Religion

Middle East Religion Security and Conflict Terrorism

The Evolution of Political Thought within the Muslim Brotherhood: Are Sisi’s Concerns Legitimate?

In 2019, Egypt saw yet another wave of protests. This time, protestors from both the right and left targeted President Abdel Fattah Sisi on the basis of corruption. Though the reasoning behind criticisms differed vastly, Sisi responded with a simple answer – the issue was “political Islam.” In almost every pro-government media response to the protests, the core enemy was “the Muslim Brotherhood.” If one wants to understand current Egyptian politics today, it is critical to examine the past and study the foundational writings that make up the political goals of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. Hassan al-Banna’s writings on jihad will be of paramount concern. Understanding what exactly Hassan al-Banna meant by jihad may prove useful in sifting through legitimate security concerns versus government posturing. Hassan al-Banna’s work On Jihad holds no monolithic view on what jihad means, but rather adopts two different views proposed throughout history. For al-Banna, jihad is both militaristic and peaceful. This research essay will seek to explain how Sufism and colonialism were critical factors in shaping al-Banna’s views.

Regarding his Sufi interpretation of jihad, Hassan al-Banna writes that the main purpose behind jihad is that of dawah, or the spreading of Islam’s message. This proselytism was to bring people into righteousness not “to further their personal gains […] rather jihad is used to safeguard the mission of spreading Islam […] this would guarantee peace […] for Islam, even as it ordains jihad, it extols peace.”[i] For al-Banna, Islam’s original message was that of pure peace. Jihad became a mechanism for him and others to actualize eventual non-violence. This conceptualization parallels similar thoughts of earlier Muslims, especially Ahmadiyya thought. For example, Ghulam Ahmad and his followers urged to “continue this jihad of the pen by publishing religious books,”[ii] where the utmost concern of jihad was that of dawah. al-Banna then flips the script here – he takes on a complete Sufi interpretation when he argues that jihad is all about the intention of one’s soul. If one embarks on jihad, one must realize that the “love of pomp is forbidden to him, and the love of show is forbidden to him, and thirst for spoils is forbidden to him.”[iii] The jihadists must abstain “from indulging their personal desires and cravings,”[iv] just as the companions of the Prophet did. Al-Banna’s rhetoric choice is very Sufi-like here, and implies jihad al-nafs, a struggle against one’s baseline desires. Pursuing jihad with the wrong intent and for the wrong reasons was utterly wrong, according to al-Banna.

Sufism clearly influenced al-Banna’s views on jihad. Growing up, al-Banna “recalls that as a twelve-year old boy he was attracted to the dhikr ceremony of the al-Hassafiyya Sufi order, in which he later became a fully initiated disciple.”[v] A dhikr ceremony is a Sufi practice that involves the repetition of the names of God until one achieves a trance-like state. He gradually drew himself into more mystic practices, and went so far as to create an extension group called the Hassafi Welfare Society.[vi] This group’s sole purpose was that of dawah, which is precisely the same interpretation of jihad that Hassan proposes in his work On Jihad. The Hassafi Welfare Society’s main mission was to counteract the incoming Christian missionaries from the Christian Biblical Mission who proselytized under the pretense of medical help and nursing.[vii] Even when examining the group structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is easy to understand that it is derived from Sufi order structures. The youth group in the Brotherhood was called the “the Rovers,”[viii] or in Arabic as the Jawwala. These “boy scouts” focused on spirituality, “Sufi self-discipline, teachings about Islamic warriors, chivalrous masculinity and the importance of jihad.”[ix] Sufi teachings regarding intention and dawah were central to Hassan al-Banna’s development as a child, and it is clear that it influenced how he structured the Brotherhood and what he thought about jihad. Jihad was only a normal and necessary extension of proper Muslim practice.

Al-Banna showcases his Sufi thought more, especially when he basically becomes an apologist for Sufi leaders. He argues that since the beginning of the Islamic empire, “the Muslims […] never abandoned jihad nor did they ever grow lax in waging it, not even their […] mystics, […] Abd Allah b. al-Mubarak, the canon lawyer and ascetic, was a volunteer in jihad for most of his life, and Abd al-Wahhab b. Zayd, the mystic and ascetic, was the same […] Shaqiq al-Balkhi, the Sufi shaykh, used to dispatch himself and his disciples off to jihad.”[x] His defense of Sufi sheikhs during this time may have been due to increasing pressure from the rise of Salafi thought, originally established in Egypt by people like Muhammad Abduh. During this time, “Sufism was increasingly seen as backwards and superstitious […] Salafī shaykhs like

Muhammad `Abduh […] argued that Islam was in actuality a rational religion far detached from the superstition of the orders.”[xi] Hassan al-Banna thus had to engage in a balancing act; he could not completely accept Sufism but rather he had to switch sides constantly. In fact, it was this new Salafist “rejection of ‘Sufism as a phenomenon [that] may account for why al-Banna could not continue his professional relationship with the Cairene Salafīs like Rashīd Rida, who was a disciple of `Abduh.”[xii] This is all really interesting, considering the fact that the original Egyptian Salafist Abduh “was much drawn to Sufism”[xiii] as a young child. Al-Banna not only had to act differently in regards to his deep admiration and interest for Sufism, but also politically. It is clear that he played both sides when he attempted to persuade Sufi sheikhs of “the need for reform so that all might unite and work together for the salvation of Islam.’”[xiv] The drive for political cohesion and solidarity drove al-Banna’s actions within the Muslim Brotherhood.

Hassan al-Banna’s interpretation of jihad as militaristic is also apparent in his piece On Jihad. He begins his work with a litany of verses regarding warfare in the Quran, and states that God “conjoins warfare with prayer and fasting, showing clearly that it […] is one of the Pillars of Islam.”[xv] When he discusses who jihad can be waged against, he professes plainly that the People of the Book are excluded from his mercy. Citing Surah At-Tawbah, Ch. 9 verse 29, al-Banna argues that the People of the Book lie outside the “religion of truth” and must be submitted to the jizya to “humble” themselves.[xvi] He believes that there exists a “clear indication of the obligation to fight the People of the Book, and of the fact that God doubles the reward of those who fight them […] Jihad is not against polytheists alone, but against all who do not embrace Islam.”[xvii] His militant writings are extensive; they incorporate many sayings from the hadith literature as well as writings from the four leaders of the different madhabs. Hassan al-Banna comes off as extremely qualified, and his strict adherence to the bones of Islam, the Quran and hadith, strengthen the credibility of his arguments ten-fold. Regarding the conduct of war, he draws a bright-line and says that “it is forbidden to slay women, children, and old men, and to dispatch the wounded, or to disturb monks and hermits, and the peaceful who offer no resistance.”[xviii] It is clear here that his conduct of warfare rules are stated in relation to his Sufi thought – jihad was for dawah and dawah only. Any transgression in war was an overstep in what he believed to be proper jihad. He offers a snarky comment right after this, saying that Islam is much more peaceful than how Western nations perceive themselves as. Islam’s mercy stands nowhere close to the “murderous warfare of the civilized peoples and their disgusting atrocities.”[xix]

Western colonialism was a key factor influencing much of al-Banna’s thoughts on jihad. Just as Ibn Taymiyyah wrote in response to the Crusades and the Mongol invasions, Hassan al-Banna writes in a time where Egypt is responding to British influence. He hints at his qualms concerning Western encroachment when he says that Muslims “are compelled to humble themselves before non-Muslims, and are ruled by unbelievers […] Their lands have been trampled over, and their honor besmirched […] Hence it has become an individual obligation […] on every Muslim […] to engage in jihad.”[xx] Egypt and Britain’s relationship during his childhood played a key role in the shaping of this Islamic thought. Though it was clear that Egypt legally became independent post-1922, it was clear that “British control of the Egyptian military and influence on Egyptian politics lasted well beyond that date.”[xxi] For example, though Egypt nominally claimed to be free, the British still had the right “to retain control over Egyptian […] internal policy in the […] Suez Canal and Sudan […], Egypt remained a de facto colony.”[xxii] It is important to note that Hassan al-Banna’s anti-imperial thoughts concerning jihad did not just stay localized to Egypt’s struggle against the British. They would also later spill over to Palestine, which became a hot conflict soon after his passing. During al-Banna’s time in the Brotherhood, they actively played a role in the “pro-Palestinian campaign organized during the dramatic riots in Palestine in 1936–1937, and again behind the Brotherhood’s military and ideological contribution to the ﬁrst Arab–Israeli War in 1948.”[xxiii] The liberation of Palestine as part of a greater anti-colonial struggle was of great importance in al-Banna’s call to jihad.

