Security and Conflict

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Ethnicity and Democracy: A Dangerous Mix?

written by Kasia Kosmala-Dahlbeck

In July 2018, the Israeli Knesset passed a law defining Israel as “the national home of the Jewish people”. This so-called “nation-state law” establishes Hebrew as the state’s official language, lauds Jewish settlement as a “national value”, and delineates the right to self-determination in Israel as “unique to the Jewish people”. It also demotes Arabic from an official language to a “special status” and states that Jerusalem, which both Israel and the Palestinians claim as their own, is the capital of Israel. A law that many say has turned a political reality into a legal one, the nation-state bill has generated widespread criticism and inflamed the very crux behind Israel’s identity: the tension between its Jewish and democratic nature. This dual yet contradicting truth has sparked questions about the viability of Israel’s future as a democracy – even leading scholars to term Israel as the only “ethnic democracy” in the world. The implications of the nation-state law are profound. Besides severely weakening the Palestinian narrative, the law strips away the rights of 20 percent of Israel’s population as well as introduces a concerning model for populist-leaning democracies across the West.

Supporters of the law argue that it does not effectively change the status quo but reaffirms what has always been true. Some even express frustration that the law does not do more to protect Jewish interests, especially regarding the building of settlements in the West Bank. However, the bill’s codification into Israeli Basic Law is significant because it delineates this highly contentious reality into law. The state of Israel does not have a constitution; as a result, its Basic Law is the highest law in the land. Moreover, the context and timing of the law’s passing give it a salience that has sparked controversy both in Israel and abroad. Whereas Israel’s particular brand of ethno-nationalism used to be unique in the world of Western democracies, in today’s age of rising global populism it may serve as an example to right-wing governments appealing to the racial identities of their supporters. This, combined with its effects on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, gives the nation-state law a unique potential to affect the politics of the region as well as the character of ethnic expression in democracies around the world.

Within Israel, the law has directly affected Arab citizens, many of whom feel as though the government has turned its back on their desire for civil rights. A law stating that the right to self-determination in Israel is unique to the Jewish people explicitly discriminates against Arabs, who make up over 20 percent of the country’s population and already face institutional discrimination in many ways. Additionally, some of the most outspoken opponents of the law have been members of the Israeli Druze community, a religious group that “participate[s] in nearly every aspect of Israeli society” but as a result of the law will not receive the same legal recognition as Jewish citizens. For decades the Druze have been active in the Israeli government and served in the Israeli Defense Forces, often in positions of influence and authority. Many have criticized the law for unjustly stripping them of rights when they have contributed substantially to the survival and success of their country.

In spite of the effects the law will undoubtedly have on non-Jewish citizens of Israel, some of its larger implications stretch beyond Israel’s borders. The legal establishment of Jewish self-determination over the land of Israel effectively delegitimizes the Palestinian right to self-determination, as well as to ownership over the land they claim. Yet this law is just the latest in a series of blows to the Palestinian cause from the combined leadership and close collaboration of President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The decision to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May, the withdrawal of American funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), and increased violence in Gaza has led to growing Palestinian disillusionment with Israel as well as with American ability to mediate the conflict. The Palestinian Authority recently expressed dismay at the fact that the United States had never been an unbiased mediator, but noted that at least it had been a respectable one. Now however, that reality has come into question. With the U.S unabashedly taking Israel’s side in its conflict with its Palestinian neighbors, Washington may be throwing away its ability to control events in the region and dictate terms in any future agreement.

Furthermore, some of the more lasting effects of the law may have little to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at all. In a global political climate of rising populism and appeals to race in democracies across the West, the legal establishment of ethnic superiority in Israel sets a powerful precedent. While the circumstances of Israel’s founding as a Jewish state have always differed from other Western countries, the tide of ethno-nationalism sweeping traditionally liberal democracies may lead to Israel becoming an example rather than an outlier. Conservative politicians in democracies around the world may well use Israel’s nation-state law to legitimize their own racialized legislation, endangering the very nature of liberal democracy as it exists today.

October 18, 2018 0 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics History Military Russia Security and Conflict Territorial disputes Vladimir Putin

The Russo-Georgian War, 10 Years Later

written by Conor McDonald

On August 7th, 2008, the leaders of the Russian Federation shocked the world and made the controversial decision to mobilize and invade Georgia, a small, sovereign nation located in the Caucasus Mountains just south of Russia. The Georgian military had been engaged with separatists from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for just under a week, yet by the time a large batch of Russian military personnel entered their territory through the mountainous Roki tunnel at 11:00 PM, it was too late. Despite what any news outlets would later report, the international community knew that Georgia had just lost a major chunk of its territory to this aggressor from the north. What no one knew, however, was that this seemingly minor excursion would begin a decade’s worth of continued Russian belligerence and adventurism toward its neighbors. But why start with Georgia?

Historically, the strained relations between Russia and Georgia are nothing new, and can be traced back as early as the year 1785 when the Russian Empire violated a treaty and refused to defend the eastern Georgian Kingdom during a Persian invasion. Some decades later, in 1801, Georgia joined the Russian Empire, and it remained a protected member up until 1918 when the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia was established following the Russian Revolution and the abdication of the Russian Tsardom. This was short-lived, however, as the Bolsheviks and the Red Army overthrew the Georgian government in 1921 and forcibly annexed the region into the newly-established United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1922.

The USSR forced an era of tension, fear and powerlessness upon the citizens of Georgia. Under the first three years of Soviet control alone, approximately 50,000 Georgians were executed by the government, while an insurmountable 150,000 were purged up through 1951 by Joseph Stalin, a native Georgian himself. Additionally, basic rights to citizenship were stripped; according to Michael Parrish in The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953, Stalin forced entire Ingush, Chechen, Balkarian and Karachay populations, all native to Georgia, into deportation. Georgian territories were seized and distributed amongst various states, including Armenia and Turkey, and nearly half of the 700,000 soldiers that the country was forced to contribute toward the Red Army were killed over the course of World War II. Even when relatively progressive leaders like Nikita Khrushchev took control of the Soviet Union — “progressive” in that he succeeded Stalin — Georgian protests promoting independence from the USSR resulted in the massacring of hundreds of college students and demonstrators.

Thus, it should surprise no one that, upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Georgian officials were quick to declare sovereignty and begin holding democratic elections. Unfortunately, the radical and autocratic Georgian presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia prompted some to lose faith in their nation, and pro-Russian separatist groups gained prominence in certain regions — most notably in South Ossetia and Abkhazia — leading to a short-lasting civil war in the latter. Somewhat ironically, this forced Georgia to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to receive Russian military support, and, in 2001, Abkhazia and Georgia co-signed “an accord pledging not to use force against each other.”

After the accord’s ratification, a shaky sense of peace was established between Georgia and the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was clearly imperfect, though, as protests and skirmishes continued to break out while political tensions rose unwaveringly; South Ossetia even went so far as to hold an unofficial referendum in which 99% of the public voted in favor of independence, an act ignored by the European Union but supported by the Russia Duma. Two years later, after hearing direct pleas for support from Abkhazian and South Ossetian officials, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stated that allying with the separatist regions “is not an easy choice, but it is the only way to save the lives of people,” and pledged both political and military support to both. Several months later, after the Georgian military responded to another South Ossetian attack, Russia launched its now-infamous military invasion.

