Nuclear Deterrence

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The Pentagon is Concerned With China’s Nuclear Ambitions, I asked SoS Pompeo and Dr. Richard Haass their Thoughts

The gold standard in nuclear deterrence is the ability to execute a devastating “second strike.” In preparation for a nuclear attack, a country presumes their nuclear arsenals will be targeted first. A second strike capability would mean that a country would have enough nuclear weapons remaining to enact a powerful and aggressive nuclear retaliation. America has held a strong second-strike posture in relevance to the rest of the world since the 1940s. Recent events in China, however, have challenged America’s preeminence in this field. Here’s why:

Countries have different ways of producing a nuclear counterattack, including what’s often referred to as “the triad,” which balances air, land, and water-based missiles used for deploying nuclear weapons. Other, though less sobering, means of conducting a second strike falls in the hands of nuclear missileers who spend seven days a week in blast-proof chambers monitoring ICBMs which they are ordered to deploy if a nuclear attack ensues.

Though America’s nuclear arsenal and second strike capabilities are arguably the most powerful in the world, recent actions by China have left Washington worried. The Pentagon’s report on China’s growing military power, which now suprasses the United States in the fields of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, is a somber reminder that the world has entered into a second nuclear age.

The report forecasts that the People’s Liberation Army will double its nuclear stockpile from around 200 warheads to 400 in the next decade. Though only a mouse in comparison to America’s nuclear inventory of 5,800 and Russia’s 6,800, it signifies something much larger, for it’s only one part of a grand ambition to eventually achieve regional hegemony.

The PLA has commenced its first nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, also known as “boomers” by the U.S. Navy. These are highly attractive means of deploying nuclear weapons because they are virtually undetectable once submerged. However, they have a significant margin for error as their deep dive into the sea means communication is incredibly difficult and is often limited to one- or two-worded messages. And even that is not guaranteed to be received. If the Cold War taught us any lesson, it is that mild mistakes made by nuclear-armed countries automatically turn into potentially life-altering actions.

China only has two of the three legs of the triad operational, though the PLA is working on developing air-launched ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads, which would complete the triad.

Even more worrisome is the change in China’s language. Xi Jinping is edging away from its historic “no first use” posture towards a “launch on warning” policy. This is what former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) called a “hair-trigger” approach, which essentially means, under this new policy, China would be prepared to attack with minimal stimulants.

Both the United States and Russia are trying to get China to join the New START Treaty, which is a bilateral arms reduction agreement. The intent is to prevent China from continuing to expand its nuclear capabilities and contain their regional ambitions.

China has no interest in joining this treaty as their arsenal is still in infancy, though considerable growth has been made in a short period of time. According to a senior Chinese diplomat, China would “happily” participate in a trilateral arms agreement if America agrees to reduce their arsenal down to that of China’s.

The New START Treaty will expire in less than five months. The Trump administration has been pushing back the negotiations partially as an attempt to add China as a signatory. This past July, I asked Secretary of State Michael Pompeo through a Federalist Society teleforum call what we can expect from the Trump Administration to see this through:

I think they’re going to make a strategic decision based on their calculus about whether it’s in their own country’s best interest to participate in this strategic dialogue alongside us and the Russians … They set a condition for entry into the conversation with a pretty high bar. And we have responded to that. But our view is very clear. We have a set of historic arms control discussion and strategic dialogues that had, historically, in the ‘80s and in the ‘90s involved two nations: the United States and the Soviet Union, and then Russia. It is no longer the case that you can get a comprehensive strategic outcome that reduces risk of a nuclear confrontation absent a nation like China that has such a significant nuclear capability. …They ought to sit down and be part of this conversation about how it is we achieve a strategic outcome that reduces risk for the world that any nation would ever actually use their nuclear weapons.

..We have made it clear to the Russians that it is important that they, too, lend their hand in convincing the Chinese Communist Party that it is the Chinese Communist Party’s best interest to participate in these discussions. They are an important nuclear country and we need them to be part of this conversation.
Secretary of State, Michael R. Pompeo

This is placing America in a difficult position of either risking a successful arms reduction with Russia, or failing to address the conjectures of China’s nuclear capabilities by moving forward with the treaty without Beijing. Dr. Richard Haass, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, also discussed with me his perspective on this issue, stating that the Trump administration needs to proceed with renewing the treaty. “Any US administration should extend the current New START agreement. The last thing we need is a new round of strategic nuclear competition with Russia. Extend it for several years.” stated Haass. “One of the conversations we should then have with Russia is over the adequacy of the previsions of the New START agreement.”

