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From Silence to Solidarity: United States Public Diplomacy in Response to Genocide in the 20th Century

By Sariah Perera, University of Southern California

Introduction: Genocide and Public Diplomacy

Genocide is a human creation – both the action and the word itself. In 1948, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew and international lawyer, coined the phrase “genocide” to describe the atrocities committed against Jews in Nazi Germany. Lemkin would go on to secure the passage of the first United Nations human rights treaty to ban the newly defined crime of genocide. Genocide, as an act, however, has stained human history long before the formal definition was established. One of the earliest recorded instances is the Assyrian Empire’s brutal campaigns in the 8th and 7th centuries BCE, involving mass killings, forced relocations, and widespread cultural destruction. Throughout human history, conquerors, colonizers, and regimes have engaged in the systematic extermination of indigenous or minority populations, such as the widespread Mongol invasions and European colonization of the Americas. While the term “genocide” was not coined until the mid-20th century, significant precursor events include the Armenian Genocide during World War I, where the Ottoman Empire orchestrated mass killings of its Armenian minority population, and the Holocaust during World War II, in which Nazi Germany systematically exterminated a population of six million Jewish civilians and five million Poles, Roma, homosexuals, political opponents, and others.

In the aftermath of the devastating carnage of the mid-20th century, the diplomatic community found itself at a crossroads, grappling with the undeniable reality that violence and death are integral to the human story. The echoes of two world wars reverberated across the global human consciousness. A collective commitment emerged as nations surveyed the smoldering ruins and contemplated the irrevocable toll on humanity. The aftermath of World War II witnessed the birth of a new era in international cooperation – the United Nations. Conceived as a bastion of hope and an embodiment of shared responsibility, the United Nations became the crucible in which the world’s leaders sought to forge a more just and harmonious future. In this spirit, the United Nations Geneva Conventions emerged as a testament to the commitment to mitigate the horrors of armed conflicts, establishing fundamental principles to safeguard the lives and dignity of civilians and combatants alike. However, perhaps one of the most poignant responses to the atrocities of World War II was encapsulated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, creating a resolute international legal framework. The Convention defined genocide as a crime under international law, binding ratifying nations to prevent and punish acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.

As the United Nations and its associated conventions crystallized, the stage was set for a global community united in purpose, poised to intervene and protect the inherent dignity of every individual, irrespective of their origin or identity. After World War II, however, Iraq targeted its Kurdish minority during the Iran-Iraq war; Bosnian Serbs set out to destroy Muslims and Croats during a Balkan civil war; and Rwandan Hutu nationalists exterminated roughly 800,000 Tutsi civilians amidst a civil war against a Tutsi rebel force. The continuous existence of genocide threatens the legitimacy of public diplomacy by compromising moral credibility, diminishing trust, and undermining a nation’s advocacy for human rights. Genocide – and the inability of the global community to condemn or stop genocide – stains a country’s image, eroding its soft power and diplomatic effectiveness, as it raises questions about its commitment to shared global values and collaborative efforts against mass atrocities. Within this historical backdrop, it is essential to navigate the complexities of United States public diplomacy in the face of genocide, scrutinizing the fidelity to these noble ideals and the intricate dance between rhetoric and action on the international stage. Through analyzing case studies of mass atrocities in Armenia, Cambodia, and Rwanda and the subsequent United States public diplomacy response, it is possible to formulate a comprehensive strategy to prevent and address genocidal atrocities in the 21^st century.

The Armenian Genocide (1915-1923)

In 1915, the Young Turks presided over the killing by firing squad, bayoneting, bludgeoning, and starvation of nearly one million Armenians. Mehmed Talaat, the former Turkish interior minister, and the Young Turks justified the “deportation” of Armenians by asserting its imperative to quash Armenian revolts – a facade for the desired eradication of the Armenian minority in the Ottoman Empire. The international community, loosely established at the time, did not widely condemn the Ottoman horrors. Still, Britain and France, who were opposed to the Ottoman Empire during World War I, publicized the atrocities of the Armenian genocide. The British Foreign Office meticulously searched for and published photographs of massacre victims and Armenian refugees. Since Britain was already at war with the Ottoman Empire, many British officials believed the most efficient way to end the atrocities would be to defeat the German-Austrian-Turkish alliance. On May 24, 1915, the Allied governments delivered a joint declaration that took the unprecedented step of condemning “crimes against humanity and civilization.” The declaration further warned the members of the Turkish government that they would be held “personally responsible” for the massacres.

During World War I, the United States was determined to maintain its neutrality in the global conflict and refused to join the Allied declaration. President Woodrow Wilson chose not to formally protest or pressure either the Turks or their German backers under the justification that the Turks had not violated the rights of any Americans. Within the Ottoman Empire, however, the United States Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Sr., responded to the Ottoman deportation and slaughter of its Armenian minority by urging Washington to condemn the Ottoman Empire and pressure Germany. Morgenthau defied diplomatic convention by personally protesting the atrocities, denouncing the regime, and raising money for humanitarian relief. He was joined by former President Theodore Roosevelt, who went a step further, calling on the administration of Woodrow Wilson to enter World War I and forcibly stop the slaughter. However, the United States’ foreign policy remained committed to neutrality and insisted that the Ottomans’ internal affairs were of little concern to the American public. An estimated one million Armenians were murdered or died of disease and starvation as a result.

American media, however, gave Ottoman atrocities steady coverage. The New York Times published 145 stories in 1915, speaking of Ottoman “massacres” and “atrocities” against Armenians. These reports relayed accounts from missionaries, Red Cross officials, local religious leaders, and survivors of the mass atrocities, creating a multifaceted account of the crimes and garnering American awareness and support for condemnation. Viscount Bryce, former British ambassador to the United States, pleaded that the United States use its influence, stating, “If anything can stop the destroying hand of the Turkish Government, it will be an expression of the opinion of neutral nations, chiefly the judgment of humane America.” As casualties rose, the United States maintained its neutrality with the Ottoman Empire, even after entering the war against Germany in April 1917. In the end, Turkey broke off ties with the United States.

The lack of immediate public diplomacy efforts from the United States established a pattern that would be repeated. Throughout the remainder of the 20^th century, the United States would constantly remain reluctant to cast aside its neutrality and formally denounce a state for mass atrocities until after the crimes had been committed. From a diplomacy standpoint, the United States wavered in its legitimacy as a global advocate for human rights. In the aftermath of World War I, the United States engaged in numerous diplomatic and public advocacy efforts to address the Armenian Genocide and seek accountability for war crimes committed by the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 included provisions for prosecuting Ottoman officials responsible for atrocities, but geopolitical shifts and the Turkish War of Independence led to the abandonment of this treaty. The King-Crane Commission, appointed by President Woodrow Wilson, highlighted the Armenian Genocide and recommended international measures for justice. Public awareness campaigns, congressional resolutions, and the presentation of evidence during the Paris Peace Conference underscored the United States’ commitment to acknowledging and addressing the genocide. However, the complex geopolitical landscape hindered immediate justice, and it would take decades for the international community, including the United States, to formally recognize the Armenian Genocide.

