Vladimir Putin

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Democracy Europe Featured Guest Article Military Russia Security and Conflict Vladimir Putin

Behind the Smokescreen: Was the Wagner Mutiny a Victory for Putin?

written by thegeneration

by Kemal Mohamedou

The Wagner mutiny of June 2023 was a moment that shocked not only Russia but the entire world. Led by the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor, the unanticipated march on Moscow served as a stark reminder of the precarious balance of power in the Russian leadership. However, in the complex terrain of geopolitics, things are seldom as they might appear. As we seek to make sense of the aftermath of these events, the question remains: was the Wagner mutiny an actual challenge to President Vladimir Putin’s authority?

The revolt was announced through a series of audio recordings posted on the online platform Telegram on June 23, 2023, when Yegevny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, stated that the “evil” of Russia’s military leadership “must be stopped.” This denouncement of the Russian military high command, coupled with the announcement of an audacious “march for justice,” was a striking blow to the established power structure in Russia. Indeed, as the Wagner group embarked on its daring advance towards Moscow, seizing control of Rostov-on-Don and the headquarters of the Russian Southern Military District, a wave of shock and unease was felt not only throughout Russia’s oligarchy but also across international borders. Yet, the march was brought to an abrupt end due to negotiations brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, a known ally of Putin.

The immediate aftermath and resolution of these events led most analysts to conclude that Putin, embattled on his home front and entrenched in a protracted conflict in Ukraine, had incurred a major loss; some scholars forecasted that this was the beginning of the end of Putin’s regime. Whilst many are eager to declare Putin’s rule in peril, there is reason to consider that Putin may have actually emerged stronger from this apparent crisis. In fact, the Wagner mutiny could have, paradoxically, bolstered his power at a time when Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine had stagnated and talk of ‘quagmire’ had emerged.

First and foremost, while Prigozhin’s rebellion posed an unexpected challenge, it never directly threatened Putin. Despite the shock of an internal rebellion, operationally, Putin seemingly remained in control, and, at the height of the revolt, was never threatened or criticized directly by Prigozhin. Within a day, the situation was then neutralized. Real coups are different. Their resolution is often messier and more ambiguous, and their immediate aftermath is more problematic to handle for surviving rulers. In this case, Putin demonstrated control and resolution, suggesting a strong grip – for now – over his own administration.

Secondly, by centering his rhetorical fire on the Russian military leadership, Prigozhin inadvertently allowed Putin to identify and address issues within his defense forces. It is no secret that bureaucratic inefficiency and internal politics have long plagued Moscow’s institutional setup. The Wagner uprising has now offered Putin an opportunity to oust Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Chief of General Staff Valery Geramisov, and “General Armageddon” Sergei Surovikin – the latter who has since gone missing – and regain full control. Regardless of whether a deal was struck with Prigozhin that they would be sidelined, the uprising opened welcome strategic space for Putin, who has already moved to restructure his defense forces. It bears reminding that, in admittedly a different context yet similar situation, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan survived the 2016 coup only to then consolidate power, crack down on his opponents and win re-election. Similarly, Putin’s brush with rebellion could now arguably make him more prepared and vigilant than ever in the face of internal defiance. Specifically, the June 2023 Wagner uprising allows Putin to reset his administration, with new leadership in his ministry of defense and an opportunity to clarify relationship with Prigozhin. Putin also has the opportunity to reaffirm strategic alliances – for example, with Belarus, which brokered a peace deal with Prigozhin.

Thirdly, the Wagner Uprising has the potential to revitalize Russia’s position and strategy in Ukraine. Despite its rebellion, the Wagner Group remains a potent force in the realm of military contractors. With its sophisticated capabilities and battle-hardened mercenaries, the group could provide a significant boost to Russian military efforts. For years, the relationship between the Wagner Group and the formal Russian military has been shrouded in uncertainty. The group has always operated in a gray area, with its status and connection to the Russian state remaining unclear. However, the recent events present a unique opportunity for Putin to redefine this relationship. By taking steps to integrate the Wagner Group more clearly into his military campaign, Putin can eliminate these ambiguities and harness the group’s capabilities more effectively. Moreover, a more closely aligned Wagner Group could lead to improved operational synergy with the Russian armed forces. By enhancing coordination and joint planning between the Wagner Group and the state military, this integration would also serve to send a clear message both domestically and internationally. Domestically, it could be portrayed as a move towards increased unity and strength in the face of adversity. Internationally, it would signal that Russia is prepared to leverage all available resources to pursue its objectives in Ukraine. Therefore, while the uprising may have been a temporary setback, it could inadvertently catalyze renewed momentum in Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine and reinforce Putin’s control over his military machine.

Moving forward, the Wagner uprising and its fallout provide Putin with several immediate benefits. Firstly, it reinforces his image as a strong leader who can withstand internal threats swiftly and effectively. Such a narrative could resonate with the Russian populace, providing a possible boost in domestic support. Secondly, it presents Putin with an excuse to conduct a further ‘cleansing’ of his administration. Existing undercurrents of dissent and inefficiency within Putin’s ranks, which have been systematically removed under the pretense of safeguarding national security, will now likely be more ruthlessly and overtly addressed. The Wagner mutiny, in this context, serves as a convenient accelerant for a new purge, enabling Putin to strengthen his control over the Russian government with even greater intensity and swiftness than before. Furthermore, the resolution of the Wagner uprising might provide an opportunity for Putin to redefine the role of private military companies in Russian foreign policy. The clarity over the status of the Wagner Group could improve the cohesiveness of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine.

To be certain, none of this solves the long-term challenges Russia faces, especially the ongoing challenges the Ukraine conflict represents for him at many levels. However, in the short term, the Wagner revolt may have unwittingly handed Putin a chance to consolidate his power, tighten his administration and refocus his strategies. Indeed, the Wagner revolt may have unintentionally provided Putin with an immediate opportunity to fortify his power, streamline his administration, and realign his strategies. Despite this, it is crucial to recognize that such short-term resolution does not eliminate the more profound, long-term challenges, complexities and pressures associated with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is also undeniable that the mutiny of a trusted ally such as the Wagner Group has revealed cracks in Putin’s hold over his military apparatus. While Putin might have the upper hand over Prigozhin for now, the seeds of dissent have been sown, and future rebellions may not be shut down as Putin’s gamble in Ukraine continues to be a thorn in his side. A rejuvenated strategy following the uprising may provide short-term advantages, but it does not alter the reality that an outright victory seems unattainable. The West’s response to Putin’s handling of the mutiny, and any subsequent crackdowns or policy changes can also significantly impact Russia’s international standing and Putin’s strength at home.

Ultimately, while it is tempting to see Putin as weakened in the aftermath of the Wagner uprising, the reality is more complex. Putin may have turned a crisis into an opportunity, and he could use the mutiny to consolidate his power. Despite this, the uprising has revealed inherent vulnerabilities in his rule, and it is uncertain how these will play out in the long term. While Putin seems to have temporarily successfully weathered the Wagner storm, the unpredictable tides of his political journey are far from complete.

Kemal Mohamedou is an intern at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). He is a recent graduate of King’s College London and wrote his thesis on the Wagner Group’s activities in Africa.