At the same time, Haass believes that America should come to an agreement with China in managing their arsenals in order to comprehensively address nuclear proliferation, as that is “what arms agreements are all about.”

Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament at the Arms Control Association, said that this fear should not be a crux for America to refuse extending New START. Nevertheless, America and Russia need to think quickly about ways to leverage their soft and hard power capabilities to prevent China from continuing on a slippery path of rapidly extending their arsenals in such a way that would prompt a modern arms race, one in which would be wrought with advents for mistakes.

October 1, 2020 0 comment

Nuclear Deterrence Security and Conflict

Relinquishing the Third Largest Nuclear Arsenal in the World: What Ukraine Teaches about Nuclear Proliferation

written by Taylor Fairless

President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk after signing documents whereby Ukraine agreed to dismantle all of its 1,800 nuclear warheads, Jan. 14, 1994, at the Kremlin in Moscow. Photo courtesy of the NPR.

The nuclear proliferation puzzle has long been thought of in relation to national security: states will build the bomb when they are placed in a significant military threat to which all other alternatives fail to suffice. Yet, Ukraine provides a counterfactual to security considerations by disinheriting one of the most powerful arsenals in the world amid military threats.

After the dismantlement of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly-formed state of Ukraine was “born nuclear” by inheriting about 4,000 of Moscow’s nuclear weapons, granting it the third largest arsenal in the world. This included some of the most technically-advanced weapons of the time: long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and strategic bombers. Yet, in 1994, Ukraine committed to full disarmament.

The history of disarmament in Ukraine can be reinterpreted to explain why states, or more currently terrorist organizations, seek to develop nuclear weapons. This explanation is tied to long-term international security objectives and current foreign policy efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons entirely. This article will better explain the path to nuclear achievement and challenge conventional ideas of why states build the bomb by illuminating multiple causalities in that process.

Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security, Scott Sagan, believes states build the bomb for three reasons. He refers to the first as the “security model,” which alerts us to states seeking nuclear capabilities when they face a significant military threat. This is the case with North Korea, whose nuclear accumulation is most considerably a reaction to America’s long desire to overthrow the Kim regime. There is little quarrel against the security model as the best explanation to many past and present nuclear buildups: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Israel, and Pakistan almost immediately acquired nuclear weapons after facing security threats. Yet, the delay between security stimuli and nuclear buildup in some cases points to a flaw in reasoning that states build their arsenal simply for national security. India, for example, developed their arsenal nearly a decade after China had, and as Ukraine will exemplify, security threats alone are not always enough to motivate the creation of a nuclear arsenal.

The second “domestic model” is a street-light perspective on nuclear weapons. This invisions nukes as a political tool for credibility; for example, despite conventional perceptions that India built their arsenal in response to China becoming nuclear in 1964, Prime Minister Indira Ganhi instead reacted to domestic pressure to commence a nuclear program. An act of nuclear proliferation can divert turbulence within a state to gain public support. In this sense, bureaucratic actors created conditions that promoted the acquisition of nuclear weapons through bottom-up activity that propagated extreme views on foreign threats while lobbying for political favorability. The case of PM Ganhi shows her motivation for creating India’s nuclear arsenal stemmed from its conference of legitimacy and national prestige.

The last point is the “norms model.” Simply put, if nuclear weapons adhere to a state’s identity, that state will likely want to build an arsenal, given it has the capacity to do so. For example, France emerged from World War Two significantly weakened, and thus vigorously explored ways to reestablish their strength. The best path was through nuclear weapons, and once created, France paraded their arsenal vibrantly on the global stage. Today, quite literally, entire parades dedicated to displaying nuclear weapons in Pakistan, North Korea, and India exemplifies the close relationship that nuclear weapons have with nationalism and identity. On the opposite spectrum, if nuclear weapons defy a state’s image, nuclear arsenals will be avoided, as is the case with Canada.

Let’s suppose these reasons as to why states build nuclear weapons can be reinterpreted into why they don’t build, or in Ukraine’s case why they relinquish, their arsenals. Ukraine is quite puzzling from both a realist and a domestic politics perspective: Russia’s hegemonic behavior, burgeoning tensions over Crimea, and growing public support between 1992 and 1993 for keeping nuclear weapons, even in spite of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, make an anti-nuclear position unlikely. Though, that’s exactly what happened.