Jihad is understood as both a militaristic and peaceful phenomenon in the writings of al-Banna. Though he wavered back and forth from supporting Sufi institutions, it is apparent that much of al-Banna’s conceptualizations of jihad had been influenced by his Sufi upbringing. Al-Banna attempted to play both sides as he witnessed a growing Salafi movement against Sufism in Egypt after the death of Muhammad Abduh. Additionally, his militant interpretations of jihad were strongly influenced by pervasive colonial control in post-independent Egypt. As Britain meddled in the affairs of both Egypt and Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood had to use jihad as a method to call Muslims into action.

This research and analysis may prove useful to understanding current uses of jihad in the Brotherhood as well. In the context of the modern-day Brotherhood, fear-mongering may prove suspect. Jihad, for many followers of the Brotherhood, may simply be that of the original Sufi interpretation by al-Banna. Polar extremes exist in every organization, so it would be no surprise to find many who harbor militant mentalities as well. However, evidence points to the fact that the “the Brothers have adhered to the beliefs of its founder Hasan al-Banna of non–violence and expansion of the ideals of Islam through education.”[xxiv] Sisi’s rhetoric may thus be understood as reductionist. It is reductionist in the sense that it boils all of Egypt’s problems down to political Islam, while ignoring massive amounts of corruption and political elitism. Sisi’s tactic of appealing to Western nations has proven effective. It is clear to note that this essay is in no way, shape, or form, a support of the Muslim Brotherhood. The purpose of this research is to provide a historical understanding of how the Brotherhood has interpreted jihad, and whether or not this interpretation necessarily warrants a violent approach. Most of the evidence points towards no. The Muslim Brotherhood is a complex organization, and must be understood in all of its complexity. Mere reductionism will only worsen Egypt’s political problems.

[i] Al-Banna, Hasan, and Charles Wendell. Five Tracts of Ḥasan Al-Bannāʼ (1906-1949): A Selection From the Majmūʻat Rasāʼil Al-Imām Al-Shahīd Ḥasan Al-Bannāʼ. Vol. 20. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Publications Near Eastern Studies, 1978. Page 151.

[ii] Hanson, John H. “Jihad and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community: Nonviolent Efforts to Promote Islam in the Contemporary World.” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 11, no. 2 (2007): 77-93. Accessed March 12, 2020. doi:10.1525/nr.2007.11.2.77. Page 78.

[iii] Al-Banna, Page 152.

[iv] Ibid, Page 155.

[v] LoSordo, John Joseph. “Is The Muslim Brotherhood Today The Same As The One That Existed Under The Autocratic Regimes In Egypt And Jordan?” Law School Student Scholarship (2014), Page 4.

[vi] Ibid, Page 5.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Larsson, Tommy. “The Islamist Ideology of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb: A Comparative Analysis.” Reprosentralen, University of Oslo (2017), Page 43-33.

[ix] Ibid.

[x] Al-Banna, Page 151.

[xi] Elmansoury, Tammy. “Spirituality, Islam, and the State: The Origins and Disavowal of Sufism in

the Ikhwan al‐Muslimīn.” MPhil Thesis. SOAS, University of London (2012), Page 143.

[xii] Ibid, Page 144.

[xiii] Ibid, Page 143.

[xiv] Ibid, Page 145.

[xv] Al-Banna, Page 135.

[xvi] Ibid, Page 136.

[xvii] Ibid, Page 144.

[xviii] Al-Banna, Page 155.

[xix] Ibid.

[xx] Al-Banna, Page 150.

[xxi] LoSordo, Page 4.

[xxii] Mura, Andrea. “A Genealogical Inquiry into Early Islamism: The Discourse of Hasan al-Banna.” Journal of Political Ideologies (2012), 17:1, 61-85, DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2012.644986, Page 42.

[xxiii] Ibid, Page 69.

May 5, 2020 0 comment

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Asia Economics Featured Print Article Religion

New Age Yogis and the Commodification of Spirituality

written by Eden Ballard

This article was published as part of our Spring 2019 print edition, the entirety of which may be found here.

One of the most basic human instincts is to search for a sense of belonging. Often, this is found through religion; believing in a higher power or powers not only facilitates a sense of purpose in life but also helps people connect to one another. However, religion and spirituality are not as cut and dry as they used to be. The global market has had a drastic and transformative impact on belief systems for people all over the world. With religion decoupled from place, sacred things have become commodities that can be traded and adapted to accommodate various cultural demands and ultimately reflect local politics. This effect can be traced by looking at the practice of yoga, a historically spiritual practice that has been processed and transformed into a sellable good that has comfortably integrated into the global market.

A Brief History of Yoga

Today, yoga is worth up upwards of $80 billion[1]the global market as a result of classes, retreats, equipment sales, and associated products. Although its status as a commodity is fairly recent, yoga began being practiced in modern day India around 3000 BCE as a way to achieve harmony between the heart and soul on the path to divine enlightenment and provided a basis for what would stem into Buddhism and Hinduism. As the centuries have passed, yoga has traveled and evolved to fit the demands of markets around the world and now has dozens of variations. In the past, yoga emphasized mindfulness and connection through the pillars of love, kindness, and compassion. In contrast, modern yoga typically prioritizes health benefits over spiritual benefits… although some people embrace the spirituality as well. Even though this ancient practice has a relatively clear history[2], the political and spiritual components of modern yoga are strained and complex and thus, impossible to generalize.

Because of its intimate ties to religion, yoga has caused extensive discourse. The physical benefits of yoga are universally appealing to those who decide to pursue it but for some, practicing spirituality outside of their normal beliefs is unacceptable. This conflict is circumvented in several different ways including prohibiting the mindfulness and spiritual practices of yoga and focusing on it as a sport or adapting the names of the poses relative to the local cultures. These maneuvers have allowed yoga to be adapted into various markets all over the world and made into a global commodity. Pierre Bourdieu, French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher, called people like the ones engineering these changes “cultural specialists” and explained that they “ransack various traditions and cultures in order to produce new interpretations and uses that can be consumed.” And consumed it is. Yoga, in various forms and interpretations, is taking off around the world.

Qualifying the Spirituality of Modern Yoga Practices

In many secular places, there is an inverse relationship between the number of people practicing yoga and popularity of organized religion. People that otherwise feel disconnected from the religions they were brought up with find the filtered spirituality of western yoga to be appealing. Brigid Delaney, Senior Writer for the Guardian Australia, wrote about how “Australians are losing their religion but their craving for meaning and moral teaching appears stronger than ever.” This trend is clearly visible in North America as well where religion is on the decline[3] but the yoga industry is booming. One in five Americans[4] describe themselves as spiritual but not religious – partially due to the influence of yoga. Delaney also wrote an article[5] on her attempt at delving into the world of yoga in an effort to clear her mind and strengthen her body. She wrote, “In many respects, yoga is the perfect pastime for our age – the meditative elements give us the opportunity to find peace and stillness in a time of increasingly hectic and crowded information, the instructional bits give us moral lessons in the absence of traditional religion, while the stretchy, bendy, sweaty physical stuff is a great way of countering eight or more hours a day spent hunched over a computer.” Yoga, effectively, has helped meet the demand for connection coming from a generation of people who feel disconnected and disillusioned.

The power of modern yoga extends beyond flimsy spirituality found while stretching on plastic mats laid out on the hardwood floors of rec center classrooms. Yoga, in more secular places, tends to be a mechanism for creating community and connection, and helps people feel grounded in an incredibly turbulent world. Delaney talks about how, secretly, she wants to be one of the yoga mat toting, juice drinking, athleisure wearing yoga fanatics that “loiter in the aisles of the organic fruit and vegetable shop.” By donning leggings and slurping green drinks, these people are finding their “Neo-Tribe”[6] – which Z. Bauman explains “helps the individual gain a sense of identity and belonging through identification with a subcultural consumer group.” Basically, buying into this consumption pattern helps people feel less lonely.