July 22, 2023 0 comment

Authoritarianism Economics Europe Featured National Security Print Article Russia Uncategorized Vladimir Putin

Why Angela Merkel’s Tenure has Emboldened Authoritarians

written by Andreas Papoutsis

Angela Merkel has often been likened to the replacement leader of the free world in the absence of active American leadership, particularly during the isolationist years of the Trump administration. Logically, her departure from the international stage is considered an imminent loss for the prosperity and security of the free world, though her legacy on the international stage should not be remembered fondly by those who truly support global democracies. Despite the occasional victory notched for neighboring democracies or domestic German society, Merkel’s legacy as a diplomat should be defined by the several inconsistencies in the values she chose to defend and the failures she has notched when standing up to autocrats.

Despite a whopping 16 years spent in office as the German Chancellor, Merkel has failed to raise German defense spending to the 2% of GDP threshold as required by NATO doctrine, instead of shrugging off the disregard for defense expenditures as a matter that should not be the worry of NATO allies. She will have left public office with a military budget that amounts to a meager 1.36% of the country’s GDP in 2019 before the pandemic-induced recession led to a sharp downtick in GDP that raised the figure to 1.57% in 2020.¹ Indifference to defense expenditures has forced the issue of foreign NATO missions to be disproportionately shouldered by other allies such as the United States. The issue of German defense spending has also left Europe in a strategically vulnerable position in the face of a revanchist Russian adversary in Vladimir Putin, whom she has seemingly cozied up to. What meaningful military response can be taken by Berlin in the event that the Kremlin’s juggernaut military invades Finland or Ukraine? At this point, the answer is clear: hardly anything of consequence. If Putin’s 2014 invasion of Crimea or repeated scares of Russian military buildup along Europe’s borders isn’t convincing enough of the very real possibility of an attack orchestrated by Moscow, we could simply turn to the leaders of Russia’s neighboring democracies, who constantly warn of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship.²

Perhaps one of the most disruptive and troublemaking authoritarian governments in the world, Russia has relied largely on its oil economy to project power and support the financial needs of its military proliferation. Amid a decline in European demand for fossil fuels, the Kremlin has been handicapped by a changing energy environment. Where would the Kremlin possibly find a lifeline? Perhaps from like-minded authoritarian governments such as the one seen in Beijing? Contrary to what logic would dictate, the helping hand was instead extended by Germany under the leadership of Angela Merkel, against the wishes of close allies such as the United States and the frantic warning of Eastern European countries like Ukraine.³ No amount of diplomacy, sanctions, or common sense could convince Germany otherwise of completing the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline despite its blatantly conspicuous strategic repercussions.

Trying to rationalize such a decision by pointing out political technicalities or lauding economic conveniences simply implies an apathetic attitude towards NATO security and laziness when configuring Germany’s energy structure. Even when Alexei Navalny was intentionally poisoned by the Kremlin for being an anti-corruption advocate, Berlin responded with inconsequential statements and sanctions that ignored the crown jewel of Putin’s objective in Europe: the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.⁴ Norbert Roettgen, the conservative party’s leader on the German foreign affairs committee, correctly assessed the seriousness of the situation by suggesting Germany, “must pursue hard politics, we must respond with the only language Putin understands – that is gas sales.”⁵ Despite calls from several Western countries and numerous politicians within her own country, Merkel decided against implicating the pipeline in any response levied by Germany.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas merely questioned and offered hollow consternation surrounding the future of the project in the aftermath of the Navalny poisoning, essentially demonstrating to one of the world’s most notorious authoritarians that his efforts to snuff out and assassinate pro-democracy advocates was entirely acceptable by Berlin’s standards.⁶ Germany seemed more enraged by American sanctions against the project than the assassination attempt undertaken by the Kremlin. Merkel instead figured that the wishes of her democratic allies were secondary to the desires of Vladimir Putin and the misconceived economic expediency he offered.

The decision to finalize the pipeline despite the Navalny poisoning now puts Ukraine and several other European partners at risk, as Kiev fears that Moscow could once again cut off oil supply to the region in an attempt to punish or coerce neighboring democracies. There does not even appear to be a surefire guarantee that implementation of the pipeline would be able to increase the volume of oil transported to Europe; we only know for certain that it would change the source of said oil. Likewise, neighboring Poland finds itself incredibly vulnerable and downright shocked in this situation, since repairs to the Ukrainian-Polish pipeline would have been significantly cheaper than the construction of the Nord-Stream 2.⁷ Since the pipeline will run through the Baltic Sea, NATO allies in the area should expect additional Russian naval assets in the region, an opportunity that Moscow will surely take advantage of to intimidate its neighbors.

All of the details and nuances of the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline, however, can be boiled down to a simple rhetorical question: why would Merkel want a sizable share of Germany’s energy supply to be in the hands of one of the world’s most notorious enemies of democracy? Considering that disdain for the project emanated not just from allies, but from domestic German lawmakers and a wide array of members of Merkel’s own party, there is no valid justification.

In recent weeks, the possibility of a Russian attack on Ukraine has grown. Despite a drawdown of troops along the Ukrainian border in April this year, Russian military assets have once again accumulated in the region, alarming officials in Kiev and causing many security officials from NATO countries to warn of an invasion. With over 100,000 troops in position, defense officials in Kiev project an attack before the end of the winter. Many American officials consider it a “high probability,” including Fiona Hill, who described Putin as “deadly serious” about commencing an incursion into Ukraine.⁸ In response to what could devolve into a major European war, Merkel has merely suggested imposing sanctions against the Kremlin. Levying sanctions against Moscow after allowing the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline to be constructed, however, seems like a rather hollow threat.

Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis expects the Kremlin to divert NATO’s attention away from Ukraine by fomenting unrest along the Polish border.⁹ Over the last few months, asylum seekers and migrants primarily originating from the Middle East have flooded the Polish border after being escorted by Belarusian security forces. Moscow has employed the strategy of attempting to create a refugee crisis within a NATO country by using the Belarusian government as a smuggler of vulnerable migrants. The predicament at the Polish border has been met with condemnation from Merkel, who rightly demonstrated solidarity with her counterparts in Warsaw. This solidarity, however, has not been consistently extended to other European democracies that have experienced similar hybrid attacks by authoritarian governments.

When standing up for European Union allies, Merkel has picked and chosen when to exhibit a commitment to democratic values. Merkel has often been perceived as the de facto leader (or co-leader alongside France’s Macron) of the European Union, especially with the departure of the United Kingdom. The Union’s mission statement includes promises of promoting peace, freedom, and security, yet it has been rendered virtually useless in acting on such promises in instances where Merkel’s leadership has deemed it as inexpedient, particularly as it relates to Turkey. For 47 years now, Ankara has militarily occupied the northeastern portion of Cyprus. Seventeen years ago, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union, which means that, for 17 years, a foreign nation has militarily occupied European territory with little to no backlash whatsoever from Berlin. Last summer, when Turkish warships were escorting oil surveying vessels in Greek and Cypriot waters, leading to a tense situation that nearly devolved into armed conflict between two NATO allies, Merkel framed the situation as if it were an incidental and natural dispute between two neighbors rather than an aggressive incursion of EU territorial waters. Instead of explicitly siding with a European partner and a country committee to good neighborly relations, Merkel chose neutrality, further emboldening the strongman residing in Ankara.