Russia’s 2008 seizure of the Ossetian and Abkhazian territories provided eerie foreshadowing for what the Federation’s neighbors had in store. Six years later, in 2014, a near-identical crisis transpired in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions, disputes which continue to the time of this article’s publication. The primary characteristic that both the Georgian and Ukrainian annexation attempts had in common is that they highlighted deep, pervading insecurities from within the highest ranks of Russian leadership. These insecurities are two-pronged, with stress placed on both military and political pressures. From a military perspective, the intimidating reach of NATO expansion is obviously considered to be a pervading, existential threat; Georgia and Ukraine were invaded while the United States and the West considered their bids to enter NATO. However, the more alarming insecurities are political, and they continue to grow increasingly problematic as democracy gains popularity within Russian spheres of influence.

During a 2005 visit, President George W. Bush proudly referred to Georgia as a beacon of liberty in a region where freedom is not always to be taken for granted. He spoke glowingly about the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, in which a peaceful change of power allied Georgia more strongly with the West. This revolution preceded and arguably inspired Ukraine’s 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, which forced the overturning of then-President Viktor Yanukovych and his corrupt, Russophilic administration in favor of the more Western-oriented candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. These so-called Color Revolutions, which also took place in post-Soviet Yugoslavia and Kyrgyzstan, sent a message to their former occupier that these nations were now independent and desirous of fair domestic representation. Seeing that his neighbors were quickly working to distance themselves from the influence of a relatively weakened Russia, it would not take a foreign affairs specialist to understand that Vladimir Putin, a longstanding disbeliever in the promises of democracy, was far from pleased with the symbolism of these revolts.

Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko began to indirectly lay the groundwork for his own country’s invasion by publicly voicing his support for Georgian independence. It is no coincidence that this controversial anti-Russian stance hurdled Ukraine toward further political crisis in November of that year, a window which Russia seized to further exacerbate political troubles. When Yanukovych successfully regained his presidency in 2013, Ukraine spiraled into yet another revolution, and this time Putin chose to involve himself on his pro-Russia counterpart’s behalf. Shortly after, the autonomous region of Crimea was annexed by Russian soldiers.

Russia had been guilty of testing Western resolve all throughout the 21st century, particularly in Eastern Europe, but the dramatic actions against Georgia in 2008 marked a critical shift in Russian foreign policy. Long gone were the days of press releases or discrete political subversion, and ushered in was an era of violent military intervention and territorial seizures. The only thing protecting Russia’s other Western-oriented, post-Soviet neighbors is their NATO membership, and the United States and its allies should not be surprised to see Russian intervention on behalf of other separatist groups from non-member states in the coming years. Ten years after the events in Georgia, the world still waits to see who will be next.

September 26, 2018 0 comment

Africa Europe Featured History Military Security and Conflict Uncategorized

La Guerre du Sahel

written by Grayson Peters

Along a desert road, a military convoy is passed by an unassuming gray car. There is a sudden explosion, then gunfire. Fifteen minutes later, four civilians are dead and eight Western soldiers are wounded. This is not the first act of terrorism in the region, nor will it be the last. The story is familiar – an Islamic terrorist attack against Western soldiers stationed in the region – but the players and setting are not. These foreign forces are not American, and the battleground is not Iraq or Afghanistan. The soldiers are French, and they are in the Sahel, a sub-Saharan strip of Africa that links the Atlantic Ocean to the west and the Red Sea to the east.

The Sahel is a vast, scarcely populated, and loosely governed region that stretches across fourteen African countries, including Mali, Chad, and Niger. In recent decades, the absence of effective governance has allowed the Sahel to become a hotbed of political violence and a safe haven for transnational terrorist organizations. Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and smaller, regional terrorist organizations have all used the Sahel as a base of operations and refuge from counter-terrorist operations. The Sahel states’ porous borders enable militant groups to travel unchecked across vast swaths of the continent and strike targets in North African nations such as Algeria and Tunisia.

Ethnic and economic tensions in the Sahel predate the arrival of transient Islamic terrorist organizations, but temporary alliances between militant groups and villagers increase the scale and danger of regional violence. The New York Times reported that France and Mali estimate that ISIS in the Greater Sahara has only 40 to 60 core members. By inflaming local passions and escalating grievances between villagers, small groups of transnational militants are able to create disproportionately large violence and chaos. For instance, Niger and Mali’s cattle-herding Tuareg people, who had previously only taken up arms to defend their cattle and on occasion engage in small-scale ethnic violence, became involved with international terrorism. Far from home, Tuareg recruits have been involved in terrorist incidents in Libya, raids in Nigeria, and “banditry” in northern Niger and southern Algeria. Ethnic grievances between the Tuareg and Fulani peoples in both Mali and Niger led to ethnic armed conflict which was dramatically escalated by the presence of Islamic militant groups. Because these ethnic grievances are often intertwined with economic concerns, especially cattle ownership, external pressures that threaten the livelihood of Sahelian villagers can catalyze conflict.

As global warming progresses, the increased frequency of droughts, expanding desertification of the Sahel, and dwindling resources in the area will likely worsen regional tensions and create conditions favorable for the growth of terrorist networks. In 2012, according to the State Department, droughts and failed harvests in the Sahel placed 18.7 million Africans at risk for food insecurity, further fueling instability in the region. It is no coincidence that, immediately following the outbreak of drought, cattle die-offs, and famine, relations between Mali’s Tuareg and Fulani peoples worsened. A series of escalating cattle raids led to an arms race and created an opportunity for al-Qaeda affiliates to supply villagers with automatic weapons. Within the year, the Tuareg people of northern Mali, with support from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) and rebelled against the central government of Mali.

When France military forces entered Mali in 2013, campaign, known officially as Operation Serval, aimed to support the beleaguered Malian government and block the NMLA’s war for a Tuareg ethnostate in northern Mali. Although Mali and France decisively defeated the NMLA after only a few months, the French remained in Mali in an attempt to suppress a continued insurgency. Five years later, Operation Barkhane, France’s ongoing operation to stabilize the greater Sahel is ongoing and there are fresh casualties. As recently as July 1, a car bombing in Gao injured French soldiers and killed dozens of Malian civilians. Nusrat al-Islam, an al-Qaeda linked organization and the primary terrorist network currently operating in the Sahel, claimed responsibility.

In 2013, three-quarters of the French citizenry supported Operation Serval, the original intervention against NMLA secessionists in Mali. Today, substantial French support endures for the ongoing Operation Barkhane despite the campaign’s duration and casualties.

At first, it may seem surprising that France is leading the international effort to stamp out terrorism in the Sahel. After all, in 2003, the French government’s opposition to American intervention in Iraq was widely mocked in the United States. In protest, Los Angelenos (and even some UCLA students) publicly poured out French wine in front of the French consulate, and the U.S. House of Representatives cafeteria menu infamously renamed French fries to Freedom fries. During this wave of anti-French sentiment, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared that “France is becoming our enemy.” In 2003, France insisted on a multilateral diplomatic approach to Iraq, in opposition to U.S. President Bush’s insistence on unilateral military action. Yet, ten years later, the French army unilaterally entered Mali, touching off a protracted five-year campaign that has expanded to include the entire Sahel region.

What changed between Freedom fries and a permanent French presence in the Sahel? In reality, France’s relationships with Iraq and the Sahel are vastly different. Countries in the western Sahel such as Mali and Niger were colonized and imperialized by France during the European Scramble for Africa in the late 19th century. These Francophone African nations still bear both the trauma and cultural legacy of French rule.

