthermore, while this article focused on the negative actions of a Republican administration, this does not mean that Democrats are free of blame either – as debates over presidential war powers and interventionism cross party lines and have been abused by both parties alike, as evidenced by airstrikes in Syria during the Obama Administration under the auspices of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). As a result, with the eventual declassification of additional documents, supplementary investigations will be of the utmost importance.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

March 20, 2021 0 comment

Asia National Security Print Article

It’s More Than “Xi’s China”

written by Zachary Durkee

Inspired by the attempted January 6th insurrection in Washington, D.C., “Changing of the Guard” is a series of reflections on transitions of power — the peaceful, the violent, and the era-defining.

China’s current leader has worked swiftly and ruthlessly to extend and cement his grip on power. He has also presided over China at a time when the West increasingly perceives his country’s rise, intentions, and actions as an existential threat to the rules-based international order. Perhaps this is the cost of realizing his paramount goal of restoring and delivering Chinese greatness. The question remains, is Xi the driving force behind today’s China, or a product of it?

Seventy-five years ago, American diplomat George F. Kennan looked out at a world that had drastically changed in a matter of six years. World War II was over, the allied powers had triumphed, and long-time great powers like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan were left battered and fundamentally weakened. While many in 1946 would have just been wrapping their heads around the freshness of peace, Kennan saw the scorched ruins of Asia and Europe as the soil, and the Soviet Union the seed, where a new era of heated contention was already beginning to sprout and take shape. Unlike previous periods in recent history, the U.S. could not afford to take the back-seat. It rose out of the ashes of the conflict as a global superpower embedded in a bipolar international system.

This newly inherited position required the U.S. to reject the pull of its past isolationist inclinations and instead take the lead in a new era of great power competition and global ideological contestation. As Kennan correctly foresaw and noted in his “Long Telegram” sent on February 22nd, 1946 from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, America now faced one of its starkest challenges to date. In it he laid the groundwork for what would become American grand strategy towards dealing with the Soviet Union: The policy of containment.

Kennan later followed up his diplomatic cable with an anonymous piece published in July 1947 under the pseudonym “X” where he laid out the “sources of Soviet conduct,” declaring: “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” This entailed “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy” and the persistent countering of “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world.”

Fast forward nearly eight decades and America now faces the emergence of a new era of great power competition and a competitor that has thrown into question the legitimacy of the current international order and the values in which it is based upon. Just as the Soviet question engaged the minds of American politicians, policymakers, and academics in the immediate post-war world, so too is China today. It is widely recognized that the United States must forge a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the country, but what the central components of that strategy look like remains in question.

George Kennan gave Cold Warriors containment; our leaders today have given us everything from naive delusions of Chinese democratization to disastrous unilateral trade wars. In short, there is consensus that China presents a fundamental challenge but little agreement on how to deal with it in the long-term.

Perhaps this lack of a coherent strategic vision stems from the fact that the world today is far more complicated than the one George Kennan had to deal with. The line then was clearly drawn between Liberalism and Communism and two powers that had little-to-no economic dependence on the other. Today, America is polarized to its core, transnational threats like pandemics and climate change continue to grow, and the need to compete and confront China increasingly appears contradicted and constrained by the realities of globalization and the lure of China’s economy.

Then came the “Longer Telegram” published last month by an anonymous senior government official with deep expertise and experience dealing with China. The full memo appeared in the Atlantic Council, while Politico published a shorter, more concise version on January 28th titled, “To Counter China’s Rise, the U.S. Should Focus on Xi.” The first sentence of which states, “The single most important challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian China under President and General Secretary Xi Jinping.”

As both the title and introductory sentence suggest, the author believes that any long-term U.S. strategy for dealing with China must focus on Xi, his inner-circle, and learn how to separate and identify the differences between the government, party-elite, and even between different factions of the party-elite and Xi himself. This proposal is predicated on one central claim: China is not homogenous and sharp divisions do indeed exist within the Communist Party.

It is true that Xi has transformed China greatly in his nearly decade-long tenure as Communist Party General Secretary. For decades, China has had term limits and rules in place to force leaders to step down after around ten years. These were intended to institutionalize succession and ensure that transfers of power were both peaceful and consistent. Xi has instead abolished term limits, failed to choose a successor, and paved the way to retain power long after his term ends in 2023. He has also worked vigorously to crush political opponents through his infamous anti-corruption campaign, centralized power in his own hands, reasserted the role of the state in the economy, embraced hard-line nationalism, and has decreased the space for civil society to operate. More importantly, Xi has turned away from Deng Xiaoping’s well-established doctrine “韬光养晦, 决不当头” (“hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead”). Indeed, Xi has overseen a vast military modernization effort, severely eroded Hong Kong’s autonomy, placed nearly 1.5 million ethnic Uyghur Muslims in “re-education” camps, put Taiwan on notice, constructed artificial islands in the South China Sea, and has recently pushed the country’s diplomats to adopt a more confrontational style of diplomacy abroad.

