Geopolitics

At the end of 2019, each of Bolivia’s nine regional departments experienced protests for nearly two months following the Oct. 20 national election, where former leftist President Evo Morales declared himself president for the fourth consecutive term. Under claims of fraud, he resigned from the presidency in November and ultimately fled the country with many of his party’s high-ranking officials, leaving the country with conservative Jeanine Añez as their interim president. However, after COVID-19 led to delayed elections and renewed protests, the state of the country’s power remains at a standstill.

Morales’ presidency was fraught with controversy. He had been president for thirteen years, having been elected in 2005 and reelected in both 2009 and 2014. Before Morales, this number of reelections was unheard of. Controversy rose after Morales’ constituent assembly and Bolivia’s Constitutional Court approved a 2009 referendum and early election, rising out of a changed constitution that allowed the president to pursue one consecutive reelection. Although the economy rose under Morales’ rule—such as the country’s poverty population percentage dropping by more than half from 36% to 17%—his increasingly leftist politics caused tension among the general population. After claims of fraud arose due to the results of the Oct. 2019 election, citizens set up roadblocks among violent clashes to challenge his continuation as president.

Bolivians took the streets claiming that Morales had engaged in electoral fraud. While observing the counts of the vote, the nation was surprised when results froze; Morales was falling behind other candidates at this time, but when final numbers were released, Morales had seemingly managed to best all his competitors. Although he was still in the margin of a runoff with the second-highest candidate, Morales declared himself victorious in the election. He resigned at the bequest of Bolivia’s then-chief of military in response to growing chaos from protests around the country.

Morales and several high-ranking Bolivian governmental figures fled the country following the civil unrest and the former president’s resignation. Morales first went to Mexico, where he urged his followers to denounce the transition of power to Añez. However, Morales was eventually granted refugee status in Argentina, where he currently resides. Although it is presumed his move to Argentina was to facilitate his organizing near Bolivia, it raises the question of the already-strained relationships in Bolivia’s foreign relations. When Bolivia’s foreign ministry challenged Argentina for protecting Morales after he continued to ask for political revolution from his party, the country’s foreign ministry responded by stating that they would not recognize Bolivia’s interim government. As elections have been pushed back, Morales continues to organize for his political party, Moviemiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism, or MAS), from Argentina, frustrating Añez and her current government.

Añez has been in power since Nov. 12th, 2019, declaring her interim presidency after the vacancy of higher-ranking officials left her at the top of the line of succession. Morales and MAS attempted to claim that her ascension was illegitimate, but she maintained her power through congressional support. Although she originally announced that her role would be only to facilitate a fair election free of fraud, she eventually announced that she would run for the presidency herself, and her administration proceeded to charge various MAS members and officials with crimes against the state. The election was originally scheduled for May, but Añez decided to push back the date due to concerns regarding COVID. However, despite taking measures such as an early lockdown, COVID rates across Bolivia are still rising, with a lack of oxygen and personal protective equipment in a damaged healthcare system from Morales’ rule. Bolivian citizens—largely those affiliated with MAS—are frustrated with Añez’ use of the pandemic to interfere with election proceedings.

The struggle for power between MAS and the interim presidency has wider implications for Bolivia’s population. The protests, both last year and now, highlight the tensions felt by the largely Indigenous leftists and the long-unrepresented conservatives in the country. They also illustrate how Morales’ presidency has strained foreign relations, as Bolivia only reestablished diplomacy with the United States during Añez’ interim administration with a visit from a White House senior advisor. As the country looks forward to finally resolving the question of the presidency, nearly a full year after the initial fateful election, these tensions will underscore the country’s final election in the age of COVID.

As the election nears, seven candidates are in the running. According to a Jubileo Foundation Poll in September, Luis Arce, the candidate from MAS, led with roughly 40% of the polled vote. Former president Carlos Mesa polled second. Añez dropped out of the race on September 17th after polling with less than 10%, most likely due to citizens’ concerns over her interim government’s handling of the pandemic.

The final election date is scheduled for Oct. 18th, 2020. After a failed election, an unstable interim government, and continued political tensions during a global pandemic, this new election will define which direction Bolivia’s domestic and international turmoil will take.

October 2, 2020 3 comments

Europe Geopolitics Russia Security and Conflict Vladimir Putin

Will Putin Rescue Lukashenko from the Jaws of Death?

written by Alex Choy

Authoritarian leader of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, is currently confronted with massive protests over accusations of winning a rigged election. Previously praised by Belarusians for bringing stability to their former Soviet republic, as Lukashenko enters his sixth consecutive term in office, Belarusians rallied by political challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya have demanded new, free and fair elections.

In response, an embattled Lukashenko announced that protesters would have to kill him first.

Mr. Lukashenko, often referred to as Europe’s last dictator, was elected in 1994 as part of Belarus’ first national election post-Soviet dissolution. A year after taking office, he won a questionable referendum that gave him the power to dissolve the legislature, and in the following year, created a legislature and judiciary subordinate to himself, essentially giving his decrees the force of law. As a result, except for the 1994 election, Belarusian democracy has not seen the light of day.

Not only did Lukashenko consolidate his power domestically early on, but he also sought closer ties with Russia. In 1999, Lukashenko and then Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a treaty intended to reintegrate the two nations by creating a confederation known as the Union State, in which the two nations would remain sovereign but would share a government. Although the date when full integration would occur was left unspecified, on a visceral level, the Belarusian flag and national seal had already been altered to reflect Soviet-era designs, borders were opened, and the Russian language was elevated, while Belarusian was suppressed. In the power-political arena, ‘oil was traded for kisses,’ as Russia granted Belarus significant energy subsidies to prop up its anemic economy, in exchange for its geopolitical loyalty as a strategic buffer against NATO.

However, let us get one thing straight: Belarus is not a Russian client state, at least not from Lukashenko’s perspective. He has long played Russia and NATO against each other, taking part in NATO programs to alleviate Western sanctions, while welcoming Russian assistance, much to Putin’s dismay. As a result, Belarusian-Russian relations have soured. The Union State remains unfulfilled, and as Lukashenko continues to demonstrate his willingness to stray from the Kremlin’s expectation that he be a willing Russian stooge, Putin’s frustration towards him has naturally increased.

For instance, concerning Russia’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Lukashenko has refused to side with Russia, citing Article 18 of the Belarusian Constitution, which stipulates Belarus’ goal of neutrality. In retaliation, Putin slashed subsidies, making their return contingent on the Union State’s fruition. Recently, Lukashenko has accused Russia of attempting to bully Belarus into full integration, and in July, Russian mercenaries were arrested in Minsk, accused by Lukashenko of being a part of a Kremlin plot to install Tikhanovskaya in power. However, Lukashenko’s accusations are nonsensical, since Tikhanovskaya herself opposes closer ties with Russia.

So why is Putin so interested in creating a Union State?

Previously, the fruition of the Union State would have created a new powerful leadership post, a position that Putin, who was barred by term limits from remaining as Russia’s President after 2024, could have filled legally, thereby exerting dominance over both nations. However, in July, Putin was able to win a questionable referendum, allowing him to skirt the term limit restriction and remain in power until 2036.

From a balance of power standpoint, his interest lies in creating a consolidated Russian Eurasia, a motive in line with Russia’s previous annexations of Crimea and Georgia. Consequently, having secured access to the Black Sea, Putin set his eyes on the Baltics and the strategic Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is cut off from Belarus, and by extension, the Russian mainland; by a narrow sliver of the Polish-Lithuanian border known as the Suwalki Gap. Should Putin attempt to forcefully ‘bridge the Suwalki Gap’ to reconnect Kalinigrad to the Russian mainland, Russian troops would have to travel through Belarusian territory. Therefore, such a scenario is contingent on Belarusian acquiescence, or Russian ability to ensure compliance through a unified government.

Regarding the Suwalki Gap, LTGEN (Ret.) Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army Europe, asserts: “Deterring any potential action [by Russia] — or even the threat of action — against Suwalki is therefore essential for NATO’s credibility and Western cohesion.” Through a military Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics and Poland, NATO can reassure its defensive commitment while deterring Russia. On the other hand, should NATO fail to counter Russia’s move to ‘bridge the gap,’ such a scenario would drastically undermine NATO’s credibility to provide collective security, essentially rendering the alliance meaningless. This in turn, would invite further brazen Russian aggression. Therefore, the risk of Russia’ bridging the gap’ not only lies with the Baltics being cut off from the rest of NATO, but threatens the very existence of the organization itself; a possibility which no doubt entices Putin.

As part of EFP, the Trump Administration recently announced the redeployment of 1000 soldiers, and the relocation of V Corps Headquarters from Germany to Poland. In response, Lukashenko placed his military on ‘high alert,’ citing the ‘threat’ to Belarusian territorial integrity. According to Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, Lukashenko’s efforts are “to divert attention from Belarus’s internal problems … with totally baseless statements about imaginary external threats.”

As boasted by Belarusian state news media, Lukashenko was able to secure Putin’s promise that “comprehensive [military] assistance will be provided to “ensure the security of Belarus in the event of external military threats.” However, it is essential to note that this ‘comprehensive assistance’ falls under the premises of Belarus’ membership in The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military alliance, and Putin has not explicitly expressed his endorsement of Lukashenko remaining in power if he cannot deliver on the Union State.

But the real question remains: Given the imminent risk posed to the Lukashenko, will Putin intervene in Belarus?

The short answer is, probably not, unless a change in Belarusian leadership involves an abrupt shift towards the West and away from Russia. The current spate of protests are primarily anti-Lukashenko and lack the anti-Russian sentiment present during the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. While Putin has leveraged hyper-nationalist ethnic Russian ‘compatriots abroad’ to undermine sovereignty in ex-Soviet Bloc nations in the past, given the existing semi-union, it is far less costly for Putin to achieve a Union State through soft power alone, rather than through military force. Therefore, if Putin chooses to send his ‘little green men’ to Belarus to prop up the existing government, Belarusian public opinion will turn solidly against Russia, viewing such an attempt as an effort to silence the voice of the people.

Having said that, should Tikhanovskaya continue to rise in popularity and place the possibility of a Union State in jeopardy, Putin’s best option would not be to intervene militarily, and certainly not to call for new elections (that Tikhanovskaya could win). Instead, he should attempt to back a transfer of power from Lukashenko to a member of the Belarusian elite, such as pro-Russian Viktor Babariko. Babariko, who intended to run for president in the 2020 Election, was arrested by Lukashenko in July. According to an unofficial internet poll conducted by popular Belarusian news site Tut.by, over half of respondents were ready to support Babariko over Lukashenko.