Yoga Outside of the West

Although yoga is gaining popularity globally, its spiritual components don’t flourish everywhere the way they do in the west. In places that tend to have stronger conventional religious practices yoga is contentious; the spirituality of yoga is seen as incongruent with dominant religious values. In 2013 the BBC ran an article called, “Does doing yoga make you a Hindu?[7]” The underlying question being are non-Hindu religious followers being subversive by practicing yoga? Can the founding spirituality be successfully cleaved from its physical counterpart in order to make a secular activity that poses no threat to dominant local ideology? The answer is complicated. So much so that the question of whether or not yoga is religious a “vexed question[8]” in Indian politics. Orthodox Muslims believe that sun salutations go against Islamic Law as Muslims are not supposed to bend to anyone, or anything, but Allah. Alternately, the practice of yoga in Indian schools causes concern for some because the chanting “Om” during the practice is too connected to Hindu religion. As a result, many leaders have said they are okay with yoga as long as it is disassociated with religion.

Different countries have handled this question in different ways. Iran, where Sharia law is the rule of the land, yoga classes “make no overt reference to spirituality at all.[9]” To avoid what could be called “blasphemy” the emphasis is instead placed on the physical component by calling it “the sport of yoga.” Where teachers in the west tap into consumer spirituality, teachers in Iran are accredited by the Yoga Federation[10]which promotes “Unity through sport” and simply defines yoga as “a holistic health system with Indian roots stretching back 5,000 years.” Their homepage justifies their practice of yoga as a sport with a quote from B.K.S. Iyengar[11]who says that, “there is nothing wrong in holding a competition on the qualitative presentation of the yoga asanas.” He concludes by saying that yoga “should be competition on the artistic level and not on egoistic body cult.” By placing the emphasis on exhibitive competition, they deliberately neglect the spirituality that people cling to in so many other places. Simultaneously, Iyengar is bashing the imagined community that yoga is creating in the Australia and North America and thrusting it in its least flattering light as an egoistic body cult.

Some places chose to forgo working through the complexities of yoga and spirituality in favor of banning it completely. In 2008, a religious ruling in Malaysia banned the sport in five states. However, in Kuala Lumpur, the capital, physically practicing yoga is allowed as long as chanting and meditation are not. This partial acceptance is standard in other Islamic countries such as Indonesia as well. A profitable compromise that introduces a new commodity while preserving and protecting tradition.

Savasana – Wrapping It Up

Since its creation in 3000 BCE in what is now modern India, yoga has evolved and expanded to accommodate demand in cultures around the world. The religious roots of the practice have been the direct cause of discourse around the world and helped shape yoga into a variety of practices and consumable packages that are woven into the global market. The adaptation of yoga in more secular places has accommodated quasi-spiritual consumerism in places that are experiencing a sense of disconnectedness a result in the decline of religion. Alternately, yoga has been adapted as a sport with an emphasis purely on its physical components so as not to interfere with dominant religious ideology. Although modern practices typically bear little resemblance to ancient practices, the addition of spiritual or physical yoga practices have influenced consumers around the world.

[1] Technavio. “Yoga Is on the Upswing in North America.” December 4, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://blog.technavio.com/blog/yoga-upswing-north-america.

[2] Yoga Six. “A Quick Reference Guide to the History of Yoga.” March 12, 2018. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://yogasix.com/history-of-yoga/.

[3] Religion News Service. “Religion Declining in Importance for Many Americans, Especially for Millennials.” December 10, 2018. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://religionnews.com/2018/12/10/religion-declining-in-importance-for-many-americans-especially-for-millennials/.

[4] Tara Isabella Burton. “‘Spiritual but Not Religious’: Inside America’s Rapidly Growing Faith Group.” Vox, November 10, 2017. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/11/10/16630178/study-spiritual-but-not-religious.

[5] Brigid Delaney. “The Yoga Industry Is Booming – but Does It Make You a Better Person?” The Guardian, September 17, 2017. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2017/sep/17/yoga-better-person-lifestyle-exercise.

[6] Russell Keat, Nigel Whiteley, and Nicholas Abercrombie. The Authority of the Consumer. Taylor & Francis, 1994.

[7] William Kremer. “Does Doing Yoga Make You a Hindu?” BBC, November 21, 2013. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25006926.

[8] Shefali Anand. “Is Yoga Religious? In India, It’s a Vexed Question.” WSJ, June 9, 2015. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/06/09/is-yoga-religious-in-india-its-a-vexed-question/.

[9] William Kremer. “Does Doing Yoga Make You a Hindu?” BBC, November 21, 2013. Accessed April 27, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25006926.

[10] “International Yoga Sports Federation – Directory,” Accessed April 27, 2019. https://www.iysf.org/directory/iran.

[11] “What Is Iyengar Yoga?,” Iyengar Yoga: National Association of the United States. Accessed April 27, 2019. https://iynaus.org/iyengar-yoga/about.

October 17, 2019 0 comment

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Featured Geopolitics Globalization Print Article Religion

The Price of Pilgrimage: Is Nothing Sacred?

written by Katie Jones

This article was published as part of our Spring 2019 print edition, the entirety of which may be found here.

One of the world’s tallest buildings, The Makkah Royal Clock Tower, looms over the Kaaba and the Masjid al-Haram Mosque, Islam’s holiest site. The Clock Tower boasts a luxury Fairmont Hotel, which offers rooms with views of the Kaaba for up to $4500 a night, along with high end shopping and restaurants. However pilgrims that cannot afford the growing number of luxury hotels sleep on the street outside, illuminated by the fluorescent lights of an opulence they may never experience. The commodification and capitalization of Mecca draws a stark contrast to the rites of the Hajj that emphasize equality and humility. Such an inherent disparity between purpose and practice has sparked a global conversation not only about the meaning of the Hajj, but Saudi Arabia’s fitness to oversee it.

The Hajj is a five day ritualistic pilgrimage to Mecca required of all Muslims who are physically and financially able at least once in their lives. Mecca is within the political jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Riyadh dictates how the pilgrimage is run and who may attend. The Kingdom claims they distribute visas to attend the Hajj in accordance with the size of each country’s Muslim population. In reality, the allotments are not always transparent and the Saudis have been known to use visas as political pawns. Nations with whom they have favorable diplomatic ties with often receive extra bonus visas unofficially, and those with whom they do not, have issues attaining any visas at all. For example Syrians, with whom the Saudis cut diplomatic ties with in 2012, cannot obtain a Hajj visa through the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – they must go through the Syrian National Coalition, a Saudi aligned opposing political party. Similarly, after the embargo placed on Qatar in 2017 the visas allotted to Qatar were halted, resulting in extreme backlash and a formal complaint to the UN. It was not until the intervention of Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani, an exiled member of the Qatari royal family, that the visas were once again granted. In both cases, the Saudi government used the visas as political leverage to undercut the authority of existing governments and give preferential treatment to their allies.

The most overt politicization of the Hajj though, has been the Saudi-Iranian cold war. Both countries use the Hajj as a battleground for promoting their competing versions of Islam, a tension which has erupted in violence on several occasions. In 1987, 402 Iranian pilgrims were killed and 600 more were injured by Saudi riot police as they protested “Death to America! Death to Israel!” during the Hajj. More recently, 464 Iranian pilgrims were killed in a tragic stampede during the Hajj. The following year, the Iranian government banned its citizens from attending the sacred rite, and since have been vocal in their dissatisfaction with Saudi management.

However the Iranians are far from the only ones to call Saudi stewardship into question. A growing number of critics have emerged due not only to the aforementioned political exploitation, but the Saudi’s growing and projected profiteering practices. The Saudi economy benefits immensely from the Hajj. The religious pilgrimage accounts for seven percent of Saudi Arabia’s GDP and 20 percent of it’s non-petrol GDP. Consequently, expanding the Hajj to accommodate more people, more businesses, and more profit has become an integral part of Mohammed Bin Salman’s economic plan for the Kingdom, Vision 2030. New hotels, shopping centers, fast trains, and airport terminals are all being constructed in anticipation of future pilgrimage, and nothing is too sacred to renovate. Even the Masjid al-Haram Mosque, which contains the Kaaba, is being expanded to accommodate as many as 1.85 million pilgrims at once in the years to come.

At first glance, these developments appear to be positive. Mecca’s growth does mean more people will have the opportunity to attend the Hajj and fulfill their religious duty. However the Saudi’s disheartening economic focus, that will entail the expansion of the tourism sector, and destruction of historic sights, negates any praise or admiration they may receive.