Many leftist and African scholars argue that France’s reassertion of authority and military power over historic colonial possessions is best characterized as neo-imperialist. Skeptical that France’s primary concern is protecting Malian citizens from terrorism, these critics of French intervention point to plausible ulterior motives including the protection of French corporate mining interests and nearby uranium mines (in both Niger and Nigeria) on which the French energy sector relies. In February, Congolese novelist and UCLA professor Alain Mabanckou criticized la Francophonie, the informal and institutionalized network of French speaking countries, and described it not as a partnership of equals but as an instrument of French neo-imperial domination.

However, there is also evidence that the French feel a sense of obligation to and fraternity with the Francophone Africans of the Sahel. Cultural ties, a shared language, and a sense of historical interconnectedness (despite the region’s colonial past) are all factors. Arguably, elements within France feel a sense of guilt and noblesse oblige, or responsibility of the privileged, towards the nations their ancestors exploited. Whether this concern is genuine or paternalistically self-serving is a matter of debate. What is clear, however, is that the security situation in the Sahel is as of yet unresolved and that the potent mixture of ethnic conflict, Islamic terrorism, rising global temperatures, and increasingly severe droughts represents a enduring security risk for African nations and a source of serious concern for France.

September 19, 2018 0 comment

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Adam Schiff: Bernard Brodie Lecture and Interview

written by Andrea Zachrich

Congressman Adam Schiff came to UCLA to give the Bernard Brodie Lecture on the Conditions of Peace on May 31st of this year. Before the lecture, members of The Generation were fortunate enough to sit down with Congressman Schiff and ask him questions about the House Intelligence Committee- of which he is currently the Ranking Member- his responsibility to his constituents and the American people, democratic institutions and the rule of law, and the reputation of the United States internationally. He echoed and elaborated on many of these topics during his lecture and audience questions, which we were also able to attend following the interview. While there has been a summer that has past since the time of interview, many of his comments remain relevant as we’ve watched President Trump’s antics unfold over the past few months.

Congressman Schiff has a great sense of humor. He began the lecture by telling an anecdote about when President Trump called him “sleazy”. Schiff said that he felt the need to explain to his son what had happened in case the other children at school talked about it. He told his son that “the President called your dad sleazy”, and his son, wholly unconcerned, replied, “Can I call you sleazy?” Congressman Schiff used humor frequently throughout his lecture to highlight the absurdity of some of the administration’s recent actions, such as President Trump calling Vladimir Putin to congratulate him on his win. He even went so far as to mimic how that phone conversation might have gone, which had the entire audience laughing.

In the interview with us, however, Congressman Schiff’s tone was markedly more serious. We began by asking him about the partisanship on his committee in the House of Representatives, which is the House Select Intelligence Committee. The committee has been charged with conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible connections between President Trump and members of his team and Russia. Despite the traditionally bipartisan nature of the Intelligence Committee, Schiff noted that one particular instance- what he called the “midnight run“– which divided the committee along partisan lines. The “run” occurred in March of 2017 when Republican Chairman Devin Nunes went to an undisclosed location to reportedly receive classified materials unmasking a conspiracy that claimed that the Obama administration had done surveillance on members of President Trump’s transition team. Nunes then went to the White House to present this evidence. However in a matter of days it as revealed that the supposedly undisclosed location was the White House. Schiff states, “But we learned within a matter of days that in fact the secret location he had gone too had been the White House and the materials he had received were from the White House that he was presenting to the White House.That kind of blew up the investigation because it became clear that the mission for the chairman was to protect the President at all costs rather than doing an objective investigation. The incident troubled Schiff for illustrating Nunes’ blatant disregard for the committee’s constitutional duty and for demonstrating the vastly different goals of its members.

We then asked Schiff what would change on his committee if Democrats win a majority in the House in the upcoming midterm elections and he becomes chairman. His first priority, he said, would be a return to “comity” on the committee, and blames the current chairman Nunes’ divisive actions for the current level of partisanship. When asked a similar question during the lecture, Schiff responded that he would like his committee to “get back in the oversight business”. Based on some recent special election results, Schiff may get his wish for his committee from the midterm elections. In a recent special election in Ohio, the vote came down to closer than 1 percent in a district that has had Republican representation in Congress for 35 years, the past incumbent consistently cruised to victory by 10 percentage points, and where Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a whooping 11 percent. These election results, while not representative of the entire nation, have led many to predict that Democrats may shortly regain the majority in Congress, making Congressman Schiff the leader of the House Intelligence Committee.

On a different note, one idea that Schiff kept highlighting throughout both the interview and his lecture was the breakdown of democratic institutions and the rule of law, and how this is affecting the U.S.’s reputation and negotiating power abroad. Schiff even went so far as to say “I think that the health of our democracy is very much at risk”. He mentioned numerous examples that ranged from President Trump’s tendency to ban reporters from news outlets he doesn’t like such as the New York Times and BBC from press briefings, to discussing the possibility of him pardoning himself for any possible crimes he may be charged with in the future. Additionally, the president’s constant Twitter tirades about the “fake news” press and special counsel Robert Mueller’s Investigation have led many of his supporters to distrust both the press and the Justice Department. The United States was downgraded from a full to a flawed democracy by the “Economist Intelligence Unit” the year Trump came into office, and has remained in the flawed category for its 2018 ranking, currently ranked 21 out of 167 countries for its democracy score. It seems as though Schiff may well be justified in worrying about the state of our democracy.

On a similar note, Schiff also noted his concerns with the way the rest of the world currently views the US, stating “our America first and everyone else be damned has really left us isolated and the rest of the world deeply concerned”. As evidence, he cited examples of this poor perception of America from our allies such as a Politico article titled “Leader of the Free World meets Donald Trump” referring to Angela Merkel, and Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal. Since this interview, President Trump has continued to take actions that worry world leaders and isolate the U.S. on the world stage, such as placing tariffs on Chinese and European goods against the advice of most of the world’s economists and Trump’s troubling actions during and after June’s G7 meeting such as arriving late for the first meeting of the conference and acting outraged at Prime Minister Trudeau’s easily predictable retaliatory actions to Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs. Congressman Schiff stated in the interview that “It’s hard to imagine a time when the United States has been held in lower regard around the world than right now”, but after Trump’s antics this summer, we may be even lower in the opinion of the world than we were in May when the interview was conducted.

This interview was conducted shortly before the first North Korea negotiations had occured. Congressman Schiff was glad to hear that the negotiations were back on after being canceled for a spell, but was concerned with this administration’s approach to North Korea, calling it “erratic and at times dangerous”. He warned that North Korea’s nuclear program was not going to be an easy problem to solve stating, “If it were not a hard problem, it would have been solved by any number of presidents in the past”. This statement has proven to be true since the interview. While President Trump and Kim Jong-Un did sit down for negotiations in June, the joint statement that came out of this was widely criticized as vague. President Trump conceded an important bargaining chip by agreeing to give up military exercises in South Korea while gaining no time table for denuclearization from the North Korean leader. Additionally, on August 24th President Trump called off talks between North Korean leaders and his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, citing concerns that not enough progress has been made in regards to the country’s denuclearization. Congressman Schiff’s warning has proven true; it seems that the problem of North Korean denuclearization has shown itself to be trickier than President Trump first believed it to be.

In a time where dishonorable behavior has come to be expected from the current administration, the political backbone displayed by Congressman Adam Schiff was refreshing. He asked his audience “What’s the point of being there [in Congress] if you’re not going to do what the country needs you to do when they need you to do it?” At one point during the lecture, he received an spontaneous round of applause from the audience after declaring he believes politicians should “do the right thing and still find a way to get reelected”.