On the off chance that Putin chooses to intervene militarily and back Lukashenko, there is no doubt that he will expect Lukashenko’s full and unbridled cooperation towards achieving Belarusian-Russian integration. Putin certainly has not been subtle in signaling these wishes, recently telling Lukashenko: “I expect that your statesmanship will facilitate the further development of mutually beneficial Russian-Belarusian relations … as well as the further enhancement of cooperation within the Union State.”

Given his motivations, Putin’s cost-benefit calculus is no doubt firing on full cylinders. As a result, as events continue to unfold, one can only wonder if he will choose his course of action wisely, and if he does not; how NATO forces will counter if faced with a potential Suwalki Gap scenario.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

September 4, 2020 0 comment

East Asia Geopolitics National Security Security and Conflict

The History Problem: How a Troubled Past Distorts Contemporary Relations Between South Korea and Japan

written by Zachary Durkee

Introduction:

History often serves as a potent force in global affairs. Its power over them can be comparable to DNA: an unseen, ancient, highly complex structure composed of even smaller units that all form to cast immense influence over the actions an organism takes and how it interacts with its environment.

Events of the past permeate deep into the collective memory of any nation. Just like DNA, the nature of history’s effects on contemporary geopolitics can depend on evolution or manipulation. Even when centuries or decades old, history can form a powerfully deep-seated narrative that winds up shaping and influencing the behavior of a state, even in the face of contemporary realities that may dictate otherwise when developing foreign strategy.

Relations between South Korea and Japan provide a case-in-point in this regard. While the powerful logic of realism lays the rationale for a robust security alliance between the two in the face of a rising China, historical memory and nationalistic fervor evoked from past trauma leave the two disunited and disengaged, and keeps their relationship fractured, even when their security rests on their ability to work together to maintain the balance of power in the region.

The History Problem, in Brief:

The origin of the current contention between South Korea and Japan can be traced back to the brutality of Japan’s empire – an entity which ceased to exist nearly eight decades ago. Throughout the course of modern history in the East Asian region, the Korean peninsula has often sat exposed and abused as a result of global imperial competition and expansion. Imperial Japan was responsible for systematic brutality during its occupation of the peninsula from 1910-1945. Among the detestable policies of the Japanese occupation were forced labor and the Japanese military’s use of Korean “comfort women” as sex slaves in wartime borthels. Many of the victims of these brutal and exploitive policies are still alive today to tell their stories.

To this day, the suffering Koreans endured still permeates deep into the relationship held between their nation and Japan, even in the face of a mutual benefit in leveraging the power of cooperation against a rising China. The starkest indication of these contentious historical grievances bubbling back to the surface is illustrated with the path the two governments have taken in the past two years.

In October 2018, South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that a Japanese steel company, which helped perpetuate forced labor over half a century ago, must compensate Korean workers for their unpaid duties. Japan argues vehemently that cases under this purview have been addressed under a 1965 treaty between the two countries which effectively normalized relations. Furthermore, a 2015 agreement designed to mend the “comfort women” wound has ignited sharp backlash from hardline nationalists in both countries, further limiting avenues for officials to ease the growing tension.

The escalatory measures taken by both sides have manifested into several other facets of the bilateral relationship. Trade and intelligence sharing have become tools for showing dismay with one another. Prominent examples include export controls Japan placed on industrial chemicals vital to South Korea’s semiconductor industry and South Korea’s recent threat to exit an intelligence-sharing pact with Japan. China and Russia also took their own measures to compound trouble: a joint military flyover into a chain of islands contested by South Korea and Japan in 2019. The result was an alarming military confrontation in which South Korea fired dozens of warning shots at the encroaching warplanes.

In April 2020, Japan’s reluctance to consider the idea of adding South Korea to the Group of Seven Club prompted an official in South Korea’s presidential office to state that “Japan’s level of shamelessness is in the world’s top tier.” Japanese firms have also been exiting the South Korean market at an accelerated rate due to a protracted trade war and an anti-Japanese boycott movement in South Korea that shows little sign of abating.

These actions have been the consequence of bottom-up and top-down negative engagement with Korea’s and Japan’s traumatic history. In short, these two dynamics feed into one another. From a domestic standpoint at the elite level, it is often politically expedient for politicians to evoke nationalistic sentiment by taking polarized, hardline stances on the historical contention held between the two. To many experts, Japan’s tough stance against South Korea stems from “apology fatigue,” the idea that Japan has done more than enough to apologize for its past atrocities and that South Korean backsliding on official agreements demonstrates an insincere desire to truly reconcile the relationship. It is the result of a younger, more nationalisitc generation of Japanese born after World War II who now equate apologizing with “selling out” Japanese pride, history, and culture.

What Realism Dictates:

Under the lens of the International Relations theory of realism, Japan and South Korea possess a mutual interest in working together to balance against a rising China and to collectively confront a nuclear equipped North Korea in a cohesive manner. Professor John J Mearsheimer captures this dynamic most eloquently in his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, when he states: “In a world where there is no agency to protect them (states) from each other; they quickly realize that power is the key to their survival.” Power, in other words, can also be gained by working together to balance against a mutual threat. In regards to a state like China, its principal aspiration is to become a regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific. A hegemon is best defined as a “state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system.” For China, pursuing this goal means eroding the United States’ ability to serve as an offshore balancer in maintaining the status quo in the region. It becomes clear that this is a scenario neither South Korea or Japan wants.

Realism dictates that Japan and South Korea diffuse their historical grievances and opt in for a strategy that is based off of sheer pragmatism. It requires a tenable level of rapport and cooperation in order to confront China as a collective whole. As long as South Korea and Japan’s relationship remains frayed, it enables China to exploit the division and further assert itself as a dominant force throughout the region.

The Path Going Forward:

The United States must use the extensive diplomatic leverage it has with both countries to facilitate dialogue, forge compromise, and cultivate a renewed focus on maintaining stability in the region. If South Korea and Japan continue to depart from one another, the ability of the United States to maintain its foothold in the region will be threatened. To effectively balance against China, the United States needs its regional allies to hold a united front against Chinese expansion. China thrives from an alliance structure that is left fractured and divided between two consequential allies of the United States.

Political leaders in both South Korea and Japan have a duty to mitigate the domestic forces seeking to demonize the other. This means refraining from taking the politically expedient route of partaking in divisive activities. Just as this example has demonstrated, leaders must balance the broader national interest with their own electoral desires to a reasonable degree. Japan ought to strike a more prudent tone when engaging with the history issue rather than framing the expression of any semblance of contrition as a humiliation of Japan’s national pride. There is a middle-road between being overly apologetic and showing a sense of sympathy for the pain many South Koreans still feel. South Korea, for its part, should abide by past reconciliation agreements and truly seek to make peace with the past. The boycotting of Japanese goods while allowing anti-Japanese sentiment to continue moving along a directionless path of outrage will not help either side come to terms with the past, nor will it serve their broader interests in the present. Both need to come to grips with reality: the past should be forgiven but not forgotten. It should not become a tool for stirring-up nationalistic backlash at the cost of failing to confront current international realities that have far greater consequences for the security of both countries. In the end, pragmatism and sensibility must prevail because regional stability rides on it.

July 23, 2020 0 comment

Africa China Geopolitics Globalization International Trade Security Technology The International Economy

Assessing China’s Belt and Road Initiative: threat or opportunity?

written by Corrado Chirico

In the early fall of 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the launch of a new initiative aimed at fostering regional integration within the Asian continent and strengthening the economic cooperation with other regions of the world. Shortly after, this project was given the official denomination “One Belt, One Road”, which was then substituted by the formula “Belt and Road Initiative” in 2015. To most observers, the concept immediately sounded highly familiar. In fact, the initiative proposed by Xi was a clear reference to the ancient Silk Road, which had been the main connecting artery between Asia and Europe for centuries. Established during the western expansion of the Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), it quickly became a crucial platform for economic and cultural exchange between East and West, until it gradually disappeared around the 13^th century.

As soon as the Chinese leadership started outlining the details of this majestic project, many analysts and politicians in the West began to express their concerns about the possibility of Beijing using the initiative as a tool to consolidate its hegemonic claims in Asia and expand its influence abroad. During an APEC-Summit in 2018 Vice President Mike Pence even labeled the BRI as a “constricting belt” and a “one-way road.” But apart from political biases and the anti-Chinese rhetoric that has marked the Trump administration’s approach toward Beijing, what are the possible threats emanating from the Initiative? And could the BRI have a positive impact on the participating countries?

Although many observers have linked the Initiative primarily to China’s expansionist ambitions, the main motivations behind Beijing’s project are strictly related to internal economic issues. In fact, after nearly three decades of unrelenting economic growth, the Chinese leadership now faces enormous challenges with regard to the future of the country’s economic development. Determined to avoid the so-called “middle income trap,” a scenario in which long periods of growth are followed by a phase of stagnation, Beijing is looking for new ways to stimulate the country’s economy. In this regard, the BRI represents an excellent tool to strengthen China’s economic condition.

Through this Initiative, the Chinese leadership intends to gain access to new markets, especially in Central and South East Asia. Additionally, Chinese leaders want an outlet to offshore some of the industrial overcapacity which Chinese companies have accumulated since the 2008 financial crisis. During that recession, the central government launched massive investments in the transport, infrastructure and real estate sectors in order to compensate the receding demand for manufacturing goods. Indeed, those companies are the real protagonists in the Initiative’s implementation, since most of the projects already underway in the various BRI-countries are being developed by Chinese firms, only seldom in cooperation with local partners.

