Security and Conflict

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Former DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il and Russian President Vladimir Putin

Europe Geopolitics Middle East Security and Conflict

Looking in the Mirror: Dukes of Anarchy

written by Changyeun Hahn

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, better known as “North Korea” is led by Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong-Un, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army. About 4600 miles away, the Syrian Arab Republic is led by President Bashar al-Assad, a leader with a much shorter title. Although the two countries are geographically distant and not often considered to be politically linked, they share a unique feature: both are run by leaders whose titles were heirlooms.

These two “democracies” are extremely relevant in today’s international affairs despite their relatively tiny economies. The population of both countries combined is 44.28 million. In comparison the population of US is 326.3 million. Economically, Syria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010 was $60 billion. North Korea’s GDP in 2015 was $16.12 billion. Comparatively, the GDP of the US is $18036.7 billion. Two Davids standing on the same ground as Goliath. These heirs have leveraged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) to stay in the international spotlight.

In 1953, Korea was divided into two with the establishment of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Syngman Rhee became the president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Kim Il Sung became the ruler of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea); North Korea was determined to follow the communism it found in the Soviet sphere, while the South was inspired by US capitalism. The 38th parallel separating the two countries also symbolized an international divide: the US supported the South, and China supported the North. The image of North Korea as a land of famished children and oppressed people was not always the case. In fact, during the 50s and 60s, North Korea had a fast growing economy while South Korea struggled with a lack of agricultural resources and was dependent on significant US aid; at the time, North Korea was an enviable land. However, South Korea developed technology and saw economic growth in the early 2000s, while North Korea withered into the state it is in today. Under the leadership of President Park Chung-Hee, South Korean policies focused on looser policies for economic giants, which allowed it to compete in the world market with companies like Samsung and LG. Furthermore, instead of taking the advice of the US to crackdown on corrupt businessmen, South Korean policies took their bank shares and invested them in import-substitution industries. This unconventional method proved effective and the South Korean economy grew exponentially within just a few decades. Meanwhile, North Korean economy dwindled rapidly. Regardless of the state of the nation, the Kim regime continued to stay in power.

While Japanese rule in Korea led to a civil war, after the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the French-ruled Syria managed to gain independence with the help of Britain, while remaining intact. In 1943, the country had its first election. However, the initial years of independence were not calm. After many coups, Baathist army officers took control of the government in 1963. Three years later, Salah Jadid led an internal coup and Hafez Assad became the defense minister. In 1970, Hafez Assad overthrew then- President Nur al-Din al-Atasi and became the president of Syria. He continued rule until his death, when his son, Bashar Assad took over.

The current leaders of both countries have kept the same ideologies of their fathers but have changed priorities in their domestic, defense, and foreign policies. Despite domestic and international resistance, both leaders have also managed to remain in power.

Domestically, Kim Jong-Un has not alleviated the humanitarian crisis faced by his people. In fact, during his leadership, the number of executions has been staggering. The Dear Respected Comrade even had his own uncle executed. However, when he first came to power, he did put effort into improving public infrastructure. Still, there has been no noticeable difference in the treatment of North Koreans or the overall quality of life in the country. Many have suggested that due to the relatively short transition period from Kim Jong-Il to Kim Jong-Un, the current leader does not hold the same level of respect that his father once did. He also does not have the close-knit advisors that his father had.

Domestically, Bashar al- Assad has a bigger problem on hand than his father Hafez did decades ago. There is no debate that Hafez al- Assad in the Hama massacres showed little regard for his people’s lives, slaughtering 20,000 Syrians. About three decades later, in 2016, his son dropped 13,000 barrel bombs onto his own people. However, with the current war in the region, and especially its role as a proxy war for Russia, US, Iran, and the Sunni countries in the region, the level of chaos is incomparable. In the beginning of his rule, Bashar al-Assad suggested his openness to a more democratic nation, while specifying that it would not look like Western democracy. However, over time, the young leader has used the barbaric tactics of his father and simply worsened the situation. A part of this may be due to the fact that Bashar al- Assad was not groomed to be the next leader, but only became so after the death of his older brother Basil al- Assad.

Both heirs have undoubtedly committed human rights violations. North Korea has been under continuous scrutiny by organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for its concentration camps. However, recently, especially after the April 2017 chemical bombings, human rights violations in Syria have garnered much international attention. Regardless, both countries have not shown much regard for international shaming. Both leaders also continue using the methods of torture utilized by their fathers.

With regards to defense policy, which is tightly interwoven in the foreign policies of both countries, Kim Jong-Un and Bashar al- Assad have become more aggressive than their fathers and have relied more heavily on WMD programs.

Since losing wealth and power, North Korea has resorted to brinksmanship–making threats that are only significant due to the nuclear power it possesses. This tactic was also utilized by the current dictator’s predecessor and father, Kim Jong-Il. In 2012, North Korea fired multiple artillery shells which resulted in a retaliatory attack by South Korea.

While the country has made brazen threats, the US stance on the issue has been heavily influenced by North Korea-China relations. Until May 2017, there was little evidence that China will abandon its “little brother”. In fact in 2016, when Kim Jong Un conducted nuclear tests, Chinese politicians continue to visit North Korea and deepen relations, instead of reprimanding the country. However, as Kim Jong-Un continued to invest and hasten its nuclear program, its relationship with China has been significantly strained. In contrast, the previous Kim dictators had been very careful to not upset China.

An easy example of what North Korea-China relations would look like to the West if the country did not have nuclear weapons can be found by looking at Syria-Russia relations. President Assad has been surviving solely with Russian support. Publically, Russia has vocalized repeatedly throughout the war for NATO to stay away from Syria. The current chaos in the country has become the home to a proxy war where US-Russia relations are being challenged. Despite Russia’s comments towards NATO, American involvement in the region has increased under the Trump administration. In order to protect its ally, Russia has continued to send military arms to Syria, allowing it to combat the rebel groups in the region. Russia is involved in Syria to protect its access to the Black Sea- more specifically the port of Tartus- which is only possible through the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, with the Assad regime gaining power in the region, there is little reason to expect Russia to stop supporting Bashar Assad.

The Syria-Russia alliance dates back four decades and has only been strengthened by. US involvement in the region. Although there are other countries where the government targets its people, like the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, it is the involvement of major powers in this proxy war that has kept Syria at the center of global issues. On the other hand, the horrors in North Korea are not new, but the country gained attention as Kim Jong-Un has heavily focused on improving its nuclear program.

