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Environmental Change Print Article Youth

Young Chileans and the Fate of a Nation

This article originally appeared in The Generation Spring 2020 print edition. The theme for this edition is “Youth Voices.” A link to our online version of the print publication can be found here: https://www.flipsnack.com/thegen/the-generation-spring-2020.html

“But the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And if you choose to fail us I say we will never forgive you.” Young climate phenom Greta Thunberg delivered this line in a speech at a Climate Action Summit at the United Nations on September 23, 2019¹. While Greta wrote this about the climate catastrophe that young people are doomed to inherit, this statement reflects an awareness that is spreading like wildfire (I am so sorry Australian and Californian readers) among young activists around the world. While older generations have had the luxury and the privilege of making decisions rooted in more short term reasoning, young people are constantly burdened by long term and structural issues that are quickly propelling them towards a variety of intolerable and even unsurvivable circumstances. This can be observed first hand in Chile. Recently, Thunberg shared a photo of current protests in Chile on her Instagram with the caption, “A beautiful sight. 1 million people in the streets of Santiago. My thoughts are with the people of Chile…”¹²

Chile, a long narrow country that winds down the Western coast of Latin America, is a relatively new democracy and no stranger to corruption. When the transition to a democractic state began in 1989, marked by the presidency of Patricio Aylwin, he quickly created the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. In February of 1991 the Commission released the Rettig Report² on human rights violations committed during the preceding military rule which counted no less than 2,279 proved and registered “disappearances,” which conveniently silenced dissenters and people who spoke out against the regime. In the decades since, Chile has seen several iterations of student led protests that illustrate that younger generations are not settling for old habits.

The March of the Penguins – 2006

In 2006, students took to the streets in response to an announcement outlining an increase in fees related to their schooling and a restriction in the use of their transportation passes. The Guardian³ reported that these protests, referred to as The March of the Penguins, drew their strength from the internet and cell phones. The students had been using this emerging technology to “[rewrite] the rules of dissent with their ability instantly to organise marches and make collective decisions.” They also noted that the organizers had an average age of 16, with the youngest being no older than eleven, and all of whom “organise forums and debate the right to a free education, turning their break into a civics lesson.” The movement became much larger and ended up calling for structural changes in the Chilean education system. The protests grew violent and over a thousand students were arrested or injured. Public opinion about how the government handled the protests was highly critical and this paved the way for the students to ultimately be invited to join a presidential advisory committee where more long term changes could be discussed. Although there were no sudden or drastic changes, these protests were the first insight into what Chilean Youth could do when they united behind an issue.

Chilean Winter – 2011 to 2013

In August of 2011, student led protests broke out once again. A mere 5 years after the March of the Penguins, students called for a radical overhaul of the education system. The Nation said numbers reached over 60,000 and similarly to the 2006 protests, “the root of current protests, at least in part, is Chile’s neoliberal economic model…”⁶ Neoliberalism is rooted in deregulation policies while de-emphasizing any kind of state welfare programs. In Chile, this led to a huge disparity in quality of education that was available to those who had access to wealth and those who did not. Student protestors were calling for more direct state participation in secondary education and an end to the existence of profit in higher education. The protests spread up and down the country but turned violent. On August 4th, more than 900 people were arrested and nearly 100 police officers were injured from the outbursts of violence. Ultimately, the government and the students were able to work out a deal that brought the protests to a close.

Unlike previous protests, this round depended on Facebook and Twitter to rally support. A legacy from the days of Pinochet, this younger generation, raised in a democracy, was watching policies that predated them create a future that they didn’t want. People across the country took to the streets for “cacerolazos”⁵, a form of protests in which pots and pans are banged together. This form of dissent hadn’t been used since Pinochet was President, and now was being revived for a new kind of protest. Ordinary Chileans have staged nightly cacerolazos, or “saucepan protests”⁴ which was especially interesting because it complements the underlying dependency on technology that is needed to both organize and report on these protests. These protests mark a bridge between historical approaches to voicing dissent while combining with new forms of technology and communication channels that allowed the movement to gain momentum.

2019 Chilean Protests

As of writing this, in November of 2019, protests focused on income inequality have been pervasive throughout the country for roughly two months. Similarly to proceeding protests, the inciting action that spurred the protest is a microcosm of what the larger trends and issues at stake. It all started with a 0.30 peso ($0.04) raise in the cost of metro fare but protestors’ list of grievances includes the poor quality of public health care and education, low wages and rising cost of living, and meager pensions that Chileans receive in old age.13 These are not new issues. The problems faced in Chile are the result of policies that have been in place for decades. Ali H. Soufa, chief executive of The Soufan Group, a security intelligence agency told the New York Times, “It’s young people who have had enough. This new generation are not buying into what they see as the corrupt order of the political and economic elite in their own countries. They want a change.”⁷

Students have resorted to mass fare evasion by jumping over metro turnstiles and sometimes even destroying them.⁸These protests have crippled a vulnerable vein of Chilean infrastructure. Some two million people have been prevented from going to school or work⁹ – the protest has been all consuming throughout Chile.

These protests mark a bridge between historical approaches to voicing dissent while combining with new forms of technology and communication channels

The protests are not confined to a particular socioeconomic group. Hugo Millacoy González, a father and a mechanical engineer, said he was protesting the hike “so my son sees that [the government] can’t mock the people.”¹⁰

On October 25th, protestors marched in Santiago, the nation’s capital. Karla Rubilar, Mayor of Santiago, said the official crowd estimate was one million, and added that the crowd seemed to be feeling a mixture of sadness and hope.¹¹ This feeling seems to be echoed by movements around the world.

Young people continue to step up to fight battles bestowed upon them by preceding generations. Chile had previously been hailed as “one of the most orderly and stable countries in South America.”⁴ More recently, the New York Times has noted that “prosperity has accumulated mostly in the hands of a lucky few. As a result, Chile has one of the highest levels of economic inequality in the developed world.” And therein lies the source of the conflict. The $0.04 was the final paper straw. Ultimately, the people in power continue to be more and more disconnected to the population at large and this has caused significant and lasting unrest among the disgruntled civilians.

The current president, Sebastián Piñera, is a billionaire who was elected in 2017. When the protests broke out, he initially declared that the government was “at war” with the people. Since then, he has revised his positioning and said that his administration and its predecessors had failed to address the protestors legitimate grievances.¹³

For older Chileans, these issues may lack urgency in comparison to how Pinochet had treated people under his regime. But the young people who have instigated this mass protest have never known anything but democracy in the country. As such, their metric for what is normal and the standards they hold their government to are different than citizens who matured in the time of Pinochet. While empowered by this newfound freedom, the protestors have also learned from the mistakes of those who came before them. Unlike in 2006 and 2011, these protests remain peaceful. Additionally, the force of technology is stronger than it has been in the years of previous protests and functions as a check on the actions of the government. Any misconduct would spread instantaneously on social media channels and only further exacerbate existing critiques and frustration. The world is watching. And young Chileans continue to spearhead a movement that functions to reform structural failures that existed long before they did.

E N D N O T E S :

Thunberg, Greta. “If World Leaders Choose to Fail Us, My Generation Will Never Forgive Them | Greta Thunberg.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, September 23, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/23/world-leaders-generation-climate-breakdown-greta-thunberg.
“Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation.” United States Institute of Peace. September 23, 2019. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-Report/Chile90-Report.pdf
Franklin, Jonathan. “Protests Paralyse Chile’s Education System.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, June 7, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/07/chile.schoolsworldwide.
Long, Gideon. “Chile Student Protests Point to Deep Discontent.” BBC, August 11, 2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-14487555.
Christoff, Stefan. “Tactic: Cacerolazo.” Beautiful Trouble: A Toolbox for Revolution, 2019. https://beautifultrouble.org/tactic/cacerolazo/.
Langman, Jimmy. “Chile’s Explosion of Protest.” The Nation, October 12, 2011. https://www.thenation.com/article/chiles-explosion-protest/.
Walsh, Declan, and Max Fisher. “From Chile to Lebanon, Protests Flare Over Wallet Issues.” The New York Times, October 23, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/world/middleeast/global-protests.html.
McGowan, Charis. “Chile Protests: What Prompted the Unrest?” Al Jazeera, October 30, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/chile-protests-prompted-unrest-191022160029869.html.
https://time.com/5706700/chile-protests-violence/
Vergara, Eva. “Chile’s President Rolls Back Subway Fare Hike amid Protests.” ABC News, October 19, 2019. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/soldiers-patrol-chilean-capital-violent-protests-66394561.
“Chilean Protestors Say Government Concession Is Not Enough.” The Washington Post. Accessed November 4, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/chile-protesters-government-concessions-not-enough/2019/10/24/8588611a-f6d0-11e9-b2d2-1f37c9d82dbb_story.html.
Thunberg, Greta (@gretathunberg). 2019. “A beautiful sight. 1 million people in the streets of Santiago. My thoughts are with the people of Chile. Horrific to follow the recent days’ developments….” Instagram, October 25, 2019. https://www.instagram.com/p/B4EOv4pJFW-/.
“Chile Learns the Price of Economic Inequality .” The New York Times, October 22, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/opinion/chile-protests.html?fbclid=IwAR3kTIWeqMxPM3ClE034Y6A9fnlYBv5e6NkLQy3_lDNag7Ybb2U_uU8z-nk.
“Chile Is Ready for a New Constitution.” The New York Times, November 18, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/opinion/chile-protests.html.

June 14, 2020 0 comment

Globalization Migration Print Article Racism White Nationalism

Young White Nationalism

written by Grayson Peters

Americans generally assume that racism is dying a generational death, and that its last vestiges can be found in an older, more backwards demographic.¹ The youth, it is generally thought, are more tolerant than their elders and may even be the generation to achieve full racial harmony and equality in the United States. Indeed, recent research indicates that young people in the United States today are quantifiably less likely to hold racially prejudiced attitudes than those surveyed in prior years.²

However, since the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, hate crimes targeting racial minorities have become substantially more frequent across the United States. Between 2016 and 2017 alone, the FBI reported a sharp 17% spike in total hate crimes, including a 37% increase in crimes targeting Jews and a 16% increase in crimes targeting African-Amerians.³ This report came only two weeks after the deadly shooting at Pittsburgh’s Tree of Life synagogue, in which 11 congregants were gunned down.

A January 2018 study by University of Alabama economist Griffin Sims Edwards and Loyola University law professor Stephen Rusher found strong empirical evidence that the election of Donald Trump increased the number of subsequent hate crimes motivated by white supremacy, validating what other commenters had referred to as the ‘Trump Effect.’⁴

Based on this information, one might reasonably draw the conclusion that recent perpetrators of ‘Trump Effect’ hate crimes skew older. Robert Bowers, the shooter who killed 11 Jews in Pittsburgh, was solidly middle-aged at 46 years old. (October 2018)

But that’s not the whole story.