It was a pleasure speaking with the Congressman and listening to his lecture, and it will be interesting to witness any potential changes within his Committee following the November midterm elections.

schiff 8

September 10, 2018 0 comment

Photo credits: Stanford University Hoover Institution

Featured Geopolitics Middle East North Korea Russia Security Security and Conflict UCLA and the World United States

Condoleeza Rice and Amy Zegart: A Lecture on Political Risk and US Foreign Policy

written by Andrea Zachrich

Earlier this month, Condoleezza Rice and Amy Zegart visited UCLA to speak about their newly published book, “Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurities” and about other foreign policy issues. While a number of topics were covered, Rice and Zegart’s comments regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, Russia and its president Vladimir Putin, and nuclear and cyber risk trends were the most striking.

Personally, I found the discussion about the book fascinating because it takes a unique approach in that it focuses on how political risk can affect businesses. Both Rice and Zegart are extremely qualified to discuss this topic. Condoleezza Rice served as the 20th National Security Advisor and the 66th Secretary of State under George W. Bush. She is also a professor of political science and business at Stanford University. In the private sector, Rice headed the committee for public policy for Chevron and has also been on the board of directors for companies such as the Carnegie Corporation, the Charles Schwab Corporation, and Chevron, among others. Similarly, Zegart has a background in international security. She currently serves as co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford. Zegart is considered a leading expert on the US Intelligence Community and national security. She has a PhD in political science from Stanford and has published three books on this topic. She also has private sector experience, and worked for the consulting firm McKinsey & Company where she advised Fortune 100 companies.

Political risk, as defined by the speakers in an article for the Harvard-Review is “essentially the probability that a political action will significantly affect their business—whether positively or negatively”. During the discussion, the speakers emphasized that while political risk has always been a factor for multi-national businesses, it is a more pressing issue today due to several recent trends around the world. One example the speakers discussed was social media. Social media makes collective action such as protests and boycotts by ordinary citizens much easier and more effective. Using social media can decrease the costs of coordination and spreads messages around the globe quickly. Small groups of people can have much larger effect in their communities and the world than ever before. This collective action may increase political risk by disrupting normal business functions such as shipping of materials and goods or governmental oversight functions. These effects were seen in the Arab Spring which began in 2010. This series of revolutions resulted in government overthrows in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and civil war in Syria. Many of the protests were organized on sites like Facebook, and protesters used social media as a platform to share their stories and generate awareness for their cause on a global scale. Social media use in this time was so prolific among users who had access to it that the Arab Spring has been dubbed both the “Facebook Revolution” and “Twitter Revolution”.

When asked about the drivers of the changes in political risk, Rice and Zegart gave a number of possible explanations. One is the changing geopolitical landscape. The speakers asserted that we all have taken for granted the liberal world order established after World War II. Over the last 70 years, there has been a general and almost worldwide belief in the benefits of free trade, capitalism, and open economies that more and more countries bought into. The post-war period saw the establishment of international regulatory committees such as the International Monetary Fund in 1945 whose stated goal is to “build a framework for economic cooperation” among countries. The idea was that countries who trade with one another and have diplomatic relations are less likely to go to war. According to the speakers, this liberal worldview is being challenged globally by what Rice and Zegart jokingly called the “four horsemen of the apocalypse”: Populism, nationalism, isolationism, and protectionism. These ideological shifts are exemplified by the recent unilateral tariffs placed on steel and aluminum by President Trump, an unprecedented move in today’s globalized economy. These tariffs raise the possibility of a trade war with China and possibly the EU, threatening businesses with supply chains running through these countries. In a world that is so undeniably and irreversibly connected, these four ideologies, and the policies they bring with them, do indeed seem apocalyptic.

Another reason for the changing “political risk landscape” identified by the speakers is that we are witnessing the emergence of great power rivalry between the United States and Russia in a way the world has not seen since the Cold War. The speakers asserted that as great powers behave badly, they substantially increase political risk. One example of this is Russia’s spread of fake news and propaganda in support of then-presidential candidate Donald Trump on Facebook and other social media outlets during the 2016 presidential election. While it is unclear if this propaganda affected the election results, Russian interference with the US on this scale has not been seen since the height of the Cold War. Russian meddling in US elections is a huge political risk for social media and technology companies, and one that is incredibly difficult to anticipate or prevent.

Another particularly insightful aspect of the conversation on political risk came from Rice and Zegart’s analysis of the different kinds of hazards associated with doing business in countries with authoritarian versus democratic governments. The speakers avoided giving a moral judgement on whether or not companies should conduct business in places with authoritarian regimes, and instead focused on the practicalities of it, stating that there are both advantages and disadvantages to doing business in each system of governments. In authoritarian states, companies can often do business efficiently, but they tend to lack both transparency and rule of law, which can be bad for business due to a lack of security and the threat of asset seizures. There is also no peaceful transfer of power, which can become an issue for companies if violence disrupts business. In contrast, doing business in a country with a democratic government typically ensures transparency and retention of property, but business may be less efficient due to burdensome regulations and large bureaucracies. While Rice and Zegart avoided making a determination as to which type of government was better for business, and instead emphasized that it is vital for businesses to understand the risks that are associated with both.

In addition to discussing their book, the speakers also discussed current foreign policy issues. Both Rice and Zegart had suggestions as to how the U.S should move forward regarding the upcoming nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Surprisingly, they don’t think that the US should try to negotiate with Kim Jong Un because such attempts have not been successful in the past. During Rice’s tenure as secretary of state, she tried to negotiate a nuclear deal with North Korea, which was unsuccessful. The speakers did however acknowledge that the current situation is unique because no previous president has had to negotiate with a nuclearized North Korea, and that negotiating with Kim Jong Un, while not recommended, may be necessary. They believe that there is a possibility that a deal could be struck, but that it will require nuanced and detailed discussions that need to be handled well with minimal negotiations. Rice, however, did not place much confidence in President Trump stating, “our President is someone whose first job in government is President”. Regardless, the speakers advocated for the US to take this opportunity, but for the administration not to forget that they are still dealing with Kim Jong Un. Rice also stated that she does not believe the US should pull their troops out of the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea because she believes that withdrawing military support would encourage Japan to remilitarize, causing even more tension in the region and possibly leading to an arms race between North Korea, China, and Japan.

The speakers also discussed recent happenings in Russia. Rice scrutinized Russian president Vladimir Putin as a leader, saying that, based on her past conversations with him, he believes that Russia has only been successfully ruled by “great men”, such as the czars of the past. He believes himself to be one of them in his quest to reestablish Russian influence worldwide. Rice stated, however, that Russia may attempt to offset their declining power by reasserting their military dominance. An example of this can be seen in Putin’s invasion of the Ukrainian region of Crimea and sending troops to support the Assad regime in Syria. In 2014, Putin invaded the Crimea, claiming that Crimeans wanted to separate from Ukraine while acting in defense against the spread of NATO. Despite the International Criminal Court calling this action a crime, Putin continues to keep troops in the region, perhaps as a way to display his military might in a world where Russia retains little diplomatic power. Similarly, Russia continues to send troops and military support to President Assad’s regime in Syria despite allegations of chemical weapon use and war crimes. Supporting Syria’s militarily allows Russia to maintain influence in the Middle East. Both actions demonstrate Russian attempts to display military power and influence at a time when Moscow has little diplomatic leverage.