Although both chemical and nuclear bombs are WMDs, the reality is that nuclear bombs create a bigger existential threat for the entire world. As the threats made by the Kim dynasty become more and more tangible, the international community has become more involved. Simultaneously, as the North Korean’s capabilities improve, Kim Jong-Un has been more brazen and willing to separate from his country’s ‘big brother’, China. The reality is that both countries are slaughtering their own people, but nuclear weapons seriously challenge other countries’ citizens and therefore give Kim Jong-Un more voice in the international arena. The chemical bombs that Assad has been utilizing, although horrific, mainly call for international human rights intervention. There is little threat to the outside world and thus the conversation has more heavily involved Russia. Without Russia, there is little chance for Assad to survive; however, Kim Jong-Un is outdoing his father’s legacy and creating a more robust nuclear program, albeit more dangerous, international ground.

September 9, 2017 0 comment

at the Al Jazeera broadcast center in Doha, Qatar

Al Jazeera English newsroom at the Doha, Qatar center

Geopolitics Middle East Security and Conflict

Al Jazeera and the Gulf Crisis: Consequences of Partial Press Freedom

written by Jemma Tan

The regularly tumultuous region of the Middle East was sent into an unprecedented tailspin last month when the Gulf Cooperation Council, a group of five Arab states spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, cut diplomatic ties with Qatar. Though the ongoing crisis is sudden, it is by no means unprompted. Saudi Arabia has had long-running frustrations with Qatari foreign policy, which do not wholly conform to that of other Arab countries.

The two most non-conformist, and thus most contentious, tenets of Qatari foreign policy are its friendly relations with Iran, considered to be a Shiite rival to Saudi authority within the region, and its historical support of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was designated by Saudi Arabia as a terrorist organization in 2014. Saudi Arabia’s cites what it calls Qatari support for terrorism as the official justification for the blockade, charges that the emirate denies.

While Qatar and Saudi Arabia publicly quarrel over the did-nots and did-toos of terrorist involvement, a less conspicuous, equally pressing issue emerges in the form of Al Jazeera. The future of the Qatari broadcast network is threatened by the country’s recent isolation. From its inception in the 1990s, the network has historically rankled interregional tensions with its critiques of Arab leaders. This is exemplified in its extensive coverage of the Arab Spring, where it played a critical role in buoying public awareness on pro-democracy protests in North Africa, at the cost of deepening mistrust from its Arab neighbors. A month before the crisis, the Al Jazeera website was banned by four of the five members of the GCC. In the days since, the company’s television broadcasts have been blocked in Saudi Arabia. On June 9th, it was the victim of a cyberattack across all its media platforms, though no country has claimed responsibility for the hack.

As Saudi bloc’s efforts to cut off Qatar increase in intensity, Al Jazeera may not be able to scrape by intact. Saudi Arabia and its supporters are betting that increased diplomatic and economic restrictions will force Qatar’s hand. To ease regional tensions, the rest of the Gulf States will expect Qatar to temper its ambitions and maintain an orthodox foreign policy. With its history of provocative news pieces, especially in the post-Arab Spring years, Al Jazeera will most certainly be on the list of negotiations.

Despite the Qatari foreign minister’s insistence that Al Jazeera is non-negotiable, the odds look stacked against the emirate. In a political move calculated to impressive precision, the Saudi Arabians have left the Qatari government scrambling for international allies. With dually vested interests in Saudi and Qatari oil, much of the non-Arab world has refrained from involving themselves in the conflict. Domestically, Qatari citizens have begun to stock up on resources, stirring local fears of a possible food crisis if the blockade is sustained. Were Qatar to hold out against the GCC, Al Jazeera would still endure regional losses in viewership, hindering its broadcasting capabilities.

The GCC has put Al Jazeera at the uncomfortable cross-hairs of a lose-lose situation. Fellow news outlets, such as the BBC and Huffington Post, are anxious over whether Al Jazeera can survive with these “new challenges.” However, Al Jazeera’s sustainability cannot simply be viewed as a nascent concern. Its vulnerability is not a sudden result of the blockade, but symptomatic of persisting issues regarding democratic development in the Middle East.

The network is generously funded by the ruling House of Thani, which impedes full editorial independence. In 2016, Freedom House gave the country a grade of 70 for press freedom (100 being the least free). While Al Jazeera has not been shy about criticizing the policies of its neighbors, questioning the Qatari government is off-limits. State law authorizes the prosecution of anyone who publishes or shares information deemed to violate “social values or principles” with possible criminal prosecution.

As a result, no matter how much Al Jazeera professes supposed freedom of speech, Qatar’s neighbors cannot see it as anything other than a mouthpiece for the House of Thani. It is the product of patchwork democratization, where a liberal institution like a free press is adopted only to the extent that it serves states’ interest. This same phenomenon can be seen throughout the Middle East, in so-called “free elections” in Iran or the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum. These pseudo-free procedures soften, perhaps even legitimize, authoritarian governments, but are unsustainable in the long-term.

True, had Qatar given Al Jazeera full independence, Saudi hostility towards the network would not have diminished in the least. But Al Jazeera’s existence would be equally threatened had they chosen to level their criticisms towards their own government. The GCC has only swung at an already cracked glass.

Despite quality reporting, Al Jazeera was always institutionally designed to fold when circumstances become too inconvenient. After all, it has set its own precedent. In 2007, Al Jazeera scaled down the intensity of its Saudi critiques in response to regional fears of Iranian nuclear development. Ten years later, little has changed. The Gulf States are equally frustrated and their demands are greater. Despite the staunchness of the Qatari government, their hopes are slim. It was not too much freedom that has jeopardized Al Jazeera, but too little.

July 15, 2017 0 comment

Students clash with National Guards members during an opposition demontration against the government of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Leo Ramirez/Flickr, 2015. CC0 3.0

Featured Security and Conflict South America

Venezuela’s Resource Curse

written by Katie Linder

Venezuela’s backslide has been rapid and devastating. Perhaps the most stunning example of the deterioration of the state has been the reemergence of malaria. By 1960 Venezuela had eradicated the disease from its urban areas, which helped set it on a path to economic prosperity for the next few decades. Despite political turmoil and a recession in the late 20th century, Venezuela was regarded as the wealthiest nation in South America up through 2001. Its comfortable perch atop the largest proven petroleum reserves in the world seemed to ensure lasting dominance in the region. Flashforward to today, malaria has spread at the highest levels in 75 years, and sick and dying people are met by extreme shortages of medical supplies in crumbling hospitals. The nation is now engulfed by massive political protests, sparked by widespread frustration over the failing healthcare system, severe shortages of food and rampant government corruption. While the situation may perplex the outside observer, a culmination of problems had been simmering for decades. Above all, the massive reserves of oil that were expected to be a catalyst to prosperity have instead catalyzed its downfall. Venezuela, like many other resource rich countries around the world, has fallen victim to the resource curse.

