Home Security and Conflict
Category

Security and Conflict

domestic, international, or personal implications of policy i.e. national security issues, U.S. foreign aid, the War on Terror, sanctions, WikiLeaks
Middle EastMilitaryNational SecuritySecurity and ConflictTerrorismUnited States

Hoodwinked: How the Bush Administration Deceived the American Public

written by Alex Choy

“Let’s keep in mind the fact that this war’s going to happen regardless of what  [CURVEBALL] said or didn’t say. The Powers That Be probably aren’t terribly interested in whether [he] knows what he’s talking about.” 

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq on the pretext of preventing Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from proliferating and distributing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, no evidence of a WMD program was ever found, resulting in national controversy. To quell negative public opinion, the Republican Bush Administration commissioned Judge Lawrence Silberman and Senator Charles Robb, who were also Republicans, to form the Silberman-Robb Commission (SRC) to investigate why an Iraqi WMD program was purported to exist. The SRC, along with the Republican-majority “Phase I” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) investigation, placed the blame squarely on the intelligence community.  

However, with the release of additional archival documents such as the SSCI’s “Phase II” investigative report, a declassified Department of Defense (DoD) memorandum and drafts of a CIA White Paper, there is now empirical evidence that the Bush Administration manipulated intelligence ex-post-facto to justify an invasion of Iraq, and that it may have gone even one step further by attempting to influence postwar investigations in order to obfuscate its complicity.

Prior to the SRC, as a result of the United Nations’ (UN) efforts to monitor Iraqi disarmament post-Gulf War, Americans already possessed a keen awareness of Saddam’s penchant for WMD. The UN defines WMD as nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. This article is concerned with the latter two. During its investigations, the UN discovered that Saddam had fired rockets “containing botulinum toxin, anthrax simulant, and aflatoxin,” and had utilized chemical nerve agents against the Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War. Furthermore, as illustrated by a 1997 New York Times article that discussed Saddam’s lack of cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, it was widely rumored that Iraqi factories which supposedly produced household goods were being used to proliferate WMD in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. In 2003, these suspicions came to fruition when Secretary of State Colin Powell proclaimed to the UN that he had ‘credible’ evidence sourced from CURVEBALL, an Iraqi scientist turned informant, that Saddam had resumed WMD production. Powell’s costly signal, and the decade-long schema buildup that preceded it, hoodwinked many American citizens into believing that the threat of Iraqi WMD was credible.

President Bush holds a press briefing at the White House on Friday, February 6, 2004, announcing the formation of the SRC. He is flanked by commission co-chairs Senator Charles Robb (left) and Judge Laurence Silberman (right). Reuters/Win McNamee

Made publicly available by the Bush Administration, the SRC had concluded that the purported existence of Iraqi WMD proliferation was a major intelligence failure. According to their report, not only was the intelligence community unable to collect ‘good’ intelligence but it “failed to convey to policymakers … information casting serious doubt” regarding CURVEBALL’s reliability before Secretary Powell crossed the Rubicon and placed American credibility on the line. 

According to the SRC, the intelligence community’s failure to do so was because of their tendency to promote intelligence in line with pre-existing theories and, consequently, discredit intelligence that contained contradictory information. Interestingly, the SRC also reported that they found no evidence that the intelligence community had attempted to politicize, or in other words, change its analytical judgments on intelligence in response to political pressure. Working off of this explanation, the SRC reasoned that the intelligence community’s failure to notify Secretary Powell, if not politically motivated, was perhaps an attempt to maintain cognitive consistency. Nevertheless, it is essential to realize that while the SRC was commissioned to uncover the ‘truth’ as to why an Iraqi WMD threat was purported, its investigation was not comprehensive, because it was “not authorized [by the Bush Administration] to investigate how policymakers used the intelligence assessments they received.”

The “Phase I” SSCI report, which was compiled during a Senate Republican majority, largely corroborated the SRC’s findings through oral records and internal emails to and from a CIA whistleblower who was the only American intelligence official ever to have physical contact with CURVEBALL. According to the whistleblower, he had serious concerns about CURVEBALL’s reliability, and as a result, had significant reservations with the Bush Administration using his intelligence as the backbone for an American claim regarding Iraqi WMD. However, when he attempted to bring his concerns to policymakers, his supervisors in the intelligence community were dismissive, replying in an email: “Let’s keep in mind the fact that this war’s going to happen regardless of what  [CURVEBALL] said or didn’t say. The Powers That Be probably aren’t terribly interested in whether [he] knows what he’s talking about.” While many Democrats took this as evidence of politicization, the Republican-majority SSCI concluded the contrary, and claimed that “customization of [intelligence] analysis is the essence of the professional practice, not a defilement of it (i.e., politicization).” As a result, while the “Phase One” SSCI report did vaguely allude to external influences on prewar intelligence assessments, it still attributes fault solely to the intelligence community, thereby perpetuating the facade of intelligence community negligence and policymaker innocence.

On the other hand, the 2008 “Phase II” SSCI report, compiled during the Obama Administration, and a Senate Democrat majority, challenged the findings of both the SRC and “Phase I” SSCI report, by illustrating how the Bush Administration made claims regarding Iraqi WMD that were not substantiated by intelligence. Up to this point, even though the findings of the SRC had been questioned extensively by independent journalists such as Thomas Ricks in his book Fiasco, such claims were based largely on un-cited oral reports, instead of official documentation. The 2008 SSCI Report concluded that Bush Administration claims of Iraqi WMD “portrayed the intelligence as more certain than it was, and did not convey [in its public statements] the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community.” Therefore, the Bush Administration was guilty of manipulating intelligence to fit its Munich Script narrative of Saddam as an unappeasable warmonger who was hell-bent on unleashing WMD on the West.

For instance, it was determined by the “Phase II” SSCI, that statements made by the Bush Administration in 2003 regarding Saddam’s intent to give WMD to al-Qaeda, contradicted the intelligence that had been conveyed to them. The SSCI did so by comparing the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) with several Bush Administration public statements regarding Iraqi WMD. Prepared for the Bush Administration by the intelligence community, the NIE had asserted that Saddam did not have nuclear weapons and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks on the US in the fear that “doing so would give the US a stronger case for war.” Therefore, Bush Administration claims to the contrary, were unsubstantiated. In addition, regarding Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN, while Powell had asserted to the international community that “most US experts” believed that the aluminum tubes reported by CURVEBALL were for nuclear weapons, intelligence experts within the Department of State and Department of Energy were found to have repeatedly emphasized to the Bush Administration that they were “not clearly linked to a nuclear” use. Therefore, the “Phase II” SSCI was able to officially establish that the Bush Administration did have the necessary intelligence required not to go to war with Iraq over WMD, but deliberately went beyond that intelligence in public statements. 

Furthermore, by comparing a recently declassified Office of the Undersecretary of the DoD for Policy (OUSDP) memorandum, to a draft of a CIA White Paper on Iraqi WMD that was a predecessor to the 2002 NIE, there is now evidence that not only did the Bush Administration ‘go beyond’ the available intelligence, but it actually politicized it. Comments made in the OUSDP memorandum match up with alterations on the White Paper drafts, suggesting that intelligence assessments were rewritten to favor a case for Iraqi WMD. 