Finally, Rice and Zegart discussed the four countries most likely to produce political risk in the form of nuclear development and cyber security issues. Rice called China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran the “Big Four” due to these countries’ threats to both company security and a country’s national security. Most of these state are sophisticated adversaries in cyber security. As discussed earlier, Russia, for example, has already displayed some of their cyber warfare capabilities during the 2016 election with a massive disinformation campaign. North Korea hacked Sony Picture Entertainment in 2014 to attempt to block the release of a movie that satirized Kim Jong Un. Their cyber attacks have only gotten more sophisticated since; in 2015 the country stole millions of dollars from the New York Federal reserve. In addition, when compared with countries such as North Korea and Iran, the US is asymmetrically vulnerable due to the number of internet users and the country’s digital connectivity. In North Korea, for example, only 10 percent of their population uses the internet compared to 89 percent in the US. In regards to nuclear threats, Rice and Zegart were concerned about all the countries mentioned above, but noted Iran in particular due to speculation at the time of the lecture that Trump would pull the U.S out of the Iran nuclear deal (He has since done so). With Trump withdrawing from this deal, there is a possibility that Iran could restart their nuclear program immediately, leading to a potential nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The speakers asserted that businesses that operate in or run supply chains through these four countries must be wary of potential tariffs and sanctions due to actions such as cyber hacking or nuclear escalation.

It was captivating to be able to listen to individuals with as much as experience as Rice and Zegart discuss business risks and foreign policy. Many thanks to both of them for visiting UCLA and giving this lecture.

May 24, 2018 0 comment

Dome of the Rock, Israel (Photo credits: Dennis Jarvis)

Donald Trump Featured Geopolitics Middle East Security and Conflict United States

Broader Regional Implications of Trump’s Jerusalem Embassy Move

written by Zach Emanuel

In one of the more contentious decisions in a presidency already packed with controversy, President Trump’s announcement in December of 2017 to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move the U.S Embassy there remains one of the more diplomatically significant choices he has made so far. Yet not for the reasons most would think. While many express fear over disrupting the potential for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, it is rather America’s broader goals in the Middle East that are threatened by the decision.

Despite near-unanimous passage of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 mandating the move of the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Trump’s predecessors have continuously delayed the decision citing fears of disrupting peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Unsurprisingly, in the wake of Trump’s precedent-breaking announcement, similar concerns were raised. The New York Times called the move “destabilizing,” saying that it “would make achieving peace even more difficult.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson echoed that concern by claiming that recognition would further disrupt peace talks. Moreover, other allies and editorials alike expressed fear that the decision would jeopardize American credibility as an honest peace broker between the two parties.

Although these desires for peace- and therefore the concerns about endangering its success- are genuine, the fear that recognition of Jerusalem’s status will be the decision that triggers a breakdown in the peace process are naïve. Rather, negotiations are at a standstill and have been for years. Ever since the 2000 Camp David Summit between President Bill Clinton, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat ended without an agreement, there has been little to no meaningful discussion of peace between the parties. Trump’s decision will do little to change that. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas have rarely met during their lengthy tenures and the leaders never developed a framework for furthering the peace process. Negotiators on both sides, such as former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and former Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, have said the peace process is “ended” and “dead”. As Israeli society continues to move to the right and the last bastion of Palestinian officials involved in genuine peace talks have aged, both sides seem to be losing the political will to make the necessary sacrifices for peace. As both peoples are increasingly tolerant of the deadliness of the status quo, peace is becoming impossible.

Thus, while recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital will have little impact on an already moribund peace process, America’s broader goals in the Middle East are seriously threatened by the decision, specifically the U.S’s objective of building a Sunni Muslim alliance to confront an budding Iranian menace. With a centuries-old religious rivalry between the two main Muslim denominations– Sunnis and Shi’ites– construction of a Sunni alliance to limit Shi’a-led Iran’s power would seem to appeal to the region’s majority-Sunni states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In the eyes of the State Department, such an alliance would ideally be led by these nations, with the goal of luring other Middle Eastern states such as Qatar, Oman, and majority-Shi’a Iraq away from Iran’s grip. The objective would be to construct a military, economic, and diplomatic coalition that isolates the Iranians by locking them out of the region’s affairs, and in the process, effectively reduces their regional power and influence.

The goal of a Sunni bloc to confront Iran is an admirable one on the part of the U.S given Tehran’s growing influence in the Middle East over the last two decades. Prior to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Tehran’s sole ally in the region was fellow Shi’ite Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite government in Syria. Yet after the invasion, dominoes began to fall in Iran’s favor. The first was the election of a Shi’ite-led government in Iraq in 2006 following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, once an Iranian adversary. Additionally, the political power of Hezbollah- the influential and militantly anti-Israel political party- and its Shi’a allies in Lebanon has grown since the 2008 Doha Agreement granted the Iranian-proxy veto power in the Lebanese national legislature. These two changes, while seemingly small, have left Iran with a crescent of control from Tehran, through Baghdad and Damascus, to the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, relations have warmed between the Iranians and several Sunni states as well. In April of 2017, joint-military exercises were conducted between Iran and Oman, an American and Saudi ally. Likewise, Qatar has signaled intentions to increase ties with Tehran following a falling out with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies due to its support for Islamist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qataris announced in August of 2017 that they would be returning an ambassador to Tehran while also expressing interest in improving bilateral ties. Therefore, as Iran’s diplomatic power in the region has grown, U.S officials increasingly view a Sunni coalition as essential to curbing Tehran’s influence and protecting American allies and regional interests.

Yet as the U.S. pulls its military and economic resources from the Middle East, it is clear that many of these nations see more opportunity in aligning themselves with a regional player who’s power and influence seem to be growing– such as Iran– as opposed to waning. Additionally, the religious citizenry that makes up a vast majority of the Sunni states will undoubtedly question allying with the outwardly pro-Israel Americans to confront a fellow Muslim state.

Thus, even as construction of an alliance is already tenuous, Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem will only serve to make a difficult job more challenging. As both The Washington Post and The New York Times noted, the embassy move dealt a blow to the U.S’s credibility of being a fair mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as it outwardly showed America’s bias in the negotiations. This bias will not be lost on the Sunni allies that Trump seeks to persuade to join him in confronting Iran. For the Saudis and Emiratis, among others, actively associating and cooperating with the Americans to work against a Muslim nation is already politically risky. Doing so in the wake of American recognition of the third holiest city for Muslims as Jewish in nature however, will not only prove to be an even tougher case to sell to their respective populaces, but also damaging to their credibility within the anti-Israel Arab world.

Additionally, a country such as Qatar, whose support is crucial for any anti-Iran coalition, will be harder pressed to align with the Americans following the Jerusalem decision. Given Qatari aversion to Israel’s very existence and its financial support for groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah which openly seek the state’s destruction, the embassy move will only hinder American attempts to win Qatar’s support. Similarly, Iraq– another nation whose backing is critical– will be further discouraged from supporting any coalition as well. Having to maintain support from a majority Shi’a population, Iraqi President Haider al-Abadi will find few reasons to challenge Iran and ally himself with the Americans as doing so would threaten political credibility with his constituency. On the contrary, abandoning an alliance with the “American imperialists” in favor of aligning with a Muslim country like Iran that strongly supports the Palestinian crusade and is increasing its military and diplomatic role in the region will be a safer bet for countries such as Qatar and Iraq.

If Trump is truly committed to an American-led alliance of Sunni states to lock Iran out of the Middle East, he must provide every incentive for these countries to align themselves with the U.S. Recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital however only serves to show where America’s real interests lie, and thus the decision jeopardizes American attempts to gain the support of countries whose backing is essential for the coalition’s success. While U.S officials may debate the consequences of the embassy move on the peace process, Trump’s decision on Jerusalem unquestionably threatens the larger and fundamentally more important American objective in the region. In a Middle East fraught with civil wars, failed states, and shifting power dynamics, a unified stance against Iran is more important than a unified capital in Israel.