It has been exactly this aspect, which has given many critics of the Initiative reason to believe that Beijing’s efforts are exclusively serving its own national interests. More specifically, skeptics have often pointed to the sometimes controversial methods of realization of the various BRI-projects. The most quoted example for China’s alleged utilitarian approach is the so-called “debt trap”. This formula describes those situations where Chinese banks lend exorbitant amounts of money in form of generous loans to the countries participating in the Initiative in order to secure the development of infrastructural projects crucial to strengthening connectivity in Eurasia. Nevertheless, critics have argued that these mechanisms are ultimately going to turn against the countries receiving the loans, given their already fragile economic conditions and inability to pay pre-existing debts. This has been the case in a number of BRI-partners, including Pakistan and Sri Lanka. While Islamabad owes China $6.7 Billion in commercial debt through 2022, but hasn’t yet suffered any significant coercions by Beijing, in 2015 Sri Lanka was forced to agree to a 99-year lease on its second biggest Port (Hambantota), given the unsustainability of its debt. By creating these conditions, China could in the long term generate unbalanced dependences and therefore exploit a country’s financial weaknesses to gain access to strategic facilities and control its internal affairs. Many observers have already recognized the phantom of Chinese imperialism looming over the less stable and most vulnerable BRI-countries.

Another questionable aspect related to the implementation of the BRI is the “strings attached”- mechanisms China has employed in its effort to bring the countries pivotal to the Initiative on board. This process has become known as “tied-lending.” Through this method, while Chinese banks have been lending large sums to target countries, Beijing has set constraining conditions for future cooperation. In Nigeria, for example, the China Development Bank granted a $200 million loan, yet the country’s government had to bindingly commit to buying digital infrastructure from Chinese tech giant Huawei. This rather unfair practice has also been deployed elsewhere and been considered by critics as proof of Beijing’s egoism and neo-colonialist ambitions.

Moreover, by closely monitoring the realization of several BRI-projects, the Initiative also appears to be of fundamental importance in China’s effort to secure energy supplies and find alternative routes, which could reduce its dependence on US-controlled chokepoints, above all the Strait of Malacca. In fact, despite its immense territory, the PRC heavily relies on oil and gas imports from other countries. Amongst China’s most prominent suppliers are the Gulf monarchies as well as Iraq, Libya and several other OPEC states. According to the International Energy Agency, Beijing imported 8.7 Billion barrels per day in 2017 and, given its enormous demand, will have to keep securing 6.6 Billion barrels daily through 2040. 90% of these supplies get to the Chinese mainland by sea, usually passing across the Indo-Pacific and thus depending on the US Navy’s presence in the region. Through the BRI, China has already built several gas and oil pipelines connecting Central Asia to its mainland as well as undertaken the construction of deep-water ports in Southeast Asia, which will allow Chinese vessels to avoid traditional sea lines presided over by American forces.

Given all the elements illustrated above, at first glance the BRI might seem a mere attempt to facilitate China’s westward economic and political expansion as well as a useful tool in finding new solutions to internal economic needs and challenges. Therefore, as realist scholars would argue, Beijing is doing nothing else than protecting its economy and weakening its neighbors in order to pave the way for the consolidation of its hegemonic claims. However, by following this interpretation of the project a fundamental aspect remains undiscussed: the positive effects on the participating countries. While many experts have discarded the Initiative as a “trap” or a “blunder,” some participating nations are expected to significantly benefit from it. In Central Asia for example, many infrastructure projects financed by Beijing, such as the Kashgar-Tashkent and the Samarkand-Mashhad railroads, will ultimately boost connectivity in the region and induce both economic and demographic growth in cities like Astana and Almaty in Kazakhstan and beyond. Furthermore, various South- and South East Asian countries are also going to draw great benefits from the BRI. According to a World Bank report, Pakistan will experience a 10.5% increase in its national real income value, whereas Thailand’s, Malaysia’s and Cambodia’s rates will go up to respectively 8.2%, 7.7% and 5.0%. Moreover, also based on predictions of the World Bank, the Initiative has the potential of globally lifting 7.6 Million people from extreme poverty; as a consequence, until 2030 poverty rates could drop from 9.5% (2015) to 3.9%.

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that there already are tangible examples of how a BRI-partner can get major advantages by cooperating with China. In this regard, Greece’s experience constitutes a highly illustrative case. In 2009, right in the midst of the European financial crisis, COSCO (China Ocean Shipping Company) decided to invest, despite the country’s enormous debt and dramatic economic conditions, large sums in Athens’ Piraeus Port. In 2016 COSCO finally bought a 51% share of the Piraeus Port Authority, automatically acquiring far-reaching rights over the port’s administration and management. Despite initial criticism about Greece “selling out” key facilities and the possibility of a “debt-trap” scenario, the Chinese investments were able to create 10.000 new local jobs as well as help Piraeus jump from position 93 (2010) to 32 (2019) in the global ranking of ports with the largest container capacities. Yet Beijing’s ambitions with regard to Piraeus have not stopped. In fact, when Xi Jinping arrived in Athens on a state visit in late fall 2019 and inspected the Port along with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, COSCO announced that it would invest another $600 Million with the goal of turning Athens’ port into Europe’s largest. In addition to the enormous sums allocated by the Chinese company, that same year the European Investment Bank decided to get on board too by emitting a $140 Million loan with a duration of 20 years and secured by CEXIM (China Export-Import Bank).

Notwithstanding the dangerous potential of too-generous loans and unsustainable debt, these numbers show how the BRI can certainly have positive externalities on the countries receiving Chinese investment. Moreover, Greece’s case represents an example worth using as a benchmark for other countries with regard to their cooperation with China. As many analysts point out, Beijing’s increasing influence over crucial infrastructure in Europe and elsewhere could ultimately lead to political interference and sovereignty limitation. Yet if Chinese investments are complemented by the participation of “neutral” institutions, such as the EIB in Europe or development banks on a global scale, that might address concerns about the possibility of Beijing gradually penetrating into the countries’ internal affairs through economic coercion. This modus operandi could indeed prove of great utility both to China and lendee countries. By doing this, Beijing could boost its reputation in the eyes of the West, while the participating countries will have solid guarantees on their cooperation with the Red Dragon. Furthermore, over the past years, China has also demonstrated its financial flexibility toward BRI-countries. Following initial concerns about the elevated cost of a new railroad for example, in 2019 Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad managed to negotiate a $10 billion price reduction (1/3 of the original) on the project and was even able to get Beijing to agree to a joint venture between a Chinese firm and a local partner in the initiative’s realization.

Therefore, by considering both each country’s concerns as well as the BRI’s overall impact, it is certainly possible to say that under the right conditions, the cooperation with Beijing could turn out to be of enormous benefit to the participating states. Practically, this requires a dynamic but resolute approach by the West, which will both challenge Beijing when needed but at the same time seek, not dread, opportunities to cooperate with China in a joint effort to globally generate growth and foster development. In other words, from a Western perspective, the smartest policy to pursue toward the BRI would be to “multilateralize” the Initiative by increasing its share in it instead of merely condemning it. This strategy is absolutely feasible since the Chinese leadership has always been highlighting the “openness” of the projects and its multilateral features.

Indeed, several aspects of the Initiative have been characterized by such an approach, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a Beijing-based development bank founded in 2015 as a response to the ineffectiveness of other similar global institutions and a fundamental financing source for several BRI-projects. Although China holds the position of majority partner with 30.7% of the total subscriptions and 26.6% of the overall voting power, other countries, which are not necessarily an integral part of Beijing’s sphere of influence, have a significant say in the Institution as well. This is the case of India and Germany for example. Whereas New Delhi disposes of 7.6% of the votes and contributes with a capital of roughly $8 Million, Germany detains the largest non-Asian subscription with 4.6% of the shares and 4.1% of the voting rights. Noteworthy is also the membership of several other nations traditionally embedded in the US alliance system, such as the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Israel, which have not hesitated to join the AIIB, despite Washington’s repeated warnings about the risks of getting involved in a Chinese-led Institution. Striking was also the United Kingdom’s entry into the Bank in 2015 as the first European founding member. Even in the West, many experts have already recognized the great potential of the AIIB’s consolidation as a truly multilateral and balanced institution. In fact, some have argued that the Bank could not only avoid the mistakes and flaws of the World Bank, but also develop itself holding high the principles of fair representativeness and sustainability. As to Beijing’s status as majority partner and the accusations about the Bank being a tool in the hands of the Chinese state, a look at the structure of other existing development banks around the World would already suffice to become aware of a feature inherent to every such institution. The World Bank for example, without questioning the organization’s integrity, could theoretically be defined as a US-controlled Bank, since Washington detains 16.7% of the shares as well as 15.8% of the overall voting power. The same applies to the ADB (Asian Development Bank), where Japan holds the highest number of shares and votes. Moreover, the idea that Beijing could potentially use its power within the AIIB to individual ends isn’t a novelty either. It might be useful to reminisce how during the Cold War the United States systematically used its influence on multilateral Institutions to direct resources to controversial strongmen in developing countries, which functioned as anti-communist forces and were useful to U.S. foreign policy; one of the most blatant examples was Washington’s support for General Mobutu in the Congo, whom an American diplomat once called “a son of a bitch, but our son a bitch.”

Through this overview, several aspects, both positive and negative, have emerged with regard to the BRI’s implications. On the one hand, Beijing has shown that it certainly is willing to use its economic influence over specific countries to pursue political objectives and gain access to strategic regions and infrastructure. Having said that, there is also enough evidence to underscore the positive potential of the Initiative, especially in terms of connectivity and economic growth. As summed up above, various countries have already benefited from BRI-projects and others are expected to enjoy the positive impact of the Initiative in the future as well. Furthermore, since many Western nations and US allies have already joined either the Initiative or the AIIB, it would be particularly wise if the West would adjust its approach toward Beijing’s initiative. This would by no means imply a capitulation before China’s expansion and ambitions, but a more structured and determined cooperation with the PRC could break the current bottleneck in the relations between China and the West. In fact, by recurring to this strategy, Western countries could not only demonstrate more interest in working with China in matters of development and economic improvement, but also implement Beijing’s plea for broad participation within the BRI and therefore gain more leverage in the Initiative. At the same time, if there still should be underlying doubts about China’s real intentions, broader cooperation with Beijing could result of fundamental importance in assessing how far the PRC intends to go and if the Initiative is really designed to be a multilateral, comprehensive and peaceful project. In other words, the West could follow China’s plea for global cooperation and use this very tool to look into Beijing’s cards. A first step in this direction could be a more far-reaching collaboration within the AIIB, which already has several features that could facilitate such an endeavor, as well as a more active and collegial implementation of the projects tied to the BRI. A sign that this sort of framework has the chance to succeed is the already existing cooperation between the United Nations Development Program and Beijing, sealed through a joint action plan on the BRI signed in 2017.