Bureaucratic politics, and the OUSDP’s status as an Executive Branch department, suggest that the White Paper was rewritten to avoid antagonizing the Bush Administration, which was inundated by the Munich Script view of Saddam. For example, the first draft of the White Paper, released in July 2002, does not include any mention of the aluminum tubes purported to be nuclear in nature, perhaps because the CIA determined CURVEBALL, who had provided the intelligence, to be unreliable. However, the OUSDP memorandum dated September 2002, does include the assessment that aluminum tubes were “to be used for the construction of high-speed centrifuges for uranium gas enrichment.” Subsequently, the final draft of the White Paper, released in October 2002, also makes a note of said aluminum tubes, commenting that “Iraq’s aggressive attempts to obtain [them were] of significant concern.” Therefore, while the 2008 SSCI determined that Bush Administration WMD claims were ‘somewhat’ substantiated by the final drafts of intelligence products, the recent discovery of the OUSDP memorandum and CIA White Papers begets the question:

How much of the intelligence was manipulated a priori and ex-post-facto to conform with Bush Administration narratives?

Finally, a more in-depth analysis of the addendums to the “Phase I” SSCI Report, when combined with the evidence above, suggests Bush Administration efforts to manipulate and obfuscate the postwar investigation by exerting political pressure. After the “Phase I” SSCI corroborated the SRC’s findings, SSCI Democrats and intelligence officials accused the SSCI Republican majority of prevaricating the investigation to help obfuscate Bush Administration culpability. In her statement, Senator Diane Feinstein asserted that the SSCI did not “acknowledge that the intelligence estimates were shaped by the Administration.” Subsequently, in her opinion, the issue of Bush Administration involvement would require additional investigation; sentiments which resulted in the 2008 “Phase II” SSCI. Similarly, Senator Richard Durbin considered both the SRC and “Phase I” SSCI report to be incomplete, citing that the “responsibility for problems related to prewar intelligence … should not be confined to … the intelligence community, but to … the White House.”

Given his dissatisfaction with the “Phase I” SSCI investigation, Durbin emphasized that “nor should the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress, which are supposed to scrutinize intelligence analysis as part of their oversight mandate, be excluded from criticism.” To strengthen his argument, Durbin enlisted the opinion of former CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr, who questioned: “what did [Senate Republicans] do to systematically look and see if … the subjects [of their investigation] were appropriate?” Therefore, according to Senate Democrats, by failing to investigate the Bush Administration, the SSCI failed to fulfill its duty to the American people. Because the President is not only the head of the nation, but the head of his political party, it is not unreasonable to strongly suspect that a concerted effort by his political party to obfuscate investigations that could implicate him of wrongdoing, were done at his request, or the very least, acquiescence. 

In conclusion, while the recent release of select archival evidence has confirmed that the Bush Administration politicized intelligence to justify an invasion of Iraq, the available evidence only strongly alludes that it interfered with postwar investigations, because much of the empirical evidence, if it even exists, remains classified. While this means that such suspicions cannot yet be confirmed, they remain a salient issue because if true, they call into question the efficacy of checks and balances. With the ever-expanding war powers of the executive, a Presidency that wages war on false premises and then is not held accountable, has the potential to erode the fabric of our democracy. 

Furthermore, while this article focused on the negative actions of a Republican administration, this does not mean that Democrats are free of blame either – as debates over presidential war powers and interventionism cross party lines and have been abused by both parties alike, as evidenced by airstrikes in Syria during the Obama Administration under the auspices of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). As a result, with the eventual declassification of additional documents, supplementary investigations will be of the utmost importance. 

March 20, 2021 0 comment
7 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
AsiaChinaSecuritySecurity and Conflict

America should Strengthen Japan’s Warfighting Abilities in Preparation for a Chinese Contingency over Taiwan

written by Taylor Fairless

Talk about China’s predatory behavior has echoed insistently in the halls of the White House.

The Communist Party under President Xi Jinping is more aggressive and coercive, yet has a veneer of approachability and humility. It is a foreign policy projection that is as intriguing as it is unstable and dangerous. With continuing racial targeting in Xinjiang and aggressive behaviors in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea, alongside impressive military advances and increased control of cyberspace, Washington officials have contemplated expanding military relations with Japan to create a stronger presence in Asia. They should.

Taiwan

If America and China ever plunge into war, it will be over Taiwan. Robert D. Blackwill, a Council on Foreign Relations fellow for U.S. foreign policy, interprets the Taiwan problem as “the most dangerous flash point in the world.”

The Chinese government envisions Taiwan as part of its mainland province, though many in Taiwan feel as though they are a separate nation. For the past four decades, the United States has played a critical role in deterring China from using force against Taiwan through military and diplomatic finesse. Though 2015, 2018, and 2019 saw critical changes that challenged regional stability.

First, China sought to possess a stronger military to back its bolder foreign policy. This included establishing the Strategic Support Force in 2015 that managed the PLA’s cyberwarfare, space operations, and other high-tech missions. In March 1996, the US government responded to China firing missiles around Taiwan by staging the largest display of American force in Asia since the Vietnam War. While China lost an important opportunity to project its strength, it did gain vital knowledge: speed is everything. Funding advances in cyberspace enabled faster assaults, which during battle would include splintering data flow and other critical networks of communication.

Three years later, Beijing demanded that international companies remove Taiwan as an independent country on their websites. The threat of blocking those corporations from conducting lucrative business in China prompted high-profiled hotels, manufacturing agencies, and airlines, including Marriott and Aston Martin, to comply with the PRC’s regulations. This exacerbated a year of depleting economic growth in Taiwan and demonstrated China’s ability to single-handedly strongarm private actors into political compliance based on its utilization of social platforms and economic prowess alone.

Yet economic measures were not the only form of pressure. The following year, the PLA flew aircrafts around Taiwan near daily for months as part of a larger concerted effort to subjugate the island, prompting Taiwanese officials to respond by readying its naval and air patrols. A senior Taiwanese security official responsible for intelligence on China told Reuters that this had indicated a “clear shift” in Beijing’s posture. Ambitions that were once theorized and blueprinted became tangible plans for military action.

The risk of conflict ensuing in the region significantly heightened for the first time in decades.

Xi Jinping’s predecessors were content with keeping the status of Taiwan unresolved in order to focus on economic and military growth. Yet, Xi has pivoted towards a more aggressive stance, letting go of a long-time Chinese ideal of maintaining a low international profile and instead has begun to more overtly provoke its neighboring countries. Under his leadership, China has militarized the South China Sea, challenged Japanese claims to the Diaoyu/Senakaku islands while simultaneously improving China’s missile and radar systems in the region, and has engaged in border clashes with India.

America has reacted by intensifying its commitment to Taipei, with Pentagon spokesman John Kirby saying: “We have obligations to assist Taiwan with their self-defence and I think you’re going to see that continue.”


Late last month, the Taiwanese Defense Ministry reported fifteen Chinese aircraft had interfered in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. This marked the twentieth intrusion in January alone and prompted the Biden administration to urge Beijing to stop pressuring Taiwan.