Brenton Tarrant, an Australian man who live-streamed on Facebook Live as he murdered 51 and wounded 49 worshipping Muslims during Friday prayers at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, was only 28 years old.⁵ Tarrant had previously remarked that he viewed Trump as a “symbol of renewed white identity and common purpose.”⁶ (March 2019)

John Timothy Earnest, who shot and killed Lori Gilbert-Kaye in Chabad of Poway on the last day of Passover 2019, was only 19 years old. Earnest was no fan of the Trump administration, calling the president as “Zionist, Jew-loving, anti-White, [and] traitorous,” echoing Pittsburgh shooter Robert Bower’s disdainful characterization of Trump as a Jewish puppet.⁷ (April 2019)

Patrick Crusius, who drove from 10 hours from Allen, Texas to El Paso in order to specifically target Hispanics and subsequently murdered 22 people in a Walmart, was only 22 years old.⁸ Though a Trump supporter, Crusius explicitly clarified in his manifesto that his prejudices predated Trump’s involvement in politics.⁹ (August 2019)

Stephan B., a 27 year old German, failed to gain entrance to a synagogue in Halle, Germany on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and instead shot and killed a nearby woman and a man in a kebab shop.¹⁰ (October 2019)

Clearly, violent white supremacism is not the sole-province of over-30s. In fact, relatively young white men across the Western world seem to be picking up assault rifles and murdering ethnic and religious minorities with relative frequency. Although the shooters’ views on Trump vary wildly, with some portraying him as a savior of embattled American whites and others as a race traitor under the influence of a global Jewish cabal, there is much similarity between their worldviews and methods.

Bowers, Tarrant, Earnest, Crusius, and the as-yet anonymous Stephan B. were all clearly motivated by a virulent identification with whiteness and a belief that violence was necessary and justified to guard against an invasion of non-whites and Muslims orchestrated by Jews. Indeed, many of the later shooters intentionally referenced the manifestos and actions of their predecessors.

Earnest (Poway) cited Bowers (Pittsburgh) and Tarrant (Christchurch) as explicit inspirations for his own shooting. Tarrant (Christchurch) was the first to livestream his shooting to a live audience using Facebook Live, and was later imitated by Stephan B. (Halle) on gaming livestream platform Twitch. Crusius (El Paso) explicitly claimed inspiration from Tarrant’s (Christchurch) actions in a manifesto posted to controversial message board 8Chan.

By reading each manifesto, one can see the gradual evolution of a sort of white nationalist terrorist canon, with increasingly complex self-referential citations and behaviors. The sheer number of shooters, necessitating parentheticals to explain who murdered who and in which city, is incredibly disturbing. Even more concerning is the high likelihood that, eventually, another white man under the age of 30 will soon write a manifesto in which the above names are mentioned, copy certain elements of previous shootings (perhaps a third livestream), and in some way innovate on the established theme.

But if the phenomenon of white supremacist mass shootings is novel, the foundational references that they cite aren’t.

Collectively, the manifestos frequently allude to the Great Replacement conspiracy theory, named after the 2011 book by French white nationalist Renaud Camus, which alleges a concerted effort by Jews to force immigration of non-whites into majority-white countries so as to effectuate a gradual “white genocide” by demographic change.¹¹

Camus, in turn has cited as inspiration British MP Enoch Powell’s 1968 “River of Blood” speech criticizing mass immigration and 1973 French dystopian fiction novel Le Camp des Saints [The Camp of the Saints], which depicts an apocalyptic flood of immigrants from the Global South into Europe and happens to be one of Trump adviser Steve Bannon’s favorite and most frequently referenced books.¹² Other allusions to 1930s British, fascist politician Oswald Mosley, Adolf Hitler, lone-wolf Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik, and others underline both a pervasive European influence, especially that of Europe’s 20th century far-right, in the ideology of American white supremacism and the deep historical roots of the racial hatreds that post-2016 shooters proclaim.

So, if their ideas are decades old, why are young white nationalists killing now?

A growing network of self-described “identitarian” (read: neo-Nazi) organizations like Patriot Front, American Vanguard, and Identity Evropa, recently rebranded as the American Identity Movement, are actively recruiting young people, especially by distributing propaganda and recruitment information on university campuses.¹³ In fact, college campuses, despite their association with liberal and left-wing politics, have become targets for white nationalist organizations seeking new members. According to the Anti-Defamation League, there were 868 documented incidents of white nationalist flyering on American college campuses in 2018, and 672 incidents in the first five months of 2019.¹⁴ White supremacist flyering on campuses increased 77% from the 2016-2017 school year to 2017-2018, and 7% from 2017-2018 to 2018-2019. White supremacists have targeted California campuses including UC Davis¹⁵ and UC San Diego¹⁶ by posting flyers, disrupting lectures, and even threatening faculty.

At least one major white supremacist organization of the 2010s – the Traditionalist Worker’s Party – was born on a university campus: at Towson University in 2013. Initially formed as a “White Student Union”¹⁷ by student Matthew Heimbach, the TWP gained notoriety for its participation in the deadly “Unite the Right” Protest and was arguably a top-ten organization in the United States until Heimbach was arrested and disgraced for assaulting his wife and father-in-law, also his spokesman, after he was confronted for having slept with his mother-in-law.¹⁸

It is also important to not understate the radicalizing effects of YouTube, the world’s most popular video sharing website, on young white men across the world.¹⁹ Until very recently, YouTube’s algorithm tended to suggest successive videos of increasing political extremism to continue to hold its viewers’ attention and maximize revenue made by showing them as many advertisements as possible.²⁰

For instance, consider the case of an average American teenage boy who mostly likes to watch Youtube videos of people playing and discussing video games that he enjoys. Suppose that he watches videos on the “Gamergate” controversy in 2014, which was an extremely toxic internet debate about the role of progressive social movements like feminism in the gaming community and attempts made on Youtube to critique popular video games from feminist or racial justice perspectives.²¹ He is told, over and over again, that liberals and feminists are threatening his harmless gaming hobby and, perhaps, American society and culture as a whole.

Very soon, this imagined teenage boy is watching videos made by self-described anti-feminists and laughing at compilations of overemotional ‘social justice warriors’ screaming at smug speakers on college campuses. From there, he is suggested videos by mainstream conservative YouTubers like Ben Shapiro and Jordan Peterson, and then videos by edgier commentators like Steven Crowder and Milo Yiannapolous, and then videos by Stefan Molyneux, Richard Spencer, and Laura Southern, all of whom promote white nationalist ideas.

It is very simple, in other words, for young people to innocently stumble into a “radicalization pipeline” of increasingly fringe and reactionary views just by watching Youtube’s suggested videos. The internet’s pervasive influence on the new generation of white supremacists is undeniable. Tarrant, the Christchurch shooter, included in his manifesto ironic references to common internet memes and a call for readers to “subscribe to Pewdiepie,”²² an extremely popular YouTuber named Felix Kjellberg (best known for his video gaming videos), who has been accused of trafficking in racism for comedic purposes.²³

There are no easy solutions to this new epidemic of historically-minded but Internet-savvy millenials committing acts of terrorism in the name of white supremacy. YouTube has begun the process of removing some explicitly white nationalist videos, though a vast majority still remain.²⁴ While this may limit young people’s exposure to the most contemporary of racist media personalities, this will not erase the long history their movement draws from. As any brief visit to the YouTube comments section will demonstrate, there are still thousands of people who idealize Oswald Moseley and his British Union of Fascists, insist that Adolf Hitler was the wronged party in the Second World War, and gleefully celebrate physical violence against leftists, minorities, and women. Any effective effort to confront this newest iteration of a centuries-old tradition of bigotry must first confront misinformation and miseducation about the historical legacy it claims.

E N D N O T E S :

¹Leah Donella. “Will Racism End When Old Bigots Die.” NPR, January 14, 2017. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/01/14/505266448/will-racism-end-when-old-bigots-die.

² Tessa E. S. Charlesworth and Mahzarin R. Banaji. “Patterns of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: I. Long-Term Change and Stability From 2007 to 2016.” Physiological Science, January 3, 2019. Accessed November 2017, 2019, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956797618813087.

³ Michael Balsamo. “FBI report shows 17 percent spike in hate crimes in 2017.” Associated Press, November 13, 2018. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/E5e7bb22f8474408becd2fcdc67f284e.

⁴ Griffin Sims Edwards and Stephen Rushin. “The Effect of President Trump’s Election on Hate Crimes.” Social Science Research Network, January 18, 2018. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3102652.

⁵“Police with the latest information on the mosque shootings.” Radio New Zealand, March 17, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/384896/police-with-the-latest-information-on-the-mosque-shootings.

⁶ Kristen Gelineau and John Gambrell. “New Zealand mosque shooter is a white nationalist who hates immigrants, documents and video reveal.” Chicago Tribune, March 15, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-mosque-killer-white-supremacy-20190315-story.html.

⁷ Seth J. Frantzman. “Anti-Trump antisemitism: The link between Pittsburgh and Poway.” The Jerusalem Post, April 28, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/

Israel-News/Anti-Trump-antisemitism-The-link-between-Pittsburgh-and-Poway-588071.

⁸ Vanessa Romo. “El Paso Walmart Shooting Suspect Pleads Not Guilty.” National Public Radio, October 10, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/10/769013051/El-paso-walmart-shooting-suspect-pleads-not-guilty.

⁹ Tim Arango, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, and Katie Benner. “Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears Online.” The New York Times, August 3, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/u s/patrick-crusius-el-paso-shooter-manifesto.html.

¹⁰ Thomas Escritt and Stephan Schepers. “Gunman kills two in livestreamed attack at German synagogue.” Reuters, October 9, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-shooting/gunman-kills-two-in-livestreamed-attack-at-german-synagogue-idUSKBN1WO1AT.

¹¹ Lauretta Charltone. “What is the Great Replacement?” The New York Times, August 6, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/politics/grand-replacement-explainer.html.

¹² Nina Burleigh. “The Bannon Canon: Books Favored By The Trump Adviser.” Newsweek, March 23, 2017. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/bannon-canon-books-trump-adviser-572835.

¹³ Nate Heygi. “White Nationalist Groups Increase Recruiting and Propaganda Across the West.” National Public Radio, March 19, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/03/19/704586335/white-nationalist-groups-increase-recruiting-and-propaganda-across-the-west.

¹⁴ Kristin Lam. “Recruiting hate: White supremacist propaganda rises for third straight year on college campuses, ADL says.” USA Today, June 27, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/06/27/white-supremacist-recruiting-rise-college-campuses-report/1590886001/.

¹⁵ Colleen Shalby. “White supremacy group’s fliers plastered across UC Davis campus.” Los Angeles Times, September 25, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-25/white-supremacy-group-fliers-uc-davis-campus.

¹⁶ Gabe Schneider. “White Supremacist UCSD Student Disrupts Lecture.” The Triton, January 29, 2018. Accessed November 17, 2019, http://triton.news/2018/01/white-supremacist-student-disrupts-lecture/.