The Kingdom hopes to increase the revenue from pilgrimage and subsequently spread the wealth through various sectors as a part of their larger tourism expansion scheme. They have started to offer an “Umrah Plus” visa (the Umrah is a pilgrimage at a non-Hajj time of year) which provides access to not only Mecca, but other religious sites across the country. This will increase sustainable development for their population, but feels disingenuous to the purpose of pilgrimage. To exacerbate their trend of capitalizing off Mecca further, the Saudis have attempted to provide ulterior motives for pilgrimage. Mark Allaf, manager of the Mecca Hilton said the hotel was “trying to introduce the concept of combining both the performance of Umrah and Hajj, and specifically Umrah, with a business event.” Many of the devout feel these distractions sully the pilgrimage.

Mirroring this shift in the purpose of the Hajj is the shift in the physical landscape of Mecca. In the process of construction and renovation of the city, the Saudis have destroyed ancient relics as well as medieval Ottoman structures, an action which the Turkish cultural minister condemned as “cultural vandalism” and a “war on legacy”. In defense of the Saudis, it is within the theology of Wahhabi Islam to destroy these sights as to prevent idolatrous practices, however it is ultimately unjust for the Saudis to take action that will affect everyone based on their unpopular interpretation of Islam. It is also a bit too convenient that the home of Khadijah, Mohammed’s wife, was replaced with bathrooms in the expansion of the mosque and the home of Abu Bakr, Mohammed’s successor, was replaced with an extremely profitable Hilton hotel. It is apparent that the Saudis care more for development and personal economic gain than preservation and reverence of a shared cultural and religious history. Perhaps it is time for a more open conversation about the Saudi’s mandate to Mecca.

Saudi Arabia’s history of political and economic exploitation of power, not to mention their condemnable human rights record, make them unfit to manage Mecca. However that brings about the question: who is? Because the problem goes far beyond the Saudis themselves, and we in the West must take our share of responsibility. Islam’s shiny new sixth pillar, western capitalism, is the direct result of decades of U.S. interventionism and soft power throughout the Middle East. It would thereby be the height of hypocrisy for us to condemn the Saudis for following in our footsteps, for bringing profit to the American corporations filling the malls of Mecca, but that doesn’t mean Muslim countries can not. It is only natural to sympathize with the Iranian pilgrims protesting US-Saudi relations during the Hajj, because cultural imperialism is a driving force of change in Mecca. After all, the city belongs to Iranian Muslims just as much as it does to the Saudis, or the other 1.8 billion Muslims on Earth; and if they’re angry that some pilgrims are sleeping on the street, and others in the Fairmont penthouse they’re not alone. Perhaps the Saudis should give some credence to these criticisms and consider incorporating their religion into their developments, their economy and their politics, rather than the other way around.

October 14, 2019 0 comment

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Featured Geopolitics Globalization Human Rights Humanitarian Aid Immigration Religion

The Rise of Buddhist Extremism in Myanmar: The World’s Largest Refugee Crisis and What To Do

written by Abdus Najmi

Known previously as Burma, Myanmar was subject to British colonial rule from around 1820 to 1948, like its surrounding neighbors of Bangladesh and India. Surprisingly, for most of Burma’s history, the Rohingya Muslim minority actually lived peacefully with their Buddhist neighbors in the Rakhine state, situated right next to Bangladesh’s Cox Bazar. Many legal documents claim Muslim minorities acted as “advisors to Buddhist royals,” even having a deliberate say and place in Burma’s politics since the 1500s. In fact, it was only towards World War II where religious violence began to erupt in the modern form that one can see today. The British began recruiting the Muslim minority as their soldiers, while the Japanese army aligned themselves with the Burmese Buddhists. Both of these governments’ armies used religious divisions as a political and military means; it was from here that we can start to see a Burmese resentment towards the Muslims as being traitors to their nation.

After Burma gained independence, the government published a list of the 135 official ethnic groups native to the country. The Rohingya are nowhere to be found on that list. There is even a law that limits the civil rights of the Rohingya. The 1982 Citizenship Law has complex procedures in which Rohingya men and women are only allowed to raise two children, and they are not allowed to marry unless given permission. This is usually done by bribing authorities or providing evidence that the couple does not follow Islam, such as giving pictures of the bride without a hijab to prove secularity. Rules governing property ownership and taxation also are extremely cumbersome and arbitrary. The Rohingya are not legally considered citizens; they are forced to carry around “white cards” which allows them legal standing as temporary residents in Myanmar.

The amount of persecution has skyrocketed within the last decade. Dildar Begum and her 10-year old daughter were repeatedly raped by Myanmar troops on August 30, 2017. She watched soldiers hack her 5-year old son “to death in front of her,” and was forced to witness the slitting of her husband’s throat. As a Rohingya Muslim, Dildar Begum’s idea of statehood and the “home” is nonexistent, as she is being kicked out of Myanmar by state soldiers, but is also unwelcomed into Bangladesh. For people like Dildar Begum, being Muslim and Burmese becomes a contradiction of sorts. She never fits in with Bengalis because of her language, but cannot be considered Burmese because of her faith. Dildar Begum’s case is not an isolated instance of violence. Mamtaj, also thirty years old, faced a similar situation where one of her sons was “thrown into a fire,” while the other was shot from behind in the head. In both of these cases, their husbands and sons were killed first so the Myanmar troops could proceed to rape the women without resistance. Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi has received tremendous amounts of criticism in terms of the delayed response to the persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority.

Kutupalong is the world’s largest refugee settlement, housing the Rohingya people and spanning over the Cox Bazar area of Bangladesh. Estimates predict that there are about one million refugees total; women and children make up most of the population of the camp, according to UN data. Recent weather analysis and scientific reports have rendered Kutupalong as one of the most susceptible areas to climate change, as the geographical positioning next to the Bay of Bengal makes the camp prone to intense cyclones and “vigorous monsoons,” further exacerbating inequality by destroying homes and requiring constant efforts to rebuild the camp. Due to massive overcrowding, water resources have become scarce as well; environmental scientists tested the groundwater at random locations around the camp and found that 70 percent of their samples contained E. coli. In addition to geographical positioning, Ukhia, in Cox Bazar, is home to many forests and contributes vastly to the world’s biodiversity. Due to overcrowding within the camp, people have shifted towards deforestation and land degradation to accommodate the influx of refugees. This depletion of resources has actually hampered the survival of refugees. The Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS) representative Atiq Rahman has in fact argued that cutting down trees “destabilizes the terrain” as Bangladesh’s hills are “soft soil hills,” getting much of their stability from the roots of trees. The risk of hill collapse becomes imminent. As the camp continues to expand and accommodate new refugees on these faulty hills, more tragedies and environmental disasters await. Expanding the refugee camp is simply not a sustainable solution.

To this day, most of Burmese nationalists refer to the Rohingya minority as “Bengali Muslims,” and fail to use the Burmese word Rohingya as it would give credence to the fact that this minority group originally stemmed from the Arakan Kingdom in Burma. Even State Chancellor and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi has denied to call them Burmese citizens, allowing the massacre to continue within her own borders. To call them Rohingya would be to humanize them as Burmese. To Buddhist nationalists in the Ma Ba Tha movement, they are anything but human.

The Ma Ba Tha movement is a nationalistic association of Buddhist monks and worshippers who preach against the rise of Islam. They fear what many of them term as the “Islamification of Asia,” a phenomenon which leader Wirathu has claimed will “destroy Burmese culture and the future of Buddhism.” In one of Wirathu’s speeches, he argued that the Muslim is one who is prone to be “inherently violent […] want[ing] to eat their own kind.”