The first seeds of the crisis were planted in 1999, when the charismatic and deeply polarizing president, Hugo Chavez, came to power. As the price of oil soared in the beginning of the 21st century, Chavez amped up public spending and became the champion of the lower class. His policies – such as fixing the price of foodstuffs and using resource rents to build homes and clinics for the poor – were fueled by profits from the state-run oil company, PDVSA. The initially prosperous regime hinged entirely on the performance of oil in the world markets. When Chavez passed away in 2013, this fragile system was inherited by his political successor, Nícolas Maduro.

In 2014 oil prices fell, PDVSA saw its profits dry up and Venezuela began its tailspin. By several measures, Venezuela has the world’s worst performing economy. In 2016 inflation rose by an astounding 800% and the economy contracted by 18.6%. Hyperinflation has obliterated the salaries of many middle class citizens. Desperate to make ends meet, people have flocked from cities to the gold mines. The swampy mines are a breeding ground for malaria infested mosquitos, and thus are culpable for the return of the disease. No longer able to rely on profits from PDVSA to import essential goods, the effects of the disease have been exacerbated by severe shortages of medicine. Hospitals lack access to such basic necessities as sutures, gloves and electricity. Similarly, the plummeting value of the bolivar has limited Venezuela’s capacity to afford basic food imports, and as a result the nation faces severe food shortages. Today buying groceries entails waiting in line for hours, with no guarantee of getting what you came for.

Massive political protests and and civil unrest have erupted around the nation as citizens grow increasingly frustrated by Maduro’s inaction. Rather than instituting economic reform he has pointed a finger at the US and political adversaries, and accused them of crafting an “economic war” to ruin the country. Unable to address the crisis and lacking in Chavez’s charisma, Maduro has become deeply unpopular with the Venezuelan people. His approval rating fell to a nine month low of 21% in July 2016. Maduro has reacted by tightening his grip on power and violently suppressing protests. Calls for a referendum to oust him from the presidency have thus far been stamped out by the National Electoral Council, and in March the Supreme Court annulled the democratically elected National Assembly. For all intents and purposes, Maduro has assumed the role of dictator with minimal checks and balances on his power.

Unfortunately, Maduro’s failure to acknowledge the root cause of the crisis has made it impossible for any meaningful changes to occur. Venezuela’s economic woes are not the design of political opponents, but rather the result of the gross mismanagement of oil wealth. The problem may seem counterintuitive; massive reserves of crude oil should be a blessing to a developing country. Nonetheless, this phenomenon can be observed in resource rich countries all over the world. The resource curse is multifaceted and complex, however there are three components that are especially relevant to Venezuela’s current situation: Dutch disease, trade shocks and corruption. Dutch disease occurs when resource exports cause a country’s currency to rise in value, which makes other export activities – such as manufacturing – uncompetitive in world markets, and effectively crowds them out. Dutch disease creates an economy that is vulnerable to trade shocks and the volatility of natural resource revenues. In Venezuela, crude oil now accounts for 96% of total exports, and thus the economy is extremely sensitive to any fluctuations in oil prices.

Perhaps the most fundamental consequence of the resource curse in Venezuela, however, has been widespread corruption. The government’s ability to use oil wealth to fund projects decreases tax burdens placed on its citizens. While this may seem like a benefit to Venezuelans, it also has the effect of decreasing the government’s accountability. Massive influxes of oil wealth combined with weak institutions and low transparency have created an environment of rampant corruption.

The good news is that the resource curse can be broken. The evidence is in the case of Botswana. Botswana is one of the most resource-rich countries in the world, especially notable for its abundance of diamonds. Unlike most resource-rich developing countries, Botswana has experienced marked economic growth and stability for the past several decades. In fact, the government has been so stable that in 2013 the leading diamond conglomerate, Da Beers, relocated its sales department to Botswana’s capital city. Botswana’s success has been attributed to sound democratic institutions and strong private property and anti-corruption laws. Of course, Botswana and Venezuela are different nations with different histories, and thus policies that work in Botswana may not apply to Venezuela. However, it should be noted that corruption in Venezuela has not been a constant. In the 1960s, Venezuela boasted a democratic government with high levels of transparency, which served as a model to other developing Latin American countries. The increase in corruption in the 1970s directly coincided with a boom in the oil industry. If nothing else, Botswana is a testament to the importance of strong institutions and transparency in the management of natural resource wealth.

Venezuela has now reached a breaking point. Maduro repeatedly demonstrates his unwillingness to implement critical reforms, and with each passing day it seems less likely he will surrender power peacefully. A political change is necessary, and as pressure mounts, a regime overthrow appears imminent. Maduro’s successor will have to act quickly to pull Venezuela back from the brink. With proper leadership and reforms, Venezuela could return to pre-crisis oil production within five years, and would be able to import enough basic goods to alleviate crushing shortages. To start, the new government must increase transparency and move away from Chavista socialist economics by adopting market-friendly policies and ending its reliance on PDVSA to fund social programs. In the long-term, major institutional reforms will be necessary to ensure a stable democracy and a prosperous economy. Furthermore, reviving idling manufacturing and agricultural industries will be vital to diversifying the economy and curing Dutch Disease. These changes will not happen overnight. However, with the responsible management of oil wealth and good governance, Venezuela could eventually transform its resource curse into a blessing.

June 6, 2017 0 comment

Photo: ISIS Banner via PBS; CC0 3.0

Featured Middle East Security and Conflict Terrorism

The Key to Defeating ISIS: Ending Sunni Disenfranchisement

written by Maya Yang

Since the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) formed in 2013, the United States has led a frontline fight alongside its allies to degrade and destroy the radical jihadist group. However, ISIS still persists throughout the region, and the US-led coalition’s strategy to defeat the group through primarily military means is flawed, especially where its inability to curb ISIS’s recruitment and outrageous collateral damage is concerned. The US-led coalition’s failures lie primarily in their historical lack of political coordination with the Sunnis. ISIS has thus been able to easily exploit this cleavage and deeply consolidate its roots in disenfranchised Sunni communities. Hence, to improve the effectiveness of the strategy against ISIS, the US-led coalition needs to learn from the past mistakes of Sunni disenfranchisement made by the Bush and Obama administrations, bolster the Sunni voices in Iraq and Syria calling for unity, and ultimately help re-create a strong notion of a unified Sunni community in the region. Only then can the US and its allies gain an upper hand in gradually squeezing out ISIS’s influence and its exploitation of these areas.

Thus far, the approaches taken by US leaders to quell terrorist recruitment have been ineffective because they have all generally lacked Sunni inclusion throughout the region. Since the 2003 Iraq War, both the short-sighted de-Baathification policies of the Bush administration’s state-building efforts and the Obama administration’s lackluster approach towards Syria allowed highly disenfranchised Sunnis in both nations to resort to ISIS for answers, inevitably increasing its influence and strongholds across the region.