In view of the various aspects concerning the BRI, it is finally possible to state that the Initiative represents both a threat and an opportunity. However, while the potential menaces of the Belt and Road Initiative could be contained by the greater involvement of Western countries, not considering the major economic benefits of Beijing’s projects would be wasting significant resources merely out of ideological prejudice.

July 6, 2020 1 comment

Geopolitics Military Security and Conflict Terrorism

Could a Global Pandemic Pave the Way for an Iranian Retaliation?

written by Taylor Fairless

Its been four months since the United States ordered a drone strike that killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) near Baghdad, an act that conjured rising fears of a severe Iranian retaliation. America prepared its troops for an assured attack, waiting steadily, all for what turned out to be an incredibly weak Iranian response. What came as a surprise to many top officials, it seemed like Iran yielded in the aftermath of the attack, leaving many to wonder . . . was that it?

Recent events have given reason to believe that this battle is far from over. With America’s attention on the coronavirus and the weakening of Iran’s regional enemies due to the pandemic, could this prove to be the perfect scenario for an Iranian retaliation?

“He’s probably the most powerful figure that is generally unknown outside Iran and the Middle East. He’s essentially Iran’s viceroy for Iraq.”
Jim Phillips, Middle East analyst for conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation, was quoted as saying this about Soleimani in 2015

Who is Soleimani, and why is he important? The Iranian General rose rapidly through the ranks of Iran’s military forces at just 20 years old. During the Iran-Iraq war, his fierce tactics made him a war hero, and he emerged as a commander of his squad. Within a few years, he became the head of the IRGC’S elite Quds force — a unit that specializes in unconventional warfare and military intelligence operations.

Following America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, Soleimani channeled money to Iran’s proxies to fund the creation of highly destructive weapons, including Improvised Explosive Devices. These would be used to kill over 300 American soldiers. The next decade would see war in Syria, where Soleimani was the lifeline that kept Bashar al-Assad’s power alive. “Tehran’s overseas visionary” propelled Iran’s expansionist agenda by directing deadly proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, where he took control of Hezbollah forces. By 2013, he was believed to be one of Iran’s most important figures, and a pressing threat for American officials.

At home, Soleimani was enigmatic and well-cherished, even by critics who acknowledged his dedication to fighting for the Islamic Republic for almost five decades. In the aftermath of his death, violent protests erupted across the Middle East, reaching Palestinians in Gaza and Pakistanis in Lahore.

“Soleimani’s martyrdom will make Iran more decisive to resist America’s expansionism and to defend our Islamic values…with no doubt, Iran and other freedom-seeking countries in the region will take his revenge.”
President Hassan Rouhani, January 3, 2020

Killed alongside Soleimani was Iraqi politician and highly influential military commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis who served with the General against the Saddam regime. With the death of two of Iran’s chief military figures and a precarious replacement, Iranian officials are fuming.

Making matters worse, many Iraqis believed this strike at Baghdad was a myopic move by America that caused severe strains to their relations. An Iraqi official told Newsweekly back in March that “America is supposed to be our ally, they are supposed to be different from Iran, that strike showed that they are no different than the Iranians.”

Iran responded to the murder by firing 15 ballistic missiles at a US Air Base station in Iraq, the long time battle ground for the two forces. No one was killed, but more than 100 American service members suffered head injury. Tehran framed the rather poor attack as the “conclusion” to their retaliation.

But, more recently, this proved to be false.

On March 11, IRGC proxies sent off a volley of rockets that killed American and British service members near Baghdad. The US responded by striking five Iranian militia logistical and military hubs. Foreign policy expert Philip H. Gordon wrote for the New York Times that Washington’s maximum pressure could pave a path to war with Iran, especially following their decision to no longer observe the nuclear restrictions outlined in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

But, the change in global atmosphere due to the coronavirus has opened up new possibilities for Iran.

Despite burgeoning tensions, American officials are now seriously considering lifting sanctions made against Iran in light of the Covid-19 crisis, which could open the doors for a renewal of Iranian strength down the line. America’s incentive for lifting sanctions include providing greater health protection for American forces stationed nearby in Iraq and showing a sense of morality in light of a cataclysmic virus, something that could fortify international and domestic favorability for the Trump administration. American officials state there is little appetite in the White House for an escalation with Iran whose population is coping with the virus amid sanctions that limit their import of medical supplies.

What would this mean for the Iranian government if the sanctions are lifted? General Kenneth Mcenzie, head of the US Central Command and now at the top of Iran’s “hit list,” said last month that Iranian leadership has become fractured because of the virus, “and they’re having difficulty dealing with a number of things. So I think it probably makes them, in terms of decision-making, more dangerous.” He went on to state that Iran is prepared to use their emissaries in Iraq against American targets and targets in the Gulf.

Indeed, Iranian militia groups have been escalating tensions with the United States in hopes of extracting the remaining 5,000 American troops from Iraq, a prominent goal of theirs.

If Iran’s vengeful mindset persists among a lift of sanctions, it could possibly mean that they could carry out an attack after gathering more resources that had once been denied to them. At that point, what would stop Tehran, in its sensitive and unstable posture, from seeking further retaliation for the murder of Soleimani? And, would America’s distractions over reinvigorating their economy prove to be perfect timing?

It doesn’t seem to be outside the realm of possibility. And now, Iran has a new figure to admire, Soleimani’s own daughter, Zeinab Soleimani, who has become the public face for consolidating national unity and openly calling for Iran to avenge her father.

With an unstable government and new public figure, the risk of an emotionally-driven attack seems more and more likely in the wake of the virus. This environment can prove to play into the political hands of the Iranian government and their proxies by opening up a new channel for strength and recuperation from the sanctions and pandemic. There is now a gamble that Washington has to play. Should the Trump administration show diplomacy and shuffle aid to Iran’s hard-hit country which could prove to lessen tensions between Washington and Tehran, or should strengthen their threats and continue imposing sanctions?

It seems like a hybrid of the two choices, that is, providing temporary relief with strings attached that would prevent Iran from manipulating the circumstances, such as renewed negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal, would seem best. This could project an image of peace and rationale for the Trump administration, perhaps resolve some tensions with Tehran, and it would help to contain the virus in the Middle East which is also risking the lives of American troops stationed there. All of this could be done while still maintaining a heavy-hand with Iran. We will have to wait and see, but given the rapidly changing and hypersensitive environment, an answer should not be long-awaited.

April 18, 2020 0 comment

Geopolitics Military Security and Conflict Terrorism

The Proliferation of Undeclared Warfare

written by Alex Choy

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

The post-WWII international order has seen the relationships between states become more numerous, complex, and interdependent. In this new age, international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the Geneva Conventions have attempted to regulate how wars are initiated and fought. Naturally, these efforts have caused considerable friction with members of the international community, such as the United States, where many believe that the ‘right’ to go to war is an extension of state sovereignty. However, in recent decades, despite a hawkish foreign policy, the US has stopped issuing formal declarations of war. This change is not due to the domestic electoral costs of declaring war; rather, it is the result of the beneficial legal flexibility the US gains when it intentionally fails to formally classify hostilities as war while operating under the constraints of international law.

One outdated argument suggests that the lack of declarations of war is because domestic electoral costs are too high; politicians shy away from declaring war in fear of not being reelected. Proponents of this argument believe that the human cost of losing loved ones will translate into a negative voter opinion towards those who declared war. However, the fact of the matter is that whether America’s conflicts are declared or not, the majority of voters do not take into account foreign policy when placing their ballots. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara once mused about going “to war without … arousing the public ire.” In recent decades, his musings have become a reality. New technology and advances in medicine have minimized the domestic human toll of conflict. For instance, in ongoing conflicts, 10 % of US soldiers have died from their wounds, compared to 30% during the Second World War. Additionally, the overall number of soldiers exposed to direct combat has decreased, given the proliferation of unmanned drone strikes. The US’s ability to wage limited war has resulted in a constituency that is detached from American foreign policy. Therefore, an argument solely based on the electoral costs of declaring war is not sufficient.

Regarding the jus ad bellum conditions under which states may declare war, the UN Charter prohibits the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” except in cases of individual or collective self-defense. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) enforces this through punitive resolutions that impose compliance costs ranging from economic sanctions to the use of force. However, given that the US is a permanent ‘P5’ member of the Security Council with veto power, UNSC resolutions regarding alleged US aggression are thereby nullified. Therefore, to hold the US accountable, less powerful nations can supersede the authority of a US veto by convening a special emergency session of the UN General Assembly.

Given the implications of blatantly violating the Charter, to fly under the proverbial radar of the UN, the US has altered the way it advertises military intervention to the international community. The precedent for doing so was established when President Truman sent US troops to Korea without a declaration of war and under the authority of an international UN treaty instead. Terming the conflict, a police action, Truman explained that under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, international treaties “are laws of the land, and it becomes the President’s duty” to execute them faithfully.The distinction created between war and police action is poignant. While a declared war is “designed to crush and conquer another nation,” a police action is simply a limited military intervention to punish perceived aggressors and to restore the status quo.

To this day, the US has continued to use the convenient ‘police action’ model to justify military intervention abroad. For instance, when questioned about the lack of a war declaration in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense McNamara explained that doing so would imply a “dedication to the total destruction of the enemy,” when US forces were only concerned with restoring the status quo established by the 1954 Geneva Accords. In the same interview, he also acknowledges that doing so would “significantly reduce the flexibility” of US forces to bring North Vietnam to the bargaining table, given the illicit insertion of US special forces into neutral Cambodia to disrupt Viet Cong supply lines.

Post-Vietnam, with the introduction of the War Powers Resolution, which enables the presidential deployment of troops for up to 90 days before seeking a Congressional Authorization of Military Force (AUMF), these so-called police actions became even easier to conduct. Conflicts such as the 1983 invasion of Grenada, the 1990 invasion of Panama, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq have been authorized in this manner, claiming target nation noncompliance with existing international treaties. Concerning these operations, US officials have maintained that the absence of a formal declaration of war is not what makes military intervention unlawful. Rather, “the only relevant legal question is whether … [intervention] is justified.” Therefore, by painting its military incursions as ‘police actions’ and refraining from official declarations of war, the US generates the plausible deniability necessary to justify that it is not waging war, but merely ‘policing’ to enforce international treaties.