The aforementioned “hybrid attacks” that entail the intentional funneling of asylum seekers into a neighboring country to overwhelm their immigration infrastructure is a tactic that has been regularly utilized by Turkey when confronting neighboring democracies like Greece. In fact, many of the migrants attempting to cross the Polish border made their way to Belarus through Turkish flights to Minsk, which were eventually stopped once the European Union and the United States agreed to sanction third-country airlines involved in flying asylum seekers to Belarus.¹⁰

In March 2020, several thousands of migrants attempted to cross into Greece’s Evros region after President Erdogan announced he would allow their passage into the European Union despite no mutual agreement from the Greeks. The Turkish president’s intentions were clear: to threaten Greece with an unsustainable influx of migrants while unethically generating leverage to exact a more financially lucrative immigration agreement with the European Union. His efforts were successful in generating more financial assistance from the European Union, and although Merkel condemned Turkey’s actions as unacceptable, her government did little to enact any consequences.

While Turkey has grown increasingly authoritarian, both in how it operates domestically through Erdogan’s consolidation of power and in his militaristic foreign policy that threatens regional democracies, Merkel and her government have rewarded such behavior with new arms sales that include the transaction of new German submarines. The decision lends a strategic advantage for an authoritarian government in its aggression directed towards neighboring democracies. Her indifference on such matters also strengthens Ankara’s disdain for the democratic aspirations of its people, knowing that corruption and authoritarianism will result in little backlash from its longtime German partner.

No leader is perfect, not even some of history’s most respected figures, but Merkel’s vaunted reputation is largely based on the intentional ignorance of her shortcomings in defending global democracy. Her work as a domestic politician has received praise from vast ranges of German society, evidenced by her incredibly long tenure as German Prime Minister, but her work in the international community is not particularly impressive considering the urgency of challenging authoritarianism.

Merkel’s true legacy as a diplomat should instead reflect the inconsistencies in her values and the appeasement she demonstrated to some of the world’s most notorious dictators, the likes of which have utilized Merkel’s support to advance their objectives of consolidating power and tearing down democratic institutions within their own countries while simultaneously lashing out against neighboring democracies that are struggling to ensure the free world’s future. So, when it comes to defending democracy and confronting authoritarianism, Merkel’s record will forever be far from perfect.

Endnotes:

1. Leah Carter. “Germany reports record €53 billion in NATO defense spending.” Deutsche Welle News, February 2, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-reports-record-53-billion-in-nato-defense-spending/a-56491017.

2. Micheal Phillips and James Marson. “Russian Aggression Spurs Neighbors to Rebuild Defenses.” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-aggression-spurs-neighbors-to-rebuild-defenses-11609859853.

3. “Ukrainian ambassador calls Nord Stream 2 ‘a stab in Ukraine’s back’.” Ukrinform, March 11, 2021, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3344084-ukrainian-ambassador-calls-nord-stream-2-a-stab-in-ukraines-back.html.

4. “Russia responsible for Navalny poisoning, rights experts say.” United Nations News, March 1, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086012.

5. Madeline Chambers. “Germany pressed to rethink Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Navalny poisoning.” Reuters, September 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny-germany-nord/germany-pressed-to-rethink-nord-stream-2-pipeline-after-navalny-poisoning-idUSKBN25U0UF.

6. “Germany has alternatives if it abandons Nord Stream 2 over Russia tensions: Experts.” Alarabiya News, September 7, 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/business/energy/2020/09/07/Germany-has-alternatives-if-it-abandons-Nord-Stream-2-over-Russia-tensions-experts.

7. Mark Temnycky. “The Security Implications of Nord Stream 2 for Ukraine, Poland, and Germany.” Wilson Center, March 17, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/security-implications-nord-stream-2-ukraine-poland-and-germany.

8. John Haltiwanger. “Putin is ‘deadly serious’ about neutralizing Ukraine, and has the upper hand over the West, former US diplomats and officials warn.” Business Insider, November 26, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/puti-deadly-serious-about-ukraine-has-upper-hand-over-west-2021-11.

9. Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis. “Why it’s better than a 50-50 chance that Russia will attack Ukraine this winter.” Fox News, November 27, 2021, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/russia-attack-ukraine-winter-biden-putin-robert-maginnis.

10. Aykan Erdimir. “Swift trans-Atlantic action kept Turkey from fueling Belarus’ hybrid attacks,” DefenseNews, November 16, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/11/16/swift-trans-atlantic-action-kept-turkey-from-fueling-belarus-hybrid-attacks/.

February 7, 2022 0 comment

Featured Geopolitics Print Article Russia Vladimir Putin

Putin’s Authoritarianism: Driven by Money

written by Alex Choy

Annually, the Comparative Survey of Freedom evaluates nations’ political rights and civil liberties. Political rights are defined as how “people have a choice in determining the nature of the system and its leaders,” through free, fair, and frequent elections, while civil liberties are the “freedoms to develop views … apart from the state,” through the press, speech, and association. Together, these form the hallmarks of a democratic society.

Under the reformist Yeltsin administration, Russia was rated as “partly free.” However, under Putin, Russia regressed into authoritarianism, as the Kremlin manipulated elections, eliminated countervailing forces by centralizing power around the executive, and instilled fear in the press corps. While some attribute this regression to Putin’s KGB past, I assert that the driving force behind the replacement of competitive democracy with what is termed sovereign democracy is business, as he realizes that in the modern age, there can be no lasting power without wealth — authoritarianism is a means to secure that end.

According to Professor Robert Dahl of Yale University, large-scale democracy requires that the people elect a government through free, fair, and frequent elections; there must be freedom of the press, speech, and association; and all adults must be allowed to vote. Comparing these criteria to the situation on the ground, by consulting quantitative and qualitative evidence compiled by Professor Daniel Treisman of the University of California, Los Angeles, will allow for a nuanced assessment of Russia’s regression.

Free and fair elections are characterized by “certain procedures [and] uncertain outcomes.” Under Yeltsin, this was largely the case as election results reflected a plurality of political views. For instance, during the 1995 parliamentary elections, the anti-Yeltsin Communists placed first, while the Yeltsin-backed party of power lagged in third. In contrast, to keep his party of power, United Russia (UR), dominant, Putin manipulates electoral procedures by silencing troublesome independent constituencies and small opposition parties. Accordingly, consulting Triesman’s research, one observes that in 2007, electoral rules were rewritten, raising the threshold for representation from 5 to 7% and eliminating single-member constituencies by switching to a pure proportional representation system. Furthermore, various opposition candidates were “struck from the ballot on technicalities or invented pretexts.” Only candidates which the Kremlin knows are weak, and will acquiesce, are allowed to run.

Manipulation encompasses not only institutional factors but also the deliberate misreporting of results. Analyzing a graph of the results of the 2011 legislative election by polling station, one would expect to see a relatively normal distribution from all parties. While this pattern is present for the opposition, Putin’s UR shows a fat right tail, and spikes repeatedly at even numbers, such as at 85, 90, and 95% of votes. It is almost as if polling stations were ordered to report certain numbers by some higher authority, ostensibly by Putin himself. While this evidence is circumstantial, it does provide strong evidence of some kind of manipulation, such as ballot stuffing, which might account for the spikes. As a result, while frequent, Russia’s elections are now anything but free or fair, as the party in power operates on an uneven playing field.