After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Bush administration introduced indiscriminate and ultimately detrimental de-Baathification policies. Over the course of a few years, the Iraqi government and military was swiftly purged of all remaining Sunni Baathists from the former regime. In turn, the US Coalition Provisional Authority installed exclusively Shia militias and officials into the government. Such a move quickly marginalized thousands of Sunnis once under Saddam Hussein. As a result, the then-developing militant Sunni group, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) conveniently capitalized on the widespread Sunni disenfranchisement and gained significant support and influence in the region, later rebranding itself into the Islamic State in 2013. The 2003 US-led Coalition Provisional Authority pursued de-Baathification as an attempt to eliminate all remaining Baathist influences from Saddam’s fallen regime in the country. Simultaneously, the Bush administration invited in some of the largest Shia militias of Iraq, who used the new government to further increase their own power in the country. As a consequence, Sunnis became incredibly frightened of being tied to Saddam Hussein and were soon treated as the enemy by the Shias ruling Iraq. Instigated by the US’s short-sighted rebuilding efforts, this overnight reversal of Iraq’s power dynamics drove victimized Sunnis to seek assistance from AQI, the emerging Iraqi affiliate of Al Qaeda that pledged to reassert Sunni control across the country. As increasing Sunnis regarded AQI as a necessary vehicle of protection, the jihadist group expanded and was eventually able to morph into the Islamic State of today.

The Bush administration’s offensive foreign policy created favorable conditions for the emergence of the Sunni military. However, the Obama administration’s passive attitude towards the Syrian civil war was ultimately responsible for allowing the Islamic State to capitalize on the disenfranchisement of “abandoned Sunnis.” Obama’s swift pullout from Iraq in 2012 was initially lauded as a productive step. Nancy Pelosi, the then House Minority Leader praised the move, stating that it honored “the US-Iraq Security Agreement and the wishes of the American people to bring all our troops home.” However, in hindsight Obama’s unwillingness to get involved in Syria has indisputably contributed to the further disenfranchisement of Syrian Sunnis and fuelled the growth of ISIS. Two years after the 2011 uprising, Sunnis harbored increasing hatred for the violently oppressive Assad regime.

During these early years, the Obama administration should have adopted a proactive approach towards Syria and committed its full support to moderate groups of the opposition in exchange for non-sectarian behavior. However, Obama’s refusal to intervene during those critical years conveniently gave more hardline jihadist groups an upper hand in recruitment. Disenfranchised Sunnis increasingly turned towards groups such as the Islamic State for sectarian solidarity and a means of protection, and the jihadist militancy managed to effectively broaden its influence and establish a de-facto capital in the northern Syrian city of Raqqa. As the Islamic State rapidly expanded, its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, flared the sentiments of Sunni disenfranchisement by proclaiming an alleged international conspiracy, accusing the West of encircling and beleaguering this majority sect of Islam. Thus far, the growing fear and beleaguerment felt by the Sunni community in Syria and other regions have served as nothing but ammunition for ISIS’s expansion. In fact, in July 2013, Syria’s then largest rebel faction, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), publicly expressed its willingness to cooperate with ISIS, stating, “ISIS are our brothers who came to help us in a time when other Islamic and Western countries kept silent about the regime’s crime” Once described as the “cornerstone brand of Syria’s moderate opposition, representing the original moderate vision of the revolution,” the FSA has become largely decentralized and currently faces great dysfunction within its ranks. Had the Obama administration crafted US foreign policy during the war’s early years to display a committed willingness to engage with and assist these and other moderate Sunnis in their fight against the Assad regime, they would likely have resisted the calls of extremist groups like ISIS for desperate solutions.

Hence, the new Trump administration needs to seriously modify the existing methods of the US-led coalition against the group and rally the Sunnis. As the frontrunner of this global fight, the United States should acknowledge the potential and importance of of Sunni Muslims in the region to serve as a vanguard proxy to fight the Islamic State. The US should work to help Iraq revive its notion of a resilient and united society from its weak sense of nationalism. This includes bolstering Sunni voices in the country that are already calling for national unity.

The Trump administration cannot afford to demonize Iraq and other Arab countries, as it did so with its repeated (but failed) travel ban attempts. By implementing these actions, the United States will further distance already frustrated Sunnis in fear of international beleaguerment and essentially sleepwalk into al-Baghdadi’s conspiracy. This will result in increased leverage for ISIS and the guaranteed failure of any future American approaches toward cooperating with the region’s Sunni Muslims.

As we witness rising aggression surrounding the Trump administration’s foreign policy, seen from the most recent slew of missile launches targeting Syrian governmental airbases as a response to the Khan Sheikhoun chemical gas attacks, as well as the largest non-nuclear bombings of ISIS caves in Afghanistan, it is clear that the US is taking a much more resolute stance against the Assad regime and ISIS itself. Nonetheless, exclusively resorting to military approaches will not yield any long-term results. Instead, the US needs to further rally the region’s Sunni Muslims in the fight against brutality and radical extremism. No matter what approach the US-coalition eventually settles on, one thing is certain: a continued American passiveness towards engaging with the Sunni community has already and will continue to embolden ISIS’s view that the West has little regard for these Muslims. As a result, Sunni disenfranchisement will continue to rise as it has done since the Iraq War.

The United States and its allies must shift their current approach. Only by acknowledging the disenfranchisement of Sunnis in the region and extending a genuine helping hand will there be any actual hope in degrading and destroying ISIS. In the meantime, ISIS will continue to exacerbate the region’s societal divisions and use the mass Sunni disenfranchisement as a feeding ground for its expansion.

May 3, 2017 0 comment

Gage Skidmore/Wikimedia Commons, 2013; (https://goo.gl/eqLJvN). CC BY-SA 2.0 (https://goo.gl/Ur3SLT).

Featured Geopolitics Security Security and Conflict

Trump’s Positive Decision on Iran Deal May Allow World to Prosper

written by Conor McDonald

To a vast number of political and nuclear scientists, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the United States and Iran is considered to be an extraordinary triumph which will ensure cooperation and peace for the foreseeable future. This feeling is not universal, however, as a great number of international politicians have not hesitated to voice their concerns regarding the JCPOA’s stipulations and the trustworthiness of the Iranian government. Most prominent among these anti-JCPOA politicians has been the recently-elected United States President, Donald J. Trump, at least until recently; it was reported under a week ago that President Trump decided to extend sanctions-relief toward Iran, a baseline admission of his newly-found confidence in the plan. To the chagrin of those who oppose the agreement, the White House’s decision heightens the chance of a longstanding implementation of this plan of action, a choice which will nearly guarantee a more positive future for the planet at large.