Regarding jus in bello conduct during hostilities, the 1949 Geneva Convention regulates the actions, strategies, and weaponry of military personnel during armed conflict. It does this by establishing standards of international human rights law (IHL). For example, captured military personnel are classified as prisoners of war (POWs) and cannot be tortured. In this context, the wording is critical since the existence of a state of war between two nations determines whether or not the Geneva Conventions apply, and therefore, whether or not war crimes have occurred. Consequently, in non-interstate conflicts, IHL does not apply to insurgents, since they are classified as unlawful combatants instead of military personnel. The useful implications of this distinction are illustrated by the US’s controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

At Guantanamo, captured insurgents were subjected to ‘enhanced interrogation techniques,’ during the post-9/11 scramble to bring its perpetrators to justice. Due to their classification as unlawful combatants, the insurgents occupied a legal gray area. In the context of IHL, declaring war is akin to crossing a line of no return. On the one hand, if a state issues a formal declaration of war, then it is forced to abide by IHL. On the other hand, when a state does not, it retains the legal flexibility necessary to justify noncompliance. Accordingly, if the US had issued a formal declaration of war against terrorists, it would have implicitly acknowledged their political legitimacy and, thereby, their POW status. However, because it did not, military and government interrogators were able to implement techniques that would have otherwise been illegal in the context of IHL.

With the recent killing of Quasem Solemani and subsequent Iranian missile strikes, the AUMF has again come under attack, with Representative Joe Kennedy III calling for its repeal. Kennedy reasons that by repealing the AUMF, legislators can redeem themselves by rescuing the power to wage war from Presidential abuse. However, while Representative Kennedy’s qualms are valid, it is essential to recognize that in the modern age, a world where insecurity is generated by threats from non-state actors, Congress is institutionally incapable of the celeritous decision making that such threats require. On the other hand, the President, by nature of his office, possesses the resources necessary to gather and analyze intelligence via his National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and therefore can act and respond to national security threats expeditiously.

Crises have illustrated that small, simple working groups focused solely on foreign affairs; i.e., the President and his Cabinet are better suited to address threats to national security than large, complex bureaucracies; i.e., Congress, which is primarily focused on domestic concerns. In addition, the introduction of the War Powers Resolution by Congress implicitly acknowledges the Congressional shortcomings regarding use of force decision making, and was designed to remedy Congressional indecision. Therefore, on top of the legal leeway that waging undeclared war affords, official declarations of war are anachronistic and only serve as a national security risk.

By not formally declaring war in an environment governed by carefully worded international guidelines, the US can afford itself flexibility when dealing with threats. As a result, when the US engages in hostilities without prior UN approval, it attempts to disguise its violations of the UN Charter by labeling its military intervention as something other than war, such as a ‘police action.’ While this is a risky endeavor, it has paid off tremendously, allowing the accomplishment of policy objectives and ensuring national security while walking the fine line between violation and compliance of international law.

April 14, 2020 0 comment

Featured Geopolitics Israel Middle East Military Security and Conflict United States

Water Politics: The United States’ Role in Israeli Water Security

written by Abdus Najmi

Part 1: Research Question

Located on the border between Israel and Jordan, the Dead Sea is a natural body of water high in salinity – in fact, the levels are so high that one can easily float on the surface. As a frequently visited tourist site, the Dead Sea holds is famous among the wonders of the Middle East. However, this reality is soon coming to an end. Scientists have noted that the “surface area has almost halved,” bringing the water elevation level to a new low.^[i] Though Israel and Jordan have agreed to combat this impending environmental disaster, little work has been done. Despite words of affirmation, the Red Sea-Dead Sea project is stuck at a standstill, as relations between the two countries “are at a historic low.”^[ii] As the crisis looms closer and closer, policymakers have been attempting to grapple with new and innovative modes of effective diplomacy over water resources.

New responses are not necessarily better responses. It is critical to examine the past to help illuminate previous mistakes administrations have made in the realm of water politics. This paper will examine the history of US-Israel relations in regards to water security and management. The amount of literature on the role of the US in Israel’s water policies is actually surprisingly large.

My analysis will focus specifically on Israeli-Jordanian cooperation and conflict, and the role of the US in mediating the allocation of water resources. I will focus specifically on the Johnston Plan in the early 1950s and the 1994 Treaty of Peace between Jordan and Israel. The question I will answer is: What conditions lead to the failure of Israeli-Jordanian water cooperation? In the conclusion, I will answer potential counterarguments and explain how understanding the conditions of failure and success over water security can help provide insights to policymakers for dealing with current failures of Israeli-Jordanian water projects, such as joint-desalination and the Red Sea-Dead Sea project discussed in the introduction.

Part 2: Thesis

My thesis is two-fold: first, I argue that a realist approach to water politics falls short of explaining historical collaboration between Israel and Jordan. Current realist approaches approach water as a commodity, arguing that the reason why cooperation is unsuccessful is because water security is seen as a zero-sum game, where the other opponent is reluctant to cooperate due to fears of losing out on greater access to that resource. In addition, the realist approach looks at that time period as a battle of competing influences between the United States and Russia.

Thus, cooperation fails insofar that policy decisions over water allocation affect the regional hegemonies of the United States and Russia respectively. However, I posit that a constructivist approach better explains the failure of cooperation, specifically focusing on Israeli/Arab identities as social constructs, including discussions of Zionism, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and the Syrian conflict. Amity and enmity are determined by identity.

Part 3: Current/Main Approaches

Current approaches to water security have mainly centered around a realist approach. The approach is as follows: water, in and of itself, cannot be divided. For example, if two people are dying of thirst in a desert, and there is only one cup of water left, it either has to be shared or given to only one person. It’s a non-negotiable good in the sense that it is a rare commodity that directly necessitates a trade-off. If someone receives water, it is inherently at the expense of the other. For many international relations scholars, this is why water cooperation over the Jordan and Yarmouk river fail. Israel and Jordan lose if the other defects, as the scenario is depicted as “a zero-sum game in the national discourses and as a situation of interdependence and possible mutual gains.”^[iii] Scholars cite numerous empirical examples to demonstrate this. For example, after the Johnston plan negotiations failed, the Hashemite Kingdom “announced plans to divert the Yarmouk river […] through the construction of the East Ghor Canal,”^[iv] while Israel attempted to retaliate back by beginning the “construction of a National Water Carrier to transport the water of the Sea of Galilee to its arid South.”^[v]Water was seen as a resource that was mutually exclusive – just as nations race to proliferate for nuclear weapons, states race to secure the most amount of water. In fact, escalation from the rush to securitize water has actually produced conflict between these two states. Israel “bombed the East Ghor Canal,”^[vi] believing that Jordan had malicious intent and was bent on overusing the canal. Furthermore, realists also examine the status quo division of water to prove their theory as well, showing that negotiations focus on the nitty gritty details of water allocations. Post the Madrid talks that ushered in the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel, Jordan was able to secure most of its water from the Yarmouk river, while Israel keeping most of the Jordan river.^[vii] Small caveats were made, with the treaty allowing the allocation “from the other river to each country […] Israel receives 25 million cubic meters (mcm) from the Yarmouk, and Jordan receives 30 mcm from the Jordan.”^[viii]

Additionally, realists would point to the way in which Israel and Jordan conduct and view water policies, especially in how they sell water to each other. The buying and selling of “water at a discounted rate to its neighbor […] reflects an understanding that the price of water is not just the marginal cost of its production but […] a political stability dividend.”^[ix] Water compromise is political compromise – political stability hinges on the zero-sum transaction of water allocation. However, I will argue that though these details may be true, the over-focus on the specifics of water allocation ignores the root causes of identity formation in constructivist theory which prevent effective compromise in the first place.

In addition, the realist approach prides itself in understanding this conflict in the context of the pursuit of hegemony. Because states pursue policies that maximize their self-interest, the US wanted to properly negotiate a solution to the water conflict between Israel and Jordan as a way to counter “communist influence spilling over to Jordan and spreading in the region.”^[x] Especially after the Soviets had managed to establish “a foothold in Egypt and Syria by supplying weapons to both countries,”^[xi] the US began to fear a growing Soviet Union presence in the Middle East writ large. The US attempted to expand its influence by appearing as a broker and friend between both parties, Israel and Jordan. This is why it initially attempted to broker the Johnston plan and provide “funding for both the Israeli National Water Carrier and the Jordanian East Ghor Canal Project.”^[xii] The US wanted to appease both sides, ultimately playing a balancing act between the favoritism of the Arabs and Israelis, but to no avail. Realists also look at the way the Soviet Union approached this conflict as well to see if the theory could be supported by the actions of both actors. When examining the actions of the Soviets, they found deep evidence of a Soviet pursuit of regional hegemony and establishment of a sphere of influence in Israeli-Jordanian water politics as well. For example, upon arrival of US ambassador Eric Johnston to the Middle East region, the Soviets “attempted to spread anti-Johnston mission propaganda and labeled the Main Plan US imperialism,”^[xiii] even going so far as to tell the Arabs that he is a “well-known Zionist.”^[xiv]

The battle of regional hegemonies and the idea of water cooperation as a zero-sum game clearly lend credibility to the realist approach. However, I will argue that though much of the theory is warranted, it falls short in explaining in entirety why cooperation fails, specifically in the context of the failure of the Johnston plan and the success of the Madrid talks. Identity formation and social constructions function as better explanations for the eventual demise of water cooperation.

Part 4: Discussion

Groups function as imagined communities, constantly constructing different identities which function as in and out groups. In a sense, there remains no possibility for the construction of one group without another; in order to first exist, something must exist in opposition to it. For example, many view the rise of Islam and the West as imagined communities; there is nothing that inherently makes them enemies besides constructions of what an enemy is and what interests they have. The same phenomenon happened during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. However, these constructions can be dangerous since “interests are neither primordial nor rational; instead, they emerge from the perceptions and interpretations of the respective groups.”^[xv] That framework is critical when thinking about what cooperation means in the context of constructivism. For the realist, cooperation over water would be about attempting to maximize one’s own self interests and power. For the constructivist, cooperation functions “as a social continuity, since cooperative – like conflictive – behavior is enabled and shaped by hegemonic discourses.” ^[xvi] Cooperation is thus about managing behavior in regards to identity negotiation, almost like negotiating which parts of social construction the other side is willing to cave in on. Seemingly, conflict is described by how dearly a group plans to stick to its social construction.