In a period of intensifying strategic competition, conflict whose nature is just below the threshold of major war has become known as the gray zone. The surge in saber-rattling suggests that Beijing will continue provoking Taipei using a gray zone strategy. While subversions of political systems and covert paramilitary operations have historic roots, China is using a new collection of tactics, notably in the cyber sector, that are challenging US and allied interests in novel ways.

Accordingly, Biden has reaffirmed China as one of his administration’s top priorities. With the PRC’s increasing hawkish behavior, President Biden should urge America’s Indo-Pacific allies to prepare for a contingency with China over Taiwan. Even if war is unlikely to ensue anytime soon, the rapidity of China’s economic growth, their military improvements, and command in cyberspace capabilities should mobilize America and its Asian partners to address and anticipate evermore aggressive threats posed by the PRC.

Taking measures to signal military preparedness and rallying crucial allies, such as India and Australia, is a necessary deterrent against advancing aggression towards Taiwan. This flashpoint is perilous. Without sufficient deterrence, China will dramatically increase its advances towards Taiwan over the next decade, which Ian Easton, Senior Director at the Project 2049, claims could lead to “an all-out invasion and a superpower war.” 

A preferred Chinese strategy would involve cyberattacks against financial infrastructure and US ballistic missile-detecting radars. Vital maritime supply lines would also be intersected. The actual invasion would include PLA warships and submarines traversing across the Taiwan strait, enabling some tens of thousands of soldiers to capture strategic points that would be valuable for staging a larger attack. Taiwan, armed with thousands of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, in turn would inflict tremendous damage on the Chinese before any vessel would reach the island. The “next five to ten years,” Easton states, “are going to be dangerous ones.”

Strategic Deterrence


The alliance between America and Japan has been dubbed “the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none” by former US Senator Mike Mansfield. The relationship between the United States and Japan is crucial in deterring the possibility of Chinese military action against Taiwan, which in turn would place US forces in Japan at risk, and likely Japan itself.

At the heart of an effective US-Japanese deterrence force are robust warfighting capabilities. Jeffrey W. Hornung at RAND makes a compelling argument that this can be achieved in three ways: establishing legal authorization for the use of force, defining Japan’s supporting role for US operations in Taiwan via a joint-operational plan, and ensuring that Japan’s current munition and fuel stocks can sustain a campaign against the People’s Liberation Army.

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) can assist the United States in critical areas, but is restricted in terms of its capabilities and legal authorization. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution renounces the threat or use of force to settle international disputes and prohibits the maintenance of armed services. Pacifists have claimed that the SDF itself is unconstitutional under these guidelines, but the government views the SDF as legitimate so long as it is used for defensive purposes─hence the use of “Self-Defense” in its name.

Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe set in motion historic shifts by increasing defense spending after years of decline and reinterpreting the constitution to allow Japanese troops to fight overseas for the first time since 1945. This year, Japan’s government approved the ninth straight annual increase in defense spending and is buying American stealth fighters, interceptor missiles, and other equipment to counter military build-ups in its region.

Although these changes may not appear drastic, they signal that Japan is beginning to react to a shifting geopolitical landscape that is increasingly being reshaped by a revisionist China and nuclear-armed North Korea. It is expected that Japan’s intensifying security environment will continue to energize reevaluations of Article 9 so that Japan can have more flexibility in its response to an evolving and increasingly uncertain battlefield.

For the time being, Article 9 remains in place. This prevents Japan from possessing weapons that could provide critical assistance in regional contingencies, such as ICBMs and long-range bombers. Despite doctrinal disagreements over what resources Japan could use in a military escalation with China, Article 72 grants the prime minister authority over decisions relating to the SDF, which means Yoshihide Suga’s interpretations of adversarial aggression influences what resources the SDF could mobilize in conflict.

However, the SDF has never been involved in combat, which means Suga would need to define what circumstances would warrant the SDF to exercise force. Even better, Suga should define what circumstances generated by the PLA specifically would permit Japan to use SDF capabilities. The United States in turn would need to outline what support it would request from Japan in order for Suga to prepare for legal authorization. The stakes of this are considerable: defining joint-plans will frame how the United States and Japan approach China using allies and partners and it will decide what wartime policies will be developed.

Japan’s constitutional restrictions on its deployment of its armed forces raises questions of how the SDF’s capabilities would be used to support American efforts in a contingency involving Taiwan.

In a time of crisis, Suga will need to ensure that Japan and America can align their political and operational timelines. Japan would need to guarantee that the legal frameworks are in place to use the right resources and services against a China that is more aggressive, dominant in cyberspace, and has a tighter grip of the seas. For example, diversifying and enhancing the defense of Japanese airfields would increase the survivability of Japan’s forces while enabling America to have more options for accessing Tokyo’s bases. This matters not only in terms of strategic posturing and wartime planning, but it is expected to require that China expend munition resources and exert more effort trying to locate alternative air bases.

Meanwhile, America could assist the SDF by improving their capabilities in case of a regional contingency, such as enhancing electronic attacks and unmanned assets. Japanese leaders should also consider hosting US systems or, at the very least, strategizing how the United States might deploy those systems to Japan in rapid speed if conflict erupts.

While America and Japan revised defensive guidelines that define their joint military roles and ambitions, the actual alliance remains structurally-unchanged. This is a problem. A rapidly-evolving battle space necessitates closer allied cooperation that should mirror the type of military structures seen in the US-NATO, US-ROK, and US-Australian alliances. Each of these relations arguably benefit from high levels of institutionalization that link political and military structures which allows for better cross-national discussion and coordination.

With restrictions in place, critics argue that Japan should not engage in military preparations to confront the PRC: regardless of what Tokyo plans, their defense forces’ restrictions makes it an easy target for an expansive Chinese military.

A Beijing triumph is not a guarantee and should not restrict Japan from taking measures to enhance its readiness for an entanglement that might emerge in a decade?two decades? More and more Japanese citizens realize their neighborhood is becoming increasingly dangerous, which is breaking up the decades long tradition of pacifism in the country. Japan can take the right measures to create and increase offensive and defensive capabilities while the time permits, including forging stronger alliances and enhancing warfighting capabilities.

Japan might take inspiration from China in terms of creating global and regional alliances to address America in critical areas such as global economic governance. Tokyo should look towards its neighbors to forge cohesive measures to address the PRC─many of which would be receptive to aligning with America as an offshore balancer. Japan has the United States, India, Australia, and, importantly, Taiwan to work alongside with.

A possible challenge would be instigating a regional arms race with Beijing. Even if Japan were to have a more forward posture, such as introducing ships dedicated to missile defense or purchasing offensive capabilities, China’s response would not significantly differ from their current plans, which are to expand their military potentialities in air, water, and now cyberspace domains alongside establishing greater regional alliances. As of last week, the PRC is trying to increase defensive partnership with its Southeast Asian neighbors by starting joint exercises between the Chinese and Singapore navies. Japan must be cautious, but it cannot be passive as China makes critical moves that will ultimately shape the geopolitics of the region. Suga needs to take strategic measures to firm up a balancing coalition.

The utility of security alliances to manage regional military dilemmas, while imperfect, presents a better alternative than the current, more volatile situation, which sees two major countries in a weakened position against the PRC: one confined to act defensively, while the other is militarily underprepared. Forming partnerships and continuing to reassess Japan’s force capabilities will be critical in forging a robust plan to deter a contingency with China.