Wirathu, known as the “Burmese bin Laden,” was on the cover of the 2013 Time Magazine under the title “The Face of Buddhist Terror.” In this piece, the magazine points out that the slogans and ideology that Wirathu is preaching is not a new phenomenon. In fact, Buddhist extremism has been prominent not only in Myanmar, but also Sri Lanka during their civil war, where many Buddhists rallied around claims of taking back Buddhism from Tamil Hindus. The same is true in Thailand. The narrative has always been as such: Buddhism is on the decline because of a foreign enemy, we must fight back to protect our way of life. These monks use the idea of sangha (or the importance of a monastic community) to justify their violent behaviors. For them, Buddha’s message is on the decline, and if there are no more monks, a “Buddhist End Times will begin.” They term this the final kalpa, where an apocalypse will occur with a massive rainfall to end all life on Earth, just to begin a new one. In order to forestall the “End Times” from happening, extremist Buddhists resort to violence to preserve Buddhist monasticism. In Meiktila, 40 Muslims were killed by a group of Buddhists. In one Rohingya village, 70 Muslims were slaughtered. It’s vicious killing campaigns like these that cause the Rohingya to flee into neighboring Bangladesh for refuge. The misguided effort to preserve Myanmar’s Buddhism has been a central tenet guiding the persecution of the Rohingya Muslims. Despite the doom-and-gloom rhetoric, it is important to highlight that positive steps are definitely being made towards the rights of the Rohingya people, and can potentially be guaranteed with external pressure from groups like ASEAN or countries such as China or India. Recently in 2017, Myanmar and Bangladesh hashed out a deal regarding the issue of repatriation, despite an eventual postponing of the deal later on. Even the international community, such as the US and EU, have attempted to impose sanctions on Myanmar for their behavior. Empirically, they have worked. Foreign direct investment from the West decreased from $3.14 billion to “$1.34 billion” due to sanctions. Tourism from Europeans is “down by […] half.” People are becoming more and more aware of the atrocities that are occurring in the Rakhine state. However, international relations scholars have posited that if any external force can help solve this crisis, it’s China. China is Myanmar’s “largest trading partner,” composing almost 33% of its trade. Due to China’s involvement in Myanmar’s economy, they may have the upper hand in securing a deal that can drastically limit the casualties in the region, if they can get Bangladesh to properly agree. The biggest place policymakers must look at when dealing with this should be China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative. Some of the infrastructure plans under this project include a multi-billion sea port project in the Rakhine state. Putting hardline pressure with China’s economic investment plans in Myanmar might be the key to getting them to cave in on reforming their human rights policies. Only time will tell.

October 9, 2019 0 comment

Iranian protesters chant slogans at a rally in Tehran, Iran, Dec. 30, 2017.

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Foreign Policy in Iran: Silence Is Worth A Thousand Lives

written by Jeremiah Barnett

A few weeks ago, something terrible and yet necessary began. Iranians took to the streets in several cities to protest a corrupt and tyrannical regime. This is the largest public show of discontent in Iran since the 2009 Green Movement in which thousands of people risked their lives to protest the outcome of their presidential elections. Now, as the protests grow and tensions in Tehran continue to build, it is of the utmost importance that the U.S. adopt a policy that simultaneously benefits American interests in the Middle East while seeking to further the success of the protest movement and assure that lives already lost not be lost in vain.

While some may call for firm and explicit action from Washington—such as sanctions or intervention—I hold that such an undertaking would be harmful to the movement’s potential for success. Rather, due to a history of backfiring rhetoric between the U.S. and Tehran, an existing regional power struggle in the Middle East, and the ease by which American actions could be misinterpreted and skewed for the benefit of the current Iranian regime, the United States must instead take advantage of the protests by adopting an approach of extreme caution.

Precedent

For decades Washington and Tehran have shared a bombastic rhetorical relationship with one another. One such example was President Bush’s 2002 declaration placing the Islamic Republic in an “Axis of Evil” alongside Iraq and North Korea. The aftermath of the statement was thousands of Iranians taking to the streets belting out, “Death to America”. This included many Iranians who indicated that they rarely engaged in such celebrations, but spoke of having joined the protests in order to show solidarity against the Great Satan—America. This single statement by a U.S. President is credited not only with having strengthened the anti-Western rhetoric of Iranian hardliners, but also with causing Iranian citizens of all stripes to rally around a common enemy: the U.S. Just as foreign attacks on U.S. soil cause an outpouring of patriotism no matter domestic approval of the current government, American accusations against Iranian transgressions are bound to have a similar effect. Therefore, just as in 2002, statements of support for the protests by the U.S. will be seen by Iranian nationals as unwanted, and perhaps abhorrent, meddling by a country that has nothing but its own interests in mind.

The Larger Context

In addition to historical tensions with Iran, the U.S. is also currently engaged in a geopolitical proxy war with Russia in the Middle East, the Syrian Civil War being the most significant manifestation of this Cold War-era clash. Saudi Arabia, backed by Washington, and Iran, with support from Moscow, struggle for dominance in the region while their superpower puppeteers pull strings behind the scenes. Thus, if the U.S. takes a strong and hawkish stance in Iran, Russia will feel it necessary to do the same. In fact, evidence of such a reaction from Moscow has already surfaced. In a recent United Nations Security Council discussion, the U.S. initiated a dialogue concerning the protests in Iran to which Russia immediately responded with objections and a call to halt the discussion on the grounds that “it would represent an inappropriate interference in Iran’s internal affairs.” As if Moscow’s protests were not enough, François Delattre, the French representative to the UN and typically an American ally, also explicitly diverged from the U.S.’s stance by stating, “However worrying the events of the last few days in Iran may be, they do not constitute per se a threat to international peace and security. We must be wary of any attempts to exploit this crisis for personal ends.” The United States’ official motive in bringing up the protests was unclear but, as is evident from the French representative’s statement, the international community—including both our European allies and Russia—is wary of the Trump administration’s current treatment of the protests and will react negatively to too much American interference.

Chess

The fact that the U.S. will use the opportunity presented by the protests to act exclusively for its own benefit is quite clear. Washington is playing a game of chess and Iran is another piece on the board. Combine this imperialistic image with our invasive history in the region as well as American support for the Saudis—whom Iranian state media is blaming for the protests—and a very sensitive situation emerges. It is easy to imagine an Iranian citizen still unsure of his resolve to put his life in danger by protesting a regime he does not support. It would not take much for him to believe that the U.S. is simply interfering to promote its interests, and not his own, thus deterring him from acting. It is therefore not difficult to understand the benefits Washington would reap from not taking an overt stance on the protests and instead letting them play out. President Trump would do well to learn from statements such as that of Emily Thornberry, a U.K. Labor Party politician, “Our approach now is one of extreme caution when it comes to Iran and a recognition that the society in Iran is an immensely complex one, and seemingly contradictory… For example, with these current riots, sometimes they are calling to reinstate the monarchy, sometimes they are calling out against [Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei, sometimes they are calling for Khamenei, sometimes they are calling for the price of eggs…”

Conclusion

Given the historically tenuous rhetorical relationship between the U.S. and Iran, the current proxy war between the American-backed Saudis and Russian-backed Iranians, as well as the aversion to protests that Iranian citizens will feel from any direct American support, the U.S. should not take a formal stance on the protests in Iran. Rather, Washington should allow the state media to continue to condemn and threaten the protestors, driving them away from the regime. Any American action or presence will only serve to drive the protesters under Khamenei’s protective, anti-Western wing. As things stand, the people of Iran are becoming increasingly bold in their opposition to the repressive acts of Iran’s leadership. If Washington’s desired outcome is regime change, the existing divide between reformers and hardline traditionalists must widen significantly. To help make that happen, the U.S. must do what it is not used to doing in the Middle East: Stay out.

January 22, 2018 2 comments

Swedish police officers observe as refugees arrive at a tram station in Malmö, Sweden. Source

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A closer look at refugee integration in Europe (Part II)

written by Sarah Wyman

The first part of this article addresses integration policies in France and may be read in full here.

Sweden: A multicultural model

Sweden has struggled with sub-replacement fertility since millions of Swedes fled poverty and religious persecution during the great emigration, a wave of migration which endured between 1850 and 1939. The process of accepting and integrating refugee and immigrant populations in Sweden has therefore been a mutually-beneficial one. In exchange for asylum, refugees augment Sweden’s dwindling population of young laborers. As highlighted in a 2015 article about a hospital in Gävleborg where around 10% of doctors are refugees, their contribution has been significant.

Sweden is developing a reputation abroad for being particularly hospitable to immigrants and received over 160,000 individuals in 2015 alone. In many ways, Sweden’s response to the refugee crisis has been exemplary. The country has instituted a number of integration programs aimed at easing immigrants’ transitions into Swedish society by teaching them about Swedish culture and instructing them in the language. The government extends a multitude of benefits to refugees including welfare and housing. Progressive legislation demonstrates Sweden’s commitment to “diversity, multiculturalism, and international cooperation” and communicates to immigrant populations that their cultural traditions are welcome and valued by the Swedish population.