¹⁷ “White Student Union.” VICE News, December 25, 2013. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/znqpye/white-student-union.

¹⁸ Kelly Weill.”Neo-Nazi Group Implodes Over Love Triangle Turned Trailer Brawl.” The Daily Beast, March 14, 2018. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.thedailybeast.com/matthew-heimbachs-traditional-workers-party-implodes-over-love-triangle-turned-trailer-brawl.

¹⁹ Kevin Roose. “The Making Of A Youtube Radical.” The New York Times, June 8, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html.

²⁰ EJ Dickson. “Study Shows How ‘Intellectual Dark Web’ Is a Gateway to the Far Right.” Rolling Stone, August 28, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/youtube-far-right-radicalization-study-877061/.

²¹ Jay Hathaway. “What is Gamergate, and Why? An Explainer for Non-Geeks.” Gawker, October 10, 2014. Accessed November 17, 2019,https://gawker.com/what-is-gamergate-and-why-an-explainer-for-non-geeks-1642909080.

²²Aja Romano. “How the Christchurch shooter’s manifesto used memes to spread hate.” Vox, March 16, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/3/16/18266930/christchurch-shooter-manifesto-memes-subscribe-to-pewdiepie.

²³ Aja Romano. “YouTube’s most popular user amplified anti-Semitic rhetoric. Again.” Vox, December 13, 2018. Accessed November 17, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2018/12/13/18136253/Pewdiepie-vs-tseries-links-to-white-supremacist-alt-right-redpill.

²⁴ Elizabeth Dwoskin. “YouTube will remove more white supremacist and hoax videos, a more aggressive stance on hate speech.” The Washington Post, June 5, 2019. Accessed November 17, 2019,https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/05/youtube-will-remove-more-white-supremacist-hoax-videos-greater-hate-speech-effort/.

June 8, 2020 0 comment

Asia Human Rights Military Print Article

The Story of Genocide, Hope, and Youth in East Timor

written by Taylor Fairless

“…We had no sense that they were in imminent danger. After all, we reasoned, what place could be safer than a bishop’s house in a predominantly Catholic country?”¹ These were the thoughts of UCLA’s own Geoffrey Robinson on September 5, 1999 when he served for the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) during their referendum. On that day, dozens of militia groups armed by the Indonesian government with machetes and handguns had attacked crowds of East Timorese who had sought refuge in the bishop’s home.² Those perpetrators came to be distinguished by their red and white bandannas — an emblem for pro-Indonesian rule.

Just days prior, the UN had overseen a vote that resulted in East Timor’s independence from Indonesia, a country that had committed a genocide against them. Young East Timorese carried the burden of resistance against the Indonesian army and their local proxies for twenty-four years. They were innovative, adaptive, and above all, exceptionally brave.

Prior to 1999, East Timor was a half-island country in Southeast Asia that was colonized by the Portuguese for about 300 years, with a brief interruption by Japan during World War Two. Then, in 1975, neighboring Indonesia invaded East Timor and took control of the country, killing an estimated 20% of their population. Routine sexual exploitation, deliberate starvation, and massacres led to the United Nations declaring a genocide had occurred.

East Timorese continued to live under authoritative rule by the Indonesians for two decades until the UN became involved and orchestrated a vote for independence in 1999. Massacres took a new turn between January and October that year, which were the months leading up to and following the vote. Close to 2,000 civilians were publicly decapitated, hacked to death, or killed in other horrific ways.³ Among the many women and girls who were raped, a noticeable amount were members of the Catholic Church. By the time the violence ended, over four hundred thousand people had been displaced.⁴

What caused this violence? It’s a good question that requires extensive political and historical thought. In 1975, Portugal relinquished its claim to East Timor, which created a vacuum of power that local political parties took advantage of. Chief among them was Fretilin, a social-democratic party that was heavily influenced by the 1960’s propagation of communism as a fix for colonial-induced violence and inequality.⁵ Their leaders were also just barely in their twenties, which brought a sense of renewed energy and novelty to this movement. Their drive for self-determination compelled them to call for immediate independence.

Three hundred years of brutal colonial rule had finally come to an end. But tragically, it was short lived. Just one week following their declaration, President Suharto of Indonesia launched a mass invasion against East Timor, citing communist insurgents and economic instability as their main concerns. Supplementing Suharto’s desire to intervene was East Timor’s enticing oil and natural gas reserves. Remarkably, great powers sat back in silent acquiescence as civilians, nuns, priests, and children became subjected to immense torture that was justified by the Cold War head space of containing communism.

This all compounded in 1991 with the Santa Cruz massacre. Just a few weeks prior, eighteen year-old Sebastião Gomes convened with a group of resistance members outside of Dili’s Motael church, a place heavily monitored by Indonesian authorities. They peacefully waved their pro-independence flags until the Indoensians began taunting them to draw the protesters to a fight.⁶ As tensions grew, more Indonesian provocateurs joined with automatic weapons. Despite being unarmed, Gomes, who had just turned eighteen the month prior, bravely risked his life in order to end decades worth of nauseating disregard to human rights. Like many others that were far too young, his fight ultimately cost him his life, and his body was found near the church early the next morning.

About 1,500 people marched in protest at the Santa Cruz cemetery, where Gomes was buried. Most of their leaders were high school and university students, another reminder that those at the forefront of change in East Timor were incredibly young. They were joined en route by many others who were exhausted by the burgeoning disregard to Timorese life and the lack of foreign intervention. Among them were school children on their way to class. They began to display Fretilin flags and posters of the thirty-five year-old independence leader and future first president, Xanana Gusmão. Their chant, “Viva Timor Leste, Timor Leste…Timor Leste…,” became a merge of consciousness that translated their jarring reality.⁷ Upon arriving at Santa Cruz, they were greeted by another 500 activists.⁸

The Indonesian army arrived at about 8 a.m. and began to fire into the crowds with automatic weapons. Many people sought safety inside the chapel during the course of the massacre. Twenty-six year old British journalist Max Stahl said the chapel was akin to “a 14th century scene of hell.”⁹ Amid the encircling militias, Stahl took out his video camera and began recording what he saw: teenagers running over one another in a frenzied escape while children fell to their knees in desperate prayer.

He was caught by the Indonesians, but managed to hide the film under a gravestone before they reached him. After retrieving it the next day, he handed it off to his friend who hid it under her dress as she flew from East Timor to Singapore, where the video was eventually aired.¹⁰ Stahl’s footage is the only video evidence in existence of this massacre; without his act of bearing witness, and without the incredible amount of bravery by those young East Timorese that day, the world would have remained naive to the atrocities that were ensuing.

Finally, the circumstances on the ground were so horrific that the United Nations had to intervene. In 1999, the UN orchestrated a referendum where the locals would vote for whether they wanted to be independent from Indonesia. In essence, this was the same as asking if they wanted to be free, or continue to live under the control of those who perpetrated a genocide against them. The foreseeable outcome was undeniable. The locals were certainly going to vote in favor of independence.

This sparked an uproar by the Indonesia army who recruited and armed militia groups and police forces to target those suspected of voting in favor of the referendum. Just days before the vote, twenty-four year old university student Bernadino Joaquim Afonso Gutteres had been gunned down by an Indonesian police officer. The local militia was setting on fire a neighborhood home, a taxi, and posters of Gusmão. They then started firing at the emerging crowds as pro-integration police officers stood by and watched. One of those officers told Gutteres to stop “exciting the people” with his pleas for help. As Gutteres turned and ran, the officer shot him in the neck, and he fell to his knees.¹¹ Robinson was there in the aftermath, and said “it spoke volumes about the political situation in East Timor in the final days before the vote.”¹²

Gutteres moments before he was gunned down

An Indonesian military officer had this to say: “We don’t regret anything. What happened was quite proper. They were opposing us, demonstrating, even yelling things against the government. To me, that is identical with rebellion.”¹³

Perhaps no other moment showed the most harmonious and wide-spread sense of heroism than on ballot day. Many East Timorese had walked miles during the night, dressed in their best clothing, just to arrive by the station’s opening time of 6:30 in the morning. UNAMET reported that about half of all registered voters were in line before that time.¹⁵ And at the end of the day, a staggering 98.6% had voted (for reference, the closest America has ever gotten to that number was in 1876 when 81.8% of registered voters cast their vote).¹⁶ The result? 78.8% voted for independence.¹⁷

Contrary to predictions, virtually all registered voters cast their ballot, without a disruption by any major act of violence.¹⁸ Even the most jaded UN personnel and police officers were moved by this colossal act of determination in the midst of such atrocities.

In the aftermath, however, the Indonesians did not respect the vote, and violence of the same nature proliferated. The UN compound in Dili, a former high school in which Robinson and his colleagues were relocated to, came under siege, effectively trapping 500 UN staff and 1,500 East Timorese refugees.¹⁹ A surprising decision was made unanimously by the UN Security Council to support an armed intervention and land representatives on the ground. Although long overdue, this, supplemented by unprecedented pressure by international forces, eventually put an end to the violence.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) took political and military control. Elections were held in late 2001, and a draft constitution was assembled and finished the following year. On May 20, 2002, East Timor became formally independent, with resistant leader Xanana Gusmão elected as the country’s first president. Four months later, East Timor became a member of the United Nations.

In order: Refugees at the UN Compound in Dili; Indonesian militia men; UNAMET Staff preparing for evacuation, including Robinson pictured in dark blue on the right.

When you first started reading this article, the cover image may have caught your eye. It’s actually more conducive to the story of Timorese resistance and resolve than its initial impression. I first saw it when I read Geoffrey Robinson’s book about East Timor’s referendum, “If you Leave Us Here, We Will Die.” When I asked him if that photo held any significance, seeing as East Timor’s history is heavily weighted with extraordinary acts by young people, even elementary schoolers, he replied that those children were playing in the remains of their home, which became one of thousands that were demolished by pro-Indonesian militias. They reflect this incredible level of hope and perseverance amid devastation that seems almost inherent to East Timorese. Their youth shows that this has no boundaries.

What this story conveys is that the means of preventing or bringing an end to on-going genocides and humanitarian crises are not exclusive to the acts of major players. It wasn’t necessarily the work of the UN, great powers, or the Security Council that ended this genocide and war. But instead, it was the work of individuals and their incredible tenacity and repeated bravery that caught the world’s attention. They forced powerful leaders to land their feet on the very ground where so many East Timorese had died fighting for freedom. They captivated the world with their resistance, and they took advantage of small moments that allowed for their courage to run free. Today, some young East Timorese are remarkably sowing the seeds reconciliation while bringing light to this seemingly unknown crime against humanity. While failures of prosecution, economic reconstruction, and a renewed sense of community continue, East Timorese are nonetheless proliferating this incredible message of determination in the face of what seemed to be a hopeless, sempiternal reality.