This actually manifests itself in a problematic manner – if this theory holds true, then cooperation is an extremely difficult process. It requires societal attitudes towards that social construction to change, easily proven true by these exact same water disputes. It took almost forty to fifty years after the Johnston Plan in 1953 for there to be any real progress on water management (since the Israeli-Jordanian peace settlement was in 1994). Identities naturally “cannot easily be manipulated by elites,”^[xvii] which illuminates why a realist approach of attempting to strike a balance of interests in water disputes doesn’t really make sense. It’s not necessarily about maximizing which side secures the most resources; it’s about how strong identities attempt to exist in opposition to each other.

This framework of identity formation is critical when examining water disputes between Israel and Jordan. Firstly, it’s important to understand the importance of the concept of water for Israeli/Jewish identity. For Jews, water is intertwined deeply with “the creation of a Jewish state and the Israeli identity […] water’s ideological meaning […] [lies] in political Zionism.”^[xviii] Driven out of their land starting with the Babylonian Exile to the Holocaust, Jewish people have linked water to their own survival, and naturally so. The ability to access water “is a question of existence for the Jewish state,”^[xix] as over half of the resources are “located outside its internationally recognized borders.”^[xx]Securitization of water is thus necessary for the security of Jewish existence. Especially given the track record of water used as a weapon in Israel’s past, securitization seems inevitable. For example, 1964 was the year in which Arab states “tried to divert the tributaries of the Jordan River,”^[xxi] which Israel responded to by regaining access during the Six Day War. Negotiations and questions of peace are necessarily tied to Israel’s access to water. Images of future Zionist possibilities also demarcated the securitization of water, since much of the discourse was filled with phrases like “making the desert bloom.”^[xxii] This gave credibility to the notion of Jews making Israel an agricultural paradise and settling the land permanently. Zionist propaganda and government statements supported this settlement ethos as well, as they mentioned the importance of “irrigating the deserts of southern Palestine.”^[xxiii] Statements by important figures such as Chaim Weizmann even stress the importance of linking water and security for Israel. For him, it was paramount that “the future Jewish state would […] ensure its control over […] water.”^[xxiv] He even wrote to the Prime Minister about the necessity to “ensure claims to territory in the North.”^[xxv] Water and security were framed as top issues in Zionist discourse, constructing Israeli identities in direct opposition to Arab access to water resources.

Moreover, as much as Zionist discourse stood in opposition to Arab control of water, Jordanian discourse equally advanced an anti-Israeli doctrine in terms of water policy, ultimately leading to the demise of the Johnston Plan of 1953-1955. Jordanians saw themselves as part of a broader Arab identity, which greatly hindered any progress on Johnston’s proposals. They followed the decision-making of the Arab League Council, who told them that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a conditional issue on which Israel needed to resolve before any agreement. Johnston’s shuttle diplomacy ultimately failed, as “two political considerations stood in the way of ratification.”^[xxvi] The first was the “plight of the Palestinian refugees, […] the other was the fact that cooperation with Israel could be interpreted as political recognition of Israel.”^[xxvii] For Jordan, Arab identity superseded any form of negotiation, no matter if the Johnston Plan would have actually been better for Jordan’s access to the water supplies of both the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers. Even though Jordan’s government may not have even liked the Palestinians, Arab constructions of identity were more influential than incentives to negotiate with the Israelis. Negotiation with Israel would also imply an acceptance of Israel as a nation-state. Media reports highlight that this wasn’t a favorable opinion among the people, as Jordanian “editorials went on to argue that it was better for Jordan to develop water within its own boundaries than ‘to cooperate with Israel.”^[xxviii]

As mentioned before, cooperation is difficult because it requires whole populations to shift their orientations about the social constructs they have created. This is clearly witnessed in the failure of the Johnston agreement. There were vast tensions between the Jordanians and Israelis, “notably at the level of the population.”^[xxix] The Jordanian people themselves felt as if the “treaty [was] unfavourable to them,” and when coupled with the “violence between Israelis and Palestinians,” it’s easy to understand the “lack of trust of Jordanians [have] towards Israel.”^[xxx] However, one can notice that these identities become problematic, especially considering the fact that the Johnston Plan would have actually been beneficial for the Jordanians. The plan would have allowed “Israel […] 30 per cent of the total water, Jordan 63 per cent, Lebanon 3 per cent, and Syria 4 per cent.”^[xxxi] This disproves the realist notion that states act in their own self-interest – if that were true, Jordan would have maximized their own access to water resources. It also disproves the notion that water security is a zero-sum game. Jordan would seek to attain the most amount of water, which they would have gotten with this plan, if it was at the expense of Israel. In addition, scholars note that the conflict should not be understood “as a zero-sum game […] if both parties were to apply joint management the potential benefits would be huge.”^[xxxii] Arab identity clearly took precedent over rational claims of maximizing self-interest. The fact that the Lebanese parliament speaker said that “rapprochement with Israel” would cause leaders to “be assassinated, as was Jordan’s King Abdullah,” really highlights how groups view opposing identities.^[xxxiii] Constructivism provides a better framework to understand the failed negotiations of the Johnston Plan.

Likewise, the evidence is bidirectional – the Israelis saw Jordanian support and sympathy with Palestine as a reason to forestall and hinder water cooperation post-Johnston plan. Specifically, in 1969, Israel failed to cooperate with the Jordanians under the banner of Jordanian support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Israelis went ahead and “bombed the East Ghor Canal […] scholars also point out that this attack was […] linked to the fact that Jordan was supporting the PLO.”^[xxxiv] The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a huge concern for both sides in terms of cooperation, as Israeli-Jordanian cooperation is contingent on the way that Jordanians see themselves as the direct allies of Palestinians, just as Israelis see themselves as part of an exclusive, Zionist project. The same thing happened with the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. Though the agreement was successful, Arab versus Israeli identity became a central factor that severely hampered full-blown cooperation. The treaty included discussion of Palestinian refugees, but “left [it] for final-status negotiations.”^[xxxv] The issue of Palestinian refugees has yet to be resolved, however it bodes that any type of future water conflict is “instrinsically linked to the central issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict […] a regional water agreement will depend on the resolution of the entire conflict.”^[xxxvi]

My argument falls short when Syria enters the picture. If constructivism is about group identity, then why do Syria and Jordan also fail to cooperate when it comes to water allocation? Syria and Jordan are both Arab nations, yet both of them failed to properly divide water resources right after the Johnston plan. Surprisingly, “Jordan’s relations with Syria have not been very brotherly.”^[xxxvii] Syria violated a 1951 treaty between the two nations in regards to water security, by “constructing earthen dams on the Yarmouk tributaries inside its borders.”^[xxxviii] Even after that, Syria and Jordan remained even more divided as both supported “opposite sides in the Iraq-Iran War.”^[xxxix] Arab identity was not enough to illicit proper diplomacy – even to this day. Currently, Syrian attitudes towards Jordan regarding water policy “in the Yarmouk catchment did not change, and Jordan continues to be adversely affected.”^[xl] Further research will have to be done to understand what other factors besides identity are at play here. Constructivism may be able to explain why the Israeli-Jordanian cooperation over the Johnston plan failed, however falls short when it discusses conflicts among the same identity group.

The realist argument that water cooperation fails due to the pursuit of hegemony between the US and Russia definitely has strong backing, but it falls short very quickly when we examine how cooperation becomes a success during the Madrid Peace talks. If it was about rivalries and the pursuit of hegemony, then why do the Soviets and US end up collaborating to put on the Madrid Peace talks? By 1991, the Soviet Union leadership under Gorbachev changes drastically, so much so that the “Soviet transformation […] in the mid-1980s” ends up making “Russia a much more acceptable partner for joint conflict resolution in the Middle East.”^[xli] The Soviet Union switches over from competition to cooperation before their collapse at the end of the year, which realism can’t explain well enough. The sudden ideological shift does not make sense given the Soviet Union’s previous drive towards revisionism. If all states exist to maximize their hegemonic influence, then it makes even less sense that the Soviet Union would do this when it was still considered to be the United States’ greatest competitor at the time.

Part 5: Conclusion

Current approaches to understanding Israeli-Jordanian water security fall short because most of the discourse assumes a realist approach to IR. Policymakers tend to view water security as a zero-sum game, which treats water as a mutually exclusive good. The realist idea of states pursuing hegemony to expand their spheres of influence can offer some explanatory potential but not all. Instead, policymakers should adopt a constructivist approach that centers decision-making around issues of identity and social construction. This will help explain the failure of the Johnston Plan as a broader Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than a Jordanian-Israeli one. My research falls short when it comes to discussing the failure of cooperation between Jordan and Syria, but I believe that as a short-term heuristic, policymakers can adopt a constructivist approach to understand Arab conflicts with non-Arab actors. We may need to develop a new framework when it comes to in-group vs. in-group violence. Further research needs to be done on the role of water conflict and scarcity from an Arab identity perspective. My future research will examine why cooperation among Arab states fails in the realm of water security. This may be due to sectarian differences in faith, essentially creating out-groups within the in-groups. Given the analysis in this research paper, it is critical for the US to realize that if it wants to play any role in resolving the Red Sea-Dead Sea canal project, it needs to address the broader issue of Israel-Palestine first.

^[i] Surkes, Sue. “Sinking Israel-Jordan Relations Leave Dead Sea, a Natural Wonder, Low and Dry.” The Times of Israel, November 7, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/sinking-israel-jordan-relations-leave-dead-sea-a-natural-wonder-low-and-dry/.

^[ii] Ibid.

^[iii] Tobias Ide and Christiane Fröhlich, “Water conflict or water cooperation? A discursive understanding of water conflict and cooperation in Israel and Palestine,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Politics (2014): 17.

^[iv] ECC. “Jordan and Israel: Tensions and Water Cooperation in the Middle-East: ECC Factbook.” ECC Library, Jan. 2018, library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/jordan-and-israel-water-cooperation-middle-east.

^[v] Ibid.

^[vi] Ibid.

^[vii] Mitha, Farooq. “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of ‘Cooperation.’” Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (September 2010): 105–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2010.00442.x.

^[viii] Ibid.

^[ix] Shay, Shaul. “Regional Water Security: Challenges and Opportunities in the Middle East .” IDC Herzliya: Institute for Policy and Strategy, (2017), www.idc.ac.il/he/research/ips/Documents/publication/5/ShaulShayWaterSecurity2.pdf.