In April 1981, over sixty years after the Ottoman atrocities toward Armenians, President Ronald Reagan issued a proclamation marking Holocaust Remembrance Day. In that proclamation, Reagan referenced the Armenian atrocities, using the term “genocide” to describe the tragic events; he said, “Like the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it – and like too many other such persecutions of too many other peoples – the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten.” Reagan’s use of the term “genocide” in this context was a significant moment as it marked a formal recognition of the Armenian genocide by a sitting president. It laid the groundwork for subsequent discussions and efforts toward official recognition. More recently, in April 2021, President Biden’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide marked a significant moment in the ongoing debate over historical accountability. While carefully phrased, acknowledging the Ottoman authorities’ role, the statement unequivocally labeled the events as genocide, aligning with President Reagan’s similar usage in 1981. This move was unsurprising given the 2019 Congressional recognition of the Armenian genocide and the strained diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey. Ostensibly grounded in human rights, these declarations often serve as strategic moves in the geopolitical chessboard, serving as diplomatic tools to reconcile accountability.

Public diplomacy initiatives in the United States regarding the Armenian Genocide encompass a range of projects aimed at raising awareness, fostering understanding, and commemorating the historical tragedy. Organizations such as the Armenian National Institute and the Armenian Genocide Museum of America actively contribute to the diplomatic aim of awareness and accountability through educational materials, exhibits, and events across the United States. The Armenian Assembly of America engages in advocacy efforts and organizes briefings to promote Armenian-American issues, including genocide recognition. Various documentary films, such as “Intent to Destroy” and “The Promise,” serve as powerful tools for reaching diverse audiences and creating public opinion through visual storytelling. Efforts to include the Armenian Genocide in school curricula, such as the “Teaching the Armenian Genocide” program, contribute to domestic educational diplomacy within the United States. The Congressional Armenian Caucus, composed of American lawmakers, plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion through briefings, statements, and resolutions on Capitol Hill. Social media campaigns, annual commemorations on April 24^th, and the active engagement of Armenian-American communities further contribute to the multifaceted landscape of public diplomacy initiatives, shaping perceptions and fostering continued dialogue on the Armenian Genocide. United States public diplomacy regarding the Armenian genocide centered on post-crime accountability as opposed to real-time condemnation.

Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian Genocide (1975-1979)

The genocide in Cambodia occurred in the backdrop of the Cold War and the steadfast American desire to quash the spread of communism around the world. In Cambodia, two wars preceded the mass atrocities, the United States war in Vietnam and a subsequent civil war in Cambodia. The Cambodian genocide, orchestrated by the Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979, resulted in the mass killing of an estimated two million civilians. For nearly four years, the Khmer Rouge rendered Cambodia off the grid, making it impossible for outsiders to enter and allow media outlets to accurately report on the atrocities, resulting in the deaths of almost two million Cambodians. The United States’ public diplomacy response followed a similar pattern as in the Armenian genocide. In advance of the seizure of Phnom Penh, numerous early warning signs of the organization’s brutality were met with unfilled hope for a natural resolution. The Khmer Rouge sealed the country after their victory, delaying and misrepresenting the international reporting and opinion of their atrocities. However, even after the facts had emerged, United States foreign policy was once again poised towards non-engagement and non-condemnation.

The public diplomacy and foreign policy response from the United States is widely intertwined with its historical role in the region in the decade prior. In Vietnam, the United States intended to prevent South Vietnam from becoming Communist; however, massive American casualties and American brutality strengthened domestic opposition to the war. In 1968, as coverage of the My Lai massacre revealed American use of defoliants and napalm, American lives, as well as honor, were being lost in Vietnam. When President Richard Nixon took office, he expanded the Vietnam War into Cambodia, pointing to sanctuary being provided to North Vietnamese units in Cambodian territory. In March 1969, Nixon ordered American B-52s to begin bombing Cambodia. The operation was nicknamed “Operation Breakfast” after the setting in which National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and U.S. military advisors drafted their bombing plans. The mission was kept top secret for fear of domestic protest, now begging the question as to whether these bombing plans constitute war crimes under international law. The incursion into Cambodia had nothing to do with Cambodians but rather the United States’ position regarding the war in Vietnam. Cambodia’s civil war, a conflict in which the genocidal Khmer Rouge would win, would also mark this violence. Still, between March 1969 and August 1973, United States military planes dropped 540,000 tons of bombs in the Cambodian countryside, resulting in the deaths of countless Cambodian civilians.

In February 1974, Kenneth Quinn, a United States foreign service officer, sent Washington a detailed report entitled “The Khmer Krahom [Rogue] Program to Create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia.” In this forty-five-page report, Quinn wrote, “The [Khmer Rogue] programs have much in common with those of totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, particularly regarding efforts to psychologically reconstruct individual members of society.” Quinn’s reporting was unique from that of his State Department colleagues because, at the time, United States government officials rarely interviewed refugees and instead relied on official government sources. Ultimately, Quinn’s reports were never heeded.

When the Ford administration started citing “very factual evidence of the bloodbath” years later, the credibility of the United States had already faltered. Nixon and Kissinger had carpet-bombed Cambodia and tainted the reputation of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The American public had learned to dismiss what it considered official rumor-mongering and anti-Communist propaganda as a consequence of the Cold War. In the United States, media and editorial neglect regarding Cambodia resulted from “Southeast Asia fatigue,” making the decline in Cambodian coverage directly impact American public opinion – or lack of opinion. As a result, it would be nearly two years before most would acknowledge that the reports of mass atrocities and “bloodbath” were accurate, delaying the public diplomacy response until after the atrocities had concluded.

In response to the genocide in Cambodia orchestrated by the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979, the United States engaged in various public diplomacy initiatives to address the humanitarian crisis. The United States government condemned the Khmer Rouge’s brutality and inhumane actions, with President Jimmy Carter expressing concern over human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, and mass killings. Public statements, including speeches and press releases, aimed to raise awareness about the atrocities and urged the international community to take restorative action. Additionally, the United States contributed significant humanitarian aid to assist survivors, particularly in the form of food assistance, medical support, and refugee relocation programs. United States diplomatic efforts included pushing for independent investigations into the genocide in Cambodia and advocating for accountability on the international stage – ranging from Amnesty International to the United Nations. Today, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum hosts a special exhibition on the heinous reign of the Khmer Rogue in Cambodia. While the overall public diplomacy response faced challenges due to the lingering impact of the Vietnam War, these specific initiatives demonstrated a commitment to addressing the Cambodian genocide on both humanitarian and diplomatic fronts.