In large, the NPT is credited for this result in four critical ways. As I delineate, I will compare these scenarios to those of the present, or cases that are predicted to ensue. Early in 1990, Ukraine tried to accede the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state to separate itself from the Soviet Union and buttress their claim to national sovereignty. This was an expedient blueprint to independence that the majority conservative communists voted in a 355-4 adoption of the NPT. In the future, Hong Kong may adopt a similar tactic of establishing sovereignty vis-à-vis treaties if they continue to seek detachment from China.

U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar turn two keys to initiate the destruction of a former Soviet nuclear missile silo at the top-secret Khmelnitsky military base in Ukraine on October 23, 1996. The keys once enabled a launch of SS-19 missiles towards the United States. Photo courtesy of RFERL.

Moreover, international prestige granted through the NPT also seeded Kiev’s anti-nuclear position. Pro-NPT officials insisted that this endeavor would enhance Ukraine’s soft power by separating it from what we call “rogue states,” such as modern North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. NPT norms birthed the idea that new nuclear weapons states were unstable threats, which by the 1990s effectively meant that they received international condemnation. Thus, Ukraine’s adherence to the NPT defanged their potentiality as a rising state, and instead invited partnership and security assurances between themselves and the members of the NPT. Moreover, joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state granted Ukraine the assurance of protection by nuclear weapon states in the treaty – a similar phenomena to the security assurances present in NATO.

Pipelining from this were economic pressures, which Ukraine certainly faced from America, and more generally NATO. The West maintained that failing to follow the NTP’s norms and regulations would result in economic restrictions, made easier by the NTP’s mobility and coordination of collective sanctions. Today, we can relate this to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 25-year nuclear agreement which limited the scope of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

Last, the NPT created a sense of international responsibility. Ukraine was satisfying the global commitment to peace, which was being renewed at the conclusion of the tumultuous 20th century. Critically, America offered financial support for relinquishing Kiev’s arsenal, which made the negative proliferation decision a far easier endeavor and helped secure Ukraine’s position as a cooperative state. We may relate this today to China. Though the political future of a post-COVID China is uncertain, I think Beijing may be one to keep an eye out in this regard. The Trump administration is fighting to see China join the New START treaty as China continues to expand technologically and militaristically. Though, China’s long disapproval of joining has made this unlikely. In a world in which China may bear the international brunt of COVID’s spread, adopting this treaty may be a counterbalance as it would assume China as committing to shouldering a responsibility of international peace.

What’s of value with these four reasons is imaging Ukraine’s renunciation without the NPT. Though some case may be made for that, it’s nonetheless hard to imagine it being any easier. Nuclear treaties may be thought of as an investment into furthering the nuclear taboo and mediating the security dilemma. As was the case in the 1960s, testing nuclear weapons and acquiring an arsenal granted positive international recognition. Yet, today’s taboo causes immediate condemnation of any state attempting to do so. This signifies the progress of the nuclear taboo, and scholars today tend to view the NPT as a way to further it into one that eventually chastises the mere possession of nuclear weapons.

States build the bomb for many reasons, and at the same time, as Ukraine exemplified, states may also relinquish their arsenal for multiple purposes. No single policy can expedite creating a nuclear free world, nor advance international security measures. It suffices to say that multicausality best explains the nuclear existence present today and the troubles that policymakers face when formulating antiproliferation measures. What Ukraine’s deviation from conventional perceptions on the security dilemma shows is that future scholarship needs to be driven by comparative studies to determine the conditions that states fall under when acting against the nuclear taboo, and more presently should expand to single actors and organizations.

As Sagan puts it: “a focusing on how different governments assess the nuclear potential and intention of neighbors, on why pro-bomb and anti-bomb domestic coalitions form and gain influence, and on when and how NPT norms about legitimate behavior constrain statesmen will be extremely important.” For certain, the world may see a Ukrainian repeat in the future, but at the same time, the current nuclear tongue cannot dismiss the possibility of a rogue actor or state dismantling the nuclear taboo. It is thus imperative that scholars continue to expand their theories and look more deeply into the desire to acquire nuclear weapons and what shape that may take on in the coming decades. Moreover, we may look at the NPT’s furthering of norms as the argument for continual enhancement of the treaty and continuing to create new, comprehensive laws and regulations agreed upon by both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states.

July 9, 2020 0 comment

Asia China Military North Korea Nuclear Deterrence Security and Conflict Technology

China, the US, and THAAD: A Case for the End of Ballistic Missile Defense

written by Abdus Najmi

Imagine this: A nuclear-arms race between the US and China. Collapse of the “No First Use” doctrine of deterrence. North Korean missiles actually being able to reach the US mainland.