April 11, 2018 0 comment

http://archive.government.ru/eng/multimedia/photo/2010/9/?page=5

Donald Trump Europe Featured Military Russia Security and Conflict United States Vladimir Putin

The Connection Between Putin’s Chef, Global Political Interference and a Ukrainian Invasion

written by Conor McDonald

If the American dream consists of starting from scratch and, through tireless labor, building one’s assets up to formidable quantities, then it should be easy for Western capitalists to understand how certain individuals were able to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 to attain the status that they have today. Boris Yeltsin’s oligarchs with insider connections, of course, are exceptions to this; instead, the individuals being referred to include middle class contractors, mid-tier managers, and even hot dog stand owners. One stand owner in particular, Yevgeny Prigozhin, provides a particularly dramatic case study for economic success following modest origins. Prigozhin used to rob banks and sell street snacks just to pay his bills, but today, he owns a number of bustling enterprises and can be seen driving a blue Lincoln Continental. However, all is not as picture perfect as it seems for this Gatsby-esque individual.

In 2016, the United States congress imposed economic sanctions against Prigozhin alongside several other Russian political elites in an attempt to strike back at the heart of Putin’s inner circle. Just under a month ago, Prigozhin was indicted by Robert Mueller, special counsel overseeing the alleged Russian interference in the United States’ 2016 presidential election, for playing a major role in the digital manipulation of public opinion. Similarly, the international community has expressed repeated disdain toward Prigozhin for his establishment of the Wagner Group, which today stands as Russia’s premier private military corporation acting in Syria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. So, how exactly did a humble, bank-robbing hot dog stand owner such as Prigozhin manage to gain such prestige and controversy in Russia’s government?

As Russian political rebel Aleksei Navalny stated in a recent interview, Prigozhin “didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In 1998, Prigozhin opened his most famous conventional business to date: New Island, a buoyant restaurant that lies atop an adorned ferry in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Two years later, in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. Coincidence or not, Putin took a liking to Prigozhin, and the very next year he brought Jacques Chirac, the former President of France, to the very same restaurant. He also brought United States President George W. Bush in 2002, and he hosted his personal birthday party there in 2003. Putin and Prigozhin rapidly formed a unique friendship, the shady personal and economic perks of which would be seen in the years to follow.

Some of these perks included contracts to provide food for Russian public schools and the Russian military — at his peak, Prigozhin was feeding 90% of Russian service-members, a job which Vox News reports earned him over a billion dollars. Perhaps it is because of Prigozhin’s humble origins as a hot dog stand owner that he is not afraid of doing President Putin’s dirty work. Perhaps he was enraptured by the economic benefits, or perhaps he was simply too afraid to say no. Regardless, with economic favors from Putin came political and social responsibility for Prigozhin to serve his leader’s interests. A decade after Putin’s birthday party, Prigozhin was presumably advised by government sources to use his funds to create the Internet Resource Agency — also known as Glavset — a Saint Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. Glavset’s campaigns initially sought to put down domestic protests by creating fake social media accounts advocating on behalf of President Putin and disparage the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny, but, according to Mueller, it allegedly expanded to the point of interference in international elections, including the United States’ in 2016. The most prominent evidence citing Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling pertains to his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times from 2015-2016 to discuss the work being done. It’s also important to note that Glavset’s Project Lakhta, a so-called “disinformation campaign,” received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Prigozhin in 2016 alone.

Following dramatic success countering protests and slandering rivals with Glasvet, Prigozhin used his immense wealth in 2014 to found and develop ChVK Wagner, a private military corporation which has, as of late, become one of President Putin’s primary sources for military operations that Russia cannot formally be involved in. Commanded by Dmitry Utkin, an ex-Russian Special Forces brigade commander, ChVK Wagner has been involved in both the conflicts in Syria and in Ukraine’s Luhansk region. Perhaps most infamously, it was recently discovered that the Wagner Group shot down the Ukrainian Air Force’s Ilyushin Il-76 in 2014, an act which was originally attributed to rogue Russian nationalists in Ukraine and killed all 49 of the plane’s passengers. ChVK Wagner has also been involved in the recent conflict in Crimea, where their innocuous green uniforms earned them the title of “little green men.” Prigozhin’s decision to fund military bases in Ukraine’s Donbas region has been a critical component of the success of Russian encroachment. In Syria, ChVK Wagner’s shady activities include serving as “shock troops” to President Bashar al-Assad, as well as seizing ISIS-held oil fields for Russian companies, including the newly made conglomerate Evro Soyuz. The Wagner Group’s economic and military influence is easily one of the most valuable assets that Prigozhin is bringing to Putin and his oligarchs’ table.

In everywhere but Putin’s Russia, it is positively bizarre for one to imagine a world in which a hot dog stand owner with a vast criminal record can rise to a point of such prominence in one of the world’s most powerful political and military systems. Prigozhin himself once said that “Vladimir Putin saw how I built up my business from nothing,” but the roots of his success lie not in his hard work — they instead lie in the fact that Putin was a personal witness and catalyst to it. This is precisely how modern Russia has operated since Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar’s disastrous economic reforms in the early 1990s. Regardless, President Putin’s crony-infested inner circle will continue to thrive on loyalty and trust above all else, proving that even the bank robber putting mustard on a hot dog has a valid chance at fulfilling his wildest dreams.

March 24, 2018 0 comment

Featured Geopolitics Middle East Security and Conflict

Sectarianism: A Chess Piece in a Nuanced Game for Dominance

written by Jeremiah Barnett

Conflict begets conflict. The violent clashes in Syria and Iraq led scholars to clash in their opposing causal explanations. The temptation to see sectarianism as the explanation and as insoluble is great. While some place an immense amount of importance on the sectarian divisions, I posit that the conflict in the region is much more nuanced than a simple sectarian war. Middle East policy advisor, Jacob Olidort explains how different types of sectarianism, institutional and exploitive, are used by some actors in the Middle East. Sectarianism is a tool that various powers have chosen to use in order to strengthen their position or further their agenda at the expense of the destabilized and vulnerable peoples of Iraq and Syria. Finally, a look at the 2010 elections in Iraq stands to show that sectarian divisions are not entirely insoluble.

As special advisor on Middle East Policy to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Jacob Olidort provides valuable insight on the intersection of theology and modern politics in the Middle East. His breakdown of sectarianism into multiple categories is crucial in understanding the origins of such intense sectarian divisions throughout states such as Syria and Iraq. The first type that Olidort posits is institutional sectarianism. “Some groups and states have integrated sectarian themes into the very fabric of their political, cultural, and educational systems.” The case of Iraq proves valuable when examining sectarianism as a culturally divisive phenomenon versus a political tool.

After the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the collapse of the regime, the protection of Iraq’s citizens was not part of the American agenda and the creation of a viable government did not seem to be within their grasp. As citizens began to realize that they were on their own, militias quickly formed and a landscape characterized by highly fragmented conflicts emerged (Lust 508). One of the divisions among these conflicts was that of Shia versus Sunni. When faced with questions of survival, sectarian divisions emerged.

But after the US changed its focus from hunting terrorists to providing basic security for Iraqi citizens, the 2010 elections witnessed the winning party running on a strictly non-sectarian platform (499). However, after the 2011 withdrawal of the last US troops from Iraqi soil, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki began to exercise explicit sectarian politics, inflaming the religious and ethnic divides once again. The Sunni felt increasingly disenfranchised by a system in which the majority, Shia, would control a significant portion of the government (499). With a watchful eye, al-Qaeda waited until the withdrawal of US troops before entering the scene and capitalizing on a previously dormant divide, driving Sunni and Shia into violent sectarian conflict.