Not only has Putin manipulated elections, but he has degraded countervailing forces by centralizing decision-making powers within the executive branch rather than with the (ostensibly) democratically elected legislature. This phenomenon is perhaps most prominently illustrated by the role that the Presidential Administration (PA) — composed of unelected appointees, has as the “command center from which the Kremlin manages politics.” For instance, in 1999, the PA, together with oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Gleb Pavlovsky, created UR, merging Unity with another pro-Putin bloc to form a pro-Putin majority in the Duma. In 2007, PA officials formed A Just Russia (JR), UR’s ‘opposition party, to give off the illusion of plurality and political competition. While JR officially positions itself to the left of UR, it “vote[s] reliably with [Putin] on key issues.”

Consequently, both the frequency of debate and the frequency of vetoes within the Duma have decreased significantly under Putin. Under Yeltsin, “initiatives ping-ponged” in a pluralistic environment of competitive politics. However, the emergence of a pro-Putin majority has since stifled debate, with the former chairman of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, asserting that the Duma is “not a venue to hold political battles.” As a result, Putin-sponsored bills “become law very quickly” without deliberation or veto. Therefore, while democracies must have elected legislatures that make the laws, but in Russia, “legislation is [no longer] made in the Duma, but by the Kremlin.”

Freedom of speech and, by extension, an independent press are essential because citizens cannot make informed decisions while voting if the government controls all information sources. Under Yeltsin, the press could be considered “generally free.” However, Putin initiated state takeovers of major news outlets, threatening their owners with jail if they did not acquiesce. Aside from major outlets, independent journalists were also intimidated. For example, journalists were handed questions in advance during press conferences and were threatened if they deviated from the script. To make matters worse, several journalists critical of the Kremlin, such as Anna Politkovskaya, have been killed in alleged contract hits. Rather than to “foster conditions favorable for healthy democratic competition,” it is clear that Putin’s Russia has regressed into authoritarianism. But why?

Many attribute this trend to Putin’s nostalgia for his Soviet KGB past, claiming that his goals were always to “roll back the freedoms established by his predecessor [and] to restore the power of the security services.” While there is quantitative evidence for this explanation — by 2002, 33% of government ministers were siloviki (strongmen), this ‘Chekist’ explanation falls short when confronted with the fact that Putin uses the security services as a means to an end, and that siloviki in Putin’s inner circle are not influential because of their formal positions within the security services, but because “they [benefit] from close personal ties to Putin,” as they are his friends. In reality, while Putin is cozy with the Federal Security Service (FSB), he cannot be considered a Chekist in the traditional sense, given his pro-business attitudes, early economic liberalism, careful political maneuvering, and attempts to manipulate election results for appearance’s sake. A true Chekist, primarily concerned with maintaining order with an iron fist, would not bother with such circumspection. So, if Putin is not driven by his KGB past, what explains this trend?

In the wake of privatization during the 1990s, Putin recognized that “in the modern world, there could be no power without” wealth, since one needs to be able to “spend more than one’s enemies” to remain on top. Therefore, the explanation for Russia’s regression can be found in Putin and his associates’ state-owned business ventures such as Rosneft, and specifically the giant state-owned gas company Gazprom, where he serves as an unofficial but de-facto CEO.

Reportedly, for Putin, Gazprom is a personal obsession. He has memorized the details of the company’s accounts and has personally approved all corporate appointments down to the deputy level — even going over the head of Gazprom’s actual CEO in some cases. While there is no direct evidence that Putin owns any part of these companies, his close friends, many of them siloviki billionaires, do, and therefore, by proxy, it can be inferred so does he to an extent. As Treisman asserts, Putin and his circle pretend to be democratic … [retaining] formal institutions” while subverting them to “preserve their power and enrich themselves.” Subsequently, through a lens of business, Russia’s authoritarianism can be contextualized.

The Yukos affair sheds light on why Putin engages in procedural manipulation and has centralized power. When he first entered office, Putin was confronted with the aftermath of Yeltsin’s privatization — a class of wealthy oligarchs, who in their largesse thought they could bend the legislature to favor their corporate interests. In the Duma, these oligarchs financed campaigns and consequently ‘owned’ parliament members once elected. For instance, in 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner and CEO of Yukos, the then-largest Russian oil company and Gazprom competitor, had “cultivated a large faction of deputies in parliament—more than one hundred … by some estimates.” Khodorkovsky then used this influence to rewrite proposed laws regarding the mining of hydrocarbons to benefit Yukos while sapping profits from state-owned competitors such as Gazprom and Rosneft and undermining Putin’s ability to shape policy through UR. Retaliating utilizing his siloviki connections, Putin threw Khodorkovsky in jail, and Yukos was nationalized.

Following this episode, it crystalizes why Putin would have subsequently attempted to exercise greater control over the Duma — by cementing a sycophantic UR majority, silencing opponents and independents, and centralizing power around himself and his unelected appointees in the PA to prevent repeat occurrences. In addition, despite promising that under his administration, the “class of oligarchs [would] cease to exist,” the nationalization of Yukos and other firms created a new class of super-wealthy oligarchs, “drawn … from the circle of Putin’s close friends.”

In this environment, Putin realizes that to stay in power, the “vicissitudes of Russian politics” necessitate wealth, and wealth necessitates authoritarian control over all facets of the political system and news media to guarantee it. For example, Gazprom was able to use its immense wealth to branch out into the media business, “buying various publications and taking over [NTV], which muted its criticism of the Kremlin” and helped to stifle internal dissent.

Consequently, why even hold elections and then manipulate results? Would it be more conducive for business to do away with democratic institutions completely?

The answer is no.

In 1999, 68% of Putin voters supported the idea of democracy. Furthermore, after the 2007 presidential election where power was ‘castled’ to Medvedev, Prime Minister Putin announced that “Russia is a country which has achieved democracy thanks to the will of its own people … and it will decide by itself” how democracy will be achieved. Accordingly, Putin plays the game to retain domestic legitimacy in line with managed sovereign democracy, which asserts that Russia is ‘democratic’ but in the face of aforementioned vicissitudes, reserves the right to control how democracy is carried out, to ensure control over “strategically important sectors” of the economy. In essence, control over the energy sector.

Obviously, there are stark differences between the Kremlin’s discourse and reality. The Russian people recognize this — but evidently believe strongly in their country’s democratic potential. Therefore, if Putin were to switch to a ‘harder’ form of authoritarianism, and say, abolish elections — the resultant massive upheaval would threaten the business climate, and resultantly, the performance of Gazprom and Yukos. Observe the recent civil unrest in Moscow over the widening “economic gap between the elite and ordinary people.” While such events only caused a slight drop in Gazprom stock prices, which quickly rebounded, they are merely a taste of the disastrous consequences that could happen. As a result, when practicing ‘soft’ authoritarianism, Putin can intimidate the opposition to secure his wealth and Russian state-owned enterprises’ prosperity, while maintaining outward appearances to appease both domestic and foreign actors.