—
E N D N O T E S :

[1] Geoffrey Robinson. “If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die.” Princeton University Press, 2011. p. 162
[2] Ibid, p. 165
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid, p. 1
[5] School of Humanities and Social Sciences Staff. Companion to East Timor – FRETILIN. The University of South Wales.
[6] School of Humanities and Social Sciences Staff. Companion to East Timor – Santa Cruz and the Aftermath. University of South Wales.
[7] Max Stahl, video footage of the Santa Cruz Massacre. 12 November, 1991 (3:11)
[8] Companion to East Timor – Santa Cruz and the Aftermath
[9] Mary Boland. Footage of a Massacre that Changed History of Timor-Leste. Dili Letter: Filmmaker Max Stahl’s Images Ensured an End to East Timor’s Long Isolation. The Irish Times. 10 November 2017.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Geoffrey Robinson, p. 145
[12] Ibid, p. 144
[13] Geoffrey Robinson. History of Southeast Asia since 1815 Lecture 19, 9 March 2020.
[14] Geoffrey Robinson, p. 153
[15] The American Presidency Project. Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections 1828 – 2012. University of California, Santa Barbara.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid, p. 156
[18] Ibid, p. 164
[19] Ibid.

June 5, 2020 0 comment

Isaac Lawrence / AFP - Getty Images

Asia China Print Article Security

Youth in Hong Kong: A Fight for Identity

written by Zachary Durkee

Over five centuries ago, Niccolò Machiavelli, renowned political scientist and author of The Prince, once observed that Republics were among the most difficult to establish control over in the face of an authoritarian conqueror. He noted that those that come into control of “a city accustomed to freedom” and do not “destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it.” This is because “in rebellion, it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget.”[i]

The anti-government protests sparked in Hong Kong this past summer are reminiscent of this observation. As millions have taken to the streets to reject what they see as an erosion of their freedom, the youth leading the charge represent a simple fact: people who have lived their entire lives under a free society will be staunch in rejecting anything they see as an external threat to it.

The protests were sparked in the wake of a proposed bill that would have enabled extradition to mainland China.[ii] Hong Kong, a longtime colony of the British Empire, was ceded back to China in 1997. Upon its return to mainland China, the former colony was granted a separate governing and economic system for a period of 50 years.[iii] Protesters viewed the bill as a wake-up call over the Special Administrative Region’s future as an enclave of freedom within a country increasingly instituting sharper forms of repression.[iv]

Many saw the bill in a larger picture: a slow, concerted effort to erode Hong Kong’s autonomy. Over a year onward, the demonstrations have snowballed into broader calls for democratic reform and vocalized opposition to officials in Beijing.[v] All of this being a far-cry from the now abandoned extradition bill.

The mass movements are overwhelmingly composed of young people. It is estimated that 60 percent of them are under the age of 30.[vi] Universities within Hong Kong have also been the center for some of the most confrontational and dramatic scenes of the protests.[vii] In November 2019, it was estimated that around 4.500 people had been detained since the protests began.[viii]

Views and perceptions of the Mainland have plummeted to all-time lows in Hong Kong. At the site of the siege of an airport in August 2019, a pamphlet that protesters were handing out to passersby’s read, “the Communist Party has increasingly encroached on HK’s territory” and intervened “in internal affairs of Hong Kong,” explaining that they were fighting “to preserve what makes this city our home.”[ix]

The youth of Hong Kong, having lived their entire lives separate from Chinese rule, view today as an inflection point in which their civil liberties are beginning to be eclipsed and eroded by the encroaching, authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

It is a generation that has come of age during a time when China has grown more assertive, powerful, and repressive with the transformative leadership of Xi Jinping, the country’s current President and leader of the CCP.[x]

Beijing is cognizant of this reality. Attempting to establish any semblance of unity or common identity in a populace conditioned to liberal values of individual freedom, liberty, and the rule of law is destined to provoke a countervailing reaction that can unleash forces outside of the control of Beijing.

This is perhaps the root of the conundrum that the “one country, two systems” approach poses. Beijing crafted the policy in an effort to eventually achieve full unification while pushing off sensitive questions such as terms of governance and levels of freedom. Its institution poses systemic problems when these tough questions must eventually be answered. In the case of both Hong Kong and Taiwan, a generation completely detached from mainland China will be placed in a position to vehemently oppose any prospect of unification and will be prepared to fight tooth-and-nail to protect the freedom they’ve become accustomed to and lived under their entire lives.[xi] Even veiled threats to it, as the case in Hong Kong demonstrates, can awaken a segment of the population which has no trust, allegiance or faith in Beijing. In 2019, the Hong Kong Research Institute noted that virtually no one under the age of 30 in Hong Kong self-identified as Chinese.[xii]

There is evidence that officials in Beijing comprehend this and are looking to implement long-term remedies for it. Imposing a more nationalist education aims to condition a new generation into becoming more pro-China.[xiii] Their assessment is that liberal educators have indoctrinated an entire generation of youth to oppose mainland China. If a rapprochement of education is effectively instituted, Beijing hopes that future generations coming of age by 2047 (when the terms of Hong Kong’s arrangement expires) will be more inclined to accept an end to the one country, two systems approach without much defiance. Beijing will also continue to aggressively push for the election and appointment of pro-China lawmakers within the special administrative region.

Today, the youth of Hong Kong are leading a fight and rejection of authoritarianism. Their actions have sparked a strong sense of sympathy and support throughout much of the free world.[xiv] From harkening back to Martin Luther King Jr’s take on injustice, to calling out the iconic phrase “give me liberty, or give me death!” in streets lined with tear gas and police in riot gear, Hong Kong’s youth have sent a clear message to Beijing.[xv]

These recent events have led them to a state of deep reflection which has drawn many to forge an identity with a powerful rallying call: “Hong Kong is not China” – at least not anymore in the eyes of a newly empowered youth.[xvi]

[i] Machiavelli Niccolò, and M.K Marriott. The Prince. San Bernardino, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017.

[ii] Cohen, Jerome A. “The Crisis in Hong Kong: What to Know.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, August 13, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/crisis-hong-kong-what-know.

[iii] Blakemore, Erin. “How Hong Kong’s Complex History Explains Its Current Crisis with China.” National Geographic, August 13, 2019. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/topics/reference/hong-kong-history-explain-relationship-china/.

[iv] Roth, Kenneth. “World Report 2019: Rights Trends in China.” Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet.

[v] John, Tara. “Why Hong Kong Is Protesting.” CNN. Cable News Network, August 30, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/13/asia/hong-kong-airport-protest-explained-hnk-intl/index.html.

[vi] “Young, Educated, Middle Class: Study Reveals Protester Demographics.” South China Morning Post, August 12, 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3022345/young-educated-and-middle-class-first-field-study-hong-kong.

[vii] Russolillo, Steven, and Joyu Wang. “Hong Kong Protests Take Over Universities, Business District.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, November 12, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/protests-take-over-hong-kong-universities-business-district-11573551681.

[viii] Cheung, Gary. “Nearly 4,500 Hongkongers Arrested over Protests so Far.” South China Morning Post, November 18, 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3038275/hong-kong-protests-police-arrested-nearly-4500-people.

[ix] Schuman, Michael. “Hong Kong Shows the Flaws in China’s Zero-Sum Worldview.” The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, August 13, 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/hong-kong-flaws-china-world-view/595960/

[x] Yu, Verna. “Children of the Revolution: the Hong Kong Youths Ready to ‘Sacrifice Everything’.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, December 15, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/15/children-of-the-revolution-the-hong-kong-youths-ready-to-sacrifice-everything.

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] “Almost Nobody in Hong Kong under 30 Identifies as ‘Chinese.’” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, August 26, 2019. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/08/26/almost-nobody-in-hong-kong-under-30-identifies-as-chinese.

[xiii] Wong, Chun Han, and Philip Wen. “China Pushes to Integrate Hong Kong Through Patriotic Education, Security Overhauls.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, November 1, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-pushes-to-integrate-hong-kong-through-patriotic-education-security-overhauls-11572617038.

[xiv] Smith, Christopher H. “H.R.3289 – 116th Congress (2019-2020): Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019.” Congress.gov, October 16, 2019. https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3289.

[xv] YouTube, October 2, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLY9BQsd_As.

[xvi] Zaharia, Marius. “’Now or Never’: Hong Kong Protesters Say They Have Nothing to Lose.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters Corp., August 28, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-radicals/now-or-never-hong-kong-protesters-say-they-have-nothing-to-lose-idUSKCN1VH2JT.

June 4, 2020 0 comment

Middle East Print Article Security and Conflict Terrorism

International Law and Child Soldiers: Yemen’s Civil War

written by Abdus Najmi

As the majority of Yemen’s population lies on the cusp of starvation and famine, urgent action in the field of international law is critical to set deterrents for future state actors and remedy the already inflicted harms from the current state actors involved in the civil war. My research will attempt to answer the following two questions: What is the status of current trends in international law regarding the use of child soldiers? Can international law offer pragmatic solutions to decrease the likelihood of conflict in Yemen, especially concerning child soldiers?

Part I of this essay will examine current recruitment strategies regarding child soldiers from both the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels. It will also analyze the role of the United States in the conflict, and offer some analysis on potential policy recommendations. Part II will explore the status of international law regarding the use of child soldiers. First, my discussion will engage international law from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. Then, I will examine Western approaches and norms. Lastly, Part III will delve into potential solutions for domestic reform in Yemen as based on the model of the new Iraqi constitution.

Part I: The Status Quo

Saudi Arabia’s child soldier recruitment strategy in Yemen is an extensive operation. The Kingdom began recruiting children from war-torn Darfur around 2016, telling children that Saudi Arabia would pay “as much as $10,000 if [they] joined its forces.”[i] The statistics are appalling. Some fighters have testified that as much as “40 percent” of their unit has been made up of children. For the residents of financially ravaged Darfur, the offer of ten thousand dollars from Saudi royals could be life changing for residents of financially ravaged residents of Darfur. When one considers the fact that “a Sudanese doctor working overtime at multiple jobs might earn the equivalent of $500 a month,”[ii] ten thousand dollars may be the difference between life and death. Saudi Arabia, along with Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Bahrain, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, and Sudan, has launched operations against the Zaydi Shi’i group known as the Houthis. Ansar Allah, another name the Houthis adopted, gained control of the capital of Yemen, Sana’a, in 2014. This was a devastating blow for former President Hadi.[iii] The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaeda have also been critical actors in the Yemeni Civil War, routinely carrying out attacks against the Zaydi Shias on the basis of sectarian differences. ISIS and Al-Qaeda’s are primarily Sunni, abiding by a Salafist ideology, while Zaydi Shi’ism stands in direct opposition to Salafism theologically. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has attempted to securitize Zaydis as inherently violent, looking at every way to “reestablish a Zaydi Imamate,”[iv] which they believe is crucial to the soundness of political order, though much of this discourse are acts of hyper-securitization and fear-mongering.