To begin to argue the JCPOA’s efficacy, it is crucial to first analyze what the trajectory of the international community would have been if deal was dissected and done away with by the Trump administration, as was originally intended. On the campaign trail, President Trump promised to “police that contract so tough [sic] they don’t have a chance,” but he failed to discuss an American course of action should Iran fail to meet his extremely high standards and militant enforcement. An Iranian breach would result in sanctions being snapped back, unnecessarily impacting both domestic and allied economies. Worse yet, the return of these detrimental sanctions would eviscerate any motivation Iranian President Hassan Rouhani would have to continue abiding by the contract’s obligations, and nuclear research and development would rapidly gain national prominence and public funding. Iranian nuclear findings would inevitably produce successful uranium enrichment exceeding 20% — a number the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) classifies as weapons-grade — and the continuation of Ayatollah Khamenei’s anti-semitic rhetoric would surely impel the nearby state of Israel to take preemptive action against Iran’s power plants. Violent confrontation would ensue, and considering that each of the combatants would presumably be nuclear powers, the world would be none-the-better.

With President Trump having accepted the relative trustworthiness of the Iranian government and the reliability of the JCPOA, however, the Middle East will be spared from this bleak future. Nuclear weapons will be kept out of the hands of an aggressive Iranian regime for at least the next 25 years. President Rouhani has proven that he can successfully abide by the maximum enrichment rate of 3.67%, enough to maintain civil nuclear reactors and utilize for efficient public energy development without endangering nearby nations. Excesses in enriched uranium, both in quantity or in sheer enrichment level, have and will continue to be turned to fuel by the IAEA, not by Iran. The institution of the JCPOA has also successfully hindered the progress made in the underground Iranian Furdow enrichment plant, where evaluations in 2015 revealed that enrichment rates had consistently reached 19.75%. As was outlined in contract, President Rouhani made true on his promise to remove each and every excess centrifuge, or enrichment device, from this underground facility. Iran has proven that a militant enforcement of standards will not be necessary, as Iranian efforts to cooperate have proven sincere and fruitful.

In addition to securing the safety of the United States, Israel, and the world, the continuation of the JCPOA brings an insurmountable number of nations closer to one another, be it directly or indirectly. With signatories including the European Union, China, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, it is made strikingly apparent that this peace-brokering is far from a partisan affair. President Rouhani’s Iran, too, now faces for the first time in decades a potential to strengthen its economy and benefit those who live within its borders, as billions of dollars in sanctions-relief lie in store for the Iranian government. Naive as it may seem, a successful continuation of the JCPOA may potentially better ties between the United States and the often-antagonistic Iran, so long as President Rouhani can continue to meet the established standards. This would help to not only weaken the threats posed by one of the United States’ greatest rivals, but also to weaken the dominating spheres of influence currently held by Russia in the region, courtesy of Syria, Egypt, and, of course, Iran. All in all, should President Donald Trump and the White House continue to view the JCPOA in a positive light, the Middle East, the West, and the world at large will maintain newfound senses of safety and prosperity.

April 26, 2017 0 comment

Photo: Ret. General Wesley K. Clark addresses the conference. Holt Alden via Holt Alden

Featured Security and Conflict Terrorism

President Obama’s Unfinished Drone Legacy

written by Holt Alden

The abundance of news focused on the U.S. presidential election has left little room for the discussion of President Obama’s national security legacy. This intense spotlight on the controversial candidates limited projections of the long-term repercussions of President Obama’s policies and the precedents they have set for the next president. Two weeks ago, UCLA’s Burkle Center for International Relations, in conjunction with the Center for Near Eastern Studies and the International and Comparative Law Program, hosted a conference on President Obama’s drone legacy that specifically focused on the use of weaponized drones against terrorists. The conference consisted of two panels hosting, among others, distinguished Georgetown Law Professor Marty Lederman and Ret. General Wesley K. Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Europe. The panelists spoke at length about international humanitarian law, human rights and the Bush Administration, tying each to President Obama’s foreign policy and national security framework.

Two very different, although not mutually exclusive, perspectives on President Obama were developed throughout the day. The first President Obama was depicted by Lederman and, to some extent, Ret. General Clark, describing President Obama’s use of drones against terrorists as responsible and restrained. They maintained that President Obama has only used weaponized drones in specific armed conflicts, restricting their use under the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) and maintaining the strikes’ legality in terms of international and domestic law. The other President Obama cut a darker figure, described by British attorney and human rights expert Alex Moorhead as a continuation of the Bush Administration’s secrecy and disregard for human rights. Moorehead chastised President Obama’s drone policies as blurring the lines between war and peace, setting dangerous precedents for drone strikes to be unrestricted in terms of geography and temporal scope.

Despite the two characterizations of President Obama, nearly all the panelists agreed on one thing: President Obama’s current drone policies must be amended by his successor. Most of the panelists also concurred that a Congressional oversight committee on drone use would perform an adequate check on presidential power. Moorhead went further, supporting the concretization of PPG into actual law, rather than just policy. Currently, the PPG will only act as a guide for future administrations and can be easily ignored or changed, whereas making it law would codify restrictions on future presidents’ drone use. President Obama’s drone legacy has now moved beyond his control. President-elect Trump must implement Congressional oversight and support new domestic laws restricting the use of weaponized drones to armed conflicts in specific countries for limited periods of time. These steps would protect a positive legacy for President Obama’s drone program, keeping executive power restrained.

Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have pursued counterterrorism policies that are designed to keep Americans safe. Weaponized drone use by the president is governed by two legal frameworks: international humanitarian law (IHL) and domestic statutes. IHL, also known as the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict, legalizes the killing of enemy combatants in an armed conflict. Cardozo Law Professor Deborah Pearlstein specified that killing as a first resort is only legitimate in this context. The classification of terrorists under IHL is key to placing limitations on drone strikes, as some argue that, as “unlawful combatants”, IHL does not apply to terrorists. Pearlstein laid the basic foundation of how terrorists fit into IHL, explaining that conflicts between state and non-state actors are called non-international armed conflicts, or NIACs. Both President Bush and President Obama were able to define and characterize American conflict with terrorist groups through a global NIAC paradigm, controlling the story around its interaction with relatively new legal frameworks and, crucially, new technology. The lack of accountability and transparency regarding drone strikes has kept government policy hidden from American citizens, while rapidly developing technology has kept it from being restricted by domestic legislation or international law. Although the U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda, and now ISIS, seems to fit into the legal NIAC framework, the U.S. insistence on a global NIAC makes U.S. drone strike capabilities dangerously unrestricted in terms of location and time period, leaving questions concerning a timeline for the end of the war on terror and its current global reach unanswered. Pearlstein also argued that as the reach of IHL grows, supplanting domestic criminal law in more situations, the space for human rights law shrinks due to the further enabling and legitimizing of state power over individuals. President Obama’s persistent use of weaponized drones has set dangerous precedents for future administrations and other national governments that may support more extreme use.