To conclude, under Putin, Russia has regressed into authoritarianism, which can be explained by Putin’s realization that there can be no power without personal wealth. To guarantee that wealth necessitates implementing authoritarian measures — given the uncertainty of Russian politics and economics. Accordingly, the Kremlin has manipulated elections, eliminated countervailing forces by centralizing power, and instilled fear in the press corps. However, it has not gone so far as to eliminate democratic institutions and continues to hold elections based on sovereign democracy, given domestic popular support for democratic principles.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

September 1, 2021 0 comment

Europe Geopolitics Russia Security and Conflict Vladimir Putin

Will Putin Rescue Lukashenko from the Jaws of Death?

written by Alex Choy

Authoritarian leader of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, is currently confronted with massive protests over accusations of winning a rigged election. Previously praised by Belarusians for bringing stability to their former Soviet republic, as Lukashenko enters his sixth consecutive term in office, Belarusians rallied by political challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya have demanded new, free and fair elections.

In response, an embattled Lukashenko announced that protesters would have to kill him first.

Mr. Lukashenko, often referred to as Europe’s last dictator, was elected in 1994 as part of Belarus’ first national election post-Soviet dissolution. A year after taking office, he won a questionable referendum that gave him the power to dissolve the legislature, and in the following year, created a legislature and judiciary subordinate to himself, essentially giving his decrees the force of law. As a result, except for the 1994 election, Belarusian democracy has not seen the light of day.

Not only did Lukashenko consolidate his power domestically early on, but he also sought closer ties with Russia. In 1999, Lukashenko and then Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a treaty intended to reintegrate the two nations by creating a confederation known as the Union State, in which the two nations would remain sovereign but would share a government. Although the date when full integration would occur was left unspecified, on a visceral level, the Belarusian flag and national seal had already been altered to reflect Soviet-era designs, borders were opened, and the Russian language was elevated, while Belarusian was suppressed. In the power-political arena, ‘oil was traded for kisses,’ as Russia granted Belarus significant energy subsidies to prop up its anemic economy, in exchange for its geopolitical loyalty as a strategic buffer against NATO.

However, let us get one thing straight: Belarus is not a Russian client state, at least not from Lukashenko’s perspective. He has long played Russia and NATO against each other, taking part in NATO programs to alleviate Western sanctions, while welcoming Russian assistance, much to Putin’s dismay. As a result, Belarusian-Russian relations have soured. The Union State remains unfulfilled, and as Lukashenko continues to demonstrate his willingness to stray from the Kremlin’s expectation that he be a willing Russian stooge, Putin’s frustration towards him has naturally increased.

For instance, concerning Russia’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Lukashenko has refused to side with Russia, citing Article 18 of the Belarusian Constitution, which stipulates Belarus’ goal of neutrality. In retaliation, Putin slashed subsidies, making their return contingent on the Union State’s fruition. Recently, Lukashenko has accused Russia of attempting to bully Belarus into full integration, and in July, Russian mercenaries were arrested in Minsk, accused by Lukashenko of being a part of a Kremlin plot to install Tikhanovskaya in power. However, Lukashenko’s accusations are nonsensical, since Tikhanovskaya herself opposes closer ties with Russia.

So why is Putin so interested in creating a Union State?

Previously, the fruition of the Union State would have created a new powerful leadership post, a position that Putin, who was barred by term limits from remaining as Russia’s President after 2024, could have filled legally, thereby exerting dominance over both nations. However, in July, Putin was able to win a questionable referendum, allowing him to skirt the term limit restriction and remain in power until 2036.

From a balance of power standpoint, his interest lies in creating a consolidated Russian Eurasia, a motive in line with Russia’s previous annexations of Crimea and Georgia. Consequently, having secured access to the Black Sea, Putin set his eyes on the Baltics and the strategic Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is cut off from Belarus, and by extension, the Russian mainland; by a narrow sliver of the Polish-Lithuanian border known as the Suwalki Gap. Should Putin attempt to forcefully ‘bridge the Suwalki Gap’ to reconnect Kalinigrad to the Russian mainland, Russian troops would have to travel through Belarusian territory. Therefore, such a scenario is contingent on Belarusian acquiescence, or Russian ability to ensure compliance through a unified government.

Regarding the Suwalki Gap, LTGEN (Ret.) Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army Europe, asserts: “Deterring any potential action [by Russia] — or even the threat of action — against Suwalki is therefore essential for NATO’s credibility and Western cohesion.” Through a military Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics and Poland, NATO can reassure its defensive commitment while deterring Russia. On the other hand, should NATO fail to counter Russia’s move to ‘bridge the gap,’ such a scenario would drastically undermine NATO’s credibility to provide collective security, essentially rendering the alliance meaningless. This in turn, would invite further brazen Russian aggression. Therefore, the risk of Russia’ bridging the gap’ not only lies with the Baltics being cut off from the rest of NATO, but threatens the very existence of the organization itself; a possibility which no doubt entices Putin.

As part of EFP, the Trump Administration recently announced the redeployment of 1000 soldiers, and the relocation of V Corps Headquarters from Germany to Poland. In response, Lukashenko placed his military on ‘high alert,’ citing the ‘threat’ to Belarusian territorial integrity. According to Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, Lukashenko’s efforts are “to divert attention from Belarus’s internal problems … with totally baseless statements about imaginary external threats.”

As boasted by Belarusian state news media, Lukashenko was able to secure Putin’s promise that “comprehensive [military] assistance will be provided to “ensure the security of Belarus in the event of external military threats.” However, it is essential to note that this ‘comprehensive assistance’ falls under the premises of Belarus’ membership in The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military alliance, and Putin has not explicitly expressed his endorsement of Lukashenko remaining in power if he cannot deliver on the Union State.

But the real question remains: Given the imminent risk posed to the Lukashenko, will Putin intervene in Belarus?

The short answer is, probably not, unless a change in Belarusian leadership involves an abrupt shift towards the West and away from Russia. The current spate of protests are primarily anti-Lukashenko and lack the anti-Russian sentiment present during the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. While Putin has leveraged hyper-nationalist ethnic Russian ‘compatriots abroad’ to undermine sovereignty in ex-Soviet Bloc nations in the past, given the existing semi-union, it is far less costly for Putin to achieve a Union State through soft power alone, rather than through military force. Therefore, if Putin chooses to send his ‘little green men’ to Belarus to prop up the existing government, Belarusian public opinion will turn solidly against Russia, viewing such an attempt as an effort to silence the voice of the people.

Having said that, should Tikhanovskaya continue to rise in popularity and place the possibility of a Union State in jeopardy, Putin’s best option would not be to intervene militarily, and certainly not to call for new elections (that Tikhanovskaya could win). Instead, he should attempt to back a transfer of power from Lukashenko to a member of the Belarusian elite, such as pro-Russian Viktor Babariko. Babariko, who intended to run for president in the 2020 Election, was arrested by Lukashenko in July. According to an unofficial internet poll conducted by popular Belarusian news site Tut.by, over half of respondents were ready to support Babariko over Lukashenko.

On the off chance that Putin chooses to intervene militarily and back Lukashenko, there is no doubt that he will expect Lukashenko’s full and unbridled cooperation towards achieving Belarusian-Russian integration. Putin certainly has not been subtle in signaling these wishes, recently telling Lukashenko: “I expect that your statesmanship will facilitate the further development of mutually beneficial Russian-Belarusian relations … as well as the further enhancement of cooperation within the Union State.”