As frightening as these phrases sound, all of them are very possible within the next decade. China or America could easily break their pledge to not use nuclear weapons first in warfare. This may seem like mere alarmist rhetoric, but the empirical track record of actions by states foreshadows this scenario as plausible. Just seven months ago, China launched its very own Starry Sky-2, a hypersonic aircraft that moves at “six times the speed of sound.” High tech aircraft isn’t the only new development in Chinese military technology, as hypersonic glide vehicles (or HGVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) put Chinese modernization at light years ahead of the US. The DF-ZF hypersonic vehicle has been successfully tested 7 times, and MIRV technology would allow China to launch multiple warheads from a single missile at a given time.

It would be misleading to characterize China as an irrational actor who seeks modernization as a means to revisionism. After all, the universal law of cause and effect would deem China’s actions as stemming as an effect. So – what is the cause?

US ballistic missile defense systems have elicited a hard-line response from China, and justly so. These systems attempt to intercept missiles during their trajectory in air, and some scientists and policymakers are even attempting to accurately take down missiles during boost phase. THAAD, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, is exactly that system – a form of ballistic missile defense (BMD) that is being deployed in South Korea to counter the North Korean threat, or so the US claims.

Wait – if the US deploys THAAD in South Korea, why would China care? Are we not just deploying it to protect our ally against a potential threat from the North?

Many would point to the necessity of THAAD as a resource to counter the North Korean threat. This argument is misleading, as THAAD is only “designed to intercept missiles within a range of 200 kilometers.” The unit’s location in Seongju County falls out of the range of Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city.

In addition, THAAD doesn’t prevent a North Korean conflict – it causes it. There are three key reasons for this. To start off, the empirical track record proves so. When the Reagan administration proposed “Star Wars,” the Soviet Union responded by upping its nuclear stockpile. This is basic IR theory 101 – states respond to military threats militarily. Second, there are geographic limitations for why THAAD cannot prevent a conflict. The geographic dimensions of the Korean peninsula make it extremely difficult to shoot missiles down, as the peninsula is “mountainous and lack[s] spatial depth.” While this technology seems promising, physics tends to err on the side of caution – BMD has a “dismal flight test record of nine successful intercepts in 17 attempts since 1999.” Lastly, the status quo proves the uniqueness of the situation. Currently, the US already has BMD elsewhere in Northeast Asia and North Korea is still testing new missiles. If ballistic missile defense was such a good deterrent, why hasn’t North Korea ended its testing? There clearly is no fear of US capabilities or practices in the region. If anything, THAAD is just another match that ignites the larger flames of the North Korean threat.

THAAD is much more political than it seems. This system is strategically positioned in Korea for other reasons – specifically to bolster a US presence in Asia. THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar has such a long range that it can peer into the Chinese mainland, strong enough to even detect Chinese missiles in centimeters through electromagnetic reflection. China’s concerns “come not from the interception component of THAAD, but rather the detection capability” which renders its military secrecy useless. This is why China has been developing MIRVs and HGVs. Both of these forms of tech provide ballistic credibility by rendering the radar system obsolete, in case of a necessary attack.

In the long run, it might be necessary for the US to end ballistic missile defense in South Korea. It is uncertain whether a Trump presidency (which tends to be hawkish) would support this type of policy. In the meantime, it might be worthwhile for the United States to develop transparency and confidence building measures with China over the deployment of THAAD. These could include agreements about data collection and forcing the US to not “conduct engagements beyond the range of their […] radar.” This might give the US the best of both worlds – maintaining THAAD but assuring China of its non-encroaching use. If neither of these worlds are met, the US might have to prepare for a hardline world of Chinese revisionism.

April 2, 2020 0 comment

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Adam Schiff: Bernard Brodie Lecture and Interview

written by Andrea Zachrich

Congressman Adam Schiff came to UCLA to give the Bernard Brodie Lecture on the Conditions of Peace on May 31st of this year. Before the lecture, members of The Generation were fortunate enough to sit down with Congressman Schiff and ask him questions about the House Intelligence Committee- of which he is currently the Ranking Member- his responsibility to his constituents and the American people, democratic institutions and the rule of law, and the reputation of the United States internationally. He echoed and elaborated on many of these topics during his lecture and audience questions, which we were also able to attend following the interview. While there has been a summer that has past since the time of interview, many of his comments remain relevant as we’ve watched President Trump’s antics unfold over the past few months.