Not all the panelists agreed that President Obama has continued the global NIAC against terrorist groups, and used the PPG as a specific example of his restraint. Conor Friedersdorf of The Atlantic stated that drone use is deliberative and discriminate, meaning it can pick out targets with little or no collateral damage. He and Lederman assert that the PPG does enhance these restrictions, setting barriers that further regulate the strikes. While the panelists agreed that the publishing of the PPG improved transparency within the Obama Administration, Moorehead focused on its limitations as a policy guideline, rather than domestic law. President-elect Trump could–and likely will–reject the PPG completely and follow his own interpretations of IHL and domestic law. Pearlstein also argued that transparency is less important than the lack of legal and political accountability. She emphasized the significance of scrutinizing the justifications for using weaponized drones in areas where legitimate and capable government does exist, such as Pakistan.

The creation of a Congressional oversight committee that monitors drone strikes and proposes legislation restricting the use of weaponized drones would create a necessary check on executive power. It would also allow Congress to contribute to the debate concerning the legality of weaponized drone usage outside of traditional battlefields and in sovereign states like Pakistan. Although President-elect Trump will likely reject any transfer of power to Congress, allowing greater congressional oversight would ensure respect for human rights and potentially spread the negative political ramifications of strikes with heavy civilian casualties and those targeting American citizens. A congressional oversight committee is a critical step towards reining in America’s weaponized drone usage. President Obama and other Commanders-in-Chief prefer drone strikes because they pose no risk to the soldiers involved, meaning the political risks of these killings are also lessened. This can incentivize leaders to use deadly force more frequently, an executive power that must be checked immediately. President-elect Trump must also support the codification of the PPG into domestic law, permanently restricting weaponized drone use and cementing a drone legacy of restraint and responsibility. The creation of checks and shared responsibility with respect to weaponized drone use may lead to political gains for both the president and Congress, while also creating spaces for human rights and legal weapons use. President Obama’s drone legacy depends on it.

November 16, 2016 0 comment

the-generation-podcast-official-aligned-words

Featured Geopolitics Middle East Security and Conflict

The Generation Presents: Global Voices, Episode 1: “The Strongman”

written by Sarah Wyman

Donald Trump’s candidacy has redefined how presidential candidates should act and speak, running a campaign that has shocked many Americans. Trump’s huge base of support can be put into context by comparing him to another charismatic leader: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Listen to how the two polarizing figures share common ideals and strategies, understand how each has gained popular support, and consider the repercussions of each of their respective movements.

November 6, 2016 0 comment

Airstrikes in Sana'a, Yemen (May 11, 2015) Ibrahem Qasim

Geopolitics Middle East Security and Conflict

The United Arab Emirates – Why One of the Most Peaceful Countries in the Middle East is Involved in the War in Yemen

written by Maya Yang

Since last March, violence has increased in Yemen’s war between the Iran-backed Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition. The latter, in what many consider a proxy war, aims to restore the Yemeni government and resist Iran’s attempt at flexing its political and religious muscle in the region. The war is also witnessing the growing existential threat of Ansar al-Shari’a, a terrorist organization that the US Department of State designated as an alias of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2010.

Amidst the major political and religious Saudi Arabia-Iran tensions and additional alliance-foe complexities in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is also playing a surprisingly major role in fighting against the Houthi rebels and AQAP, alongside the Saudi-led coalition. Generally known for its secularism and peacefulness, why is this tiny, young Gulf country heavily involved in a war 1,500 kilometers away from home?

The United Arab Emirates, founded by His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan in 1971, has been a member of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) since its establishment in 1981. One of the integral foundations of the GCC is joint military cooperation, to which the Arab members agree to cooperate and defend their sovereignty, stability, and interests from domestic and external threats. The UAE, along with the rest of the predominantly Sunni GCC members, hence have a distinctive reason to resist a Shiite Iran’s attempt to gain influence in the region. The Houthis, aligned with Iran, practice an offshoot of Shi’a Islam known as Zaydism. With a Sunni population of over 80%, the future of Yemen poses great anxiety for the UAE. An alliance with Iran could severely affect its own and the Gulf’s delicate religious stability, should the Iran-backed Houthis prevail in Yemen. It would be particularly detrimental to the Gulf countries if Yemen, a neighboring country with significant territorial size, transforms into a Shi’a dominated government, potentially increasing Iran’s influence in the region at the expense of the UAE’s military and economic interests. Hence, since the beginning of its involvement in the Saudi-led coalition, the UAE has carried out extensive air raids through warplanes against the Houthi rebels.

In addition to Iran-backed Houthi rebels, radical terrorist groups, especially Ansar al-Sharia, pose a potential, yet severe existential threat to the UAE. In recent years, the UAE has arrested several domestic terror cells that were found to be “support networks” for groups with ties to Al Qaeda. The UAE is still a relatively safe country with few terror-related incidents. However, due to the latest rise in terror-related activities throughout the region, the country has nonetheless increased its counter-terrorism security and vigilance throughout the years. The UAE trains and arms local recruits for the fight against AQAP, as well as captures its strongholds in Yemen. In April, with the military support of the Yemeni military and local tribes, the UAE carried out a major Al-Qaeda defeat by securing the Yemeni port city of Mukallah from AQAP. As this city holds Yemen’s second largest port, AQAP has acquired substantial revenue by imposing taxes on the shipment of goods. With this major defeat, the UAE and its local partners managed to choke off one of AQAP’s major sources of financial support.

The UAE’s heavy involvement in Yemen is also attributed to its growing status as a powerful regional trade partner. Less than fifty years old, the country has experienced rapid development and a flourishing economy. Despite its diversifying sources of income, including an ever-expanding tourism industry and robust foreign trade networks, the UAE still remains one of the world’s leading oil producers. Its yearly oil exports contribute to twenty-five percent of the country’s GDP. The UAE heavily depends on Bab-el-Mandab, a narrow but vital strait situated between Yemen and the Horn of Africa that bridges the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In 2013, approximately 3.8 million bbl/d (barrels per day) of crude oil and refined petroleum products flowed through the strait to Europe, the United States, and Asia. If Iran circumvents the Saudi-led coalition through the assistance of the Houthi rebels and gains control over the strait, the trade traffic at Bab-el-Mandab will be heavily impeded. In 2012, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, another narrow strait located in the Persian Gulf where one-fifth of the world’s oil and forty percent of the world’s energy passes. A similar Iranian dominance over Bab-el-Mandab through sea mines, interdiction of trading ships, air and land-based attack systems will greatly affect the UAE’s ability to export its oil. Closure of the strait will prevent the UAE, along with the rest of the Gulf exporters, from reaching the Suez Canal and other pipelines efficiently. If the UAE loses access to the strait, they would have to reroute through the southern tip of Africa, leading to increased transit time and heavier costs. Hence, the UAE needs to exert significant efforts against the Houthi rebels, and thus Iran, to ensure that neither of the two cooperating groups affects traffic flow of the strategically situated strait.