Given his motivations, Putin’s cost-benefit calculus is no doubt firing on full cylinders. As a result, as events continue to unfold, one can only wonder if he will choose his course of action wisely, and if he does not; how NATO forces will counter if faced with a potential Suwalki Gap scenario.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

September 4, 2020 0 comment

China Technology United States Vladimir Putin

The Digital Iron Curtain

written by Zachary Durkee

Russian President Vladimir Putin once noted that “whoever leads in AI will rule the world [i]”. He may just be right. From the battlefield to the kitchen, there is close to no aspect of society that artificial intelligence (AI), and high technology for that matter, will not touch. To put this assertion into perspective, the 2018 World Economic Forum meeting noted that 5G’s global impact is expected to be on par with the invention of electricity and the automobile. The technology will enable billions of new digital connections, advance the utility of AI through denser data transfer and is expected to contribute $12 trillion to global GDP by 2035 [ii].

Though civilization sits on the horizon of a new world reminiscent of science fiction, shifting geopolitical dynamics and a brewing great power rivalry stand as forces capable of distorting, and ultimately setting the course of humanity on two starkly different paths.

The current erosion of U.S. – China relations stands as the catalyst for this prospective detour in a forthcoming technological revolution. From global economic uncertainty compounded by a battering trade war to the prospect of dangerous miscalculation in a region increasingly marred by power politics [iii], there is much at stake even this early on in what’s likely to be a century marked by stiff competition between the two superpowers.

One of the most far-reaching casualties of this rivalry can be felt in technology. The “digital iron curtain” is a term currently being coined to describe the prospect of the formation of two distinct global digital ecosystems brought on by Chinese – U.S. contention in the technology sector [iv]. Societies around the world would be divided via the internet and devices they use rather than walls and barbed wire.

New America Foundation Fellow Samm Sacks provided a compelling reason this is occuring at Bloomberg’s New Economy Forum in Beijing this past November. Miss Sacks argues that the United States is pursuing a policy founded on paranoia and fear, in which all Chinese companies and researchers are seen as nefarious. In contrast, China is cultivating an environment of “techno nationalism” where the government views technology as a tool and appendage of the state [v]. These policy choices are fostering an environment incompatible with cooperation. Political ideology, economic nationalism, and increasing suspicion of the other is laying the foundation for a wall separating two of the world’s most technologically adept countries.

Indications of this divide are already unfolding. Following a May 2019 executive order that virtually bans the Chinese tech giant Huawei in the United States and limits U.S. companies from cooperating with it, Google stripped the firm from use of its Android operating system [vi]. Though this ban has been temporarily lifted, it has cemented volatility and mistrust in the trade relationship between the two. It has also compelled Huawei to develop its own native operating system in the event that the restriction is imposed. Huawei smartphone sales outside of China could dwindle if their access to widely used Google services are permanently cut off.

This individual case demonstrates that when the avenues enabling the interdependence between U.S. and Chinese tech firms close, it ultimately forces each side to ensure they become independent from the other.

The greatest implications of this divide will become more visible as the second half of the world comes online. The International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) Measuring the Information Society Report (2018) estimates that around 3.9 billion people, or around 51% of the world’s population, now has access to the internet [vii]. This leaves a huge segment of the world without the kind of tech that China and the United States will compete vigorously to rollout within these developing markets. When the current polarization and competitive attitudes are taken into account, it’s no surprise that the world sits on the cusp of falling between a deeply divided American and Chinese led digital market.

These two distinct digital orders may incorporate and draw themselves along political boundaries. Democracies sharing the United States’ culture of a free and open internet promoting freedom of speech and expression will be more inclined to work with Western firms over Chinese ones. Authoritarian countries may find it more attractive to work with the latter to satiate, rather than challenge, their desire to consolidate political power. The prospective benefits that advanced technology brings to the future is ultimately being constrained by a vital relationship in disarray.

[i] Vincent, James. “Putin Says the Nation That Leads in AI ‘Will Be the Ruler of the World’.” The Verge, 4 Sept. 2017, www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world.

[ii] Rosenberg, Don. “How 5G Will Change the World.” World Economic Forum, 18 Jan. 2018, www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/the-world-is-about-to-become-even-more-interconnected-here-s-how/.

[iii] “Global Conflict Tracker l Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/?category=us.

[iv] Yuan, Li. “As Huawei Loses Google, the U.S.-China Tech Cold War Gets Its Iron Curtain.” The New York Times, 20 May 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/business/huawei-trump-china-trade.html.

[v] “’Digital Iron Curtain’ Will Have Grave Consequences for Humanity: Sacks.” YouTube, Bloomberg Live, 26 Nov. 2019, www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsqdCfEBhco.

[vi] Weinstein, Natalie. “Google Cuts off Huawei Phones from Future Android Updates.” CNET, 20 May 2019, www.cnet.com/news/google-reportedly-cuts-off-huawei-phones-from-future-android-updates/.

[vii] “Measuring the Information Society Report 2018.” International Telecommunication Union , 2018, www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/publications/misr2018.

February 8, 2020 0 comment

Cartoon Donald Trump Featured Geopolitics Human Rights Populism Russia United States Vladimir Putin

Conservatives and the Kremlin: An Emerging Alliance

written by Zach Emanuel

This past summer while leading a Congressional delegation to Moscow, Republican Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama proclaimed in a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that the United States and Russia “don’t necessarily need to be adversaries” and that “the world is better off…if Russia and the U.S. have fewer tensions.” While it is tough to disagree with Shelby, such statements are often expected from the perpetrators of cyber-warfare and election interference, not the victims.

Among fellow Republicans, Shelby is not alone in his conciliatory and even flattering tone towards our former Cold War enemy. Vice President Mike Pence said that it was “inarguable” that Russian President Vladimir Putin “has been a stronger leader in his country than Barack Obama has been in this country.” Likewise, President Donald Trump has gone from calling Putin a “strong leader” and “very smart” to asking “wouldn’t it be nice if we actually got along with Russia”.

Ronald Reagan would recoil and reject his fellow Republicans’ words. In 1983, Reagan declared the Soviet Union to be an “evil empire” and “the focus of evil in the modern world.” Indeed, these recent statements are a far cry from the hawkish tone Republican leaders used under Reagan. They also differ tremendously from the way Republicans spoke about Russia just a few years ago when Barack Obama still occupied the Oval Office, such as when 2012 Republican Presidential nominee Mitt Romney famously called Russia our “number one geopolitical foe.”

To what can we attribute this sudden, yet strong change of perspective within the GOP leadership?

It might be that former Russia hawks who have reversed their positions have done so out of political necessity. In just four years, the percentage of Republicans who consider Russia an ally has nearly doubled to 40 percent, while just 10 percent now consider Russia the greatest immediate threat to the United States. Russia, like Trump, is popular with the GOP base and Senators, like Shelby, want to keep their jobs.

But if politics can answer the question of why Republican elected officials have changed their minds on Russia, then what can possibly explain the Republican base’s change of heart?

Surprisingly, the Republican base’s pivot towards Moscow began well before Trump entered the political arena, let alone the Oval Office. In August of 2013, Matt Drudge, the conservative pundit and founder of the right-wing Drudge Report, called Putin the “leader of the free world.” Later that year, Pat Buchanan, the same Pat Buchanan who was a senior advisor to both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, penned a column defending both Putin’s leadership and conservative record. And in 2014, evangelist Franklin Graham, long a prominent face on the religious right along with his father, Billy Graham, defended Putin on a host of issues ranging from LGBT rights to military engagement in Syria. What gives?