Despite these victories, Sweden too has experienced social turmoil as a result of immigration. According to an annual survey conducted by Gothenburg University this year, 53% of Swedes identify immigration and integration as the most pressing social issue facing their country, marking a nearly twofold increase from last year’s result of 27%. This rising concern is likely correlated to the dramatic increase in the volume of immigrants entering the country, many of whom Sweden is struggling to acommodate.

Like France, Sweden is home to a number of densely populated, urban, and largely immigrant-inhabited cities riddled with poverty and violence. For example, Malmö, Sweden’s third largest city—where 32% of the population is foreign-born (the national average hovers around 14%)—made international headlines last year for its sudden spike in violent crime, and the community remains unstable. Sverigedemokraterna, Sweden’s right-wing conservative party, is responding in full force with xenophobic rhetoric and anti-immigration policy.

However, contrary to what critics of immigration in Sweden are suggesting, the rise of violence in major metropolitan areas like Malmö is not evidence of the failure of multicultural integration programs. The fact that violence and crime perpetrated by immigrants occurs almost exclusively in isolated urban communities instead speaks to the success of integration programs operating in small villages. The meaningful, one-on-one interactions taking place in rural communities are simply less feasible in rapid-pace city environments where etiquette demands less from people to begin with.

Sweden would do well to implement the sort of one-on-one, community-led mentorship efforts which have been successful in smaller towns and cities in urban areas. In order to prevent the formation of socially isolated immigrant communities, genuine channels of communication between native and immigrant populations must be open from the start, and they must remain so throughout the integration process.

A European model for integration

When the EU begins—as it must—to design European guidelines for integration, it should consider the strengths and weaknesses of existing models. Like Sweden, it should encourage mentorship programs that allow native and non-native individuals to get to know one another. However, it also should improve the efficacy and reach of these programs by ensuring that they are successfully implemented in urban environments as well as villages. In the French vein, the EU must ensure that its legal systems are prepared to serve individuals of all ethnic and cultural backgrounds equally. However, it must also be wary of assimilationist policy and prepared to accept that the process of integration will involve reciprocal cultural exchange. If Europe fails to take these steps, poorly-integrated immigrant communities will continue to grow in size and scope and social isolation will increase accordingly.

Europe’s plan to redistribute refugees and asylum seekers proportionally across Europe is a good one. As the success of small-scale programs in Sweden has demonstrated, integration is most successful where the ratio of immigrants to native population is low enough to allow for meaningful interaction between the two groups. However, if, like in France, enough is not done to facilitate this sort of cross-cultural exchange in the first place, the EU’s redistribution plan will do little to resolve the social turmoil unleashed by the inundation of refugees into Europe and will further deteriorate inter-cultural relations moving forward.

The urgency of the refugee crisis demands an immediate response from Europe. However, it also presents an excellent opportunity for countries like France and Sweden to reconsider their models of integration, identify their weaknesses, and construct the foundation for societies richer in empathy and culture.

June 24, 2016 0 comment

A young boy plays in the abandoned complex where he lives with more than 135 other refugees in Toulouse, France. Source

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A closer look at refugee integration in Europe (Part I)

written by Sarah Wyman

In 2015, over 1.3 million people displaced by war and conflict sought asylum in Europe. Of this number, only 292,540 were refugees—individuals approved for asylum and guaranteed protection by the European Union (EU)—and one million were migrants—individuals who have not completed the legal process of claiming asylum. This massive wave of forced migration has proved a challenge for the EU, whose member states have responded with varying commitments to accepting displaced people. Thus far, Greece and Italy have borne the burden of processing applications for asylum, and the vast majority of refugees have settled in Germany, Hungary, and Sweden.

When David O’Sullivan, Ambassador of the European Union to the United States, spoke at UCLA earlier this month, he emphasized the need for a unified European response to the refugee crisis. According to O’Sullivan, the solution to what many Europeans perceive as an insurmountable problem is the proportionate redistribution of refugees and asylum seekers between the European member states. This perspective is the driving force behind recent EU legislation outlining redistribution procedures and controlling the safe and legal arrival of refugees by land and sea.

However, the EU has failed to address a third, equally necessary response to the refugee crisis: integration. Europe does not currently have an integration plan for the millions of people resettling across the continent, a fact which is made more disconcerting by Europe’s long history of unsuccessful immigrant integration.

Over the course of the past few decades, isolated and predominantly immigrant communities have become an increasingly common feature of European suburbs. One such community, Molenbeek St. Jean—the so-called “jihadi capital of Europe” in western Brussels—has been under scrutiny in the wake of terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels. Five individuals involved in November’s Paris attacks were tied to the community, and it was implicated again during the investigation of the Brussels attacks in March. Molenbeek St. Jean and its association with a violent and poorly-integrated immigrant population represents a larger European problem: the social segregation of native and non-native populations.

While the refugee crisis differs from Europe’s tradition of immigration in many respects, the process of refugee integration will face many of the same challenges. Namely, in order for successful integration to take place, native and non-native communities must overcome the profound socio-cultural divides which separate them. There is no apparent answer for how to address this problem. However, there are lessons to be learned from legislation and policies already implemented by European nations.

Two particularly interesting targets for comparison are France and Sweden, which have adopted opposing methodologies with respect to immigration. France, commanding a clearly-defined and longstanding national identity, expects immigrants and refugees to assimilate to French culture and traditions. Meanwhile, the Swedish government has adopted a multicultural approach, incorporating the customs of refugees and immigrants into a broader Swedish identity. Neither strategy has been wholly successful in producing social harmony, and closer study reveals why: both models fail to produce organic social interaction between native and immigrant populations. Without this crucial ingredient, Europe will not arrive at a sustainable solution for the refugee crisis.

France: An assimilationist model

Any discussion about immigration in France must begin with the French tradition of laïcité. The term, which was coined during the French Revolution and ultimately formalized in a 1905 law, can be loosely summarized as an equivalent to the United States’ separation of church and state. However, its definition relies on a different set of principles which, in practice, render its implementation problematic on a social scale.

While the American tenet of separation of church and state seeks to protect freedom of religion and individual liberty, laïcité’s end goal is to achieve social equality by preventing religiously-motivated discrimination. It draws a sharp distinction between private and public life and decrees that while individuals are free to practice whichever religion they choose in their private life, religion shall in no capacity infringe on the public sphere. Unlike the separation of church and state in the United States—which seeks to grant equal religious liberty to all US citizens—laïcité promotes equality by preventing anyone from practicing their religion in the public sphere. The strategy here is to achieve equality by removing religion from the social equation. Laïcité privileges French identity over other cultural and religious identities so as to ensure that all French citizens are viewed as French first and foremost and that their status in the eyes of the law is protected from religious bias.

Laïcité achieved international controversy following a March 2004 law banning students from wearing symbols or clothing denoting religious affiliation in schools. Other laws apply this precedent to all public institutions, ranging from government offices to post offices. This legislation has proved particularly problematic for French Muslim women who wish to wear headscarves in accordance with their religious values, making laïcité’s incompatibility with current societal truths clear.

Laïcité is a system designed for a mono-cultural, Catholic—or Christian at best—French society. It was not conceived during a time in which multiculturalism was prevalent, nor has it evolved to match the needs of France’s diversifying population. Instead, it is reinforcing a narrow definition of French national identity which does not include the multi-faceted racial, cultural, and ethnic dimensions of modern France.

The ideology which shaped laïcité is a deeply-ingrained component of the French identity. Although its ramifications on the reception of immigrants in France are complex and far-reaching, they may be condensed broadly into two categories:

Firstly, the restrictive cultural norms imposed by laïcité make little room for immigrants’ diverse religions and cultures. While studying in France, I asked a French person I knew well to explain to me what one had to do to “be French” in modern France. His answer was simple: “you just have to obey our laws.” That’s precisely the problem. French laws, as they stand, are not feasible for segments of the population that don’t resemble the sort of French people they were designed for. This is especially true for France’s growing Muslim population, which continues to challenge France’s cultural norms. Most recently, a Muslim student in Northwestern France was sent home for wearing a long skirt—a choice which her school’s administration interpreted as a religious statement. There has also been controversy surrounding French schools’ refusal to serve Halal food in cafeterias. These incidents stand in sharp contrast to the norm of institutionalized Catholicism in France, where many schools hold mass daily and nearly all Roman Catholic holidays are observed by the French state.