Looking Ahead
Hornung summed up the need for broader strategic initiatives nicely when he said: “the longer these efforts are put off, the steeper the challenges could become for future administrations.”

America and Japan should be prepared for increased Chinese aggressions in Taiwan. While the expectations of war occurring anytime soon are low, the PRC has demonstrated their abilities to make significant growth in record time. Efforts should be taken to enhance the US-Japanese warfighting capability in preparation for growing Chinese hostilities in Taiwan. Though limitations persist, reevaluations of Japan’s constitution has allowed for new opportunities to cooperate with the United States in important contingency planning areas.

While the Biden administration will find difficulty in addressing this issue in a timely fashion, the President and his advisers must initiate critical attention to its Indo-Pacific allies, particularly Japan, to ensure that they have the capabilities to fight a regional contingency. 

March 7, 2021 0 comment
4 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
Middle EastMilitarySecurity and Conflict

The Gulf War: Overcoming the Collective Action Problem

written by Alex Choy

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

The havoc unleashed by the 1991 Iraqi annexation of Kuwait marked the first major international crisis in a unipolar post-Cold War world. For the first time since the inception of the United Nations, a member nation had been fully annexed by another, part of Iraq’s plan to become a Middle East hegemon. Previously open to neoliberal free markets, Gulf oil reserves were held hostage, generating an international uproar. Following the failure of peaceful negotiations, a robust US led, yet UN-sanctioned coalition deployed to the Saudi Arabian desert, forming a Desert Shield which would later transition to a Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait. Despite stemming from decades of self-serving conflict, the Gulf War remains the high-water mark of post-Cold War international cooperation, serving as the premier example of how skillful domestic diplomacy can unify a multinational response and overcome the collective action problem against hegemonic aggression.

If state actors want to preserve the sanctity of international law, they must oppose aggression by other actors. Traditionally, because the complexities of multilateral conflict make collective action difficult, the opportunity for a punitive international response to an aggressor is limited. Threatening to undermine the existing global order, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a textbook case of said aggression. Fortunately for Kuwait, as the declining Soviet Union pursued a non-interventionist foreign policy, the UN found itself armed with a newfound capacity for action. No longer would collective security be stymied by a bipolar struggle for supremacy. Instead, the world was on the brink of a New World Order, where under American leadership, “diverse nations [would be] drawn together in common cause to achieve … peace and security, freedom and the rule of law.” Multilateral intervention in Kuwait would be the first step in codifying this idealist liberal worldview. 

According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, by 1980, American dependence on foreign oil was a staggering 42 percent of total consumption. As a result, securing the availability of Persian Gulf oil imports, and by extension, maintaining Gulf regional security, was paramount to American foreign policy. To achieve this, the US initially relied on the monarchies of Iran and Saudi Arabia to serve as the ‘gatekeepers’ of American interests in the Middle East. However, this arrangement was abrogated following the Iranian Revolution, which saw the instability-generating rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, an anti-Western cleric who viewed the revolution in Iran as the start of a broader Muslim uprising that would sweep the Gulf clean of Western imperialists and their collaborators. 

Given Khomeini’s unnerving rhetoric, it was no surprise that when conflict erupted between Iraq and Iran in 1980, those with economic interests in the Middle East threw their support behind Saddam Hussein, fearing that a victorious Iran would “slice through Iraq to the oilfields of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia” and capture the world’s oil reserves. In a true display of realpolitik, nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the West, funneled billions of dollars into Iraq to protect the global oil trade. Subsequently, the US also adopted the Carter Doctrine, which established that America would use force to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf.

Adversaries: Ayatollah Khomeini, left, and Saddam Hussein, right. Illustration by The New York Times, photographs by Bettmann/Corbis and Gamma-Keystone, via Getty Images

When Iraq and Iran negotiated a ceasefire in 1988, Saddam found himself with a dangerous surplus of foreign debt and offensive military capabilities. The Iran-Iraq War had seen the Iraqi economy’s rapid militarization, with about 21% of the Iraqi labor force serving in the armed forces by 1988. Naturally, such a sharp increase in the number of military personnel resulted in an equally sharp increase in military expenditures, which the Iraqi government financed by taking out numerous high-interest foreign loans. By the end of hostilities, it is estimated that Iraqi foreign debt was $80 billion. Having ‘sacrificed’ his country to protect the GCC nations, Saddam was enraged when repayment was demanded, as he had viewed the GCC financial contributions not as loans, but as endowments. From that point on, Saddam grew increasingly paranoid of a conspiracy to weaken Iraq. He accused Kuwait of intentionally producing oil in excess of OPEC quotas to lower the oil price to harm Iraqi profits, thereby engaging in economic warfare. 

Angered and humiliated by the continued degradation of the Iraqi economy, Saddam invaded Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990, expecting that the kingdom’s wealth would provide a quick solution to his country’s economic crisis. What Saddam did not expect, however, was the broad-based multinational response that would stand in his way.

Having established pre-invasion “that disputes [between Iraq and Kuwait should] be settled peacefully and not by threats or intimidation,” the Department of State immediately dispatched UN Ambassador Pickering to draft a resolution condemning Iraq. The UN’s newfound capacity for productive discourse, combined with the exceptionally heinous nature of Saddam’s violation of international law, resulted in the Security Council’s swift and unanimous issuance of Resolution 660 calling for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. While Ambassador Pickering was in New York, Secretary of State Baker was in Moscow, drafting a joint US-Soviet statement condemning Iraqi aggression. Given the international scope of the conflict, a statement from both superpowers sent a powerful message of unity to the world, thus preventing the exploitation of Cold-War divisiveness by Saddam.

President George H. W. Bush, left, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in 1991. Rick Wilking/Reuters

However, despite unprecedented US-Soviet cooperation, the international response in the early stages of the conflict was plagued by impediments to collective action, namely among the Gulf states. Wary of previous instances of foreign intervention that only proved to exacerbate regional tensions, the League of Arab States wished to resolve matters in-house, and pressed Washington to support what Yasser Arafat described as: an “Arab solution [and] not an international one.” A far cry from the unconditional withdrawal spelled out by Resolution 660; an Arab solution would likely involve Iraqi appeasement and Kuwaiti concessions specifically regarding Iraqi claims over Kuwaiti islands in the Gulf, thereby emboldening Saddam in the process. Following a call from British Prime Minister ‘Iron Lady’ Thatcher, urging President Bush “to [not] go wobbly,” Bush strengthened his resolve and deemed that anything less of an unconditional withdrawal was unacceptable, proclaiming that Iraqi aggression would not stand. Pressured economically by the West and internally, by Western-friendly members such as Egypt; the Arab League finally capitulated and passed its own resolution condemning Iraq and calling for its unconditional withdrawal.

Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat meets with Saddam Hussein in 1988.