While Buchanan and Graham’s respective defenses of Putin have been tied to his crackdown on gay rights in Russia, the right-wing obsession with Russia extends beyond “homosexual marriage,” (Buchanan’s words) and into the broader culture war taking place in the U.S. and across the Western world. On issues such as racial diversity and multiculturalism, immigration, LGBT rights, and abortion, the left and right in America and in Europe are increasingly divided.

Where does Putin stand on multiculturalism, gay rights, abortion rights, and immigration? Firmly in the conservative camp.

When it comes to racial diversity and immigration, Russia represents a Trump-Republican’s dream. While whites in the U.S make up 61% of the population, in the next 20 to 25 years, the U.S will become a majority-minority nation. Russia’s population on the other hand is still over 82% white– and not shrinking. And there is no immigration to Russia. As of January of 2018, Russia has granted only one Syrian national refugee status since the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011. To quote HBO’s “Real Time” host Bill Maher, “Russia is a honky oasis and Republicans love it.”

Putin’s record on gay and abortion rights is similar. In advance of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia famously passed a law banning “the propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations,” and threatening stiff penalties for those who “promote homosexuality to anyone under 18.” Same-sex couples in Russia are ineligible for a number of legal protections available to heterosexual couples and there are no laws banning discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Finally, in the Russia republic of Chechnya in 2017, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov was accused of rounding up and detaining over 100 men suspected of being gay, three of whom were killed. In the aftermath Kadyrov denied the claims and Putin appeared to back him up.

Restrictions on abortion are similarly harsh. In 2011, the Russian Parliament passed a law banning abortions after the twelfth week of pregnancy and instituted a mandatory waiting period of two to seven days to allow the woman to “reconsider her decision.” Moreover, the law mandates that abortion providers devote “10 percent of any advertising to describing the dangers of abortion to a woman’s health” while making it illegal to “describe abortion as a safe medical procedure.”

With bans on public expressions of homosexuality and restrictive abortion laws, its no wonder Christian conservatives in the United States like Franklin Graham and Mike Pence find Vladimir Putin to be a strong and admirable leader. Many Republican voters overlooked Trump’s anti-democratic tendencies when voting for him in 2016 simply so they could finally overturn Roe v. Wade. It’s not a leap to say that those same Republicans could overlook Putin’s despotism for similar reasons.

The Republican base no longer views Russia as an “evil empire” but rather as the “leader of the free world” because the battle lines dividing our world are no longer ideological, but cultural. Communists and dictators are no longer the enemy, liberals are.

The consequences of viewing the world through a cultural lens rather than an ideological one are nothing short of profound. If the features that unite people with one another are their race or policies on abortion and gay marriage rather than their commitment to American values, then it’s no wonder Republicans view Russia, rather than Democrats, as a more natural ally.

At the summit meeting between Russia and the United States in Helsinki this past July, President Trump was asked whether or not he believed America’s intelligence agencies or Vladimir Putin when it came to Russian meddling in the 2016 election. He sided with Putin. While even GOP leaders chastised Trump for his comment and came to the defense of the FBI and CIA, his decision to believe and defend the Russians over fellow Americans is a sign of what’s to come if cultural values continue to supersede democratic ones. To avoid this fate, Americans must again find a way to replace partisanship with patriotism, and commitment to our causes with a commitment to our country.

October 23, 2018 0 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics History Military Russia Security and Conflict Territorial disputes Vladimir Putin

The Russo-Georgian War, 10 Years Later

written by Conor McDonald

On August 7th, 2008, the leaders of the Russian Federation shocked the world and made the controversial decision to mobilize and invade Georgia, a small, sovereign nation located in the Caucasus Mountains just south of Russia. The Georgian military had been engaged with separatists from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for just under a week, yet by the time a large batch of Russian military personnel entered their territory through the mountainous Roki tunnel at 11:00 PM, it was too late. Despite what any news outlets would later report, the international community knew that Georgia had just lost a major chunk of its territory to this aggressor from the north. What no one knew, however, was that this seemingly minor excursion would begin a decade’s worth of continued Russian belligerence and adventurism toward its neighbors. But why start with Georgia?

Historically, the strained relations between Russia and Georgia are nothing new, and can be traced back as early as the year 1785 when the Russian Empire violated a treaty and refused to defend the eastern Georgian Kingdom during a Persian invasion. Some decades later, in 1801, Georgia joined the Russian Empire, and it remained a protected member up until 1918 when the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia was established following the Russian Revolution and the abdication of the Russian Tsardom. This was short-lived, however, as the Bolsheviks and the Red Army overthrew the Georgian government in 1921 and forcibly annexed the region into the newly-established United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1922.

The USSR forced an era of tension, fear and powerlessness upon the citizens of Georgia. Under the first three years of Soviet control alone, approximately 50,000 Georgians were executed by the government, while an insurmountable 150,000 were purged up through 1951 by Joseph Stalin, a native Georgian himself. Additionally, basic rights to citizenship were stripped; according to Michael Parrish in The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953, Stalin forced entire Ingush, Chechen, Balkarian and Karachay populations, all native to Georgia, into deportation. Georgian territories were seized and distributed amongst various states, including Armenia and Turkey, and nearly half of the 700,000 soldiers that the country was forced to contribute toward the Red Army were killed over the course of World War II. Even when relatively progressive leaders like Nikita Khrushchev took control of the Soviet Union — “progressive” in that he succeeded Stalin — Georgian protests promoting independence from the USSR resulted in the massacring of hundreds of college students and demonstrators.

Thus, it should surprise no one that, upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Georgian officials were quick to declare sovereignty and begin holding democratic elections. Unfortunately, the radical and autocratic Georgian presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia prompted some to lose faith in their nation, and pro-Russian separatist groups gained prominence in certain regions — most notably in South Ossetia and Abkhazia — leading to a short-lasting civil war in the latter. Somewhat ironically, this forced Georgia to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to receive Russian military support, and, in 2001, Abkhazia and Georgia co-signed “an accord pledging not to use force against each other.”

After the accord’s ratification, a shaky sense of peace was established between Georgia and the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was clearly imperfect, though, as protests and skirmishes continued to break out while political tensions rose unwaveringly; South Ossetia even went so far as to hold an unofficial referendum in which 99% of the public voted in favor of independence, an act ignored by the European Union but supported by the Russia Duma. Two years later, after hearing direct pleas for support from Abkhazian and South Ossetian officials, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stated that allying with the separatist regions “is not an easy choice, but it is the only way to save the lives of people,” and pledged both political and military support to both. Several months later, after the Georgian military responded to another South Ossetian attack, Russia launched its now-infamous military invasion.

Russia’s 2008 seizure of the Ossetian and Abkhazian territories provided eerie foreshadowing for what the Federation’s neighbors had in store. Six years later, in 2014, a near-identical crisis transpired in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions, disputes which continue to the time of this article’s publication. The primary characteristic that both the Georgian and Ukrainian annexation attempts had in common is that they highlighted deep, pervading insecurities from within the highest ranks of Russian leadership. These insecurities are two-pronged, with stress placed on both military and political pressures. From a military perspective, the intimidating reach of NATO expansion is obviously considered to be a pervading, existential threat; Georgia and Ukraine were invaded while the United States and the West considered their bids to enter NATO. However, the more alarming insecurities are political, and they continue to grow increasingly problematic as democracy gains popularity within Russian spheres of influence.