Congressman Schiff has a great sense of humor. He began the lecture by telling an anecdote about when President Trump called him “sleazy”. Schiff said that he felt the need to explain to his son what had happened in case the other children at school talked about it. He told his son that “the President called your dad sleazy”, and his son, wholly unconcerned, replied, “Can I call you sleazy?” Congressman Schiff used humor frequently throughout his lecture to highlight the absurdity of some of the administration’s recent actions, such as President Trump calling Vladimir Putin to congratulate him on his win. He even went so far as to mimic how that phone conversation might have gone, which had the entire audience laughing.

In the interview with us, however, Congressman Schiff’s tone was markedly more serious. We began by asking him about the partisanship on his committee in the House of Representatives, which is the House Select Intelligence Committee. The committee has been charged with conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible connections between President Trump and members of his team and Russia. Despite the traditionally bipartisan nature of the Intelligence Committee, Schiff noted that one particular instance- what he called the “midnight run“– which divided the committee along partisan lines. The “run” occurred in March of 2017 when Republican Chairman Devin Nunes went to an undisclosed location to reportedly receive classified materials unmasking a conspiracy that claimed that the Obama administration had done surveillance on members of President Trump’s transition team. Nunes then went to the White House to present this evidence. However in a matter of days it as revealed that the supposedly undisclosed location was the White House. Schiff states, “But we learned within a matter of days that in fact the secret location he had gone too had been the White House and the materials he had received were from the White House that he was presenting to the White House.That kind of blew up the investigation because it became clear that the mission for the chairman was to protect the President at all costs rather than doing an objective investigation. The incident troubled Schiff for illustrating Nunes’ blatant disregard for the committee’s constitutional duty and for demonstrating the vastly different goals of its members.

We then asked Schiff what would change on his committee if Democrats win a majority in the House in the upcoming midterm elections and he becomes chairman. His first priority, he said, would be a return to “comity” on the committee, and blames the current chairman Nunes’ divisive actions for the current level of partisanship. When asked a similar question during the lecture, Schiff responded that he would like his committee to “get back in the oversight business”. Based on some recent special election results, Schiff may get his wish for his committee from the midterm elections. In a recent special election in Ohio, the vote came down to closer than 1 percent in a district that has had Republican representation in Congress for 35 years, the past incumbent consistently cruised to victory by 10 percentage points, and where Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a whooping 11 percent. These election results, while not representative of the entire nation, have led many to predict that Democrats may shortly regain the majority in Congress, making Congressman Schiff the leader of the House Intelligence Committee.

On a different note, one idea that Schiff kept highlighting throughout both the interview and his lecture was the breakdown of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and how this is affecting the U.S.’s reputation and negotiating power abroad. Schiff even went so far as to say “I think that the health of our democracy is very much at risk”. He mentioned numerous examples that ranged from President Trump’s tendency to ban reporters from news outlets he doesn’t like such as the New York Times and BBC from press briefings, to discussing the possibility of him pardoning himself for any possible crimes he may be charged with in the future. Additionally, the president’s constant Twitter tirades about the “fake news” press and special counsel Robert Mueller’s Investigation have led many of his supporters to distrust both the press and the Justice Department. The United States was downgraded from a full to a flawed democracy by the “Economist Intelligence Unit” the year Trump came into office, and has remained in the flawed category for its 2018 ranking, currently ranked 21 out of 167 countries for its democracy score. It seems as though Schiff may well be justified in worrying about the state of our democracy.

On a similar note, Schiff also noted his concerns with the way the rest of the world currently views the US, stating “our America first and everyone else be damned has really left us isolated and the rest of the world deeply concerned”. As evidence, he cited examples of this poor perception of America from our allies such as a Politico article titled “Leader of the Free World meets Donald Trump” referring to Angela Merkel, and Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal. Since this interview, President Trump has continued to take actions that worry world leaders and isolate the U.S. on the world stage, such as placing tariffs on Chinese and European goods against the advice of most of the world’s economists and Trump’s troubling actions during and after June’s G7 meeting such as arriving late for the first meeting of the conference and acting outraged at Prime Minister Trudeau’s easily predictable retaliatory actions to Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs. Congressman Schiff stated in the interview that “It’s hard to imagine a time when the United States has been held in lower regard around the world than right now”, but after Trump’s antics this summer, we may be even lower in the opinion of the world than we were in May when the interview was conducted.