Up to this point, the Bush Administration had exhibited hesitation and uncertainty regarding direct intervention in the Gulf. While Saddam’s invasion was no longer a fait accompli,  it was not obvious what the US should do next. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait had already secured Saddam a substantial portion of the world’s oil reserves, and his troops stationed on the Saudi border stood poised to double that figure. Therefore, similar to the threat posed by Iran a decade earlier, Saddam’s aggression threatened not only the collective good of state sovereignty, but the stability of global oil markets as well. As a result, defending Saudi Arabia as per the Carter Doctrine would be the first course of action. However, at the time, it was uncertain if Saudi King Fahd would even permit US troops to defend his country, given the Arab League’s history of apprehension towards foreign intervention. Ironically, following a diplomatic mission made by US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, it was revealed that Fahd actually welcomed Western protection and was worried about a lack of American commitment. As a result, within hours, President Bush appeared on national television to announce Operation Desert Shield, a “wholly defensive” deployment of over 500,000 US troops to the Saudi Arabian desert made only after “unparalleled international consultation.”

Operation Desert Shield. US Army Photo/Sgt. Renee Sitler

With Desert Shield underway, Ambassador Pickering and the UN Security Council continued to deliberate, formulating resolutions to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. In accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 661, which was ratified without incident on August 6th, imposed a full economic embargo on Iraq, while Resolution 665 authorized a naval blockade. Determined to exhaust peaceful options before resorting to force, the Security Council hoped that an economic war of attrition would ultimately compel Saddam to capitulate. Ultimately, although the trade embargo successfully crippled an already struggling Iraq, economic warfare did not seem to faze Saddam, who grew obstinately uncooperative. 

In response to Saddam’s stubbornness, President Bush started to advocate for a resolution authorizing direct military intervention to present Iraq with a final, unmistakable display of UN resolve. Bush’s calculated decision to pursue a UN Resolution instead of unilateral action under Article 51 of the UN Charter was due to the importance of framing a use of force decision in a way where it would not be viewed as “a cowboy operation.” Consequently, while the US could count on  cooperation from the permanent five, ‘P5’ members of the Security Council (minus China) in ratifying such a resolution, the real challenge lied with the approval of the ‘non-aligned,’ temporary members of the Security Council, which in 1990 included Colombia, Cuba, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Yemen, and Zaire. With 7 out of 15 possible votes, these nations represented a potential veto to a proposed resolution, giving them serious bargaining power. 

As a result, drafting a resolution authorizing punitive military action was complicated. The wording could not be so strong as to constitute a declaration of war, nor could it be ambiguous, which would translate to a lack of resolve. In the end, Resolution 678 was adopted with 12 votes for, two votes against, and one abstention. While the Resolution did not expressly authorize military force, it did give Iraq a deadline of January 15th, 1991, to willingly withdraw from Kuwait before the UN would be authorized to use “all necessary means” to ensure compliance. 

As per a strategy of sticks and carrots, many of the non-aligned members who were initially opposed to such a resolution had agreed to ratify under the threat of economic penalty or were convinced to do so following the inclusion of a “pause of goodwill” clause, which would afford Iraq a final opportunity to comply peacefully. Members who had voted against the revolution, namely Yemen and Cuba, had emphasized their concern over the ambiguity of the “necessary means” clause, citing that such a statement gave the US too much leverage. In exchange for their stubbornness, they were punished by the immediate cessation of World Bank, IMF, and US aid. China, the Council’s lone abstainer, did so in exchange for an easement of economic sanctions levied following the Tiananmen Square Massacre.

With the possibility of military action now extremely likely, and given America’s status as a military superpower, it was accepted by US policymakers that the US would have the most boots on the ground during a peace enforcement mission. However, as the American presence in Saudi Arabia became increasingly protracted, the high costs of sustaining force projection were met with domestic belt-tightening. American generals, predicting that a war would last months and result in tens of thousands of casualties, projected costs at roughly $70 billion. As a result, to minimize the financial strain on taxpayers, it became imperative to secure the support of a broad-based coalition. Such a coalition would not only provide much-needed funding but would also further increase the legitimacy of any military actions taken, eliminating rumors of an Orientalist dynamic to the conflict. As a result, securing financial and military commitments from other nations, or ‘burden sharing,’ became the focus of US efforts.

Secretary of State James Baker. Terry Ashe /The Life Images Collection/ Getty

Working in conjunction with Ambassador Pickering, Secretary of State Baker embarked on an international fundraising mission, nicknamed the ‘Tin Cup Tour.’ Traveling to nine countries over 11 days, Baker secured about $61 billion, covering more than 80% of the war’s total cost. The lion’s share of the contribution, roughly $36 billion, came from the oil-rich GCC nations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, who had the most to lose if a US withdrawal were to occur. According to Baker: the GCC “weren’t going to argue over dollars,” since they needed American troops. 

Citing that their constitutions had forbidden foreign military intervention, Japan and Germany contributed roughly $16 billion to the war effort as measures of good faith, dispelling any notions of freeloading. In addition to securing financial assistance, Baker secured unexpected military contributions from several nations through a series of quid-pro-quo deals. Most notably, in exchange for eliminating a $7 billion debt, Egypt pledged 45,000 troops, the largest commitment made by a non-Gulf member of the Arab League. In addition, Syria, a longtime US adversary, also pledged troops in an attempt to improve relations with the US. Baker’s efforts had brought “the conservative Saudi monarchy, the militant Syrian regime, and the moderate Egyptian regime” together to fight against Iraqi aggression.

US soldiers stand watch in Saudi Arabia. Pascal Guyot/AFP/Getty Images

Despite Saddam’s best efforts to exploit the Coalition’s diversity to his advantage, both through the use of Western hostages and linkage to the controversial Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, as the January 15th deadline neared, a broad-based coalition of 34 nations stood unwavering, ready to take the fight to Saddam. Under the unified command of US General Norman Schwarzkopf, Coalition forces began Operation Desert Storm on January 16th to affect “the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait” to restore Kuwait’s legitimate government. As per ‘Shock and Awe’ doctrine, Coalition aircraft, flying from bases in Saudi Arabia, quickly gained air superiority and bombed the Iraqi Air Force into submission. Following the airstrikes, ground forces overwhelmed Iraqi positions, pushing Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and back into Iraq, ending the war in just 42 days.

Holistically, the Gulf War was a resounding success. Saddam’s hegemonic aspirations were checked by a broad-based multinational coalition that would have been unfathomable a decade earlier, made possible by skillful US diplomacy, and legitimized by a series of UN Resolutions. While critics have since argued that Desert Storm planners ignored the long-term political implications of an invasion, such criticisms were made with the benefit of hindsight and do not find fault in the diplomatic process itself. As a result, despite the Gulf War’s changing legacy, what remains true is that it was a remarkable episode of international cooperation. The initiative exhibited by domestic leaders such as President Bush, Ambassador Pickering, and Secretary Baker, in conjunction with other world leaders, serves as a shining example of how unilateral diplomacy can be utilized to overcome collective action problems on an international scale. 

January 13, 2021 0 comment
5 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
FeaturedGeopoliticsGlobalizationHistoryHuman RightsHumanitarian AidSecurity and Conflict

A Call to Amend the Security Council Veto

written by Annabelle Werner

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the global powers came together to create an intergovernmental organization, the United Nations, that would facilitate diplomacy and “save the world from the scourges of war.” The spirit of the UN Charter was to create an international community that would prevent a disastrous third world war in the nuclear age and establish legal procedures and forums to address the world’s darkest problems. Since then, the United Nations has saved countless human lives and acted as a mechanism for preserving and building peace. However, there are many significant structural problems in the institutions of the international community. Multilateral humanitarian intervention, or the deployment of a multilateral peacekeeping force to halt genocide and crimes against humanity, is one of the most controversial actions of the UN. One should be critical of the effectiveness of Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter which allows the permanent members of the Security Council to veto resolutions for this type of military intervention.