Olidort’s second proposed type is that of exploitive sectarianism. Perhaps the most significant type, exploitive sectarianism serves as a catalyst leading to increased violence. The actions of al-Qaeda and the regime in Syria both exemplify the significance this type of sectarianism. In the state of Syria, exploitive sectarianism was explicitly used by the government. The struggle against the Assad regime in Syria began as a conflict between an oppressed people and their oppressive ruler. As the conflict evolved and foreign intervention manifested, along with the entrance of the Islamic State, the conflict took on sectarian overtones. After the 2011 Arab Uprisings, Assad’s violent reaction was the spark that ignited the civil war. As the conflict evolved, the regime turned to a strategy of sectarianizing the issue in order to win the support of the minorities who had a vested interest in keeping the current regime in power. The opposition did not initially revert to sectarianism but as the intensity of the situation increased, the high level of insecurity shifted the balance toward Islamist hard-liners (799).

Sectarianism rose as a dominant factor in the Syrian conflict only after the Assad regime decided it was necessary for their success to rally the minorities in Syria. The opposition initially attempted to use rhetoric of civic inclusion to win over the minorities, but the Islamist hard-liners, “empowered by money and guns from the Gulf” soon shifted the balance in their own favor (799).

The conflict in Iraq resembles that of Syria in the plethora of players involved, the reversion to sectarian identities and the fingerprints from many foreign powers attempting to play out their agendas in Iraq and Syria. Both the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts are characterized by the exploitive sectarianism Olidort defines while also evidencing the exportation of a sectarian agenda by actors that have institutionalized sectarianism. Once these conflicts are more carefully analyzed through the lense of exploitive and institutionalized sectarianism, it is clear that sectarianism stands as a tremendous factor in both civil wars but it is not the root of the conflicts.

There are two valuable takeaways from this brief analysis; one, an understanding of how violent sectarian conflicts arise due to institutional and exploitive sectarianism; and two, as observed in the case of the 2010 elections in Iraq, sectarian divisions are not insoluble. Drawing from the case of Iraqi elections in 2010, there appears to be a strong case on behalf of peaceful cohabitation of divided peoples such as Sunni and Shia. Sectarian violence arises as security is diminished and state or non-state actors choose to implement exploitive or institutional sectarianism as a tool in their nuanced game for dominance.

The current US administration should improve its foreign policy where sectarian divisions are concerned–such as those that appear in Syria and Iraq–by avoiding brashness and seeking deeper understanding. The nuances of regional, tribal and religious differences in the Middle East should be matched by an equally nuanced policy strategy. Maintaining a rhetoric that supports the interests of America is not mutually exclusive with striving to understand the subtle details of regions such as the Middle East. Standing strong as an international leader does not preclude our ability to empathize through careful understanding before acting. Regions such as the Middle East require the ability to act decisively while avoiding brashness and therefore stand to test even the most astute leader.

Lust, Ellen. The Middle East. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2017.

September 27, 2017 1 comment

Former DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il and Russian President Vladimir Putin

Europe Geopolitics Middle East Security and Conflict

Looking in the Mirror: Dukes of Anarchy

written by Changyeun Hahn

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, better known as “North Korea” is led by Dear Respected Comrade Kim Jong-Un, Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army. About 4600 miles away, the Syrian Arab Republic is led by President Bashar al-Assad, a leader with a much shorter title. Although the two countries are geographically distant and not often considered to be politically linked, they share a unique feature: both are run by leaders whose titles were heirlooms.

These two “democracies” are extremely relevant in today’s international affairs despite their relatively tiny economies. The population of both countries combined is 44.28 million. In comparison the population of US is 326.3 million. Economically, Syria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010 was $60 billion. North Korea’s GDP in 2015 was $16.12 billion. Comparatively, the GDP of the US is $18036.7 billion. Two Davids standing on the same ground as Goliath. These heirs have leveraged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) to stay in the international spotlight.

In 1953, Korea was divided into two with the establishment of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Syngman Rhee became the president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Kim Il Sung became the ruler of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea); North Korea was determined to follow the communism it found in the Soviet sphere, while the South was inspired by US capitalism. The 38th parallel separating the two countries also symbolized an international divide: the US supported the South, and China supported the North. The image of North Korea as a land of famished children and oppressed people was not always the case. In fact, during the 50s and 60s, North Korea had a fast growing economy while South Korea struggled with a lack of agricultural resources and was dependent on significant US aid; at the time, North Korea was an enviable land. However, South Korea developed technology and saw economic growth in the early 2000s, while North Korea withered into the state it is in today. Under the leadership of President Park Chung-Hee, South Korean policies focused on looser policies for economic giants, which allowed it to compete in the world market with companies like Samsung and LG. Furthermore, instead of taking the advice of the US to crackdown on corrupt businessmen, South Korean policies took their bank shares and invested them in import-substitution industries. This unconventional method proved effective and the South Korean economy grew exponentially within just a few decades. Meanwhile, North Korean economy dwindled rapidly. Regardless of the state of the nation, the Kim regime continued to stay in power.

While Japanese rule in Korea led to a civil war, after the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the French-ruled Syria managed to gain independence with the help of Britain, while remaining intact. In 1943, the country had its first election. However, the initial years of independence were not calm. After many coups, Baathist army officers took control of the government in 1963. Three years later, Salah Jadid led an internal coup and Hafez Assad became the defense minister. In 1970, Hafez Assad overthrew then- President Nur al-Din al-Atasi and became the president of Syria. He continued rule until his death, when his son, Bashar Assad took over.

The current leaders of both countries have kept the same ideologies of their fathers but have changed priorities in their domestic, defense, and foreign policies. Despite domestic and international resistance, both leaders have also managed to remain in power.

Domestically, Kim Jong-Un has not alleviated the humanitarian crisis faced by his people. In fact, during his leadership, the number of executions has been staggering. The Dear Respected Comrade even had his own uncle executed. However, when he first came to power, he did put effort into improving public infrastructure. Still, there has been no noticeable difference in the treatment of North Koreans or the overall quality of life in the country. Many have suggested that due to the relatively short transition period from Kim Jong-Il to Kim Jong-Un, the current leader does not hold the same level of respect that his father once did. He also does not have the close-knit advisors that his father had.

Domestically, Bashar al- Assad has a bigger problem on hand than his father Hafez did decades ago. There is no debate that Hafez al- Assad in the Hama massacres showed little regard for his people’s lives, slaughtering 20,000 Syrians. About three decades later, in 2016, his son dropped 13,000 barrel bombs onto his own people. However, with the current war in the region, and especially its role as a proxy war for Russia, US, Iran, and the Sunni countries in the region, the level of chaos is incomparable. In the beginning of his rule, Bashar al-Assad suggested his openness to a more democratic nation, while specifying that it would not look like Western democracy. However, over time, the young leader has used the barbaric tactics of his father and simply worsened the situation. A part of this may be due to the fact that Bashar al- Assad was not groomed to be the next leader, but only became so after the death of his older brother Basil al- Assad.

Both heirs have undoubtedly committed human rights violations. North Korea has been under continuous scrutiny by organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for its concentration camps. However, recently, especially after the April 2017 chemical bombings, human rights violations in Syria have garnered much international attention. Regardless, both countries have not shown much regard for international shaming. Both leaders also continue using the methods of torture utilized by their fathers.

With regards to defense policy, which is tightly interwoven in the foreign policies of both countries, Kim Jong-Un and Bashar al- Assad have become more aggressive than their fathers and have relied more heavily on WMD programs.