Regional alliances and trade routes aside, perhaps the most significant reason for the UAE’s involvement in Yemen is the opportunity to project itself as a credible, powerful military ally, especially to the United States. As American ties between Turkey and Saudi-Arabia deteriorate, and while Egypt faces domestic challenges, the UAE has emerged in recent years as a staunch ally of the United States. Commonly known as “Little Sparta” by US officials, the UAE is the only Arab country to host an American military base (Al-Dhafra) with F-22 raptors, as well as the US’s busiest overseas port of call, Jebel Ali. As the country continues to transform into one of the world’s leading commerce and financial hubs, Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince, His Highness Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, has sought to strengthen the Emirati military to also become regionally and internationally influential. Combined with its fierce anti-Islamist rhetoric, renowned women empowerment, and secularism, the UAE’s young yet powerful military has greatly appealed to the West. While neighboring countries, such as Qatar, downplayed its role in raids against regional extremists, the UAE proudly projected images of Major Mariam al-Mansouri, the female fighter pilot, known internationally for her involvement in the strikes against the Islamic State. The war in Yemen thus serves as a strategic opportunity for the UAE to show the world its ability to effectively mobilize forces and assure the United States, one of its main military partners, that it is indeed a credible, reliable regional ally.

As the United Arab Emirates continues to fight in the war in Yemen, there are evidently many costs, including troop losses through its heavy involvement in military operations overseas. Despite this, the UAE serves as a paradigm for other other Gulf countries. Shedding its traditional military efforts of only protecting the country from internal threats, the UAE has evolved into a powerful country in the Middle East that has been able to heavily invest in its military in recent years, alongside other aspects of development. The UAE’s willingness to cooperate with similar agendas to its own has helped itself gain strong alliances with various countries around the world, including the US. Ultimately, other wealthy Gulf states should also take a page out of the Emirati playbook to preserve their own stability and security, while additionally protecting their neighboring countries.

The article has been revised for clarity.

August 29, 2016 0 comment

North Korea-China Friendship, Flickr, (CC). Source

Asia Featured Security and Conflict

Frenemies: Strained Relations Between North Korea and China

written by Susan Oh

Less than two weeks after terrorist attacks in Brussels shook the world, the U.S. hosted the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. Representatives from over 50 nations met to continue a discussion started by President Obama in 2009 on the need to secure global nuclear material to prevent nuclear terrorism. While the summit addressed recent terrorist attacks and the threat of ISIL, it also focused on meetings between President Obama, Shinzo Abe (Japan), Geun-hye Park (South Korea), and Xi Jinping (China) to discuss recent advancements in North Korea’s nuclear program. Ironically, just hours after these meetings, North Korea, who was not present at the summit, tested a short-range, anti-aircraft missile off of it’s east coast.

This year, we’ve seen North Korea ramp-up development of its nuclear and weapons programs: it conducted an alleged hydrogen bomb test in January, a rocket launch to space in February, multiple missile launches in March, and weapons tests since early April. This recent activity reflects Kim Jong-un’s commitment to his father’s “Songun”, or “military first” policy by focusing on the expansion of weapons development to secure North Korea’s presence in the global community. He has also taken the policy to a new level through increased, targeted threats to the U.S. and South Korea.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is notorious for sending mixed signals regarding its position on nuclear and weapons development. For example, in 2009, North Korea withdrew from the Six Party Talks, a multilateral effort to denuclearize the country, but shortly after increased diplomatic engagement with the international community. In August 2015, North and South Korea engaged in marathon negotiations and reached what was perceived to be a landmark agreement, ending a military standoff between the two nations that occurred just weeks earlier. In December 2015, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon received “positive signs” from North Korea regarding a proposed visit to the country, signaling a possible end to its isolationist behavior. However, a month later in January 2016, DPRK undermined this progress by allegedly detonating its first hydrogen bomb, undoing any peaceful diplomatic efforts it had made until then.

In response to North Korea’s increased nuclear and military activity, the 15-member UN Security Council reached a unanimous vote in early March to toughen sanctions against the country. This agreement was negotiated for weeks between the U.S. and China, whose partnership in countering North Korea’s weapons advancements has strengthened in recent months. At the Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama and President Xi Jinping stated that they were committed to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and united in wanting to prevent North Korea from carrying out any more nuclear tests. China’s cooperation with the UN Security Council and international community to curb DPRK’s nuclear program adds to growing tensions between China and North Korea, and possibly signals a new era in relations between the two countries.

China has has been North Korea’s largest trading partner and greatest ally since the Korean War, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. According to the Council of Foreign Relations, China accounts for more than 70% of North Korea’s trade volume and serves as its main source of food, arms and energy, showing just how heavily North Korea relies on its northern neighbor. Economic trade between the two countries do not show signs of slowing, as bulk cargo shipping and high speed bullet train routes were established between the two countries in late 2015. Politically, China has been North Korea’s most outspoken ally, historically opposing sanctions and actively speaking out against reports of human rights violations in the country. More recently, China began to use a mix of both soft and hard power with North Korea, urging North Korean leaders to rejoin the Six Party Talks, but also punishing North Korea’s military activity through sanctions. Militarily, China is obliged to defend North Korea against “unprovoked aggression” under a treaty signed in 1961, but experts believe that China’s commitment to the treaty is waning.

Strained relations between the two countries began a few years after North Korea withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty and test-fired several missiles in 2006, under then Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il. For the first time, China took a punitive approach to North Korea’s actions through its support of UN sanctions. Since then, China has also sent mixed messages to the international community regarding its relationship with North Korea. On the one hand, China has been active in publicly denouncing North Korea’s recent military activity. On the other hand, it showed support of Kim Jong-un’s regime by sending a high-level official to Pyongyang to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party in late 2015. These conflicting actions hint that there is perhaps a deeper and more stable connection between the two countries that is able to resist the day-to-day inconsistencies in behavior toward each other.

It is in China’s interest to maintain stability in the Korean peninsula. If North Korea were to initiate an act of war on either the U.S. or South Korea, China would have to take decisive action on whether or not to defend North Korea; upholding the 1961 security treaty would jeopardize China’s relations with many of its allies, but abandoning the treaty would likely end ties between the two countries. In addition, the collapse of the North Korea’s regime would not only result in an influx of North Korean refugees to China, but would also dismantle the buffer zone that North Korea provides to China. Since the end of the Korean War, U.S. and South Korean troops have been stationed along the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea. The destabilization of North Korea would bring U.S. and South Korean military forces closer to China’s border, which China does not want. Likewise, North Korea depends on China for the majority of its livelihood: food, aid and energy. With rumors that North Korea is facing another famine, China will be North Korea’s main lifeline for assistance.