These developments lead the author to state that “the rise to power of Xi has greatly accentuated” the China challenge and “accelerated its time-table.” The author further notes that all five of China’s post-Mao leaders prior to Xi were able to “work with the United States,” therefore, “the mission for America’s China strategy should be to see China return to its pre-2013 path—i.e., the pre-Xi strategic status quo.”

I challenge the basis of this prescription. It is difficult to imagine that any prospective strategy Washington employs would be able to, in essence, turn back the clock on China’s strategic calculus. A pre-Xi status quo is a world in which China was content with growing richer and Washington was under the impression that China would eventually liberalize and become more democratic. With this in mind, it is no wonder that China’s post-Mao leaders preceding Xi were able to work with the United States. And although Xi has both accelerated and come to embody the collapse of this status quo, the author of the memo misses one crucial point: The inherent lack of trust surrounding China that extends beyond Xi.

Why is there a lack of trust? It is because no state can know what China’s intentions are now, or what they will be in the future. This has little to do with Xi. States are more concerned with the material capabilities (economic and military) of potential threats and rivals. Xi may be a strong man that thrives on military might, nationalism, and repression, but these are things that have little to do with the inherent structural stress that China’s rise is putting on the international system. In a recent piece in Foreign Affairs, Professor Rana Mitter of Oxford University argues that “As China’s overseas interests grow, Beijing will not be able to continue taking advantage of existing security umbrellas,” and that “China’s growing range of economic and diplomatic interests increasingly demands an expanded global Chinese security presence.” Indeed, regardless of whether or not Xi is in power or if China eventually softens its rhetoric, China will still be constructing more aircraft carriers, modernizing its fast-growing nuclear arsenal, digitizing surveillance, and expanding its economic, military, and diplomatic footprint abroad simply because it now has the means and interests to do so. In short, China cannot return to its pre-2013 status quo because it no longer fits within it.

It is important to remember that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) increasing embrace of popular nationalism and calls for striking a more confrontational tone with the West long preceded the arrival of Xi. Professor Minxin Pei, a leading expert on Chinese governance, traces the roots of modern Chinese nationalism as far back as the May 4th Movement in 1919 when students took the streets to protest the Treaty of Versailles’ transfer of Chinese territory to Japan. “Chinese nationalism was actually partly a creation of Western imperialism,” he argues. By the last quarter of the 20th century, this anti-imperialist/anti-West nationalism began to replace the Marxist-Lenninist ideology that once undergirded the CCP, but now appeared increasingly passé in the context of the vast reforms taking place within China. Five years before Xi would even assume power, China experts were asserting time and again that this brand of nationalism was now the “pillar of legitimacy” for the CCP. This is not to say that Xi himself has not altered or stoked Chinese nationalism, but one must ask: Is Xi’s more overt brand of nationalism truly a break from the past? Or can it be seen as another step in a longer trend towards a more assertive and confident China which now boasts a commanding position in global affairs?

If the latter is the case, focusing too much on Xi’s nationalism misses the forest for the trees. Even when one looks to Xinjiang and the rise of ethnonationalism within China, it is evident that Xi’s autocratic turn is just one of many variables shaping a situation that many countries in the West have now labelled a genocide. According to Professor Sean R. Roberts, these include “the need to develop Xinjiang as an important land port in the vast infrastructure and development program known as the Belt and Road Initiative; Uyghur resistance to state policies; and China’s growing confidence in itself as a global power unconcerned with international criticism.” And although the situation concerning the Uyghurs temporarily improved under the reformist leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the general arch of CCP rule over the region has bent towards where the situation is today. The same, unfortunately, can be said for Tibet as well.

Furthermore, flagship projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, Made in China 2025, and the country’s militarization of the South China Sea reflect a state seeking to carve out a sphere of influence, secure sea and energy routes, gain access to new markets, achieve technological primacy, and project more power and influence abroad— all of which are aspirations that transcend any individual leader. They instead appear more in line with a state that possesses a massive (but slowing) economy that is finding it increasingly necessary to climb the economic value chain which, in turn, steps on the toes of the dominant state positioned on the end of that chain. More fundamentally, they reflect a state that contains sharp differences in values, goals, and interests than that of its principal rival. Xi or not, these are the new realities that characterize China and its place in the world.

Lastly, the argument that China intended to join the existing international order before Xi’s rise is incorrect. Before Xi, China benefited from the existing order. It supplied the world with cheap labor, fed its appetite for cheap products, and followed Deng’s advice of laying low to focus on getting rich. Times have changed. China can no longer hide its rise. Its interests have expanded and its need to secure those interests have had the unintended consequence of exacerbating mistrust inherent to the international system.

No strategy, no matter how savvy, will make China believe its true interests lie nearly a decade in the past. Focusing too much on Xi mistakes him as a driving force behind today’s China rather than a product of it. And although it is possible that a more tempered, moderate successor could one day take the reins in China, this would have little impact on the long-term trajectory of U.S.-China relations. No leader or rhetoric will fundamentally alter the fact that China seeks to preserve its autocratic political system, achieve regional hegemony, attain technological primacy, and champion its state-capitalist economic system. It would be a mistake to base any prospective China strategy on the misplaced belief that China can be returned to a day before Xi.

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