The Rwandan Genocide (April 1994- July 1994)

In December 1990, the Hutu newspaper Kangura published its “Ten Commandments of the Hutu,” resembling Hitler’s Nuremberg laws and the Bosnian Serbs’ 1992 edicts. The commandments included divisive and inflammatory statements towards the Tutsi population in Rwanda, claiming “every Tutsi is dishonest in business,” all positions of power “should be entrusted to Hutu,” and “the Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi.” In addition, the precursors of the Rwandan genocide witnessed the appalling role of media manipulation through the infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). RTLM played a central role in spreading hate propaganda, fueling ethnic tensions, and inciting violence against the Tutsi population. The radio station, known for its extremist broadcasts, dehumanized Tutsis, encouraged mass killings, and served as a tool for coordination among perpetrators. The broadcasts not only fueled the intensity of the genocide but also contributed to the dehumanization and vilification of the Tutsi community. The RTLM highlights the dangerous potential of media in exacerbating ethnic strife during times of conflict, underscoring the importance of responsible journalism and the prevention of hate speech to mitigate the risk of mass atrocities from occurring.

The Rwandan genocide of 1994, marked by the mass slaughter of approximately 800,000 ethnic Tutsis by the Hutu majority, posed a significant challenge to United States public diplomacy. The United States’ response to the genocide was widely criticized for its perceived inaction and lack of robust intervention. Despite mounting evidence of the unfolding atrocities, the international community, including the United States, hesitated to intervene militarily. The most frequently cited reason for United States non-intervention in Rwanda is President Clinton’s intention to avoid another failed mission, like the one that occurred in Somalia just six months earlier. However, like in the case of Vietnam and Cambodia, salient foreign policy measures should not hinder the American obligation to prevent mass atrocities from occurring. The United States’ public diplomacy efforts during the crisis were marred by a sense of regret and the acknowledgment of a failure to prevent the genocide. In later years, President Bill Clinton expressed remorse for the international community’s insufficient response. The Rwandan genocide stands as a sobering chapter in United States foreign policy, prompting reflections on the ethical responsibility of nations to prevent and respond to mass atrocities and emphasizing the crucial role of public diplomacy in shaping international perceptions of such crises.

In the course of 100 days in 1994, the Hutu government of Rwanda virtually succeeded in exterminating the country’s Tutsi minority. It was the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century. The warning signs were early and evident, pointing to an increasingly unstable situation capable of sliding into genocide. The United States understood the conditions in Rwanda before and during the genocide, but the United States officials decided against taking a leading role in confronting the slaughter in Rwanda. A declassified White House email from Eric Schwartz to Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg on April 19, 1994, warned of a possible genocide. This email, however, would be of no actionable use. Instead of intervening in the conflict, United States officials confined themselves to public statements, diplomatic overtures, and initiatives for a ceasefire – all while never using the word “genocide.”

In the wake of mounting evidence and international media coverage, the United States finally launched substantial operations in July 1994, in a supporting role to assist humanitarian relief efforts for those displaced by the genocide. If the United States had responsibly intervened earlier and identified the crime of genocide, the tragic outcome could have been altered. In future scenarios, the United States must lead and bring all national elements of power to prevent genocide and mass acts of violence. The United States and the international community should prioritize robust public diplomacy campaigns that emphasize early recognition of potential crises, a commitment to prevention, and the swift mobilization of coordinated international efforts in the face of mass atrocities.

Overarching United States Public Diplomacy Response

In times of mass atrocities, the United States has generally fostered a public diplomacy response of non-engagement and non-condemnation. Once atrocities have concluded, the United States usually engages in public awareness and memorial efforts, focusing on post-atrocity diplomacy instead of preventative genocidal diplomacy. Preventing genocide using public diplomacy is achievable, with a committed international community required to lead the effort. The United States must embrace the reality that a failure to responsibly intervene when genocide conditions surface does not absolve it from future intervention. Instead, a failure to prevent genocide guarantees future involvement – too late and after millions of innocent lives are lost. By recognizing early warning signs, United States public diplomacy can be used to counter messages of divisiveness and hateful propaganda.

Lessons for Future Public Diplomacy

Instances of genocide in the 20^th century, including the Armenian Genocide, Cambodian genocide, and Rwandan genocide, provide valuable lessons for future public diplomacy endeavors, particularly in the face of mass atrocities. First, timely and accurate communication is paramount to preventing and addressing mass atrocities. Swift and transparent responses from the international community and effective public diplomacy campaigns are essential in mobilizing support and raising awareness. Second, acknowledging historical wrongs and expressing genuine remorse enhances the credibility of public diplomacy efforts. The importance of aligning rhetoric with concrete actions cannot be overstated, as demonstrated by the impact of perceived inaction in cases like Rwanda. Additionally, proactive diplomacy and early intervention are critical to preventing the escalation of conflicts into genocidal acts. Future public diplomats should consider the insights of foreign service members and media sources with weight and importance, especially in times of crisis. Future public diplomacy initiatives should prioritize the ethical responsibility of nations to protect vulnerable populations and uphold human rights. By learning from these historical cases, the international community can strengthen its commitment to preventing, responding to, and learning from genocides through principled and effective public diplomacy strategies.

Drawing from the historical lessons of the Armenian genocide, it is imperative to apply these insights to the contemporary context of the Azerbaijani seizure of the Nagorno-Karabakh region – an enclave with a predominantly Armenian population. The tragedy of the Armenian genocide serves as a poignant reminder of the catastrophic consequences that can unfold when the international community remains passive in the face of mass atrocities. As tensions escalate in Nagorno-Karabakh, there is an opportunity to leverage these historical lessons to advocate for proactive measures that prioritize diplomacy, conflict resolution, and the protection of human rights. By heeding the warnings embedded in history, there is a chance to prevent the recurrence of similar patterns of violence and displacement, fostering a commitment to international cooperation and peacebuilding in the pursuit of a just and equitable resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

United States involvement in Vietnam undoubtedly cast a shadow over its public diplomacy efforts in the wake and aftermath of the Cambodian genocide. The contentious Vietnam War, marked by significant loss of life and deep societal divisions, created a context where public trust in government actions was strained. When news of the Cambodian genocide emerged, the general skepticism fueled by the Vietnam War undoubtedly influenced perceptions of the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia. The trauma and disillusionment from Vietnam likely contributed to a lack of public faith in United States diplomatic initiatives, hindering effective communication about the Cambodian genocide. Similarly, fears of a failed mission in Rwanda grew from prior experiences in Somalia. Future public diplomacy efforts should prioritize transparency, accountability, and clear communication to prevent such challenges. This includes a salient approach to every diplomatic situation in which prior mistakes inform future actions rather than halting any action altogether. Acknowledging historical mistakes and actively engaging in open dialogue about the complexities of international interventions can help rebuild public trust. Additionally, emphasizing shared values, ethical considerations, and a commitment to humanitarian principles can enhance the credibility of United States public diplomacy in addressing and preventing mass atrocities. Learning from past experiences is crucial in ensuring that public diplomacy effectively navigates the complexities of international crises.