The victors of the war had the most influence in forming the laws for this new international agency and for establishing new diplomatic norms. For example, the Allied powers organized the Nuremburg Trials to hold leaders who committed genocide and crimes against humanity during the war accountable. But because the winners, the Allies, were holding the trials, only Nazi leaders were tried for war crimes. The Allied powers also created the legal structure for the Security Council, and the US especially advocated for the veto power because it was an added protection of American domestic sovereignty. But the veto power has continually inhibited the functions of the Council, especially humanitarian intervention, and conflicted with the spirit of the UN Charter.

Multilateral humanitarian intervention exists to protect those who are suffering from the worst of crimes, crimes which are perpetrated by the victim’s own state. And while the UN recognizes the sovereignty of each of its member states and functions in an anarchic international system with no higher enforcement, if a state were to begin systemically exterminating its own people, the UN has the authority under international law to intervene with peacekeeping forces. Thus, multilateral humanitarian intervention is one of the two exceptions to the UN Charter’s ban on the use of force. The deployment of peacekeeping forces is authorized by the Security Council, who is bestowed with this authority because of Article 42 of the Charter. The permanent five (P5) members of the Security Council, the U.S., the U.K., Russia, France, and China, all have veto power when considering resolutions that authorize multilateral humanitarian intervention. Ten rotating non permanent members also vote on related issues and nine affirmative votes are needed to approve a resolution, but one veto from any of the P5 stops it from passing. This presents a problem when factoring in geopolitics and international relations into how the Council votes.

If a P5 nation decides that an act of humanitarian intervention would not be in their interest domestically, or in the interest of their allies, they can stop it from happening. This hypocrisy has been cited as a reason for a failure of preventing or halting genocide in the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Syria among other cases. Some would argue that multilateral humanitarian intervention should rarely ever be used and that the veto power encourages the Council to keep this type of resolution as a last resort. However, because this intervention is only ever considered in emergency situations, delay only means death for those affected. The Security Council veto promotes inaction by allowing a select few states the ability to act in their own interests at the expense of protecting human life.

It’s also important to remember that humanitarian intervention, which is a use of force, is only allowed as an exception under international law. One of the fundamental purposes of the UN is to prevent war and thus the UN Charter bans the use of force in Article 2(4). This law states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Yet, the UN also codifies two major exceptions. The first is outlined in Article 51, which makes an exception for cases of individual or collective self-defense as no state would have signed a treaty that prohibited them from striking back after an attack. The other exception, outlined in Article 42, allows the use of force with Security Council approval if it is conducted in the spirit of Chapter V or “maintenance of international peace and security”. The UN gave themselves the power to intervene in another state if international peace is at stake. The exact law that details the structure of the Security Council veto on this type of force is enumerated under “Article 27 (3)…[which] establishes that all substantive decisions of the Council must be made with ‘the concurring votes of the permanent members’”; it also requires 9 affirmative votes out of both the 5 permanent and 10 rotating members to move forward with multilateral action, but the P5 are the only states with the ability to perpetuate inaction by dismissing a draft resolution. Historically, Article 27 (3) becomes problematic when most members (9 or more) will agree on a resolution and then one P5 state halts the process.

Syria has become a visceral example of how gridlocked the Security Council can become. The Syrian conflict began in 2011 when the revolutions of the Arab Spring reached Syrian borders. Assad’s regime began using violence against protestors and turmoil swelled. A civil war began, drawing in many other countries and ravaging the country for the last decade. According to the Human Rights Watch “World Report” that covered the events of 2018,

“The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a monitoring group based in the UK, estimated the death toll since the start of the war to be as high as 511,000 as of March 2018. Years of relentless fighting left 6.6 million displaced internally and 5.6 million around the world, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)”.

Despite the desperate circumstances and the mass migration into Europe, the Security Council was again deadlocked. Russia supported Assad’s regime and vetoed any military intervention. The Syrian people have since suffered from the following human rights violations, described in the The World Report, such as chemical weapon attacks, arbitrary detention, and forced disappearances conducted by Assad’s government, as well as indiscriminate attacks by a Syrian-Russian alliance, persecution by non-state armed groups, deaths and displacement from Turkish military offenses, and violations by US-backed and US-Led coalitions; all of these human rights issues contributed to the disastrous displacement crisis. Because Russia has domestic interests in backing Assad, the Security Council remains deadlocked and no legal military intervention can occur. Instead, other illegal uses of force are occurring, and Assad’s regime continues operating with impunity. In a July 2020 UN Report, the Commission of Inquiry on Syria found “fresh evidence of war crimes committed by all sides in the Syrian Conflict”. The conflict and humanitarian disaster continues on. Hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost and entire cities have been displaced as the veto power halts legal international help.

There are various proposed legal Security Council reforms including: abolishing the veto and then expanding permanent membership to five other states or supporting the resolution “Responsibility Not to Veto” where P5 members’ veto power would not apply to military intervention related to genocide prevention. While these propositions have their own faults, a change to the legal structure of the Security Council is needed to prevent further inaction.

One proposed solution is to abolish Article 27 (3) and expand permanent membership to five other states from differing regions of the world. The reasoning behind this solution comes from a historical analysis of the UN structure. During the creation of the UN in 1945, the Council consisted of five permanent members and only six non-permanent members because the total number of members of the UN was only 51. Following decolonization, the number of states in the UN grew and by 1963, there were 113 member states. In response, an amendment to the Charter was made and went into effect in 1965 to add 4 more elected seats of nonpermanent members; this expanded the total number of members in the Security Council to 15. But now, the UN has 193 members and the Charter hasn’t been amended in 55 years; there are no permanent member countries from Latin America, Africa, or Southeast Asia. One solution is to expand the number of states from 15 to 20 and abolish the veto power. This would provide more representation to other parts of the world and reflect the global changes in international relations that have occurred in the half of a century since the last amendment. In addition, this idea could help solve the gridlock problem caused by the veto, which realistically occurs when all countries are in agreement except for one P5 state. The complications associated with this resolution lie in selecting the states that would form this new Council. One scholar described the frustration of diplomats trying to pass Security Council reforms when he states, “Beyond the idea of expansion, any consensus falls apart, with fierce regional rivalries over who might gain new permanent seats making any changes problematic, if not impossible”. The decision of which states can be on the new Security Council has also produced gridlock in moving forward with reforms.