However, those aspiring to earn the social status of citizen in France have no choice but to assimilate to French cultural and religious norms. This is made difficult by the popular disdain of many native French for immigrant communities, perpetuating a vicious circle of social isolation. The French are inclined to distrust and disapprove of growing immigrant neighborhoods like those in Seine-Saint-Denis and Marseilles because they perceive their failure to integrate as an affront to French tradition and hospitality rooted in immigrants’ lack of interest in integrating. This attitude contributes to the stigma which makes it difficult for immigrants and refugees to integrate in the first place, widening the social gap between these populations and attesting to the inefficacy of laïcité as a strategy for integration.

Secondly, because religion—and, by extension, religious and cultural differences—are taboo in France, relations between the ethnically French and the multicultural “new French” are plagued by a fundamental lack of mutual understanding. Lines of communication between these increasingly isolated populations are cut in part because their social spheres do not overlap, but also because dialogue about the issues which separate them is made uncomfortable by prevailing cultural norms.

France’s policies, built around the notion of laïcité, reinforce the ideological divide between native and non-native populations before they have an opportunity to interact. The sociocultural repercussions of this method have already posed a problem in ethnically-divided France, and the addition of hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers is likely to escalate existing tensions within France if efforts are not made to bridge these polarized communities.

The second part of this article details Swedish integration policy and proposes a model of integration for Europe. Visit The Generation website later this week to read more.

June 21, 2016 1 comment

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An Interview with Mubin Shaikh: Former Jihadist Turned Counter-Terrorism Operative

written by Madison Weil

In light of recent radical Islamic terrorist attacks worldwide, individuals everywhere are feeling uneasy and unsafe. The topic of national security has moved to the forefront of political agendas and has become an integral part of international discussions. In the United States, 49% of citizens are worried that they, or someone in their family, will become a victim of terrorism. This percentage is the highest it has been since the year following 9/11. According to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll, “Over three-quarters of Americans doubt the nation’s ability to stop ‘lone wolf’ terrorist attacks by individuals acting on their own.” Additionally, 59% of Republicans, 38% of Independents, and 15% of Democrats support a ban on all Muslims wishing to enter the United States. For a nation that prides itself on freedom and equal opportunity for all, these are surprising numbers, which reveal the success of radical extremists in their ability to create widespread fear and anti-Muslim sentiment.

In an effort to learn more about the goals and recruitment strategies of ISIS, a colleague and I recently interviewed Mubin Shaikh—an ex-extremist turned counter-terrorism operative, and author of the book Undercover Jihadi. Born in Canada, Shaikh was raised Muslim and became influenced by the radical ideas of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. He began actively recruiting other young Muslims for the cause of jihad. After the events of 9/11, however, he questioned Islamic extremism and travelled to Syria, where he underwent deradicalization—a process he defines in his interview as “a full cognitive shift away from extremist thinking.” Upon his return home, he began working undercover with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in the “Toronto 18” case, in an effort to prevent extremist attacks. Today, he works to stop radicalization using social media to directly engage Islamic State sympathizers, while also speaking out against Islamophobia, which he believes only fuels and encourages radicalization.

What many people do not understand is that the fulfillment of ISIS’ agenda is actually dependent upon worldwide discrimination against Muslims—all Muslims, even moderate, peaceful, law-abiding Muslims. According to Shaikh, “It would be laughable if it wasn’t so serious how easily people are falling into that trap. ISIS has actually written a document in which they wrote and said ‘we will commit these attacks so as to create retaliation on Muslims to make them feel so isolated and marginalized that they will be pushed into our waiting arms.’”

Shaikh is referring to both a manifesto called “The Black Flags from Rome,” as well as the February edition of ISIS’ online magazine, Dabiq, in which the Islamic State warned, “Muslims in the West will soon find themselves between one of two choices.” This statement was published in the weeks following the massacre at the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris—an abhorrent act that only heightened the pre-existing tension between French Muslims and their fellow citizens. The group boasted that the attack had “further [brought] division to the world,” and “eliminated the grayzone,” representing the coexistence between Muslims and their non-Muslim neighbors. The text further explains that Muslims living in the West will soon feel so isolated and marginalized, they will be forced to “either apostatize … or [migrate] to the Islamic State, and thereby escape persecution from the crusader governments and citizens.” The term “crusader” is the title given by ISIS to every Western soldier, civilian, and politician, regardless of party or nation.

In the weeks following the most recent attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California, ISIS has seen their goal come to fruition—innocent Muslims everywhere have been experiencing acts of violence, hatred, and discrimination at the hands of angry, fearful Western citizens. Many in the West believe that Islam is a religion that promotes violence, without understanding that the majority of Muslims are peaceful. Shaikh explained that ISIS manipulates the Quran, “cherry-picks” verses, and uses phrases out of context in order to piece together an outline for their violent mission.

In a more recent interview with VICE, Shaikh reemphasizes that widespread Islamophobia provides a major advantage to ISIS recruiters: “The sad reality is, you have people on the right who might as well directly take the marching orders from ISIS because they’re doing the work for them.” ISIS targets individuals who feel isolated and rejected. Youths are an easy target given their desire to formulate their own identity and find a community to which they belong. Shaikh comments, “Your brains are still developing until your mid-twenties. That’s a time when you’re susceptible to influences from adults, community members, and religious members.” ISIS preys on the vulnerability of ostracized youths, reaching out to them via social media platforms such as Facebook, Skype, Twitter, Instagram, etc. “They’ll take screenshots and continue to engage you until they feel like they can successfully recruit you,” says Shaikh. He also solemnly discusses the impossibility of quitting ISIS once an individual has been recruited: “Their lives are destroyed. And it will be very, very difficult for them to leave that place. Some of them have been executed because they were creating ‘too many problems’ because they wanted to go home.”

While widespread fear and anger might seem inevitable in light of current events, Shaikh encourages individuals to educate themselves on the goals and strategies of extremists, and to resist the temptation to perpetuate the anti-Muslim sentiment which only further fuels radicalization and polarization.

December 28, 2015 1 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics Globalization Humanitarian Aid Immigration Middle East Religion Security Security and Conflict Society and Culture Terrorism Uncategorized

Nationality vs. Humanity: The Stranger’s Case

written by Madison Weil

“It is nationalism which endangers nations, and not the other way round.” –Ernest André Gellner (British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist)

French President Francois Hollande recently issued a statement that his country is prepared to open its borders and welcome 24,000 migrants seeking asylum over the next two years. This statement, issued on September 7, 2015, is part of a new plan designed by the European Union to accept and appropriately distribute the massive exodus of refugees fleeing from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other surrounding nations. When asked to comment on French polls that indicated 55% of the national population was opposed to accepting more refugees, Hollande responded that asylum is a constitutional right and a moral duty, and that “France’s image and standing in the world were at stake.”

In light of the recent terrorists attacks on Paris, and amid reports that one of the attackers held a Syrian passport, Hollande has emphasized the necessity of making proper background checks prior to accepting these refugees. Hollande has declared war on ISIS, but made it clear that France will maintain its “humanitarian duty” and promise to welcome refugees over the next two years.

While many refugees initially identified Germany as the most ideal place to relocate with supposed security and job opportunities abound, other European countries are now offering comparable conditions and welcoming the migrants. In fact, because Germany has been accommodating such a massive influx of individuals in recent months, France has offered to help by offering an expedited asylum application to migrant families arriving in Munich: temporary housing in France along with a two-week approval process as opposed to the usual six-month process.

These recent political and cultural strides made by France are particularly notable given the nation’s sticky history with immigration and ethnic tension. Having just spent a month living and learning in France, I can attest that it is challenging to go more than a day without hearing an allegation that the presence of ethnic minorities, foreigners, and immigrants creates a grave problem for the nation. A commonly held belief among French traditionalists is that these groups directly threaten and compromise the very essence of true “Frenchness.” Many harbor a sense of nationalism that transcends the concept of national pride and actually results in extreme and egregious discrimination—for example, some believe that to be truly “French” is to be white, Catholic, and multi-generationally French. This statement parades as protectionism when in reality it is rooted in racism. This has created an ongoing and very heated dialogue surrounding immigration policy in the last century.