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April 8, 2024 0 comment

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Featured Israel Middle East Palestine

Unfulfilled U.N. Resolutions

written by thegeneration

By Seb Zerilli, University of California, Los Angeles

The establishment of the State of Israel received widespread support from the Western world, often seen as a response to the suffering of the Jewish people during the Holocaust. However, the international community did not fully account for the displacement of the population already residing on the land they sought to assert as their own – the Palestinians.

In response to the perceived oversight, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 in 1947, a document that has faced ongoing academic scrutiny due to its perceived inequities toward the Palestinian people. The resolution outlined the establishment of two separate states, one for the Arab population and one for the Jewish community, with Jerusalem designated as an international territory. A major point of contention arose from the territorial distribution proposed in the UN Partition Plan. The plan allocated fifty-five percent of the land to the Jewish state, encompassing cities with predominantly Palestinian Arab populations and a crucial coastal stretch from Haifa to Jaffa. Critics argued that this distribution would significantly compromise the agricultural and economic viability of the envisioned Palestinian state. Consequently, the proposal was rejected by the Palestinians, leading to armed conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Zionist groups. Adding to the complexity, some viewed the conflict as unjust given that Zionist factions had received significant training and arms from their collaboration with Britain during World War II.

As such, these actions associated with the establishment of the State of Israel led to the Nakba, meaning “catastrophe” in Arabic, which was a significant event in 1948 that resulted in widespread devastation of Palestinian territories. Some believe that the Nakba was included attempts at ethnic cleansing. Rooted in the ideological principles of Zionism, a political and ideological movement supporting the creation and maintenance of a Jewish homeland in the region of Israel, approximately 750,000 Palestinians were displaced, and 530 cities and villages were destroyed. In response to the humanitarian crisis, the international community addressed the situation through UN Resolution 194 in 1948. The resolution affirmed the inherent right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland, specifically their return “at the earliest practicable date.” It also recognized the entitlement of reparations for losses incurred during the forced diaspora. Despite the legal safeguards provided by Resolution 194, the realization of the right of return for Palestinians has not materialized, highlighting a human rights concern and emphasizing the enduring consequences of historical events such as imperialism.

In 1949, the establishment of Jewish settlements covered seventy-eight percent of historically Palestinian territory. Following the Six-Day War in June 1967, the United Nations responded to Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip by enacting Resolution 242. This resolution called for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” However, Israel has consistently violated this resolution, asserting control over Palestinian territories through the construction of illegal settlements, accommodating between 600,000 and 750,000 illegal settlers. The majority of these settlements have been built, either entirely or partially, on privately owned Palestinian property, thus extending beyond the officially recognized boundaries of the Israeli state. Many settlers have been attracted to the land by government-subsidized housing and additional benefits specifically extended to Israeli Jewish citizens. As of 2017, 6.6 million Jewish individuals were residing on land beyond the internationally recognized borders, a figure that has substantially increased since then.

The strategic policies and geographical positioning of the Israeli occupation are perceived by critics as deliberate efforts aimed at undermining the viability of the Palestinian state. This is often achieved through economic exploitation and the utilization of resources from the local population, particularly in agriculturally advantageous regions. The economic benefits Israel gains from the occupation are evident in the approximately $3 billion generated annually from the sale of Dead Sea minerals and the roughly $130 million in revenue obtained through the use of native Palestinian land and its resources. In 2016, the United Nations indicated that ending the occupation would lead to a twofold increase in economic and financial prosperity for the Palestinian territories. Israeli-controlled areas are established on fertile lands conducive to optimal mining and mineral extraction, as well as possessing abundant water resources. In the West Bank, Israeli settlers control approximately 90 percent of the water resources, a disproportionate share compared to the 3.1 million Palestinians residing in the same region. Notably, over 96 percent of the water in Gaza’s aquifers is rendered non-consumable, leading to the need to purchase trucked water at inflated rates. The intentional control over water resources in the Israeli-occupied territories is argued to not only exacerbate economic hardships but also perpetuate a cycle of dependence. This compels Palestinians to buy water at inflated rates due to the contamination of Gaza’s aquifers. Additionally, the prohibition on Palestinians collecting rainwater since 1967 is seen as not only criminalizing a basic practice but also deepening the manipulation of essential resources as a method of exerting control and causing suffering to the civilian population.

The disregard for the mandates of the UN Resolutions sustains a cycle of displacement and hinders justice for those forcibly uprooted from their land. As the international community observes the erosion of justice and human rights, essential questions emerge. What potential repercussions may arise from the ongoing non-compliance with UN Resolutions? How can the international community actively enforce accountability for governments that fail to adhere to these mandates? What is the efficacy and purpose of the UN if there is no mechanism in place to hold member states accountable for their failure to comply with mandated resolutions? These inquiries seek an objective assessment of the challenges and effectiveness of the UN in ensuring adherence to its resolutions.

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January 24, 2024 0 comment

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Featured Guest Article Israel Middle East Palestine

Taking a Closer Look at the U.S.-Israel Partnership

written by thegeneration

By A. Avery, University of Southern California

While the United States has been a steadfast ally of Israel for many years, recent events on the Gaza Strip warrant a closer examination as to why Israel has continued to receive such unwavering and unparalleled support from the U.S.

On October 7th, the terrorist organization Hamas carried out an unprecedented attack on a music festival in Tel Aviv, resulting in the murder of over 1,400 Israeli citizens. An additional 200 Israeli citizens were taken hostage, with 136 that have yet to be released. In the aftermath of this attack, Israel has retaliated by moving forward with the declared intention of fully eradicating Hamas from the Gaza strip. Under this auspice, Israel has conducted indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas, with health authorities in the Hamas-run territory estimating that about 40% of the 23,357 killed were under the age of 18. 4,000 of the reported civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip are children, according to U.N. reports. The result has been the creation of a complex humanitarian emergency (CHE) that threatens to disrupt the already fragile balance of peace in the Middle East.

As the civilian death toll in Palestine continues to rise and the U.S. continues its unwavering support for Israel, it risks stoking resentment across the developing world and driving a further wedge between the U.S. and key partnerships in the Global South.

Political pundits often suggest that supporting Israel is essential for ensuring the survival of democracy in the Middle East, claiming that the two are inextricably linked. As Israel is the region’s sole democracy, its survival is often threatened by its autocratic neighbors that have expressed their displeasure through anti-semetic rhetoric, funding of extremist terrorist groups, and conventional warfare. Hence, the subsequent rationale suggests that withdrawing U.S. support would result in the death of democracy in the Middle East. Therefore, the only way to guarantee the propagation of democratic ideals throughout the region is to ensure the survival of Israel.

However, suggesting that the U.S.’s motivation in supporting Israel rests on its faith in democratic ideals may not be the whole truth. In fact, the U.S. has a long history of working alongside dictators in order to topple democracies. For example, in 1953, the U.S. aided in toppling a democratically-elected Iranian leader in order to prop up an autocratic leader that would ensure continued Western control of Iran’s oil reserves.