Another possible solution is the acceptance of the “Responsibility Not to Veto” or the RN2V initiative which is associated with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. R2P was a paradigm shift in the early 2000s that changed how the international community viewed state sovereignty when faced with atrocious human rights violations; it was in reaction to the failures of the UN to stop the genocides of the 90s, including Rwanda and Srebrenica. R2P claims that the international community has a responsibility to protect citizens of other countries if their states begin to commit egregious human rights violations against them; it thus views sovereignty as a responsibility which could be revoked by the international community on the grounds that the state is committing a crime so atrocious and offensive, they have disrupted international peace. The RN2V is an initiative to eliminate the deadlock of the Security Council veto so that humanitarian intervention can be effectively applied. More specifically, the RN2V requires that “‘[t]he Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support’”. This initiative has met resistance from most of the P5, but has actually found support from France. The Official French diplomatic website states,

“…in 2013 France launched an initiative proposing a collective and voluntary agreement by permanent members of the Security Council whereby permanent members shall not exercise the right to veto in the event of mass atrocities. The Security Council’s ability to prevent or put an end to situations of mass atrocities is key to its legitimacy. As of September 2020, the political declaration of support to this initiative, carried by France and Mexico, had been approved by 105 countries”.

Like the previous solution of expanding P5 membership, which France also supports, many of the complications lie in the process of implementing these new laws. What will convince the P5 to sacrifice their own power? In addition, the RN2V initiative “explores the interaction of power and law, and the role of secondary rules therein…. Hence, the legitimacy crisis of the Security Council is at the same time a legitimacy crisis of international law”. Circumventing international law, even to provide necessary action, only decreases the legitimacy of these conventions. The ability for the P5 to restrain their own power and reform the Security Council represents the complicated interaction of power, politics, and international cooperation.

In conclusion, the inaction created and perpetuated by the Security Council veto is deadly. While the Allied Powers had the most influence in creating new international norms 75 years ago, future international conflicts ought to have leadership that more accurately represents the current international community and not just the domestic interests of the P5. The evidence for reform is clear. There is already a legal precedent for Security Council veto reform as a result of an increase in membership in the United Nations. There are many case studies where the veto power cost hundreds of thousands of lives, and Syria specifically serves as an example of when human life was lost when military intervention could have stopped militias from systematically massacring their own people. The international community already accepts, as a result of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the idea of humanitarian intervention for the purpose of stopping or preventing the worst of humanity’s crimes is needed to maintain international peace. However, Article 27 (3) prevents the UN from fulfilling its duties because it codifies the ability for the most powerful states to act in their own interest at the expense of the most vulnerable.

The Syrian case study also presents another dilemma: how society interprets international law. If states and civil society see case after case of deadlock that is only alleviated by illegal uses of force, what precedent does that set for international norms? The validity of Article 2 (4)’s ban on the use of force will be questioned or even disregarded. The cornerstone purpose of the UN is to prevent war, but unless the Security Council reforms its veto power, the status quo for genocide prevention will be inaction until illegal action is taken: the world cannot afford either. Two possible reforms could include abolishing the veto and expanding permanent members or accepting and promoting the Responsibility Not to Veto. Either of these reforms provide solutions, yet may be difficult to instate because they would require the most powerful states to limit themselves.

The issues of the veto power thus represent the broader dilemma of international cooperation. There is no overarching power, only states with individual interests that must work together to solve humanity’s most complex and dark problems. But, reform has occurred before and these necessary changes could save millions of lives. Reforming the Security Council to check the most powerful will increase the validity of the UN and international law in the future, which will help ensure that international aid will not forget the most vulnerable. Beth Simmons perhaps describes this power dilemma and importance of international human rights law when she states,

“No other international legal regime has aimed quite so consistently, explicitly, and universally at improving the quality of human existence… The key question is not whether crime exists – that is an indubitable point. It is, what and how has international law contributed to the chances that human beings will enjoy their rights more fully than would have been the case in the absence of the major human rights treaties?”

While international legal institutions, like the Security Council, need reform, a world without global forums dedicated to protecting human rights would be much worse. Therefore, reforming these institutions is not a sign of failure, but a commitment to the laws that will protect the human rights of future generations.

October 25, 2020 0 comment
0 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
Middle EastMilitaryNational SecuritySecurity and ConflictTerrorismUnited States

Afghanistan Reconstruction, Security, and their Ramifications on the Peace Process

written by Alex Choy

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

“I don’t think it is responsible to the American taxpayers to leave it like it is. We need a way forward.”

– Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld

Following the Battle of Tora Bora, while the Bush Administration remained steadfast in its commitment to maintaining a light footprint in Afghanistan; taking into account the destabilizing nature of regime change, it began to recognize that the US needed to ‘do right’ from a humanitarian standpoint to preclude an environment conducive to extremism. However, given Afghanistan’s decimated infrastructure, and deteriorated security, it was evident that ‘doing right’ would involve the same extensive, expensive and resource-intensive nation-building that the Bush Administration was reluctant to provide. Therefore, the issue of reconstruction presented yet another contradictory policy prescription, the lasting effects of which, specifically regarding building the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), have continued to stymie the peace process.

But why was the Bush Administration reluctant to engage in nation-building in the first place? In a previous article, I established: 

[Bush] held a personal aversion towards protracted involvement, and an aversion towards using conventional forces to engage in … risky nation-building that would tie “up US troops indefinitely,” and stir up anti-American sentiments.

Given the above, why on the one hand, did the Bush Administration speak of a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Afghanistan, and on the other, condemn nation-building? 

In a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) interview, senior Rumsfeld advisor Marin Strmecki explained that the Administration was only “against [nation-building] in the sense of [the US] being [it’s] preeminent and dominant force.” Therefore, the point of contention was not reconstruction per se, only the potential unilateral commitment that it entailed. Essentially, the Bush Administration was willing to ‘talk the talk,’ setting impressive objectives, but was reluctant to ‘walk the walk’ and put forth the necessary resources. As a result, to address the issue at hand and assuage fears of protracted unilateral commitment, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established.

In addition to hunting anti-Afghan forces and developing the Afghan Government (GIRoA), a large part of ISAF’s mission was to create a self-sufficient ANDSF. Regarding the latter, under a lead nation approach, the US was assigned the responsibility of developing the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Germany, the Afghan National Police (ANP). However, just as how a lack of strategic clarity prevented systematic planning at the national level, the broad-based coalition of ISAF fared similarly. For instance, German officials reported that they believed their role in ISAF was simply to serve as short term advisors; “they did not believe [that they] entailed full responsibility for developing … the entire ANP.” Of course, this view ran contrary to the Bush Administration’s intent for urging the establishment of ISAF in the first place, which was to maintain a light footprint by spreading the burden of reconstruction between multiple nations. Furthermore, reflecting fears of protracted involvement; pre 2004, ISAF was relegated to Kabul to primarily train and advise, with a ragtag ANDSF in charge of securing the remainder of the country.

German soldiers from ISAF German Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) Six patrols the streets of Mazar-e-Sharif with a soldier from the ANA, 2009. NATO Photo.

Consequently, the Bush Administration took nearly unilateral control of ANDSF development, fearing that deteriorated security would threaten Afghan elections and by extension, an expedient handover of responsibility to the newly formed GIRoA. However, it soon became evident that the ANDSF would need to mature significantly before shouldering the full burden of Afghan defense. Therefore, to bridge the gap while ANDSF forces were trained, the US commitment in Afghanistan, and in turn, the intensity and frequency of combat operations, were steadily increased. To reflect the new US-centric effort, a new  military command, the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was created to train the ANDSF. On the other hand, to minimize the duration of a US presence, the Bush Administration also sought to rapidly expand the ANDSF on a condensed timeline, prioritizing quantity over quality. 