^[x] Haddadin , M.J. “The Jordan River Basin: A Conflict Like No Other.” Edited by Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama. Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 1 (2014): 250. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849775809.

^[xi] Ibid.

^[xii] ECC. “Jordan and Israel: Tensions and Water Cooperation in the Middle-East: ECC Factbook.” ECC Library, Jan. 2018, library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/jordan-and-israel-water-cooperation-middle-east.

^[xiii] Sosland, Jeffrey. Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin. Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2007. Page 46.

^[xiv] Ibid.

^[xv] Tobias Ide and Christiane Fröhlich, “Water conflict or water cooperation? A discursive understanding of water conflict and cooperation in Israel and Palestine,” Institute for Peace Research and Security Politics (2014): 4-5.

^[xvi] Ibid.

^[xvii] Ibid.

^[xviii] Ibid, page 7.

^[xix] Renger J. “The Middle East Peace Process: Obstacles to Cooperation over Shared Waters.” In: Scheumann W., Schiffler M. (eds) Water in the Middle East. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (1998): 50.

^[xx] Ibid.

^[xxi] Ibid.

^[xxii] Morag, Nadav. “Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 3 (2001): 179-98. www.jstor.org/stable/4284179.

^[xxiii] Ibid.

^[xxiv] Ibid.

^[xxv] Ibid, page 191.

^[xxvi] Haddadin , M.J. “The Jordan River Basin: A Conflict Like No Other.” Edited by Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama. Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 1 (2014): 252-253. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781849775809.

^[xxvii] Ibid.

^[xxviii] Wishart, David M. “The Breakdown of the Johnston Negotiations over the Jordan Waters.” Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 4 (1990): 542. www.jstor.org/stable/4283397.

^[xxix] ECC. “Jordan and Israel: Tensions and Water Cooperation in the Middle-East: ECC Factbook.” ECC Library, Jan. 2018, library.ecc-platform.org/conflicts/jordan-and-israel-water-cooperation-middle-east.

^[xxx] Ibid.

^[xxxi] Morag, Nadav. “Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel.” Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 3 (2001): 194-195. www.jstor.org/stable/4284179.

^[xxxii] Jägerskog A. (2007) “Why States Co-operate over Shared Water: The Water Negotiations in the Jordan River Basin.” In: Shuval H., Dweik H. (eds) Water Resources in the Middle East. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2007): 116.

^[xxxiii] Sosland, Jeffrey. Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin. Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2007. Page 40.

^[xxxiv] Ibid.

^[xxxv] Mitha, Farooq. “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of ‘Cooperation.’” Middle East Policy 17, no. 2 (September 2010): 110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2010.00442.x.

^[xxxvi] Renger J. “The Middle East Peace Process: Obstacles to Cooperation over Shared Waters.” In: Scheumann W., Schiffler M. (eds) Water in the Middle East. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (1998): 54.

^[xxxvii] Haddadin , M.J. “The Jordan River Basin: A Conflict Like No Other.” Edited by Erika Weinthal, Jessica Troell, and Mikiyasu Nakayama. Water and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 1 (2014): 253-254.

^[xxxviii] Ibid.

^[xxxix] Ibid.

^[xl] Ibid.

^[xli] Jägerskog A. (2007) “Why States Co-operate over Shared Water: The Water Negotiations in the Jordan River Basin.” In: Shuval H., Dweik H. (eds) Water Resources in the Middle East. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2007): 87-88.

February 5, 2020 0 comment

Featured Geopolitics Globalization Print Article Religion

The Price of Pilgrimage: Is Nothing Sacred?

written by Katherine Jones

This article was published as part of our Spring 2019 print edition, the entirety of which may be found here.

One of the world’s tallest buildings, The Makkah Royal Clock Tower, looms over the Kaaba and the Masjid al-Haram Mosque, Islam’s holiest site. The Clock Tower boasts a luxury Fairmont Hotel, which offers rooms with views of the Kaaba for up to $4500 a night, along with high end shopping and restaurants. However pilgrims that cannot afford the growing number of luxury hotels sleep on the street outside, illuminated by the fluorescent lights of an opulence they may never experience. The commodification and capitalization of Mecca draws a stark contrast to the rites of the Hajj that emphasize equality and humility. Such an inherent disparity between purpose and practice has sparked a global conversation not only about the meaning of the Hajj, but Saudi Arabia’s fitness to oversee it.

The Hajj is a five day ritualistic pilgrimage to Mecca required of all Muslims who are physically and financially able at least once in their lives. Mecca is within the political jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Riyadh dictates how the pilgrimage is run and who may attend. The Kingdom claims they distribute visas to attend the Hajj in accordance with the size of each country’s Muslim population. In reality, the allotments are not always transparent and the Saudis have been known to use visas as political pawns. Nations with whom they have favorable diplomatic ties with often receive extra bonus visas unofficially, and those with whom they do not, have issues attaining any visas at all. For example Syrians, with whom the Saudis cut diplomatic ties with in 2012, cannot obtain a Hajj visa through the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – they must go through the Syrian National Coalition, a Saudi aligned opposing political party. Similarly, after the embargo placed on Qatar in 2017 the visas allotted to Qatar were halted, resulting in extreme backlash and a formal complaint to the UN. It was not until the intervention of Sheikh Abdullah Al Thani, an exiled member of the Qatari royal family, that the visas were once again granted. In both cases, the Saudi government used the visas as political leverage to undercut the authority of existing governments and give preferential treatment to their allies.

The most overt politicization of the Hajj though, has been the Saudi-Iranian cold war. Both countries use the Hajj as a battleground for promoting their competing versions of Islam, a tension which has erupted in violence on several occasions. In 1987, 402 Iranian pilgrims were killed and 600 more were injured by Saudi riot police as they protested “Death to America! Death to Israel!” during the Hajj. More recently, 464 Iranian pilgrims were killed in a tragic stampede during the Hajj. The following year, the Iranian government banned its citizens from attending the sacred rite, and since have been vocal in their dissatisfaction with Saudi management.

However the Iranians are far from the only ones to call Saudi stewardship into question. A growing number of critics have emerged due not only to the aforementioned political exploitation, but the Saudi’s growing and projected profiteering practices. The Saudi economy benefits immensely from the Hajj. The religious pilgrimage accounts for seven percent of Saudi Arabia’s GDP and 20 percent of it’s non-petrol GDP. Consequently, expanding the Hajj to accommodate more people, more businesses, and more profit has become an integral part of Mohammed Bin Salman’s economic plan for the Kingdom, Vision 2030. New hotels, shopping centers, fast trains, and airport terminals are all being constructed in anticipation of future pilgrimage, and nothing is too sacred to renovate. Even the Masjid al-Haram Mosque, which contains the Kaaba, is being expanded to accommodate as many as 1.85 million pilgrims at once in the years to come.

At first glance, these developments appear to be positive. Mecca’s growth does mean more people will have the opportunity to attend the Hajj and fulfill their religious duty. However the Saudi’s disheartening economic focus, that will entail the expansion of the tourism sector, and destruction of historic sights, negates any praise or admiration they may receive.

The Kingdom hopes to increase the revenue from pilgrimage and subsequently spread the wealth through various sectors as a part of their larger tourism expansion scheme. They have started to offer an “Umrah Plus” visa (the Umrah is a pilgrimage at a non-Hajj time of year) which provides access to not only Mecca, but other religious sites across the country. This will increase sustainable development for their population, but feels disingenuous to the purpose of pilgrimage. To exacerbate their trend of capitalizing off Mecca further, the Saudis have attempted to provide ulterior motives for pilgrimage. Mark Allaf, manager of the Mecca Hilton said the hotel was “trying to introduce the concept of combining both the performance of Umrah and Hajj, and specifically Umrah, with a business event.” Many of the devout feel these distractions sully the pilgrimage.

Mirroring this shift in the purpose of the Hajj is the shift in the physical landscape of Mecca. In the process of construction and renovation of the city, the Saudis have destroyed ancient relics as well as medieval Ottoman structures, an action which the Turkish cultural minister condemned as “cultural vandalism” and a “war on legacy”. In defense of the Saudis, it is within the theology of Wahhabi Islam to destroy these sights as to prevent idolatrous practices, however it is ultimately unjust for the Saudis to take action that will affect everyone based on their unpopular interpretation of Islam. It is also a bit too convenient that the home of Khadijah, Mohammed’s wife, was replaced with bathrooms in the expansion of the mosque and the home of Abu Bakr, Mohammed’s successor, was replaced with an extremely profitable Hilton hotel. It is apparent that the Saudis care more for development and personal economic gain than preservation and reverence of a shared cultural and religious history. Perhaps it is time for a more open conversation about the Saudi’s mandate to Mecca.

Saudi Arabia’s history of political and economic exploitation of power, not to mention their condemnable human rights record, make them unfit to manage Mecca. However that brings about the question: who is? Because the problem goes far beyond the Saudis themselves, and we in the West must take our share of responsibility. Islam’s shiny new sixth pillar, western capitalism, is the direct result of decades of U.S. interventionism and soft power throughout the Middle East. It would thereby be the height of hypocrisy for us to condemn the Saudis for following in our footsteps, for bringing profit to the American corporations filling the malls of Mecca, but that doesn’t mean Muslim countries can not. It is only natural to sympathize with the Iranian pilgrims protesting US-Saudi relations during the Hajj, because cultural imperialism is a driving force of change in Mecca. After all, the city belongs to Iranian Muslims just as much as it does to the Saudis, or the other 1.8 billion Muslims on Earth; and if they’re angry that some pilgrims are sleeping on the street, and others in the Fairmont penthouse they’re not alone. Perhaps the Saudis should give some credence to these criticisms and consider incorporating their religion into their developments, their economy and their politics, rather than the other way around.

October 14, 2019 0 comment

Featured Geopolitics Globalization Human Rights Humanitarian Aid Immigration Religion

The Rise of Buddhist Extremism in Myanmar: The World’s Largest Refugee Crisis and What To Do

written by Abdus Najmi

Known previously as Burma, Myanmar was subject to British colonial rule from around 1820 to 1948, like its surrounding neighbors of Bangladesh and India. Surprisingly, for most of Burma’s history, the Rohingya Muslim minority actually lived peacefully with their Buddhist neighbors in the Rakhine state, situated right next to Bangladesh’s Cox Bazar. Many legal documents claim Muslim minorities acted as “advisors to Buddhist royals,” even having a deliberate say and place in Burma’s politics since the 1500s. In fact, it was only towards World War II where religious violence began to erupt in the modern form that one can see today. The British began recruiting the Muslim minority as their soldiers, while the Japanese army aligned themselves with the Burmese Buddhists. Both of these governments’ armies used religious divisions as a political and military means; it was from here that we can start to see a Burmese resentment towards the Muslims as being traitors to their nation.