In terms of strategic gains, proponents of the U.S.-Israel partnership often claim that the relationship is necessary for the U.S. to have a foothold in the region. In reality, Israel continues to be both a strategic and financial burden to the United States. Israel was of little aid to the U.S. during both the Iranian Revolution and the first Gulf War, as any level of military aid from Israel risks triggering further Arab opposition. Conversely, the aid the U.S. provides Israel comes at a high cost. In 2022, the U.S. committed over $3.3 billion in aid to Israel alone, despite Israel’s advanced military and prosperous economy. Few other U.S. allies have received such unwavering support.

The ongoing U.S. support for Israel strains relations with the Global South, especially as the Biden administration seeks international cooperation for the Ukraine conflict. Many nations – including Indonesia, home to the world’s largest Muslim population – have objected to the U.S.’s continued support of Israel while simultaneously attempting to rally the world against Russian violence. Unfortunately, the U.S.’s apparent hypocrisy threatens to push potential allies towards American adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran, who have all been vocal about their disapproval of Israel’s actions.

Recent events have illustrated a growing shift in public sentiment in the United States as well, as pro-Palestinian protests have increased in major cities and universities and social media has become a platform for resistance. Even in the U.S. House of Representatives there is internal strife. Palestinian-American Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib was censured by the House for using rhetoric in response to the Israel-Hamas war, including sharing a video with the phrase “from the river to the sea,” which critics argue calls for the abolition of Israel, leading to bipartisan backlash.

However, this still begs the question – why does the United States continue to give such unwavering support to Israel?

The answer is lobbyists. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, wields significant power and influence in Congress. Through its broad efforts, it is able to achieve two goals: (1) pressure policymakers’ views to support Israel and (2) influence the American public’s perception of Israel to be positive. In return, according to Federal Election Commission records, the 31 AIPAC-backed lawmakers have received a total of at least $3.6 million from AIPAC since February 2022. Without AIPAC’s continued support and funding, policy makers risk losing a key source of funding.

Creating substantial change is a complex and challenging endeavor, especially in the realm of domestic politics. To better ensure U.S. policymakers represent the interests of their constituents, greater transparency and limitations are required in regards to campaign funding sources and their motivations. However, the outpouring of public frustration in regards to the influence of special interest groups over policymakers may hopefully serve as a catalyst for institutional reform.

Regardless, it may be time to take a closer look at the U.S.-Israel partnership. Failing to do so risks further disruptions to the global balance of power, alienating potential allies, and hurting the U.S.’s reputation on both the global and domestic fronts.

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January 22, 2024 0 comment

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Featured Guest Article International Law Women

The Recognition of Acts of Sexual Violence as Genocidal Crimes

written by thegeneration

By Alix Mazieres, Columbia University

Maria Bahizi, now 67 years old, narrates her traumatizing experiences of April 1994 during the Rwandan genocide: “I think that I am still alive, that the Interahamwe didn’t kill me, because the high-level army officials came to rape me every day. Because I was ‘their’ woman,” she says. “And for me, it was like I was more than dead.” A Bosnian Muslim girl anonymously referred to as Witness 87 shares a similar story of the Bosnian genocide that started in 1992. She explains that the Serb soldiers “would come inside looking for particular persons, girls. They would select them, as many as they wanted, and then they would take them with them,” every night. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 250,000 women were raped during the Rwandan genocide and between 20,000 and 50,000 women were raped during the Bosnian genocide. These testimonies and figures demonstrate the consistency of rape as a means of genocide, that it is not collateral damage as is often argued, but intrinsically linked to the oppressor’s intention to dehumanize an ethnic, national or religious group.

Though these numbers are already appalling, rape is only one of the acts of sexual violence that occur during genocide and war, including in Rwanda and Bosnia. It must be noted that sexual violence is an umbrella term that refers also to sexual assault, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, sexual trafficking, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization. These crimes are in majority committed against women, but can also be perpetrated against men.

Acts of sexual violence are undoubtedly human rights violations, breaching one’s right to health and bodily integrity and to not to be subject to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. These rights are enshrined in binding international treaties on political and civil rights and socio-economic rights. Women are additionally legally protected from sexual violence through the Convention of Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that recognizes gender-based violence, defined by the General Recommendation 19 as “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.” In times of conflict, instruments of international humanitarian law, such as the Geneva Conventions, also protect civilians populations against all acts considered as cruel treatment and torture, sexual violence falling under these protections.

Despite international law treaties protecting one from sexual acts of violence both in conflict and in peace, they are limited in their enforceability. Different definitions of rape and other acts of sexual violence render accountability and justice difficult to implement. The differences among countries revolve around factors such as the legal age of consent, the definition of penetrative acts considered as sexual violence, and the recognition of marital rape. Moreover, debates persist about whether sexual violence refers to the victim’s lack of consent or to the use of force, threat, and coercion. These variations complicate the international community’s role in enforcing human rights and legal obligations when it comes to sexual violence. Historically, the international community has failed to correctly address the question: are acts of sexual violence in conflict individual crimes, or are they constitutive of genocide? In developing a uniform and universal answer to this question, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the aftermath of the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides represent turning points, considering sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and as genocidal crimes. Nonetheless, I later argue these tribunals were of a limited efficiency regarding accountability of perpetrators of sexual violence.

Established by the UN Security Council, the ICTY, formed in 1993, and the ICTR, formed in 1994, have indeed considerably changed the way sexual violence is recognized in international law. While both of these tribunals operated independently from one another, being conducted simultaneously, they followed similar principles, rules, and inspired one another. In this article, I will be using examples from both to highlight a larger trend in international justice.

First, and most importantly, by condemning rape within their statutes as crimes against humanity, the ICTY and ICTR both recognized that systemic rape is not an isolated crime from genocide and war. Notably, article 4 of the ICTR gives judges the freedom to condemn “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault” within the context of genocide. In that sense, the tribunal affirmed that sexual acts of violence are not ordinary crimes and that the perpetrators can be tried as war criminals for such acts. This stance, shared by the ICTY, represents an unprecedented progress in international law, sexual violence not yet having been defined as a war crime in past international trials.

In the additional rules to their mandates and statutes, the tribunals defined consent, and therefore non-consent, with more precision and breadth than previous international tribunals. The ICTY stated that meaningful consent is not possible when the victim “has been subjected to, threatened with, or has reason to fear violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression” or “reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear.” This definition of what is considered lack of consent is large and thus represents a great progress concerning the prosecution of sexual violence. Further, the ICTY has a set of Rules of Procedure and Evidence partly created to protect victims, including victims of sexual violence. For instance, rule 96 states that corroboration is not required in sexual violence cases. By implementing this rule, the tribunal acknowledges the challenge of presenting evidence for wartime sexual violence and aims to ensure that the testimony of the victim can be given appropriate weight and consideration in legal proceedings.