However, child soldier recruitment is not a one-sided effort from Saudi Arabia. Though scholars may be quick to blame the Saudi-led coalition for violating international law as a state actor, they quickly forget that the Houthis are still equally guilty under international human rights conventions. The Houthis have “inducted 18,000 child soldiers […] since […] 2014.”[v] The strategy differs with every child, for some, it is promises of “money or the chance to carry a weapon […] But others described being […] abducted from schools or homes or coerced into joining in exchange for a family member’s release from detention.”[vi] The ability to protect one’s family or earn money are enticing opportunities for anyone living in a country with one of the worst humanitarian crises. The Zaydi Houthis have declined these allegations; however, on-the-ground journalism tells a different story.

Before diving into the legal issues at hand, it is critical to understand status quo levels of involvement from different state (and non-state) actors. The United States has an extremely important role in the Yemeni Civil War. Currently, US arm sales to Saudi Arabia total billions of dollars, as the “State Department has approved at least $30.1 billion in Saudi military contracts.”[vii] Saudi Arabia has extensively used these weapons in their coalition against the Houthis. In terms of sheer statistics, US weapons from companies like General Dynamics or Lockheed Martin have directly killed “at least 434 people and injure[d] at least 1,004 in attacks.”[viii] The US can implement a number of policy measures to prevent further carnage and help end the use of child soldiers in the conflict. First, the United States “should end its provision of military aid to Saudi Arabia,”[ix] guaranteeing that the Saudis receive a signal of noncompliance with their behavior in the region. This will signal that the United States no longer exclusively backs Saudi interests in Yemen and will significantly lessen the number of casualties from the conflict. The US may benefit from using a quid pro quo approach, conditioning arm sales and military aid on the end of the use of child soldiers. This can be legally justified under the Child Soldier Prevention Act.[x] Empirically, the conditioning of military aid on the cessation of the use of child soldiers has been very effective – the United States has “in at least three cases, […] been instrumental in securing foreign governments’ agreement to enter into a UN action plan to end their use of child soldiers.”[xi]

In addition, it may be necessary to hold elected officials accountable. While the laws may be in place, political elites like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are able to manipulate moral questions into military ones. Pompeo “blocked the inclusion of Saudi Arabia on a list of countries that recruit child soldiers,”[xii] making it difficult to get the US legally behind any form of arms embargo against the Kingdom. Adding Saudi Arabia to that list may be the first step needed to pursuing conditional military policies with Riyadh. Establishing a quid pro quo relationship with Saudi Arabia bodes well as an effective mechanism in securing the rights of children and ending the use of child soldiers in the Middle East writ large.

Part II: Discussion on International Law

When one discusses customary international law, it is crucial to remember that not all states are as keen to adopt Western legal frameworks when dealing with issues like conduct in warfare. Though most Islamic countries do not follow word for word principles established in Sharia’, which may be broadly defined as Islamic jurisprudence, they still abide by large, overarching principles that can be found in the Quran, the Hadith, and through hermeneutic practices, including others like ijma (scholarly consensus) or qiyas (analogical reasoning). In order to make policy recommendations, it may be critical to examine Islamic law and jurisprudence in regards to child soldiers to better access frameworks that individuals in Yemen may be more inclined to adapt. It is imperative to abide by the frameworks of those who are most affected by the conflict.

Islamic fiqh in the context of family relations holds a deep literature base regarding the rights of children. Primarily, scholars contend that Islam necessitates “that children should be given a protective environment, and […] the right to have sufficient parental care, the right to have education, the right to healthcare, and the freedom of expression and thought.”[xiii] In fact, if a child does not have parents, it is encouraged greatly for the children to be “protected through sponsorship provided by people acting in the role of parents.”[xiv] Even when one looks at commentary concerning jihad from the most famous Muslim scholars, child recruitment for offensive jihad is explicitly denied. Ibn Rushd, known more famously as Averroes, stated that “the collective obligation lies with the freemen and adults.”[xv] Hanafi scholar and jurist al-Marghinani made clear that “jihad is not a requirement for the child.”

Islamic traditions would also contend that there are “two qualifications someone is considered to reach a majority age, namely, ‘âqil and bâligh.”[xvi] Reaching aqil and baligh set the benchmark for what being an “adult” constitutes. Aqil refers to being in possession of one’s mental abilities, while the latter means ‘physically grown up, bodily of age.”[xvii] Both of these benchmarks are hard to quantify; in many Islamic countries such as Indonesia, scholars can find indicators of adulthood in marital law, where it’s legislated to allow marriage without consent at the age of 21.[xviii] However, in Yemen, marital law might tell a different story. There is no formal age of consent in Yemen, and many cases have surfaced regarding child marriages as young as 8 years old.[xix] Theory and practice tell vastly different stories, making it very difficult to set a clear definition of what adulthood really is. Further research may be needed to understand the effect of culture as an alternative explanation for child marriages.

Even if we wanted to adopt a more conservative view of Islamic law regarding jihad for children, the story of ibn Umar would set the limit of child participation in war at fifteen years old. During the Battle of Badr, ibn Umar asked to fight alongside the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, who then forbade it. The hadith goes as such: “‘The messenger of God reviewed me the day [of the battle] of Uhud, when I was just a boy of 14 years, and I was not allowed [to fight]. Then he reviewed me the [day of the battle] of the Trench, I was 15 years old and he agreed.”[xx] This is strikingly similar to the age limit set in international law as well; “the age limit is set at fifteen in Article 38”[xxi] in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Both Western, international law and Islamic law hold the age of fifteen as the proper age of participation in warfare.

Current trends in international law have attempted to raise the minimum age of child soldiers globally. Article 38 did not suffice, so in 1993, committee members attempted to push for the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. On “May 25, 2000,”[xxii] the United Nations ended up taking on the new changes, raising the minimum age of child warfare “from fifteen to eighteen years.”[xxiii] There are loopholes to this though – states may still be able to benefit from the voluntary participation of children in the armed forces, “so the notion of a “straight-eighteen rule” has yet to be fully accomplished.”[xxiv] Though Saudi Arabia and Yemen are parties to the Optional Protocol, it is clear that both of these countries do not abide by the rules they have agreed to. The Optional Protocol lacks an enforcement mechanism, effectively negating the power behind international law.

Part III: Potential Solutions

Yemen may be able to model domestic laws in Iraq in regards to children in armed conflict to further ensure the safety of children. The new Iraqi constitution, which was drafted post US invasion in 2003, incorporates both Western legal doctrines and the Sharia’. It holds in Article 29 that “family is the foundation of society… and the state guarantees the protection of […] childhood.”[xxv] Articles 33 and 37 were home runs for legal innovation regarding the use of child soldiers. This article contains provisions and statutes that are critical to “children who have become child soldiers in armed conflict,” prohibiting the use of force on any “person to join any party, society or political entity or force him to continue his membership in it.”[xxvi] It is critical for Yemeni policymakers to examine the new Iraqi constitution as a potential model for future laws regarding conduct of warfare. Though the efficacy of the new Iraqi constitution has not yet been determined, as witnessed with the rise of ISIS and political instability, the constitution still provides a base frame for Yemen to build upon domestically. Due to the impending humanitarian disaster, it is crucial that policymakers not focus on the small details of legal innovations, but rather adopt a framework quickly to resolve status quo harms as fast as possible. An external agency that monitors enforcement may need to be established to ensure productive results. Without external enforcement mechanisms, Yemen may fall into the same paradigms of failure and noncompliance that Iraq has witnessed.

In addition, Yemen is unique from Iraq since Yemen is home to the Zaydi Shia group. Preservation of Zaydi identity, or at least an attempt at negotiation of it, is critical to ensure the freedom of worship and minority rights. In the new Iraqi constitution, it was held that the “holy shrines and religious sites in Iraq are religious and civilizational entities […] the State is committed to assuring and maintaining their sanctity, and to guaranteeing the free practice of rituals in them.”[xxvii] This did not matter whether the minority was a Chaldean Christian or a Yazidi, Iraq attempted to maintain the ability for its citizens to uphold the freedom of religion. However, in Yemen, the idea of freedom of religion is a different story, at least post-Saudi airstrikes. Saudi Arabia has deliberately attacked Zaydi sites, such as Al-Hadi mosque, “the final resting place of Imam al-Hadi ila’l-Haqq Yahya, the first Shiite Zaydi imam of Yemen.”[xxviii] The destruction of Shiite religious and cultural sites is a clear violation of international law, and begs the question: What Islamic principles can be maintained in a future negotiation between the Houthis and Saudis? If both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have different notions of Islam, then the potential for finding common ground severely diminishes. Adopting Iraq’s notions of religious freedom must be the stepping stone in Houthi-Saudi negotiation.

However, this conflict is much more difficult than it seems. Though sectarian differences regarding Zaydi Shi’ism and Sunni Islam are tantamount concerns, they are not the main drivers of the conflict. For one, Zaydi Shi’ism is actually considered “closer to Sunni Islam rather than to Twelver Shiism, which is the form of Shiism practiced in Iran.”[xxix] Theologically, there are critical differences regarding the status of the fifth Imam Zayd ibn Ali, but overall, Zaydi Shi’ism holds much more tolerant views of the earlier Sunni caliphs, granting them openness “towards other interpretations of Islam.”[xxx] The notion that this conflict is a new Cold War along sectarian lines between Iran and Saudi Arabia must be rejected and analyzed further. Economics, power politics, and the drive for natural resources may very well serve as alternative explanations for the ongoing proxy wars throughout the Middle East.

As examined in this essay, the recruitment of children as soldiers in Yemen goes against Islamic principles contained in the hadith and Western norms of international law broadly. As the Saudi-led coalition gains momentum and continues to pay children in Darfur to participate in war crimes, the world must attempt to restrain Saudi Arabia through means of coercion, whether that be economic sanctions or hardline military force. States must look at empirical examples and attempts at peace negotiations, such as the Stockholm agreement and the Riyadh agreement. Further research needs to examine the factors and conditions that led the Southern separatists to “have pulled out”[xxxi] of the Riyadh agreement near the beginning of this year. However, it is clear that an agreement that precludes any discussion regarding the use of child soldiers is problematic and destined to continue the suffering of many. The United States has a clear position in the conflict as Saudi Arabia’s guarantor of arms sales, and will need to serve a crucial role in diplomatic efforts with Saudi Arabia if it wants to see any resolution of the ongoing tragedies in Yemen.

[i] Kirkpatrick, David. “On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur.” New York Times, December 2018. Accessed 4 February 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Waseem A. Qureshi, The Crisis in Yemen: Armed Conflict and International Law, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 227 (2020).

[iv] King, James. “Zaydī revival in a hostile republic: Competing identities, loyalties and visions of state in Republican Yemen.” Brill, Arabica 59 (2012) 404-445.