This interview was conducted shortly before the first North Korea negotiations had occured. Congressman Schiff was glad to hear that the negotiations were back on after being canceled for a spell, but was concerned with this administration’s approach to North Korea, calling it “erratic and at times dangerous”. He warned that North Korea’s nuclear program was not going to be an easy problem to solve stating, “If it were not a hard problem, it would have been solved by any number of presidents in the past”. This statement has proven to be true since the interview. While President Trump and Kim Jong-Un did sit down for negotiations in June, the joint statement that came out of this was widely criticized as vague. President Trump conceded an important bargaining chip by agreeing to give up military exercises in South Korea while gaining no time table for denuclearization from the North Korean leader. Additionally, on August 24th President Trump called off talks between North Korean leaders and his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, citing concerns that not enough progress has been made in regards to the country’s denuclearization. Congressman Schiff’s warning has proven true; it seems that the problem of North Korean denuclearization has shown itself to be trickier than President Trump first believed it to be.

In a time where dishonorable behavior has come to be expected from the current administration, the political backbone displayed by Congressman Adam Schiff was refreshing. He asked his audience “What’s the point of being there [in Congress] if you’re not going to do what the country needs you to do when they need you to do it?” At one point during the lecture, he received an spontaneous round of applause from the audience after declaring he believes politicians should “do the right thing and still find a way to get reelected”.

It was a pleasure speaking with the Congressman and listening to his lecture, and it will be interesting to witness any potential changes within his Committee following the November midterm elections.

schiff 8

September 10, 2018 0 comment

Donald Trump Featured Geopolitics Middle East Nuclear Deterrence Security United States

The Art of “No Deal”

written by Zach Emanuel

After many months of debate within the executive branch, on May 8th, 2018 President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The agreement, more commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal was reached in 2015 and later signed onto by Iran, the U.S, China, Russia, France, the U.K, and Germany. The intent was to limit the advancement of Iranian nuclear capabilities. The deal mandated that Iran reduce its uranium-enrichment activities for the next fifteen years and agree to increased inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure compliance with the agreement. Assuming Iranian cooperation, the other parties agreed in exchange to terminate the United Nations Security Council’s economic sanctions against Iran for its past nuclear activities, freeing up billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets, and to provide Iran with economic relief. While much has been made of the deal’s shortcomings, the overwhelming consensus is that the agreement is the best option available for avoiding either a nuclear arms race in the Middle East or another American-led war in the region.

Yet despite the consensus, Trump has long railed against the deal as a poor choice on the part of his predecessor, President Barack Obama, calling the agreement “an embarrassment” and “the worst [deal] the U.S ever entered into”. In both his speech withdrawing the U.S from the agreement and his campaign rallies before that, Trump justified and encouraged America’s exit from the agreement on the basis of three points. First, the President claims that the deal does little to limit Iran’s access to a nuclear weapon. Second, he maintains that it encourages Iranian meddling in the Middle East, such as support for the Assad regime in Syria and Houthi rebels in Yemen, threatening the region’s stability as well as U.S and Israeli national security. Third and finally, President Trump claims that withdrawing would demonstrate a renewed sense of American strength and leadership to the world, as it shows that the U.S will not be cowed into compromise. Unfortunately for Trump, the U.S, and the rest of the world, he is wrong on all three fronts. In fact, on each point, Trump’s decision to leave the JCPOA will have the opposite effect than the one he claims.

At the beginning of his speech announcing America’s intent to withdraw, Trump justified his decision by saying that if the deal were not to be altered or adjusted, then “in just a short period of time, the world’s leading state sponsor of terror will be on the cusp of acquiring the world’s most dangerous weapon.” Contrary to his claim, this assessment is false. There is an overwhelming consensus amongst government officials and nuclear experts that the current deal is, and remains, the best available option to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities. According to a poll of international relations experts conducted by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) organization, an astonishing 94% of international relations scholars agree that remaining in the deal is the U.S’s best chance of limiting Iran’s access to a nuclear weapon. Jeffrey Lewis, for instance, the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, has said that pulling out of the deal will actually allow Iran to produce nuclear weapons faster, a sentiment often echoed by President Obama. Kingston Reif, the director of Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy for the Arms Control Association agrees, saying that the move will actually “[increase] the risk of an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program.” Additionally, General Joseph Dunford Jr., Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, has maintained that the deal “has delayed the development of a nuclear capability by Iran.” Moreover, despite a barrage of criticism leveled at the deal by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who recently accused Iran of cheating on its commitments, Israeli Defense Forces Chief-of-Staff Gadi Eisenkot has noted that Iran has yet to violate the deal and that the agreement, so far, “is working…putting off realization of the Iranian nuclear vision by 10 to 15 years.”