Since losing wealth and power, North Korea has resorted to brinksmanship–making threats that are only significant due to the nuclear power it possesses. This tactic was also utilized by the current dictator’s predecessor and father, Kim Jong-Il. In 2012, North Korea fired multiple artillery shells which resulted in a retaliatory attack by South Korea.

While the country has made brazen threats, the US stance on the issue has been heavily influenced by North Korea-China relations. Until May 2017, there was little evidence that China will abandon its “little brother”. In fact in 2016, when Kim Jong Un conducted nuclear tests, Chinese politicians continue to visit North Korea and deepen relations, instead of reprimanding the country. However, as Kim Jong-Un continued to invest and hasten its nuclear program, its relationship with China has been significantly strained. In contrast, the previous Kim dictators had been very careful to not upset China.

An easy example of what North Korea-China relations would look like to the West if the country did not have nuclear weapons can be found by looking at Syria-Russia relations. President Assad has been surviving solely with Russian support. Publically, Russia has vocalized repeatedly throughout the war for NATO to stay away from Syria. The current chaos in the country has become the home to a proxy war where US-Russia relations are being challenged. Despite Russia’s comments towards NATO, American involvement in the region has increased under the Trump administration. In order to protect its ally, Russia has continued to send military arms to Syria, allowing it to combat the rebel groups in the region. Russia is involved in Syria to protect its access to the Black Sea- more specifically the port of Tartus- which is only possible through the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, with the Assad regime gaining power in the region, there is little reason to expect Russia to stop supporting Bashar Assad.

The Syria-Russia alliance dates back four decades and has only been strengthened by. US involvement in the region. Although there are other countries where the government targets its people, like the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, it is the involvement of major powers in this proxy war that has kept Syria at the center of global issues. On the other hand, the horrors in North Korea are not new, but the country gained attention as Kim Jong-Un has heavily focused on improving its nuclear program.

Although both chemical and nuclear bombs are WMDs, the reality is that nuclear bombs create a bigger existential threat for the entire world. As the threats made by the Kim dynasty become more and more tangible, the international community has become more involved. Simultaneously, as the North Korean’s capabilities improve, Kim Jong-Un has been more brazen and willing to separate from his country’s ‘big brother’, China. The reality is that both countries are slaughtering their own people, but nuclear weapons seriously challenge other countries’ citizens and therefore give Kim Jong-Un more voice in the international arena. The chemical bombs that Assad has been utilizing, although horrific, mainly call for international human rights intervention. There is little threat to the outside world and thus the conversation has more heavily involved Russia. Without Russia, there is little chance for Assad to survive; however, Kim Jong-Un is outdoing his father’s legacy and creating a more robust nuclear program, albeit more dangerous, international ground.

September 9, 2017 0 comment

at the Al Jazeera broadcast center in Doha, Qatar

Al Jazeera English newsroom at the Doha, Qatar center

Geopolitics Middle East Security and Conflict

Al Jazeera and the Gulf Crisis: Consequences of Partial Press Freedom

written by Jemma Tan

The regularly tumultuous region of the Middle East was sent into an unprecedented tailspin last month when the Gulf Cooperation Council, a group of five Arab states spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, cut diplomatic ties with Qatar. Though the ongoing crisis is sudden, it is by no means unprompted. Saudi Arabia has had long-running frustrations with Qatari foreign policy, which do not wholly conform to that of other Arab countries.

The two most non-conformist, and thus most contentious, tenets of Qatari foreign policy are its friendly relations with Iran, considered to be a Shiite rival to Saudi authority within the region, and its historical support of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was designated by Saudi Arabia as a terrorist organization in 2014. Saudi Arabia’s cites what it calls Qatari support for terrorism as the official justification for the blockade, charges that the emirate denies.

While Qatar and Saudi Arabia publicly quarrel over the did-nots and did-toos of terrorist involvement, a less conspicuous, equally pressing issue emerges in the form of Al Jazeera. The future of the Qatari broadcast network is threatened by the country’s recent isolation. From its inception in the 1990s, the network has historically rankled interregional tensions with its critiques of Arab leaders. This is exemplified in its extensive coverage of the Arab Spring, where it played a critical role in buoying public awareness on pro-democracy protests in North Africa, at the cost of deepening mistrust from its Arab neighbors. A month before the crisis, the Al Jazeera website was banned by four of the five members of the GCC. In the days since, the company’s television broadcasts have been blocked in Saudi Arabia. On June 9th, it was the victim of a cyberattack across all its media platforms, though no country has claimed responsibility for the hack.

As Saudi bloc’s efforts to cut off Qatar increase in intensity, Al Jazeera may not be able to scrape by intact. Saudi Arabia and its supporters are betting that increased diplomatic and economic restrictions will force Qatar’s hand. To ease regional tensions, the rest of the Gulf States will expect Qatar to temper its ambitions and maintain an orthodox foreign policy. With its history of provocative news pieces, especially in the post-Arab Spring years, Al Jazeera will most certainly be on the list of negotiations.

Despite the Qatari foreign minister’s insistence that Al Jazeera is non-negotiable, the odds look stacked against the emirate. In a political move calculated to impressive precision, the Saudi Arabians have left the Qatari government scrambling for international allies. With dually vested interests in Saudi and Qatari oil, much of the non-Arab world has refrained from involving themselves in the conflict. Domestically, Qatari citizens have begun to stock up on resources, stirring local fears of a possible food crisis if the blockade is sustained. Were Qatar to hold out against the GCC, Al Jazeera would still endure regional losses in viewership, hindering its broadcasting capabilities.

The GCC has put Al Jazeera at the uncomfortable cross-hairs of a lose-lose situation. Fellow news outlets, such as the BBC and Huffington Post, are anxious over whether Al Jazeera can survive with these “new challenges.” However, Al Jazeera’s sustainability cannot simply be viewed as a nascent concern. Its vulnerability is not a sudden result of the blockade, but symptomatic of persisting issues regarding democratic development in the Middle East.

The network is generously funded by the ruling House of Thani, which impedes full editorial independence. In 2016, Freedom House gave the country a grade of 70 for press freedom (100 being the least free). While Al Jazeera has not been shy about criticizing the policies of its neighbors, questioning the Qatari government is off-limits. State law authorizes the prosecution of anyone who publishes or shares information deemed to violate “social values or principles” with possible criminal prosecution.

As a result, no matter how much Al Jazeera professes supposed freedom of speech, Qatar’s neighbors cannot see it as anything other than a mouthpiece for the House of Thani. It is the product of patchwork democratization, where a liberal institution like a free press is adopted only to the extent that it serves states’ interest. This same phenomenon can be seen throughout the Middle East, in so-called “free elections” in Iran or the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum. These pseudo-free procedures soften, perhaps even legitimize, authoritarian governments, but are unsustainable in the long-term.

True, had Qatar given Al Jazeera full independence, Saudi hostility towards the network would not have diminished in the least. But Al Jazeera’s existence would be equally threatened had they chosen to level their criticisms towards their own government. The GCC has only swung at an already cracked glass.

Despite quality reporting, Al Jazeera was always institutionally designed to fold when circumstances become too inconvenient. After all, it has set its own precedent. In 2007, Al Jazeera scaled down the intensity of its Saudi critiques in response to regional fears of Iranian nuclear development. Ten years later, little has changed. The Gulf States are equally frustrated and their demands are greater. Despite the staunchness of the Qatari government, their hopes are slim. It was not too much freedom that has jeopardized Al Jazeera, but too little.

July 15, 2017 0 comment

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