This French perception of nationalism (hopefully) seems foreign to us in the United States. Our nationality law is based on the principles of jus soli (Latin for “right of soil”), meaning that individuals gain immediate citizenship upon being born in the U.S. This has subsequently created the notion that America is a mixing pot of racial identities—our sense of national pride comes from being united as American, not from being one united race. In contrast, most states in Europe, Asia, and Oceania grant citizenship based on principles of jus sanguinis (Latin for “right of blood”) or a restricted version of jus solis—as is the case in France. Under this philosophy, individuals become citizens depending on their parents’ citizenship and not by birthplace. This has fostered and accentuated the cultural division in France between natives and immigrants which has resulted in the emergence of a perceived social hierarchy. Because of this heated history and conflicting cultural dynamic, President Hollande’s decision to welcome refugees in spite of opposition (and in spite of recent events) deserves recognition.

France’s situation forcibly evokes a particularly challenging set of questions: at what point should international leaders place a greater emphasis on obligations to humanity than on obligations to their own national interests? How do leaders of the Western community in particular negotiate or reconcile national interests with moral duty? Is there such a thing as a moral duty to the international community? According to the UNHCR: “Since, by definition, refugees are not protected by their own governments, the international community steps in to ensure they are safe and protected.” In fact, in the past few decades 142 nations have signed on to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol. By signing this international treaty and its 1967 amendment, the UNHCR states nations are essentially agreeing that “refugees deserve, as a minimum, the same standards of treatment enjoyed by other foreign nationals in a given country and, in many cases, the same treatment as nationals.”

While we have historically seen that most national actions, even humanitarian ones, are often out of self-interest, it is my sincere hope that international authorities will continue to improve and open their borders to those in need. Afterall, those of us born in Western nations with relatively safe conditions could have just as easily been born into a nation experiencing a crisis. Wouldn’t we then hope and pray for assistance and asylum in the E.U.? In the U.S.?

This debate reminded me of an excerpt from Shakespeare’s play “Sir Thomas More.” Sir Thomas More is a lawyer, sent to address an angry crowd of individuals rioting to get rid of “those immigrants” or “strangers.” Shakespeare delivers a powerful message that transcends time and place when More challenges the natives to consider what they would do if they had to flee their home country:

“Whether would you go?

What country, by the nature of your error,

Should give you harbor? go you to France or Flanders,

To any German province, to Spain or Portugal,

Nay, any where that not adheres to England,–

Why, you must needs be strangers: would you be pleased

To find a nation of such barbarous temper,

That, breaking out in hideous violence,

Would not afford you an abode on earth,

Whet their detested knives against your throats,

Spurn you like dogs, and like as if that God

Owed not nor made not you, nor that the elements

Were not all appropriate to your comforts,

But chartered unto them, what would you think

To be thus used? this is the strangers case;

And this your mountanish inhumanity.”

(Sir Thomas More, Act II, Scene IV)

This is the stranger’s case—the immigrant’s case. For many, it’s near impossible to fully comprehend the plight and experiences of today’s refugees, but so important to try. While it’s challenging to reconcile national interests with humanitarian needs, our nationality shouldn’t supersede our humanity.

November 20, 2015 0 comment

Featured LGBT Religion

The Crossroads: The Modernization of the Roman Catholic Church

written by Tala Ahmadi

As one of the world’s oldest institutions still alive today, the Roman Catholic Church has been at the intersection of traditional versus contemporary many times before. The most recent example of this occurred in October, when Pope Francis called on leading clergy to discuss the Church’s approach on family values.

Among the topics discussed at the synod, a meeting of bishops to discuss or determine changes in doctrine, were some of the most controversial issues facing the Church today. These included gay marriage and whether divorced and remarried Catholics can receive Communion. Halfway through the two-week discussion, the Vatican released a preliminary report that caused shockwaves within the Catholic community. The section that prompted the most debate was titled, “Providing for homosexual persons,” and included unprecedented language like, “Homosexuals have gifts and qualities to offer to the Christian community.”

The ensuing response from conservative bishops and Catholics was overwhelmingly negative. American Cardinal Raymond Burke claimed the Church was manipulating information and misrepresenting the discussions going on behind closed doors. The Vatican responded by stating that this was only a preliminary document serving simply as a summary of the topics being discussed. On the last day of the synod, the bishops voted on the final document that had a less welcoming approach than the previous one. The final version no longer contained the “gifts and qualities” sentence and the title of the section was changed to “Pastoral attention to people of homosexual orientation.” Even this watered down version did not get the two-thirds majority vote required to be included in the document. However, per Pope Francis’ request, the paragraphs were inserted in the final document along with the vote count. The Vatican stated this was because the synod will reconvene in a year’s time to discuss the topics once more, and thus the paragraphs can act as a framework for future discussions. This give and take between conservative Catholics and more liberal ones may resemble the internal conflict among Catholic leaders in steering the future of the religion.

To understand why the topics discussed and the actions of Pope Francis are unconventionally progressive, it is helpful to take a closer look at the steps Pope Francis took during the synod in the context of traditional Catholic doctrine. Last year, when asked about his beliefs on gay priests, Francis replied, “If someone is gay and he searches for the Lord and has good will, who am I to judge?” To put this quote in context, Pope Benedict XVI called homosexuality “an intrinsic moral evil.” Additionally, Pope Francis convened the synod to discuss the ways in which the Catholic Church can be more welcoming to the LGBT community. For a religion that deems homosexuality as “intrinsically disordered,” even discussing these topics is unprecedented.

However, convening the synod was not enough for Pope Francis. Halfway through, per Pope Francis’ request, the revolutionary preliminary document containing never before seen language in the history of the Catholic Church was released. Even when the controversial language was then watered down and did not pass, Pope Francis still included it in the final document. In his final speech at the synod, Francis said that bishops were becoming too attached to doctrine, were guided by “hostile rigidity,” and demonstrated a “destructive goody-goodiness.”

Pope Francis’ actions raise two questions that are closely related and are worth considering: Is the Pope too progressive for the current Catholic climate? or Is his progressivism exactly what the Catholic Church needs to reshape its image in the 21st century? I believe the latter.

The Catholic Church is no stranger to controversy. The recent sex abuse scandals, the abrupt resignation of Pope Benedict XVI, and harsh doctrinal language about homosexuality and female leadership roles have tainted the Church’s public image in an increasingly liberal global population. The world has become more receptive to empowering historically marginalized communities. 17 countries have legalized gay marriage and 22 countries have women as President or Prime Minister. Yet, the Catholic Church still does not allow women to become priests and views homosexual activities as sinful. If the Catholic Church wants to remain relevant to the youngest generation and cultivate a sustainable base of support, they must adapt, and this is what Pope Francis is attempting to do.

The last time there were substantial changes to the Catholic Church was during the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965 where institutional modifications, like changing the language used in Holy Mass from Latin to the vernacular, helped ease the Church’s transition into the modern world. Vatican II was called because the Pope at the time (Pope John XXIII) was receptive to the cultural changes ushered in from the aftermath of WWII and wanted to ensure the Church could adapt. The similarities between the Catholic Church’s efforts in the 1960s and Pope Francis’ efforts today are evident, and perhaps Vatican III could be around the corner.

The bishops who convened at October’s synod will be outlived by a generation far more receptive to the needs and desires of communities that have been suppressed. The Catholic Church needs to ensure that it not only has enough support to remain relevant, but also promotes ideologies that are compatible with what it means to be Catholic in the 21st century. However, there is a flipside to this argument. The region with the fastest-growing Catholic population is Sub-Saharan Africa. The Catholics from this region also tend to be the most conservative. Out of the 47 countries on the African continent,36 have outlawed homosexuality and 4 have the death penalty for homosexual acts. Sub-Saharan Africans could become the next major Catholic population, and the future of Catholic doctrine could be heavily influenced by their beliefs.

For the moment however, Pope Francis is doing nearly everything in his power to help usher in a new age for the Catholic Church. His controversial and progressive tactics are causing ripples through an institution that has traditionally clung to its centuries old doctrines and beliefs. Pope Francis is getting senior clerics to talk about some of the most contentious issues that have remained taboo in the Church for quite some time. He could be exactly what the ancient institution needs to mature into the 21st century without losing its relevance and legitimacy.

December 12, 2014 3 comments