Even many officials within Trump’s inner circle have argued on behalf of the constraints the deal places on Iran’s nuclear activities. Dan Coats, Trump’s Director of National Intelligence, said in May 2017 that the JCPOA has “enhanced the transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities” and “extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce…a nuclear weapon.” Defense Secretary James Mattis has also advocated for remaining in the deal, calling the inspections the deal requires “pretty robust” and the text written “almost with an assumption that Iran would try to cheat.” Finally, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also disagreed with his former boss on the deal, and lobbied hard for the U.S not to renege on its commitment. Thus, despite Trump’s constant stream of claims that the deal assists Tehran in its quest for a bomb, scholars, military officials, and even members of Trump’s administration believe that leaving the deal will actually result in a stronger Iranian nuclear capability.

The second argument Trump made to justify America’s exit from the Iran Deal was that remaining in the agreement would cause a “nuclear-arms race in the Middle East,” and would allow Iran to continue its “destabilizing” and “menacing activities” in the region and across the world. These assertions too are false. Mark Fitzpatrick, the former U.S Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for nonproliferation has said that allowing Iran’s nuclear program to proceed without the limits and transparency the deal creates actually increases the potential of an arms race in the Middle East. British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson concurred. Appearing on Fox News just days before Trump’s announcement, the former London mayor warned that pulling out of the deal would cause “an arms race in the Middle East…the Saudis wanting [a nuclear weapon], the Egyptians wanting one, the Emiratis [wanting one].” Thus, contrary to Trump’s claims, a Middle Eastern arms race is now much likelier following America’s exit from the agreement.

Moreover, the U.S’s best bet to deal with Tehran’s “destabilizing” and “menacing” activities in the Middle East is to empower moderate factions within Iran, including the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani who struck the deal back in 2015. This will have the additional effect of bolstering American and Israeli national security. Elected on a promise to spur the economy, Rouhani and his Moderation and Development Party’s gamble was that an end to the U.N sanctions and the subsequent growth that ensued would be enough to convince ordinary Iranians of the deal’s merits and his decision to engage with the West. Therefore, the U.S’s exit and its choice to reinstate sanctions discredits Rouhani and the moderates while empowering the religious and political hard-liners who have been actively attacking the agreement. In the words of one Iranian diplomat, having lost the support of the people Rouhani is now operating essentially as a “lame-duck” president. These hardline factions will destabilize the Middle East– through ramped up Iranian intervention in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen– and threaten American and Israeli national security more than Rouhani will. The effects of this can already be seen with the recent missile exchanges between Israeli forces and Iranian militias along the Syrian-Israeli border; the first time Iranian forces have fired directly on Israeli soldiers. As the Washington Post reported on May 10th, America’s exit from the agreement gives Tehran “less to lose by retaliating” against Israel and has “served to embolden hard-liners…who want to show strength.” Iranian missile launches against Israel are both destabilizing, menacing, and a threat to the national security of the U.S and its Middle Eastern allies. Therefore, despite Trump’s supposed desire to bring “peace and stability” to the Middle East, pulling out of the deal has already, brought about the exact opposite and will likely continue to do so.

The third and final justification Trump gave to defend his decision to leave the JCPOA was demonstrating a renewed sense of American strength and leadership to both Iran and the rest of the world. In his speech Trump said, “America will not be held hostage to nuclear blackmail,” that “we will not allow American cities to be threatened with destruction,” and that the U.S “no longer make[s] empty threats.” In Trump’s eyes, refusing to compromise shows strength and acting unilaterally, and independently from our allies, constitutes leadership. Unfortunately for the United States and the rest of the world, the President’s understanding of what makes America strong is flawed. Since the end of World War II every President- Republican and Democrat- has supported the international-liberal order in which American-led multilateral action has been the response to international crises. This belief that the U.S, given its overwhelming economic and military might, has a unique responsibility to lead on global issues has not only guided American foreign policy for the last 70 years but has been of tremendous benefit to the world. Trump’s choice to pull the United States out of the Iran deal, and his previous decisions to do the same with both the Paris climate agreement and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade deal, demonstrate an end to this consensus. While the President may believe that pulling out of these agreements show strength, breaking promises, cheating commitments, and acting without regard for any country but our own are hardly traits indicative of a strong, consistent, reliable nation, nor ones that other nations are likely to look for in a leader.