During a 2005 visit, President George W. Bush proudly referred to Georgia as a beacon of liberty in a region where freedom is not always to be taken for granted. He spoke glowingly about the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, in which a peaceful change of power allied Georgia more strongly with the West. This revolution preceded and arguably inspired Ukraine’s 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, which forced the overturning of then-President Viktor Yanukovych and his corrupt, Russophilic administration in favor of the more Western-oriented candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. These so-called Color Revolutions, which also took place in post-Soviet Yugoslavia and Kyrgyzstan, sent a message to their former occupier that these nations were now independent and desirous of fair domestic representation. Seeing that his neighbors were quickly working to distance themselves from the influence of a relatively weakened Russia, it would not take a foreign affairs specialist to understand that Vladimir Putin, a longstanding disbeliever in the promises of democracy, was far from pleased with the symbolism of these revolts.

Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko began to indirectly lay the groundwork for his own country’s invasion by publicly voicing his support for Georgian independence. It is no coincidence that this controversial anti-Russian stance hurdled Ukraine toward further political crisis in November of that year, a window which Russia seized to further exacerbate political troubles. When Yanukovych successfully regained his presidency in 2013, Ukraine spiraled into yet another revolution, and this time Putin chose to involve himself on his pro-Russia counterpart’s behalf. Shortly after, the autonomous region of Crimea was annexed by Russian soldiers.

Russia had been guilty of testing Western resolve all throughout the 21st century, particularly in Eastern Europe, but the dramatic actions against Georgia in 2008 marked a critical shift in Russian foreign policy. Long gone were the days of press releases or discrete political subversion, and ushered in was an era of violent military intervention and territorial seizures. The only thing protecting Russia’s other Western-oriented, post-Soviet neighbors is their NATO membership, and the United States and its allies should not be surprised to see Russian intervention on behalf of other separatist groups from non-member states in the coming years. Ten years after the events in Georgia, the world still waits to see who will be next.

September 26, 2018 8 comments

Donald Trump Europe Featured Military Russia Security and Conflict United States Vladimir Putin

The Connection Between Putin’s Chef, Global Political Interference and a Ukrainian Invasion

written by Conor McDonald

If the American dream consists of starting from scratch and, through tireless labor, building one’s assets up to formidable quantities, then it should be easy for Western capitalists to understand how certain individuals were able to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 to attain the status that they have today. Boris Yeltsin’s oligarchs with insider connections, of course, are exceptions to this; instead, the individuals being referred to include middle class contractors, mid-tier managers, and even hot dog stand owners. One stand owner in particular, Yevgeny Prigozhin, provides a particularly dramatic case study for economic success following modest origins. Prigozhin used to rob banks and sell street snacks just to pay his bills, but today, he owns a number of bustling enterprises and can be seen driving a blue Lincoln Continental. However, all is not as picture perfect as it seems for this Gatsby-esque individual.

In 2016, the United States congress imposed economic sanctions against Prigozhin alongside several other Russian political elites in an attempt to strike back at the heart of Putin’s inner circle. Just under a month ago, Prigozhin was indicted by Robert Mueller, special counsel overseeing the alleged Russian interference in the United States’ 2016 presidential election, for playing a major role in the digital manipulation of public opinion. Similarly, the international community has expressed repeated disdain toward Prigozhin for his establishment of the Wagner Group, which today stands as Russia’s premier private military corporation acting in Syria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. So, how exactly did a humble, bank-robbing hot dog stand owner such as Prigozhin manage to gain such prestige and controversy in Russia’s government?

As Russian political rebel Aleksei Navalny stated in a recent interview, Prigozhin “didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In 1998, Prigozhin opened his most famous conventional business to date: New Island, a buoyant restaurant that lies atop an adorned ferry in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Two years later, in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. Coincidence or not, Putin took a liking to Prigozhin, and the very next year he brought Jacques Chirac, the former President of France, to the very same restaurant. He also brought United States President George W. Bush in 2002, and he hosted his personal birthday party there in 2003. Putin and Prigozhin rapidly formed a unique friendship, the shady personal and economic perks of which would be seen in the years to follow.

Some of these perks included contracts to provide food for Russian public schools and the Russian military — at his peak, Prigozhin was feeding 90% of Russian service-members, a job which Vox News reports earned him over a billion dollars. Perhaps it is because of Prigozhin’s humble origins as a hot dog stand owner that he is not afraid of doing President Putin’s dirty work. Perhaps he was enraptured by the economic benefits, or perhaps he was simply too afraid to say no. Regardless, with economic favors from Putin came political and social responsibility for Prigozhin to serve his leader’s interests. A decade after Putin’s birthday party, Prigozhin was presumably advised by government sources to use his funds to create the Internet Resource Agency — also known as Glavset — a Saint Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. Glavset’s campaigns initially sought to put down domestic protests by creating fake social media accounts advocating on behalf of President Putin and disparage the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny, but, according to Mueller, it allegedly expanded to the point of interference in international elections, including the United States’ in 2016. The most prominent evidence citing Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling pertains to his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times from 2015-2016 to discuss the work being done. It’s also important to note that Glavset’s Project Lakhta, a so-called “disinformation campaign,” received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Prigozhin in 2016 alone.

Following dramatic success countering protests and slandering rivals with Glasvet, Prigozhin used his immense wealth in 2014 to found and develop ChVK Wagner, a private military corporation which has, as of late, become one of President Putin’s primary sources for military operations that Russia cannot formally be involved in. Commanded by Dmitry Utkin, an ex-Russian Special Forces brigade commander, ChVK Wagner has been involved in both the conflicts in Syria and in Ukraine’s Luhansk region. Perhaps most infamously, it was recently discovered that the Wagner Group shot down the Ukrainian Air Force’s Ilyushin Il-76 in 2014, an act which was originally attributed to rogue Russian nationalists in Ukraine and killed all 49 of the plane’s passengers. ChVK Wagner has also been involved in the recent conflict in Crimea, where their innocuous green uniforms earned them the title of “little green men.” Prigozhin’s decision to fund military bases in Ukraine’s Donbas region has been a critical component of the success of Russian encroachment. In Syria, ChVK Wagner’s shady activities include serving as “shock troops” to President Bashar al-Assad, as well as seizing ISIS-held oil fields for Russian companies, including the newly made conglomerate Evro Soyuz. The Wagner Group’s economic and military influence is easily one of the most valuable assets that Prigozhin is bringing to Putin and his oligarchs’ table.

In everywhere but Putin’s Russia, it is positively bizarre for one to imagine a world in which a hot dog stand owner with a vast criminal record can rise to a point of such prominence in one of the world’s most powerful political and military systems. Prigozhin himself once said that “Vladimir Putin saw how I built up my business from nothing,” but the roots of his success lie not in his hard work — they instead lie in the fact that Putin was a personal witness and catalyst to it. This is precisely how modern Russia has operated since Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar’s disastrous economic reforms in the early 1990s. Regardless, President Putin’s crony-infested inner circle will continue to thrive on loyalty and trust above all else, proving that even the bank robber putting mustard on a hot dog has a valid chance at fulfilling his wildest dreams.

March 24, 2018 0 comment