In practice, one case that has changed the course of international law concerning sexual violence is the Prosecutor v. Akayesu case of the ICTR. The court accused Mr. Akayesu, mayor of the Taba commune during the genocide, of knowing of acts of sexual violence and refusing to help those seeking safety from rape. For his inaction in the face of mass sexual violence and genocide, Mr. Akayesu was found guilty of both genocide and crimes against humanity. This case confirmed in an unprecedented way that sexual violence can be recognized as constitutive to genocide rather than as an isolated crime. It demonstrates that sexual violence in genocide is not about male pleasure but rather concerned the will of a group to dehumanize, humiliate and torture a minority.

However, the progress made through the ICTY and the ICTR was limited, and despite sexual violence being addressed by the tribunals, most perpetrators were not convicted of any or all of the rapes of which they were accused. For instance, Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, during the Rwandan genocide, would encourage the rape of Tutsi women publicly with a megaphone and was accused of rape by multiple women. He was found guilty of rape as a crime against humanity, but the ICTR failed to convict him of all the acts of sexual violence he encouraged and participated in because of the difficulty to prove his direct responsibility. Although his conviction can and should be seen as a progress in international law, it must be noted that it did not provide justice for all of the concerned victims. As for the Bosnian genocide, where it is estimated that at least 20,000 women were raped, the court heard 161 cases of sexual violence crimes, charged 78 individuals, and convicted only 32 perpetrators. Victims’ fear to testify in an effort to promote reconciliation or their inability to testify against their assaulter because they did not know their name can partly explain such a turnout. Therefore, in Rwanda as well as in Bosnia, most victims of sexual violence did not get the justice they deserved.

Furthermore, rank-and-file individuals that committed acts of sexual violence during the genocide in an effort to humiliate and torture were not charged as war criminals. Only the commanding officers (e.g. Akayesu, Gacumbitsi) were charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal crimes for acts of sexual violence. Thus, the novel principle of considering rape as a war crime, as stated in the statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY, was not applied equally to all individuals that have participated in the sexual violence of the genocides. This is problematic in the sense that, whenever it is within the context of genocide, sexual violence should be regarded as a genocidal act and as a war crime, whoever the perpetrator may be. Ultimately, the ICTR and the ICTY failed to convict all perpetrators of sexual violence, rendering their contribution to changing accountability for sexual violence in international humanitarian law less practical than it had been hoped.

The last limitation to the progresses of the ICTR and the ICTY regarding sexual violence is revealed by the one-sided narrative that only men are the perpetrators of rape and only women are their victims. By considering that sexual violence can only be gendered violence against women — even if that is true for the overwhelming majority of cases — one underestimates the prevalence of rape against men during conflicts. In contexts of genocides where the target of mass violence is an ethnic group, one’s vulnerability to sexual violence is dependant on ethnicity as much as it is on gender. For example, a Bosnian ex-prisoner narrates anonymously his experience being raped in an interview for a local Balkan newspaper and confirms that rape was a strategy of humiliation and emasculation during the war. His rapist has never been brought to justice. As the witness explains, men who were victims of these crimes were often scared of being stigmatized by addressing the courts, and for this reason, many cases of rape against men went unreported.

To conclude, sexual violence cannot be regarded as an isolated crime from contexts of genocides and brutal wars. Rape is used as a tool for dehumanizing ethnic, national or religious minorities. The ICTR and ICTY tribunals of the 1990s, following the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, have built the foundation for a greater recognition of rape and sexual violence within the scope of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal crimes. These advances had effects beyond their own jurisdictions, inspiring future courts and international considerations on sexual violence. However, the accountability of perpetrators through these tribunals was limited because of challenges regarding the lack of proof of non-consent, the forgotten responsibility in international courts of individual perpetrators of sexual violence, and lastly, the one-sided narrative that undervalues the prevalence of men as victims. Writing this article has led me to ask myself whether sexual violence against women and men in conflict, and especially in genocide, is inevitable. As long as sexual violence may be regarded as a means to the end of genocide and is used to express profound hatred, it seems like even significant efforts in the international community may not suffice. Therefore, are we bound to depend on postbellum reparations and sentences by criminal courts such as the ICTY and the ICTR to address sexual violence in conflict? If so, can ad hoc tribunals eventually offer justice for all victims of sexual violence in conflict, ovecoming challenges related to proof, taboos, and fear? As new conflicts erupt globally and threaten the rights, health and dignity of countless vulnerable individuals, it seems that a forward-looking approach to addressing sexual violence must still be reinforced, both building on the previous efforts of the ICTY and ICTR, as well as learning from their failures and limitations.

January 11, 2024 0 comment

Image from Wikimedia Commons. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/90/Vladimir_Putin_and_Sergey_Shoigu_-_Saint-Petersburg_2017-07-30_%281%29.jpg

Democracy Europe Featured Guest Article Military Russia Security and Conflict Vladimir Putin

Behind the Smokescreen: Was the Wagner Mutiny a Victory for Putin?

written by thegeneration

by Kemal Mohamedou

The Wagner mutiny of June 2023 was a moment that shocked not only Russia but the entire world. Led by the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor, the unanticipated march on Moscow served as a stark reminder of the precarious balance of power in the Russian leadership. However, in the complex terrain of geopolitics, things are seldom as they might appear. As we seek to make sense of the aftermath of these events, the question remains: was the Wagner mutiny an actual challenge to President Vladimir Putin’s authority?

The revolt was announced through a series of audio recordings posted on the online platform Telegram on June 23, 2023, when Yegevny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, stated that the “evil” of Russia’s military leadership “must be stopped.” This denouncement of the Russian military high command, coupled with the announcement of an audacious “march for justice,” was a striking blow to the established power structure in Russia. Indeed, as the Wagner group embarked on its daring advance towards Moscow, seizing control of Rostov-on-Don and the headquarters of the Russian Southern Military District, a wave of shock and unease was felt not only throughout Russia’s oligarchy but also across international borders. Yet, the march was brought to an abrupt end due to negotiations brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, a known ally of Putin.

The immediate aftermath and resolution of these events led most analysts to conclude that Putin, embattled on his home front and entrenched in a protracted conflict in Ukraine, had incurred a major loss; some scholars forecasted that this was the beginning of the end of Putin’s regime. Whilst many are eager to declare Putin’s rule in peril, there is reason to consider that Putin may have actually emerged stronger from this apparent crisis. In fact, the Wagner mutiny could have, paradoxically, bolstered his power at a time when Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine had stagnated and talk of ‘quagmire’ had emerged.

First and foremost, while Prigozhin’s rebellion posed an unexpected challenge, it never directly threatened Putin. Despite the shock of an internal rebellion, operationally, Putin seemingly remained in control, and, at the height of the revolt, was never threatened or criticized directly by Prigozhin. Within a day, the situation was then neutralized. Real coups are different. Their resolution is often messier and more ambiguous, and their immediate aftermath is more problematic to handle for surviving rulers. In this case, Putin demonstrated control and resolution, suggesting a strong grip – for now – over his own administration.