With the Iraq War siphoning attention away from Afghanistan, and the Bush Administration’s contradictory prescriptions towards reconstruction guiding a reactionary, rather than proactive approach at the policy level, the stage was set for a Taliban insurgency. In response, ISAF’s mission was expanded beyond Kabul, a decision that some leaders opposed, given their interpretation of ISAF’s role within the train-advise-assist paradigm; with the latter component holding secondary importance. For instance, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien said: “We [Canada] are supporting the expansion of ISAF, and we will work to convince other nations to send troops here… but will we put more troops? We do not have the intention, and we are not able to do this at this moment.” With this dysfunction, ISAF’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan were “akin to punching an adversary with five outstretched fingers rather than one powerful closed fist.”

A different ISAF patch is attached to the backpack of a U.S. Soldier in Helmand Province, 2010. AP Photo/Pier Paolo Cito.

For the ANA, training capacity was increased from two to five kandaks (battalions), while basic training was reduced from 14 to 10 weeks. For the ANP, despite a reported 34,000 ‘trained’ Afghan police officers, only 3,900 had been through the prescribed eight-week basic course, with the remainder only having attended a two-week introductory course. The rapid expansion of the ANDSF led to them becoming “miserably under-resourced,” and according to General Barry McCaffery, such circumstances were a “major morale factor for the force.” However, despite these issues, the ambitious Bush Administration continued to push for rapid expansion, threatening the GIRoA with reductions in funding if they did not comply. 

Undertrained and underequipped, the ANDSF did not stand a chance against a resurgent Taliban during the latter half of 2008. Infamously, one such attack overran a US Combat Outpost in Kamdesh, resulting in the tragic deaths of eight US Soldiers and 27 wounded, following their betrayal by the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and abandonment by their ANA contingent.

Despite these signals, expediency, rather than responsibility, would continue to characterize US policy under the Obama Administration, as the President called for a short ‘surge’ in activity “to weaken the Taliban and improve the ANDSF,” before a 2014 withdrawal. The surge, which was intended to bring the war to a quick end, incentivized corruption by flooding the rentier state with a tsunami of cash, digging Afghanistan deeper into a kleptocratic grave. For example, Afghan civilians reported prolific extortion by ANDSF forces, with “two-thirds of police checkpoints charging illegal tolls” in 2013. Subsequently, in a survey conducted by ISAF between 2010 and 2012, Afghans ranked corruption as one of the top three reasons why they “choose to support the Taliban instead of the government.” 

Subsequently, with the end of the surge and scheduled drawdown of offensive combat operations in 2014, ISAF was dissolved, and Operation Resolute Support (ORS) was initiated to achieve ‘peace with honor’ by handing over responsibility to the GIRoA and ANDSF. Accordingly, US troop numbers dropped to just 16,100 advisors, from a peak of 100,000 combat troops in 2011. 

Unsurprisingly, the drawdown emboldened insurgent forces and instead of proving their self-sufficiency, the ANDSF suffered major failures, most notably the fall of Kunduz City in 2015. According to eyewitness accounts, during the battle, “a chaotic environment quickly spread and government officials, ALP commanders and … ANA officers fled to the … airport, leaving [the city] effectively leaderless.” This scene, reminiscent of South Vietnamese soldiers’ actions during the fall of Saigon, was certainly a reality check for policymakers.

 An ANA soldier sits in front of a closed shop in Kunduz City, 2016. Reuters/Nasir Wakif.

For many in the US Government, it became evident that forcing western solutions onto a largely illiterate population had created unsustainable dependencies on foreign assistance. During the surge, the tsunami of funding and military advisors for ANDSF development created a force that was “a carbon copy of US doctrine” and Afghan commanders were “addicted to air support,” a combat enabler inorganic to their organization. Given the pressure generated by the Obama Administration’s hard deadline, indigenous solutions were replaced with western ones, and a blind eye was turned towards corruption, because doing so was expedient given the time constraint. Former US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Senior Advisor Barnett Rubin explained: “We did what we knew [in Afghanistan] … not what needed to be done.” 

2-12 Infantry soldiers prepare to move from cover during an attack by anti-Afghan forces in Kunar Province, 2010. US Army Photo/SSG Gary A. Witte

If the surge incentivized corruption and produced a deficient ANDSF, why wasn’t it remediated under the Obama Administration?

As the 2014 deadline neared, the top-down pressure from the Obama White House to report success up the chain of command, outweighed demands for accountability. For instance, ANDSF trainers were encouraged by their commanders to bolster ANA and ANP competence assessments in order to present Washington with a facade of higher numbers of combat-ready units. In a 2015 interview with SIGAR, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn questioned: “So, if we are doing such a great job, why does it feel like we are losing?” Answering his own question, he remarked, no “commander is going to leave Afghanistan …  and say, you know what, we didn’t accomplish that mission. So, the next guy that shows up finds it screwed up.” By placing a time constraint on ‘winning,’ the Obama Administration inadvertently stymied a chance for victory, and peace. Consequently, as of 2020, American and Coalition advisors remain in Afghanistan, and despite efforts to broker a negotiated settlement, the Coalition’s resolve seems to be shrinking, while the Taliban’s grows. 

President Trump says the US forces were to stay in Afghanistan ‘until such time as we have a deal, or we have total victory, and they want to make a deal very badly,’ 2019. Reuters/Tom Brenner

Enter the current administration. 

Addressing his generals, President Trump reportedly exclaimed: “You guys have created this situation. It’s been a disaster. You’re the architects of this mess in Afghanistan … you haven’t been able to fix it, and you’re making it worse.” Judging from the equanimous American acceptance of the capture of Saigon due to the widespread popularity for a withdrawal from Vietnam, given the similar public support for a withdrawal from Afghanistan, the President has little to worry in terms of blowback in the form of domestic opinion. However, in regard to international prestige and credibility, some critics of the peace deal, such as Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, claim that by withdrawing, “the US will cast further doubt on [its] willingness to sustain a leading role in the world.” Such qualms may be a victim of the sunk cost fallacy and ‘press-on-itis,’ which is the unwise tendency to persist with a plan that is failing, especially after considerable investments have been dedicated.

Mark Hannah, a senior fellow at the Eurasia Group Foundation puts it succinctly:

“We’re going into the 20th year of this war where people who were not even born on Sept. 11 are being called to serve [in Afghanistan],” Hannah said. “I think there’s a sense that … the original motivation for going into Afghanistan in the first place has receded into the rearview mirror.” 

During the the 2020 Democratic Presidential Debates, Rep. (D-Hawaii), combat veteran and member of the House Armed Services Committee: Tulsi Gabbard, asserted that “we [the US] are no better off in Afghanistan today than we were when this war began,” and promised to bring all US troops home within her first year if elected President.

Rep. (D-Hawaii) and Soldier Tulsi Gabbard.

It is time for policymakers to join Rep. Gabbard and President Trump in making a bipartisan and definitive assessment of whether the sheer prospect of remaining embroiled in a never-ending quagmire will tarnish America’s international reputation more than coming to a negotiated settlement ever will. 

October 4, 2020 0 comment
2 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
Newer Posts
Older Posts