Cooperation between China and North Korea is essential to maintaining stability within each country and the region, but Kim Jong-un’s increasingly erratic behavior and unilateral decisionmaking will undoubtedly strain the relationship. Without China’s support, North Korea would become a true hermit kingdom in the global community, isolating its leaders and citizens from any connection to the outside world. While its rocky relationship with China may not be ideal, it is North Korea’s last chance at maintaining some sort of leverage within the international community and nonviolent interaction with the rest of the world, making it one of the most crucial partnerships in foreign relations today.

April 14, 2016 0 comment

Laurent Gbagbo, President of Côte d'Ivoire, addresses the general debate of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly.
25/Sep/2009. United Nations, New York. UN Photo/Marco Castro. www.unmultimedia.org/photo/ - United Nations Photo, Flickr (CC).

Laurent Gbagbo, United Nations Photo, Flickr (CC). Source

Africa Featured Security and Conflict

Laurent Gbagbo and the Future of the International Criminal Court

written by Holt Alden

In November 2010 Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo lost the presidential election to rival Alassane Ouattara in an extremely tight and fiercely contested race. Gbagbo refused to step down, denying the results of the election, while Ouattara, as well as the Ivory Coast’s Constitutional Council and international leaders, claimed Gbagbo had lost. The stand-off continued for months as violence spread in Abidjan, the nation’s capital. Gbagbo supporters were accused of murdering civilians from the opposition party and burning people alive, while others claimed pro-Ouattara groups also engaged in human rights abuses. By April of 2011 more than 3,000 people had died and claims of crimes against humanity surfaced in the international press. Soon after, Gbagbo was arrested and extradited to The Hague where he awaited trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This January, Gbagbo’s trial began and is still ongoing. Ouattara on the other hand, has not been charged, leading to pro-Gbagbo groups joining the chorus of critical opposition to ICC indictments, its current justice process and the court itself.

The Gbagbo case marks an integral test for the ICC’s effectiveness and legitimacy, as it exemplifies both the potential importance of the ICC in prosecuting heinous crimes and the problems associated with a supranational criminal court that tries individuals. The high-profile nature of the trial is also important, as it turns international media focus to the ICC and allows for a close inspection of how the court has evolved since opening in 2002.

The ICC–currently supported by 123 nations–was established through the Rome Statute with the mandate of prosecuting cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression and crimes against humanity. However, since 2002 the ICC has only completed twelve proceedings, resulting in two convictions. Gbagbo is the first former head of state to reach trial at the ICC, making this a landmark case for the court. The case’s high-profile status will test the ICC’s ability to act effectively and justly under intense scrutiny.

One of the most common issues surrounding the ICC is the possibility of political manipulation and unbalanced use of judicial power. The explicit purpose of the ICC is to fight impunity in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity; moreover, as a criminal court, it is also meant to prevent retaliatory vengeance by monopolizing legitimate justice. Gbagbo may have incited the violence in Ivory Coast by refusing to step down from the presidency, but the accusations that Ouattara groups also assaulted and murdered civilians shows that, in this instance, the ICC’s theoretical premise of preventing vengeance failed. The threat of punishment from the ICC did not stop Ouattara groups from attacking Gbagbo supporters. That being said, an increased efficiency in the court and the cooperation of international leaders in apprehending those indicted by the ICC may inhibit future groups from retaliating with violence. Prosecuting Gbagbo fairly, while also thoroughly investigating Ouattara and his actions in 2010-2011, would show the world there will not be impunity for similar crimes nor violent and heinous reactions from the victims.

Critics of the court, including pro-Gbagbo groups, also cite imbalanced investigations and prosecutions, as well as negative African bias. So far, the ICC has failed to adequately investigate Ouattara’s influence on the unrest, even as news reports claim both Gbagbo and Ouattara’s forces perpetrated extreme violence in the months following the presidential election in 2010. In this vein, the court is caught between domestic groups hoping the ICC can provide justice and others, such as African leaders, who critique neocolonial tendencies and bias. The Gbagbo case also continues the ICC’s questionable record of only indicting Africans, which must change. Much of Africa is mired in violence, as seen in the cases of Joseph Kony and others, but there are many conflicts outside the continent that deserve equal investigation. For instance, there is much evidence that Bashar al-Assad’s regime perpetrated crimes against humanity in Syria. France is currently investigating Assad’s possible war crimes, though it would show a strong commitment to unbiased justice if the ICC were to indict him as well. Each of these elements fuel claims that the ICC lacks legitimacy as an impartial justice institution.

The Gbagbo case alone will not solve these issues but a focus on thoroughness and unbiased justice for all those involved, as well as others in similar conflicts, will create an opportunity for legitimacy. Each of the previous critiques is important and relevant, yet they must not spell the closing of the ICC. Here, the importance of Gbagbo and the Ivory Coast becomes evident. Gbagbo’s trial is an important first step toward justice for those involved in the violence in Ivory Coast but it is only the beginning of a long process. The ICC’s investigation into possible violent crimes by Ouattara and his supporters groups is ongoing; investigations that involve issues of national sovereignty or that scrutinize governments currently in power are time-intensive and must be treated with patience.

Although the ICC’s negative African bias should be criticized, the court only has a short history of indictments. The method and focus of their investigations can easily be changed to incorporate trends of equality and objectiveness regarding who is charged and tried. Laws that are enforced unevenly are often illegitimate and discriminatory, which makes it imperative that the ICC broaden its gaze beyond Africa. Indicting Bashar al-Assad would be a promising step forward, showing the ICC’s commitment to equality under the law.

The ICC’s implicit narrative of vengeance prevention should also be looked at from a broader, long-term perspective. Many cases of crimes against humanity or genocide stem from intra-state conflicts or civil wars. The court will not be able to stop violent acts of retaliation by immediately indicting and trying national leaders. If the ICC gains legitimacy and more countries sign the Rome Statute, retaliation by victims in these horrific instances may be prevented. As the ICC grows into a meaningful supranational criminal court, its full body of work and unbiased effectiveness in prosecuting violent criminals should provide these incentives against vengeance. Victims of heinous crimes will feel confident that their persecutors will be brought to justice and will not think it necessary to seek out individual revenge. The successful prosecution of Gbagbo and a non-partisan investigation of Ouattara’s actions may be the first step in ending any future attempts at retribution.

The Gbagbo case allows the ICC an opportunity to prove to the world that it has grown and evolved over the past fourteen years. The international community must also pay attention, without focusing on the court’s failures or shortcomings. We must instead comment with a critical eye and support change that will allow the ICC to be more effective and just. The ICC is unlike any other criminal court or international institution created and it is still in its earliest stage. In order to reach the ultimate goal of denying impunity to warlords and leaders who commit crimes against humanity, the court must be allowed to push through growing pains and mold itself to the nuances of the world in which we currently live.

April 4, 2016 0 comment

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