Secondly, by centering his rhetorical fire on the Russian military leadership, Prigozhin inadvertently allowed Putin to identify and address issues within his defense forces. It is no secret that bureaucratic inefficiency and internal politics have long plagued Moscow’s institutional setup. The Wagner uprising has now offered Putin an opportunity to oust Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Chief of General Staff Valery Geramisov, and “General Armageddon” Sergei Surovikin – the latter who has since gone missing – and regain full control. Regardless of whether a deal was struck with Prigozhin that they would be sidelined, the uprising opened welcome strategic space for Putin, who has already moved to restructure his defense forces. It bears reminding that, in admittedly a different context yet similar situation, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan survived the 2016 coup only to then consolidate power, crack down on his opponents and win re-election. Similarly, Putin’s brush with rebellion could now arguably make him more prepared and vigilant than ever in the face of internal defiance. Specifically, the June 2023 Wagner uprising allows Putin to reset his administration, with new leadership in his ministry of defense and an opportunity to clarify relationship with Prigozhin. Putin also has the opportunity to reaffirm strategic alliances – for example, with Belarus, which brokered a peace deal with Prigozhin.

Thirdly, the Wagner Uprising has the potential to revitalize Russia’s position and strategy in Ukraine. Despite its rebellion, the Wagner Group remains a potent force in the realm of military contractors. With its sophisticated capabilities and battle-hardened mercenaries, the group could provide a significant boost to Russian military efforts. For years, the relationship between the Wagner Group and the formal Russian military has been shrouded in uncertainty. The group has always operated in a gray area, with its status and connection to the Russian state remaining unclear. However, the recent events present a unique opportunity for Putin to redefine this relationship. By taking steps to integrate the Wagner Group more clearly into his military campaign, Putin can eliminate these ambiguities and harness the group’s capabilities more effectively. Moreover, a more closely aligned Wagner Group could lead to improved operational synergy with the Russian armed forces. By enhancing coordination and joint planning between the Wagner Group and the state military, this integration would also serve to send a clear message both domestically and internationally. Domestically, it could be portrayed as a move towards increased unity and strength in the face of adversity. Internationally, it would signal that Russia is prepared to leverage all available resources to pursue its objectives in Ukraine. Therefore, while the uprising may have been a temporary setback, it could inadvertently catalyze renewed momentum in Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine and reinforce Putin’s control over his military machine.

Moving forward, the Wagner uprising and its fallout provide Putin with several immediate benefits. Firstly, it reinforces his image as a strong leader who can withstand internal threats swiftly and effectively. Such a narrative could resonate with the Russian populace, providing a possible boost in domestic support. Secondly, it presents Putin with an excuse to conduct a further ‘cleansing’ of his administration. Existing undercurrents of dissent and inefficiency within Putin’s ranks, which have been systematically removed under the pretense of safeguarding national security, will now likely be more ruthlessly and overtly addressed. The Wagner mutiny, in this context, serves as a convenient accelerant for a new purge, enabling Putin to strengthen his control over the Russian government with even greater intensity and swiftness than before. Furthermore, the resolution of the Wagner uprising might provide an opportunity for Putin to redefine the role of private military companies in Russian foreign policy. The clarity over the status of the Wagner Group could improve the cohesiveness of Russia’s military operations in Ukraine.

To be certain, none of this solves the long-term challenges Russia faces, especially the ongoing challenges the Ukraine conflict represents for him at many levels. However, in the short term, the Wagner revolt may have unwittingly handed Putin a chance to consolidate his power, tighten his administration and refocus his strategies. Indeed, the Wagner revolt may have unintentionally provided Putin with an immediate opportunity to fortify his power, streamline his administration, and realign his strategies. Despite this, it is crucial to recognize that such short-term resolution does not eliminate the more profound, long-term challenges, complexities and pressures associated with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is also undeniable that the mutiny of a trusted ally such as the Wagner Group has revealed cracks in Putin’s hold over his military apparatus. While Putin might have the upper hand over Prigozhin for now, the seeds of dissent have been sown, and future rebellions may not be shut down as Putin’s gamble in Ukraine continues to be a thorn in his side. A rejuvenated strategy following the uprising may provide short-term advantages, but it does not alter the reality that an outright victory seems unattainable. The West’s response to Putin’s handling of the mutiny, and any subsequent crackdowns or policy changes can also significantly impact Russia’s international standing and Putin’s strength at home.

Ultimately, while it is tempting to see Putin as weakened in the aftermath of the Wagner uprising, the reality is more complex. Putin may have turned a crisis into an opportunity, and he could use the mutiny to consolidate his power. Despite this, the uprising has revealed inherent vulnerabilities in his rule, and it is uncertain how these will play out in the long term. While Putin seems to have temporarily successfully weathered the Wagner storm, the unpredictable tides of his political journey are far from complete.

Kemal Mohamedou is an intern at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). He is a recent graduate of King’s College London and wrote his thesis on the Wagner Group’s activities in Africa.

July 22, 2023 0 comment

Humantics Podcast

Lula’s Back, Back Again

written by thegeneration

From 2003 to 2011, Lula da Silva served as Brazil’s 35th President. From reforms to scandals, Lula is viewed as either a national hero or villain, depending on who you ask. But now, in 2022, Lula was re-elected as the 29th President…

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January 7, 2023 0 comment

Internet Interview Racism Society and Culture Technology

UN Special Rapporteur Tendayi Achiume on Racial Discrimination in Emerging Digital Technologies: Annabelle Werner and Elizabeth Onibokun

written by thegeneration

E. Tendayi Achiume is a Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Promise Institute for Human Rights at University of California, Los Angeles. She serves as the United Nations special rapporteur on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.

As we enter into the one year anniversary of the COVID-19 pandemic, we have learned just how much of our society can be conducted in virtual landscapes. We keep up with our friends through endless scrolling on international social media platforms, we coordinate “zoom” calls with our colleagues across different time zones, and our children log into their classrooms from behind a screen: our virtual society is essentially intrinsic to our physical one. Yet, one could argue that the relationship between society and digital technology has always been heavily intertwined since the latter’s development, and in fact, the societal problems we see in our physical world are also manifested in and perpetuated by our online one.

In our interview with UN Special Rapeturer Tendayi Achiume, we were able to discuss such relationships between societal inequality and technology in covered in her 2020 thematic report on “Racial discrimination and emerging digital technologies: a human rights analysis”. Ultimately, we learned how different forms of racial discriminination appear “in the design and use of ‘‘ digital tools. In our brief interview, we not only gained an appreciation of the urgency and timeliness of Professor Achiume’s findings, but also began to understand the gravity of our virtual situation: not even our most advanced, “objective”, digital inventions can overcome historical legacies of social injustice.

Definitions and Examples of Techno-chauvinism and Technological Determinism

When discussing how societal problems are manifested in technology, Professor Achiume argues that we must be cognizant of the ills of techno-chauvinism. Techno-chauvinism is the idea that technology is the solution to everything, when in reality, some forms of digital technology can create more (or simply different) problems than before. If we make presumptions that technology will blanketly fix the issues that we cannot, Achiume claims that we will fail to critically investigate the ways that technology “reproduces human biases and perpetuates structural inequalities”. After all, the structures, designs, and functions of social media platforms and AI algorithms are shaped by the beliefs of those who create them.