[v] Associated Press. “Children as young as 10 fight, kill and die in Yemen’s war.” NBC News, December 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/children-young-10-fight-kill-die-yemen-s-war-n949721.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Kane, Alex. “Here’s Exactly Who’s Profiting from the War on Yemen.” In These Times, June 2019 Issue, https://inthesetimes.com/features/us-saudi-arabia-yemen-war-arms-sales.html

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Lena Mizrahi, “The U.S. Must End Military Aid to Saudi Arabia – Berkeley Political Review”, Berkeley Political Review, https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/11/12/the-u-s-must-end-military-aid-to-saudi-arabia/, accessed 11-19-2019.

[x] Becker, Jo. “From Opponent to Ally: The United States and Efforts to End the Use of Child Soldiers, 22 Mich. St. Int’l L. Rev. 595 (2013), Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/ilr/vol22/iss2/5

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Seligman, Lara. “The Child Soldier Crisis: ‘Kids Are Cheap’,” Foreign Policy, November 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/08/child-soldier-crisis-kids-are-cheap-yemen-isis-my-star-sky/

[xiii] Anna-Liisa Jacobson, “Lambs into Lions: The Utilization of Child Soldiers in the War in Iraq and Why International and Iraqi Laws are Failing to Protect the Innocent,” Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 161-194

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/sharia-law-does-not-call-child-soldiers

[xvi] https://media.neliti.com/media/publications/157450-EN-the-issue-of-child-soldiers-in-islamic-p.pdf

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/after-years-civil-war-child-marriage-rise-yemen/33762

[xx] https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/sharia-law-does-not-call-child-soldiers

[xxi] Anna-Liisa Jacobson, “Lambs into Lions: The Utilization of Child Soldiers in the War in Iraq and Why International and Iraqi Laws are Failing to Protect the Innocent,” Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 161-194

[xxii] Ibid.

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Constitute Project, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005.” https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en

[xxviii] Craig, Iona. “The Agony of Saada”: U.S. and Saudi Bombs Target Yemen’s Ancient Heritage.” The Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2015/11/16/u-s-and-saudi-bombs-target-yemens-ancient-heritage/

[xxix] Perteghella, Annalisa. “Yemen: the Sectarianization of a Political Conflict.” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, March 2018. https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/yemen-sectarianization-political-conflict-19933

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] Reuters, “Yemen’s southern separatists pull out of Riyadh agreement committees,” Reuters, January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/yemens-southern-separatists-pull-out-of-riyadh-agreement-committees-idUSKBN1Z01ZE

June 1, 2020 0 comment

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Asia Economics Featured Print Article Religion

New Age Yogis and the Commodification of Spirituality

written by Eden Ballard

This article was published as part of our Spring 2019 print edition, the entirety of which may be found here.

One of the most basic human instincts is to search for a sense of belonging. Often, this is found through religion; believing in a higher power or powers not only facilitates a sense of purpose in life but also helps people connect to one another. However, religion and spirituality are not as cut and dry as they used to be. The global market has had a drastic and transformative impact on belief systems for people all over the world. With religion decoupled from place, sacred things have become commodities that can be traded and adapted to accommodate various cultural demands and ultimately reflect local politics. This effect can be traced by looking at the practice of yoga, a historically spiritual practice that has been processed and transformed into a sellable good that has comfortably integrated into the global market.

A Brief History of Yoga

Today, yoga is worth up upwards of $80 billion[1]the global market as a result of classes, retreats, equipment sales, and associated products. Although its status as a commodity is fairly recent, yoga began being practiced in modern day India around 3000 BCE as a way to achieve harmony between the heart and soul on the path to divine enlightenment and provided a basis for what would stem into Buddhism and Hinduism. As the centuries have passed, yoga has traveled and evolved to fit the demands of markets around the world and now has dozens of variations. In the past, yoga emphasized mindfulness and connection through the pillars of love, kindness, and compassion. In contrast, modern yoga typically prioritizes health benefits over spiritual benefits… although some people embrace the spirituality as well. Even though this ancient practice has a relatively clear history[2], the political and spiritual components of modern yoga are strained and complex and thus, impossible to generalize.

Because of its intimate ties to religion, yoga has caused extensive discourse. The physical benefits of yoga are universally appealing to those who decide to pursue it but for some, practicing spirituality outside of their normal beliefs is unacceptable. This conflict is circumvented in several different ways including prohibiting the mindfulness and spiritual practices of yoga and focusing on it as a sport or adapting the names of the poses relative to the local cultures. These maneuvers have allowed yoga to be adapted into various markets all over the world and made into a global commodity. Pierre Bourdieu, French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher, called people like the ones engineering these changes “cultural specialists” and explained that they “ransack various traditions and cultures in order to produce new interpretations and uses that can be consumed.” And consumed it is. Yoga, in various forms and interpretations, is taking off around the world.

Qualifying the Spirituality of Modern Yoga Practices

In many secular places, there is an inverse relationship between the number of people practicing yoga and popularity of organized religion. People that otherwise feel disconnected from the religions they were brought up with find the filtered spirituality of western yoga to be appealing. Brigid Delaney, Senior Writer for the Guardian Australia, wrote about how “Australians are losing their religion but their craving for meaning and moral teaching appears stronger than ever.” This trend is clearly visible in North America as well where religion is on the decline[3] but the yoga industry is booming. One in five Americans[4] describe themselves as spiritual but not religious – partially due to the influence of yoga. Delaney also wrote an article[5] on her attempt at delving into the world of yoga in an effort to clear her mind and strengthen her body. She wrote, “In many respects, yoga is the perfect pastime for our age – the meditative elements give us the opportunity to find peace and stillness in a time of increasingly hectic and crowded information, the instructional bits give us moral lessons in the absence of traditional religion, while the stretchy, bendy, sweaty physical stuff is a great way of countering eight or more hours a day spent hunched over a computer.” Yoga, effectively, has helped meet the demand for connection coming from a generation of people who feel disconnected and disillusioned.

The power of modern yoga extends beyond flimsy spirituality found while stretching on plastic mats laid out on the hardwood floors of rec center classrooms. Yoga, in more secular places, tends to be a mechanism for creating community and connection, and helps people feel grounded in an incredibly turbulent world. Delaney talks about how, secretly, she wants to be one of the yoga mat toting, juice drinking, athleisure wearing yoga fanatics that “loiter in the aisles of the organic fruit and vegetable shop.” By donning leggings and slurping green drinks, these people are finding their “Neo-Tribe”[6] – which Z. Bauman explains “helps the individual gain a sense of identity and belonging through identification with a subcultural consumer group.” Basically, buying into this consumption pattern helps people feel less lonely.

Yoga Outside of the West

Although yoga is gaining popularity globally, its spiritual components don’t flourish everywhere the way they do in the west. In places that tend to have stronger conventional religious practices yoga is contentious; the spirituality of yoga is seen as incongruent with dominant religious values. In 2013 the BBC ran an article called, “Does doing yoga make you a Hindu?[7]” The underlying question being are non-Hindu religious followers being subversive by practicing yoga? Can the founding spirituality be successfully cleaved from its physical counterpart in order to make a secular activity that poses no threat to dominant local ideology? The answer is complicated. So much so that the question of whether or not yoga is religious a “vexed question[8]” in Indian politics. Orthodox Muslims believe that sun salutations go against Islamic Law as Muslims are not supposed to bend to anyone, or anything, but Allah. Alternately, the practice of yoga in Indian schools causes concern for some because the chanting “Om” during the practice is too connected to Hindu religion. As a result, many leaders have said they are okay with yoga as long as it is disassociated with religion.

Different countries have handled this question in different ways. Iran, where Sharia law is the rule of the land, yoga classes “make no overt reference to spirituality at all.[9]” To avoid what could be called “blasphemy” the emphasis is instead placed on the physical component by calling it “the sport of yoga.” Where teachers in the west tap into consumer spirituality, teachers in Iran are accredited by the Yoga Federation[10]which promotes “Unity through sport” and simply defines yoga as “a holistic health system with Indian roots stretching back 5,000 years.” Their homepage justifies their practice of yoga as a sport with a quote from B.K.S. Iyengar[11]who says that, “there is nothing wrong in holding a competition on the qualitative presentation of the yoga asanas.” He concludes by saying that yoga “should be competition on the artistic level and not on egoistic body cult.” By placing the emphasis on exhibitive competition, they deliberately neglect the spirituality that people cling to in so many other places. Simultaneously, Iyengar is bashing the imagined community that yoga is creating in the Australia and North America and thrusting it in its least flattering light as an egoistic body cult.

Some places chose to forgo working through the complexities of yoga and spirituality in favor of banning it completely. In 2008, a religious ruling in Malaysia banned the sport in five states. However, in Kuala Lumpur, the capital, physically practicing yoga is allowed as long as chanting and meditation are not. This partial acceptance is standard in other Islamic countries such as Indonesia as well. A profitable compromise that introduces a new commodity while preserving and protecting tradition.

Savasana – Wrapping It Up

Since its creation in 3000 BCE in what is now modern India, yoga has evolved and expanded to accommodate demand in cultures around the world. The religious roots of the practice have been the direct cause of discourse around the world and helped shape yoga into a variety of practices and consumable packages that are woven into the global market. The adaptation of yoga in more secular places has accommodated quasi-spiritual consumerism in places that are experiencing a sense of disconnectedness a result in the decline of religion. Alternately, yoga has been adapted as a sport with an emphasis purely on its physical components so as not to interfere with dominant religious ideology. Although modern practices typically bear little resemblance to ancient practices, the addition of spiritual or physical yoga practices have influenced consumers around the world.

[1] Technavio. “Yoga Is on the Upswing in North America.” December 4, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://blog.technavio.com/blog/yoga-upswing-north-america.

[2] Yoga Six. “A Quick Reference Guide to the History of Yoga.” March 12, 2018. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://yogasix.com/history-of-yoga/.

[3] Religion News Service. “Religion Declining in Importance for Many Americans, Especially for Millennials.” December 10, 2018. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://religionnews.com/2018/12/10/religion-declining-in-importance-for-many-americans-especially-for-millennials/.

[4] Tara Isabella Burton. “‘Spiritual but Not Religious’: Inside America’s Rapidly Growing Faith Group.” Vox, November 10, 2017. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/11/10/16630178/study-spiritual-but-not-religious.

[5] Brigid Delaney. “The Yoga Industry Is Booming – but Does It Make You a Better Person?” The Guardian, September 17, 2017. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/sep/17/yoga-better-person-lifestyle-exercise.

[6] Russell Keat, Nigel Whiteley, and Nicholas Abercrombie. The Authority of the Consumer. Taylor & Francis, 1994.

[7] William Kremer. “Does Doing Yoga Make You a Hindu?” BBC, November 21, 2013. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25006926.

[8] Shefali Anand. “Is Yoga Religious? In India, It’s a Vexed Question.” WSJ, June 9, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/06/09/is-yoga-religious-in-india-its-a-vexed-question/.

[9] William Kremer. “Does Doing Yoga Make You a Hindu?” BBC, November 21, 2013. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25006926.

[10] “International Yoga Sports Federation – Directory,” Accessed April 27, 2019. https://www.iysf.org/directory/iran.