Furthermore, while Trump may believe that leadership is demonstrated by independent action, such an understanding is only valid when there is actual action being taken. Despite references to a better deal, there is no strategy within either the administration or the State Department on how the U.S plans to improve on it. Taking an axe to international agreements with no concrete movement towards correcting the flaws that inevitably arise from negotiation does not constitute leadership. On the contrary, it simply shows laziness.

If Trump was truly committed to limiting Iranian nuclear capability, a peaceful and stabilized Middle East, and American strength and leadership, he would proudly keep the United States in the Iran deal. It is to the detriment of both the U.S and the world that his decision to pull out of the agreement will likely contribute to the loss of all three.

May 16, 2018 0 comment

Cartoon Donald Trump Featured North Korea Nuclear Deterrence

My Button’s Bigger

written by Landon Hsieh

May 10, 2018 0 comment

Asia China Featured Geopolitics North Korea Nuclear Deterrence Security

Tension in the Korean Peninsula: Is There a Way Out?

written by Jenny Wang

Ever since North Korea began its missile development program in the 1970s, its threat as a potential nuclear power has fluctuated as attempts at negotiations were often postponed in the past. Since Kim Jong-Un came to power, the number of missile launches and nuclear tests by North Korea increased drastically, nearly tripling the total number of tests conducted under his father and grandfather combined. The United Nations Security Council has successively passed tighter economic sanctions, ranging from bans on military-related technology and seafood to caps on oil and refined petroleum. On top of tighter sanctions, threats exchanged between Kim Jong-Un and Trump only serves to exacerbate tensions between North Korea and the rest of the international community.

Will peaceful negotiations be able to resume and achieve their goals, or will direct conflict be unavoidable? In the past two years, North Korea has tested a total of forty-seven missiles, and in November, they have even successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile that puts mainland U.S. within range. Unlike his father and grandfather who seemed more willing to negotiate the possibility of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Kim Jong-Un has put nuclear and missile development as a top priority since his ascension to power. North Korea is led by a unitary one-party government, essentially a totalitarian dictatorship. Further pressuring by the international community would only make North Korea feel more threatened and vulnerable, which would accelerate their weapons program. It is important for the U.S. and its allies to reassure North Korea that they would not infringe upon the sovereignty of a denuclearized North Korea.

In the past, negotiations have taken place such as the Agreed Framework which was signed in 1994 between the U.S. and North Korea, and the Six Party Talks, which began in August 2003 involving China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S. The former broke down with North Korea stretching the limit to test its missiles and the U.S.’s policy changes. Thereafter, negotiations shifted to the Six Party Talks. It appeared quite successful at first when North Korea agreed to abandon its weapons program in 2005. However, the talks came to a halt when the U.S. sanctioned several North Korean entities believed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities. Since then, these talks have continued intermittently but with little to no results. Obstacles that frequently stood between a successful negotiation include the unpredictability of the North Korean regime and the other countries’ divergent interests.

However, North Korea’s actions are not entirely illogical and radical. From their willingness to engage in dialogue, we see that they are not steadfast on a path towards complete isolationism. The formal talk between North and South in January further alleviates the concerns of war. But, on the more unpleasant side, this certainly does not indicate North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize, or even postpone their accelerated weapons program. It may be a sign that the sanctions imposed by the UN and other countries are hurting the North too much, and they hope to cut some of it through negotiations with South Korea.

During the meeting of countries that sided with South Korea during the Korean War in January, the U.S. Secretary of State warned that if North Korea did not come to the table, they would be choosing the military option themselves. The White House’s change of plan for the appointment of the U.S. ambassador to South Korea because of disagreements regarding policy towards North Korea further signals the U.S.’s serious consideration of war. Yet North Korea seems to believe that the only way to prevent a military strike by the U.S. is to secure nuclear weapons that target their mainland. Kim Jong-Un fears that the West will assimilate their ideology and overthrow the authoritarian dictatorship of the Kim family. Indeed, the choices are hard to make. Increasing sanctions may back them into a corner and cause retaliation through war, as predicted by Russia. But they are not about to abandon their weapons program anytime soon either.

Although the outlook for the prospect of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula seems grim, both sides should avoid direct confrontation in war at all costs. The formal meeting between the North and the South indicate a possible turning point. If negotiations could resume after the games, both sides should be willing to make some concessions. Sanctions could be slowly relaxed in exchange for halting the research in nuclear and missile technology. A complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula may seem an impossible task due to North Korea’s rapid progress in missile development. But ultimately, it should be pursued through peaceful negotiations, whereby each side takes a few steps back. Pressuring North Korea though various sanctions would most likely result to a harsher rebound.

February 28, 2018 0 comment