The UN special rapporteur found that emerging digital technologies can directly perpetuate racial discrimintion. In the report, she discusses “digital redlining”, or “the creation and maintenance of technology practices that further entrench discriminatory practices against already marginalized groups’”. In Section III B 32, Achiume describes how Facebook used to have a function that would allow one to “narrow audiences” by providing the ability to filter Facebook users by “ethnic affinities” under a demographics category of its ad-targeting tool. Facebook by itself controls about a quarter of the market share for digital advertisements in the U.S., so this tool had a significant impact and resulted in the prevention of Black people from viewing housing advertisements. If we were to accept principles of techno-chauvinism and assume that technological tools will be ubiquitously advantageous, we would fail to see how problems of racial bias were created by this new tool. Techno-chauvinism shields digitals tools from critique and blinds us from seeing how racial discrimiantion can be ingrained in the structures of our social, political, and economic interactions online, including how these virtual inequalities can be actualized into very real harm in our physical lives.

It is also important to discuss the spaces in which these global networks are created. Digital technologies and social media platforms are mainly produced in a few, concentrated environments in the Global North, which directly or indirectly affect the product. Sillicon Valley, for example, is experiencing what has been called a “diversity crisis” and has had “a history of problems of discrimination, exclusion, and sexual harassment”. These findings prompt the question: Who is creating AI technology? And who is it being created for?

In an investigation of the effects of this lack of diversity, Achiume includes a 2019 study that reviewed 99 developers from around the world. It found that, “‘many of these algorithms were 10 to 100 times more likely to inaccurately identify a photograph of a black or East Asian face, compared with a white one. In searching a database to find a given face, most of them picked incorrect images among black women at significantly higher rates than they did among other demographics’”.

We can see how even the seemingly “neutral” AI systems are shaped by the lack of representation in the environments that they are created. The inequalities at various intersections of our social identities, such as race and gender, are then present in the technologies we produce. Thus, we cannot simply code away racial bias because technology can never be a completely “neutral” instrument: it is ultimately influenced by what it’s creators perceive, or rather, what they do not perceive. In fact, this problematic assumption that technology is objectively neutral, is codified in the term “technological determinism”.

Technological determinism, defined and discussed by Achiume, is the assumption that technology is somehow isolated and not influenced by social, political, or economic structures. This perspective is false. Our digital landscapes determine “everyday outcomes in employment, education, health care and criminal justice”, and will continue to facilitate harm unless we are able to isolate how society’s injustice manifests itself in our digital tools; a process that is only possible through the rejection of technological determinism.

Limitations of “Colorblindness”

The term “colorblind” is sprinkled liberally throughout texts, articles, and journals and while it traditionally had a positive connotation, Professor Achiume cautions against its use. She highlights the insidious effects of “colorblindness,” particularly when dealing with a world increasingly defined by technology and its perceived objectiveness. Achiume recognizes the fact that the idea of a colorblind world seems appealing. Who wouldn’t want to live in a world where a person is not judged by something as inconsequential as skin color?

But, the sad fact is that, “we live in a society which has been constructed on a racial basis.” Approaching issues such as racial discrimination in technology and AI programs without acknowledging the inherit systemic obstacles in this world does no one any favors. Achiume brings up the current COVID-19 pandemic and how black and brown communities have been disproportionately affected, in part, due to factors such as exclusion from healthcare systems and the overrepresentation of people of color in the social services. By stating that “the colorblind approach is not enough” she is calling for approaches that examine the racial and ethnic impact of policymaking that appear to be neutral. She asserts that it should not be about a blindness to difference but rather an engagement with how differences makes certain communities more vulnerable to exploitation, discrimination, and exclusion. In fact, she insightfully states that we don’t yet live in a world where taking a colorblind approach can lead us to justice but that it often sustains systems of injustice.

Importance of Public Awareness

To further expand on this theme of objectivity, Achiume coined the brilliant term “the veneer of neutrality” and this applies especially to the current design and use of emerging digital technologies. There is the widely-held belief that technology is completely impartial but it is in everyone’s best interests to shed these notions. There are people behind the creation of these programs who, whether consciously or subconsciously, perpetuate harmful stereotypes or prejudices.

One of the most terrifying manifestations of this is predictive policing, a phenomena seen around the world and contributes directly to over-policing of black and brown communities. Achiume highlights the transnational nature of these programs and that is not an issue seen only in the United States. For example, in the United Kingdom there is a predictive policing database intended to create profiles of those most likely to commit crime. A staggering number of 78% of black youth is represented despite the fact that when looking at the actual rates of violence, black youth are implicated only 20% of the time. She insists that one of the most urgent courses of action is public awareness, especially in terms of surveillance and predictive policing that exists around the world.

Even in Los Angeles, where many of us call home, the extent to which police surveillance exists is incredibly high. Professor Achiume spotlights the coalition Stop LAPD Spying whose name perfectly reflects their mission statement. They work hard to release reports that reflect the high levels of racialized surveillance of the LA Police Department. The large gap of awareness in the public is a huge wall to climb and Achiume believes this is why the devastating murder of George Floyd ignited the world in the way it did. Public awareness is truly the first step towards seeing action and one of the goals of her report is to raise the all-important point that this issue needs to be on national agendas. In a perfectly worded conclusion she declares that “you don’t get change if you have societies that are unaware of the depth and the nature of a problem. These new forms of surveillance disproportionately affect black and brown communities, whom are more subject to over-policing and discrimination than their white counterparts which is reflected in the makeup of prison populations that unfairly represent minorities to an absurd degree. Relating back to Professor Achiume, the LAPD’s police surveillance tactics are said to be completely objective but as discussed with the aforementioned veneer of neutrality, technology can never be truly “neutral”. Hence the need for caution, awareness, and action.

Reflection

As the world continues to grow more globalized, criticizing the unintended consequences of emerging technology can lead to the implementation of systems that are actually effective and useful. We must recognize how the location of the center of development for digital technologies in the Global North has resulted in both direct and indirect perpetuations of racial bias on the design and use of the tools produced. Unabated trust in our new virtual world, with no caution to how it could reflect racial bias in our physical one, will simply perpetuate such harm.

Dismantling principles such as techno-chauvinism, technological determinism, and colorblindness will help us understand how these tools discriminate along racial and gendered lines, such as heightened surveillance of certain communities. The growth of technology can be a wonderful thing but it also has the potential to be incredibly dangerous. In an increasingly interconnected world, nothing is truly as isolated as it seems. An innovation in Silicon Valley can have reverberations throughout the world. It is best that with the knowledge provided we work hard to create digital technologies that don’t perpetuate the problems and prejudices we face in the real world.

March 11, 2021 0 comment