[11] “What Is Iyengar Yoga?,” Iyengar Yoga: National Association of the United States. Accessed April 27, 2019. https://iynaus.org/iyengar-yoga/about.

October 17, 2019 0 comment

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Featured Geopolitics Globalization Print Article Religion

The Price of Pilgrimage: Is Nothing Sacred?

written by Katie Jones

This article was published as part of our Spring 2019 print edition, the entirety of which may be found here.

One of the world’s tallest buildings, The Makkah Royal Clock Tower, looms over the Kaaba and the Masjid al-Haram Mosque, Islam’s holiest site. The Clock Tower boasts a luxury Fairmont Hotel, which offers rooms with views of the Kaaba for up to $4500 a night, along with high end shopping and restaurants. However pilgrims that cannot afford the growing number of luxury hotels sleep on the street outside, illuminated by the fluorescent lights of an opulence they may never experience. The commodification and capitalization of Mecca draws a stark contrast to the rites of the Hajj that emphasize equality and humility. Such an inherent disparity between purpose and practice has sparked a global conversation not only about the meaning of the Hajj, but Saudi Arabia’s fitness to oversee it.

The Hajj is a five day ritualistic pilgrimage to Mecca required of all Muslims who are physically and financially able at least once in their lives. Mecca is within the political jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Riyadh dictates how the pilgrimage is run and who may attend. The Kingdom claims they distribute visas to attend the Hajj in accordance with the size of each country’s Muslim population. In reality, the allotments are not always transparent and the Saudis have been known to use visas as political pawns. Nations with whom they have favorable diplomatic ties with often receive extra bonus visas unofficially, and those with whom they do not, have issues attaining any visas at all. For example Syrians, with whom the Saudis cut diplomatic ties with in 2012, cannot obtain a Hajj visa through the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – they must go through the Syrian National Coalition, a Saudi aligned opposing political party. Similarly, after the embargo placed on Qatar in 2017 the visas allotted to Qatar were halted, resulting in extreme backlash and a formal complaint to the UN. It was not until the intervention of Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani, an exiled member of the Qatari royal family, that the visas were once again granted. In both cases, the Saudi government used the visas as political leverage to undercut the authority of existing governments and give preferential treatment to their allies.

The most overt politicization of the Hajj though, has been the Saudi-Iranian cold war. Both countries use the Hajj as a battleground for promoting their competing versions of Islam, a tension which has erupted in violence on several occasions. In 1987, 402 Iranian pilgrims were killed and 600 more were injured by Saudi riot police as they protested “Death to America! Death to Israel!” during the Hajj. More recently, 464 Iranian pilgrims were killed in a tragic stampede during the Hajj. The following year, the Iranian government banned its citizens from attending the sacred rite, and since have been vocal in their dissatisfaction with Saudi management.

However the Iranians are far from the only ones to call Saudi stewardship into question. A growing number of critics have emerged due not only to the aforementioned political exploitation, but the Saudi’s growing and projected profiteering practices. The Saudi economy benefits immensely from the Hajj. The religious pilgrimage accounts for seven percent of Saudi Arabia’s GDP and 20 percent of it’s non-petrol GDP. Consequently, expanding the Hajj to accommodate more people, more businesses, and more profit has become an integral part of Mohammed Bin Salman’s economic plan for the Kingdom, Vision 2030. New hotels, shopping centers, fast trains, and airport terminals are all being constructed in anticipation of future pilgrimage, and nothing is too sacred to renovate. Even the Masjid al-Haram Mosque, which contains the Kaaba, is being expanded to accommodate as many as 1.85 million pilgrims at once in the years to come.

At first glance, these developments appear to be positive. Mecca’s growth does mean more people will have the opportunity to attend the Hajj and fulfill their religious duty. However the Saudi’s disheartening economic focus, that will entail the expansion of the tourism sector, and destruction of historic sights, negates any praise or admiration they may receive.

The Kingdom hopes to increase the revenue from pilgrimage and subsequently spread the wealth through various sectors as a part of their larger tourism expansion scheme. They have started to offer an “Umrah Plus” visa (the Umrah is a pilgrimage at a non-Hajj time of year) which provides access to not only Mecca, but other religious sites across the country. This will increase sustainable development for their population, but feels disingenuous to the purpose of pilgrimage. To exacerbate their trend of capitalizing off Mecca further, the Saudis have attempted to provide ulterior motives for pilgrimage. Mark Allaf, manager of the Mecca Hilton said the hotel was “trying to introduce the concept of combining both the performance of Umrah and Hajj, and specifically Umrah, with a business event.” Many of the devout feel these distractions sully the pilgrimage.

Mirroring this shift in the purpose of the Hajj is the shift in the physical landscape of Mecca. In the process of construction and renovation of the city, the Saudis have destroyed ancient relics as well as medieval Ottoman structures, an action which the Turkish cultural minister condemned as “cultural vandalism” and a “war on legacy”. In defense of the Saudis, it is within the theology of Wahhabi Islam to destroy these sights as to prevent idolatrous practices, however it is ultimately unjust for the Saudis to take action that will affect everyone based on their unpopular interpretation of Islam. It is also a bit too convenient that the home of Khadijah, Mohammed’s wife, was replaced with bathrooms in the expansion of the mosque and the home of Abu Bakr, Mohammed’s successor, was replaced with an extremely profitable Hilton hotel. It is apparent that the Saudis care more for development and personal economic gain than preservation and reverence of a shared cultural and religious history. Perhaps it is time for a more open conversation about the Saudi’s mandate to Mecca.

Saudi Arabia’s history of political and economic exploitation of power, not to mention their condemnable human rights record, make them unfit to manage Mecca. However that brings about the question: who is? Because the problem goes far beyond the Saudis themselves, and we in the West must take our share of responsibility. Islam’s shiny new sixth pillar, western capitalism, is the direct result of decades of U.S. interventionism and soft power throughout the Middle East. It would thereby be the height of hypocrisy for us to condemn the Saudis for following in our footsteps, for bringing profit to the American corporations filling the malls of Mecca, but that doesn’t mean Muslim countries can not. It is only natural to sympathize with the Iranian pilgrims protesting US-Saudi relations during the Hajj, because cultural imperialism is a driving force of change in Mecca. After all, the city belongs to Iranian Muslims just as much as it does to the Saudis, or the other 1.8 billion Muslims on Earth; and if they’re angry that some pilgrims are sleeping on the street, and others in the Fairmont penthouse they’re not alone. Perhaps the Saudis should give some credence to these criticisms and consider incorporating their religion into their developments, their economy and their politics, rather than the other way around.

October 14, 2019 0 comment

Islamic Center of America Source

Featured Print Article

The West’s Religious Freedom Test

written by Zach Emanuel

This article was published as part of our Spring 2019 print edition, the entirety of which may be found here.

On March 15^th, 2019, an Australian man opened fire in two New Zealand mosques, killing 50 Muslim worshippers and injuring 50 others. In the aftermath of the attack, officials discovered a manifesto written by the shooter which stated his desire “to show the invaders that our lands will never be their lands, [and] our homelands are our own” among numerous other rationales for killing Muslim New Zealanders.[1] The attacks cut right at the heart of the West’s tradition of—and commitment to—religious freedom, which for centuries has defined society not by blood-and-soil nationalism or adherence to a specific religious doctrine, but rather by a commitment to a shared set of values and ideals, among them religious freedom.

The roots of religious freedom in the West can be traced to the Magna Carta, a treaty between King John of England and a group of powerful barons in the year 1215. In it, the King promised to protect the Catholic Church’s rights in exchange for the barons allowing him to retain the throne. Although the charter failed to achieve all of its stated objectives and was thus unsuccessful in the short term, the agreement has since helped form the basis of religious freedom in the West.[2] In 1789, when James Madison was tasked with composing the Bill of Rights, the first right Madison enumerated was, by no coincidence, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Ever since, religious tolerance has held a unique place within the American ethos, as presidents such as Abraham Lincoln, John F. Kennedy, and George Bush, among numerous others, have praised the strength that freedom of religion, separation of church and state, and a diversity of opinions and cultures provides a society.[3]

The story is similar in Europe. In 1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, drafted by Abbe Sieyes and Marquis de Lafayette during the French Revolution proclaimed religious freedom across France by subordinating the Catholic Church to the newly established French government. Over a century later, in 1920, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was speaking glowingly of the British commitment to “defend freedom of conscience and religious equality,” and in 1950, Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), composed in the aftermath of World War II, specifically notes the “right to freedom of…religion,” including the “freedom to change…religion.” [4]

Yet for all the talk of religious freedom representing a fundamental underpinning of liberal society, the last ten years have seen the West’s political commitment to protecting such freedoms dwindle. The New Zealand mosque attack was simply the latest development in the West’s growing issue with religious diversity, manifesting most notably in a series of attacks, both verbal and physical, against both Muslim and Jewish communities. Like in the New Zealand attack, the attackers almost always tout their goal as ridding their native lands of religious “outsiders.” In Europe, as Muslim migrants flow in from the Middle East and North Africa, right-wing fascism has taken hold of conservative parties promising a return to the white, Christian majorities of old. In the U.S., Donald Trump’s presidency and his stranglehold on the American right can too be traced to many of the same fears. Although the West has spoken eloquently of its commitment to religious tolerance for hundreds of years, its faith in the ideal has never been truly scrutinized as the Christian majorities in European states and the U.S. have yet to come under threat. But in the globalized world of the 21^st century, when the cross-cultural movement of people from different faiths is becoming commonplace, the West’s commitment to the doctrine of religious freedom is, for the first time, truly being put to the test, and the results so far do not bode well for liberalism.

In December of 2015, following a terrorist attack by a Muslim couple in San Bernardino, California in which fourteen people were murdered and 24 more seriously injured, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”[5] As numerous legal scholars have argued, by specifically targeting Muslim-majority countries, the policy is in violation of Madison’s Establishment Clause, which bans Congress from making a law respecting the establishment of a religion. Nevertheless, a July 2017 POLITICO poll found that a whopping 84% of GOP respondents and 56% of independent respondents approved of Trump’s ban, numbers indicative of a departure from the American adherence to the doctrine of religious freedom.[6] From that moment forward, the “Muslim ban”—along with Trump’s promised border wall—have constituted the hallmarks not just of the administration’s immigration policy, but also of Trump’s presidency as a whole. As conservative political commentator Ann Coulter wrote in her 2016 book In Trump We Trust, “there’s nothing Trump can do that won’t be forgiven. Except change his immigration policy,” or in other words, Trump could change his mind on just about any issue without losing our support, so long as he retains his promise to bar any more Muslims and Mexicans from entering the U.S.[7]

In addition to the Muslim ban, in July of 2017 right-wing rally-goers in Charlottesville, Virginia marched with tiki torches and shouted, “Jews will not replace us,” and received almost a tacit endorsement from the president who noted the “very fine people” among the marchers.[8] Just over a year later in October of 2018, Robert Bowers murdered eleven Jews in a synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In the aftermath of the attack, Bowers was found to have posted online “There is no #MAGA (Make America Great Again) as long as there is a kike manifestation,” using a derogatory term for Jews.[9] Trump’s “Muslim ban,” which was upheld by the Supreme Court in June of 2018, along with the anti-Jewish rhetoric in Charlottesville and attack in Pittsburgh, demonstrate the U.S.’s faltering over its commitment to religious liberty in the face of both Muslims and Jews being incorporated more widely and permanently into the fabric of America. Trump, the face of the Republican Party, and much of his supporters no longer seem interested in the ideal either in practice, or even in theory. As the American Jewish and Muslim populations grow and individuals of those faiths begin to occupy the highest positions in American society, Trump’s presidency appears to illustrate that a vast swath of the U.S. is questioning whether or not it is religious tolerance or rather Christianity that is truly the fundamental tenet of American identity.

This very debate appears to be being held in Europe as well. Although Marine Le Pen, President of France’s right-wing National Front Party, lost France’s 2017 presidential election to Emmanuel Macron, she collected 34% of the vote and still today commands widespread support across the country.[10] Throughout the campaign Le Pen harped on anti-Muslim themes, proclaiming at a rally in Marseille:

“We are being submerged by a flood of immigrants that are sweeping all before them. There are prayers in the street, cafes that ban women…I will say when I become president that this is not the French way…If we carry on like this, the whole of France will become a gigantic no-go zone. …A multicultural society is a society that has multiple conflicts.”[11]

After an April 2017 attack on the Champs-Elysees, Le Pen demanded that, “Islamic mosques must be closed,” before promising to deport all foreign citizens on the terrorist watch list.[12] In 2017, about one-eighth of the French population was Muslim, the vast majority of whom are immigrants themselves, with the population expected to double in the next 20-30 years. Le Pen’s proposals to close mosques and to rid France of “multiculturalism” directly contradict the value of religious freedom. Moreover, even before Le Pen’s candidacy France made headlines for banning the “burkini” from its beaches. Since the French Revolution, France has boasted of a unique attachment to secularism and has prided itself on not including religion in public society, more so than in any other Western country. Nevertheless, the French government, via Le Pen and the “burkini” ban, has forced religion back into the public eye through blatant discrimination against Muslims in recent years. The support for both Le Pen and the ban amongst the French populace illustrate an additional Western nation’s waning commitment to religious tolerance in the face of a rising Muslim presence.

Le Pen’s anti-immigrant right-wing populism is not alone on the continent. In September of 2015, over 138,000 Muslim migrants entered Hungary, more than 1.5% of the country’s population.[13] In response, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban erected fencing along its borders with Croatia and Serbia, the entry points for most Syrian and Iraqi refugees migrating West, and refused asylum-seekers passage through Hungary.[14] Orban called Muslim migration “not a solution, but a problem [and] not medicine but a poison,” adding “we don’t need it and won’t swallow it.”[15] By the 2017 parliamentary election, opposition to immigration and migration was the centerpiece of the platform of Orban’s Fidesz Party, with the party “running a single issue campaign against immigrants.”[16] Yet as Bloomberg’s Leonid Bershidsky notes, “Hungary isn’t really an anti-immigrant country,” as in 2016 “23,803 foreigners moved there” and up until March of 2017, the Orban government sponsored “residency bond programs targeted largely at Asians” where for a $370,000 “investment in Hungarian government bonds, permanent residency could be obtained.”[17] Budapest is, however, “fiercely against a certain kind of immigrant”: Muslims.[18] Despite a “right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,” Hungary’s experience, like France and the U.S., is another example of the West’s loosening attachment to religious tolerance as a valued ideal.

And it is not just France and Hungary. Other European countries have shown similar tendencies. In Germany, where the Muslim population grew from 4.1% to 6.1% in just six years, the right-wing and anti-immigrant party Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) has gained ground electorally.[19] While the German constitution specifically guarantees “the undisturbed practice of religion” and a “freedom of faith and of conscience,” in March of 2016, the AfD’s Lower Bavarian branch called for banning mosques, minarets, and the muezzin, the individuals who recite the Islamic call to prayer.[20] In Poland, several members of the dominant right-wing Law and Justice Party have rejected plans to construct a Saudi-funded mosque in the Polish capital, Warsaw.[21] In the Netherlands, where 17% of Amsterdam’s population is Muslim, the right-wing Party for Freedom, which holds the second-largest number of seats in the Dutch parliament, recently proposed banning the Quran and shutting down all Dutch mosques, despite the Dutch constitution’s protections for all citizens “to profess freely [their] religion or belief…without prejudice…under the law.”[22] Finally, in Austria in June of 2018, Chancellor Sebastian Kurz announced plans to forcibly close seven mosques and expel 60 imams for not expressing a “’positive fundamental view towards [the] state and society.’”[23] Whether it be AfD, Law and Justice, the Party for Freedom, or Kurz, each action fundamentally contradicts a commitment to religious tolerance.

As Muslim populations continue to rise across Europe and the United States, the once strong Western commitment to religious freedom appears to be faltering. It is easy to praise the idea of religious liberty when a country does not have to implement it in practice. But as Christian majorities come under threat from demographics, a once pleasant ideal no longer appears so attractive to those who feel as though the country they know is disappearing, an understandably scary notion for those who have felt at home there for centuries.

Whether the West’s commitment to religious freedom will survive the globalization of populations is uncertain, but it is only a fraction of the threat that Western democracies face in dealing with migration and religious diversity. Anti-religious freedom policies are not the only authoritarian tendencies of right-wing parties across the U.S. and Europe. Trump, Orban, and the Law and Justice Party in Poland have attacked Islam repeatedly, but they have also derided the courts, rule of law, and other institutions essential to liberal democracy in the process. While many voters may prefer democracy to dictatorship, as Ann Coulter explains when she said that Trump could, in essence, do anything and still maintain his support so long as he did not change his position on immigration, the importance of democracy apparently matters little in comparison to ensuring that religious outsiders stay out. Westerners formerly committed to a depoliticized court system and rule of law appear ready to throw those values out the window so long as their religious majorities are retained. Mass migration is unquestionably causing many in the West to rethink their commitment to religious freedom, but in so doing it may also be causing many to rethink their commitment to democracy and liberal values altogether.

[1] Jane Coaston. “The New Zealand Shooter’s Manifesto Shows How White Nationalist Rhetoric Spreads.” Vox, March 18, 2019. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/3/15/18267163/new-zealand-shooting-christchurch-white-nationalism-racism-language.

[2] “Magna Carta,” Wikipedia. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna_Carta.

[3] NPR. “Transcript: JFK’s Speech on His Religion.” December 5. 2007. Accessed April 1, 2019, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16920600.; Elisabeth Bumiller. “Bush, Calling U.S. ‘A Nation Guided by Faith,’ Urges Freedom of Worship in China.” The New York Times, February 22, 2002. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/22/world/bush-calling-us-a-nation-guided-by-faith-urges-freedom-of-worship-in-china.html.; Frank Weathers. “Abraham Lincoln on the Importance of Freedom of Conscience and Religious Liberty.” Patheos, June 10, 2012. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.patheos.com/blogs/yimcatholic/2012/06/abraham-lincoln-on-the-importance-of-freedom-of-conscience-and-religious-liberty.html.

[4] Andrew Roberts. “Churchill Proceedings – Winston Churchill and Religion – A Comfortable Relationship with the Almighty.” International Churchill Society, November 1, 2013. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://winstonchurchill.org/publications/finest-hour/finest-hour-163/churchill-proceedings-winston-churchill-and-religion-a-comfortable-relationship-with-the-almighty/.; “European Convention on Human Rights.” Wikipedia. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Convention_on_Human_Rights.

[5] The Associated Press. “How Donald Trump’s Plan to Ban Muslims Has Evolved.” Forbes, June 28, 2016. Accessed April 1, 2019, http://fortune.com/2016/06/28/donald-trump-muslim-ban/.

[6] Steven Shepard. “Poll: Majority of Voters Back Trump Travel Ban.” Politico, July 5, 2017. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/05/trump-travel-ban-poll-voters-240215.

[7] Ann Coulter. In Trump We Trust: E Pluribus Awesome, (New York City: Sentinel, 2016).

[8] Robert Tracinski. “The ‘Charlottesville Hoax’ Hoax.” The Bulwark, April 1, 2019. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://thebulwark.com/the-charlottesville-hoax-hoax/.

[9] Paula Ward, Rich Lord, and Liz Navratil. “29 Federal Charges Filed Against Suspect Robert Bowers.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 27, 2018. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.post-gazette.com/news/crime-courts/2018/10/27/squirrel-hill-synagogue-shooting-suspect-pittsburgh-mass-officers-victims-casualties/stories/201810270072.

[10] Matt Bradley. “French Election: Marine Le Pen Loses but Propels Far-Right to Mainstream.” NBC News, May 9, 2017. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/french-election-marine-le-pen-loses-propels-far-right-mainstream-n756716.

[11] Yonette Joseph. “In Their Own Words: Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron.” The New York Times, May 5, 2017. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-quotes.html.

[12] ibid.

[13] Shane Savitsky. “Border fences and refugees bans: Hungary Did it – Fast.” Axios, February 1, 2017. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.axios.com/border-fences-and-refugee-bans-hungary-did-it-fast-1513300201-a344dd93-a4bd-4a34-85f7-10086f2ec678.html.

[14] ibid.

[15] Staff and Agencies. “Hungarian Prime Ministers Says Migrants Are ‘Poison’ and ‘Not Needed.’” The Guardian, July 26, 2016. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/hungarian-prime-minister-viktor-orban-praises-donald-trump.

[16] Leonid Bershidsky. “Hungary Is Winning Its War on Muslim Immigrants.” Bloomberg. April 13, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-13/hungary-is-winning-its-war-on-muslim-immigrants

[17] ibid.

[18] ibid.

[19] Pew Research Center. “The Growth of Germany’s Muslim Population.” November 29, 2017. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.pewforum.org/essay/the-growth-of-germanys-muslim-population/.

[20] Zoya Sheftalovich. “German Far-Right AfD Calls for Mosque Ban.” Politico. March 31, 2016. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/german-far-right-afd-calls-for-mosque-ban/.

[21] Jack Montgomery. “Polish Lawmaker Backs Burqa Ban, No Saudi Mosques in Europe Until Poland Can Build Cathedral in Saudi Arabia.” Breitbart, August 28, 2018. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2018/08/28/polish-lawmaker-burqa-ban-no-saudi-arabia-mosques-europe-build-cathedrals/.

[22] “Islam in the Netherlands” Wikipedia. Accessed April 2, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_the_Netherlands#Demographics.

[23] Tara Isabella Burton. “Austria is Closing 7 mosques and Licking Out 60 Imams.” Vox. June 8, 2018. Accessed April 1, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2018/6/8/17442240/austria-closing-mosques-kicking-out-imams.

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