After Burma gained independence, the government published a list of the 135 official ethnic groups native to the country. The Rohingya are nowhere to be found on that list. There is even a law that limits the civil rights of the Rohingya. The 1982 Citizenship Law has complex procedures in which Rohingya men and women are only allowed to raise two children, and they are not allowed to marry unless given permission. This is usually done by bribing authorities or providing evidence that the couple does not follow Islam, such as giving pictures of the bride without a hijab to prove secularity. Rules governing property ownership and taxation also are extremely cumbersome and arbitrary. The Rohingya are not legally considered citizens; they are forced to carry around “white cards” which allows them legal standing as temporary residents in Myanmar.

The amount of persecution has skyrocketed within the last decade. Dildar Begum and her 10-year old daughter were repeatedly raped by Myanmar troops on August 30, 2017. She watched soldiers hack her 5-year old son “to death in front of her,” and was forced to witness the slitting of her husband’s throat. As a Rohingya Muslim, Dildar Begum’s idea of statehood and the “home” is nonexistent, as she is being kicked out of Myanmar by state soldiers, but is also unwelcomed into Bangladesh. For people like Dildar Begum, being Muslim and Burmese becomes a contradiction of sorts. She never fits in with Bengalis because of her language, but cannot be considered Burmese because of her faith. Dildar Begum’s case is not an isolated instance of violence. Mamtaj, also thirty years old, faced a similar situation where one of her sons was “thrown into a fire,” while the other was shot from behind in the head. In both of these cases, their husbands and sons were killed first so the Myanmar troops could proceed to rape the women without resistance. Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi has received tremendous amounts of criticism in terms of the delayed response to the persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority.

Kutupalong is the world’s largest refugee settlement, housing the Rohingya people and spanning over the Cox Bazar area of Bangladesh. Estimates predict that there are about one million refugees total; women and children make up most of the population of the camp, according to UN data. Recent weather analysis and scientific reports have rendered Kutupalong as one of the most susceptible areas to climate change, as the geographical positioning next to the Bay of Bengal makes the camp prone to intense cyclones and “vigorous monsoons,” further exacerbating inequality by destroying homes and requiring constant efforts to rebuild the camp. Due to massive overcrowding, water resources have become scarce as well; environmental scientists tested the groundwater at random locations around the camp and found that 70 percent of their samples contained E. coli. In addition to geographical positioning, Ukhia, in Cox Bazar, is home to many forests and contributes vastly to the world’s biodiversity. Due to overcrowding within the camp, people have shifted towards deforestation and land degradation to accommodate the influx of refugees. This depletion of resources has actually hampered the survival of refugees. The Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS) representative Atiq Rahman has in fact argued that cutting down trees “destabilizes the terrain” as Bangladesh’s hills are “soft soil hills,” getting much of their stability from the roots of trees. The risk of hill collapse becomes imminent. As the camp continues to expand and accommodate new refugees on these faulty hills, more tragedies and environmental disasters await. Expanding the refugee camp is simply not a sustainable solution.

To this day, most of Burmese nationalists refer to the Rohingya minority as “Bengali Muslims,” and fail to use the Burmese word Rohingya as it would give credence to the fact that this minority group originally stemmed from the Arakan Kingdom in Burma. Even State Chancellor and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi has denied to call them Burmese citizens, allowing the massacre to continue within her own borders. To call them Rohingya would be to humanize them as Burmese. To Buddhist nationalists in the Ma Ba Tha movement, they are anything but human.

The Ma Ba Tha movement is a nationalistic association of Buddhist monks and worshippers who preach against the rise of Islam. They fear what many of them term as the “Islamification of Asia,” a phenomenon which leader Wirathu has claimed will “destroy Burmese culture and the future of Buddhism.” In one of Wirathu’s speeches, he argued that the Muslim is one who is prone to be “inherently violent […] want[ing] to eat their own kind.”

Wirathu, known as the “Burmese bin Laden,” was on the cover of the 2013 Time Magazine under the title “The Face of Buddhist Terror.” In this piece, the magazine points out that the slogans and ideology that Wirathu is preaching is not a new phenomenon. In fact, Buddhist extremism has been prominent not only in Myanmar, but also Sri Lanka during their civil war, where many Buddhists rallied around claims of taking back Buddhism from Tamil Hindus. The same is true in Thailand. The narrative has always been as such: Buddhism is on the decline because of a foreign enemy, we must fight back to protect our way of life. These monks use the idea of sangha (or the importance of a monastic community) to justify their violent behaviors. For them, Buddha’s message is on the decline, and if there are no more monks, a “Buddhist End Times will begin.” They term this the final kalpa, where an apocalypse will occur with a massive rainfall to end all life on Earth, just to begin a new one. In order to forestall the “End Times” from happening, extremist Buddhists resort to violence to preserve Buddhist monasticism. In Meiktila, 40 Muslims were killed by a group of Buddhists. In one Rohingya village, 70 Muslims were slaughtered. It’s vicious killing campaigns like these that cause the Rohingya to flee into neighboring Bangladesh for refuge. The misguided effort to preserve Myanmar’s Buddhism has been a central tenet guiding the persecution of the Rohingya Muslims. Despite the doom-and-gloom rhetoric, it is important to highlight that positive steps are definitely being made towards the rights of the Rohingya people, and can potentially be guaranteed with external pressure from groups like ASEAN or countries such as China or India. Recently in 2017, Myanmar and Bangladesh hashed out a deal regarding the issue of repatriation, despite an eventual postponing of the deal later on. Even the international community, such as the US and EU, have attempted to impose sanctions on Myanmar for their behavior. Empirically, they have worked. Foreign direct investment from the West decreased from $3.14 billion to “$1.34 billion” due to sanctions. Tourism from Europeans is “down by […] half.” People are becoming more and more aware of the atrocities that are occurring in the Rakhine state. However, international relations scholars have posited that if any external force can help solve this crisis, it’s China. China is Myanmar’s “largest trading partner,” composing almost 33% of its trade. Due to China’s involvement in Myanmar’s economy, they may have the upper hand in securing a deal that can drastically limit the casualties in the region, if they can get Bangladesh to properly agree. The biggest place policymakers must look at when dealing with this should be China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative. Some of the infrastructure plans under this project include a multi-billion sea port project in the Rakhine state. Putting hardline pressure with China’s economic investment plans in Myanmar might be the key to getting them to cave in on reforming their human rights policies. Only time will tell.

October 9, 2019 0 comment

Environmental Change Featured Geopolitics Immigration

Climate Refugees: From Abstraction to Reality

written by Katarina Kosmala-Dahlbeck

The United Nations defines a refugee as “a person forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, violence or war”. This definition arises from the UN Refugee Convention, which was signed in 1951 by its 145 member states. In the decades following this decision, refugees came to be commonly understood as people fleeing “ethnic, tribal and religious violence”, and these groups have been legally protected under international law. However, this post-World War II understanding of what constitutes a refugee has recently been the subject of criticism by scholars throughout the international community. In focusing specifically on persons fleeing persecution, international law fails to include protections for migrants fleeing numerous other threats. And, as the Earth’s climate continues to warm throughout the 21st century, the most powerful threat facing vulnerable communities is not violence or war, but rather climate-induced environmental disaster.

The International Organization for Migration predicts that climate change will displace up to 250 million people around the world by 2050. This poses enormous complications worldwide, especially considering the rise of anti-immigration policy in many Western democracies. Crop failure, drought, rising sea levels, stronger storms, and disease pose significant threats to people’s homes and livelihoods throughout the Global South. Climate-induced natural disasters have already caused irreparable harm in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, and as the Earth’s climate is expected to warm far beyond the Paris threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius, this could well spread to other parts of the world as well. Most poignantly, the populations most vulnerable to these changes are the developing world, rural and indigenous communities, and the poor: those who hold the least responsibility for industrialized fossil fuel production in the first place. Although the largest population shifts are expected to take place in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, hurricanes and fires have even caused migration in the United States.

Still, climate migration is a relatively new phenomenon, and misunderstandings abound as to what conditions accurately describe a ‘climate refugee’. Although the term has gained prominence in academia in recent years, the meaning behind it rings empty as no international framework yet exists to address the issue. Additionally, the inherent complications of climate change often cross national borders and international institutions are thus unfit to handle climate migration under their existing framework. No action has been taken to amend the UN definition of a refugee, and no legal protections exist for environmental migrants. To further complicate this, the World Bank estimates that the majority of climate-displaced people will not be refugees at all, but rather be internally displaced, or forced to resettle within their country of origin. Internally displaced people (IDP’s) are not granted refugee status by the UN, but instead fall under the legal obligation of their own governments.

Cases invoking international refugee status for migrants fleeing climate stress have already been heard by national courts, most notably in New Zealand with mixed results. Ioane Teitiota sought refugee status from New Zealand in 2014 on the basis of rising sea levels endangering his home country of Kiribati. The case was dismissed by the New Zealand Supreme Court, however, because he could not prove persecution and therefore was not offered protection under international law. Even though the court conceded that Teitiota’s case met the “sociological definition” of a refugee, it did not meet the legal one. On the other hand, the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal ruled in the same year to accept the refugee application of Siego Alesana, a migrant from the island nation of Tuvalu also fleeing rising sea levels. The court accepted him and his family on humanitarian grounds, claiming that the adverse impacts climate change would have on his young children classified as a human rights violation should he return to Tuvalu. Neither court, however, accepted land disappearance due to rising sea levels as legitimate in proving refugee status.

Our understanding of refugee status has to evolve past its outdated definition of simply those fleeing ethnic, tribal and religious persecution. Humanitarian crises in the 21st century are more likely to be caused by environmental factors than by violent conflict, and international law must develop in accordance with this. The UN declared in September that “climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods and security… of the peoples of the Pacific”, as Pacific Island nations continue to face some of the world’s highest levels of displacement. If

emissions continue at their current rate, however, even cities such as New York and Tokyo can expect to be under water by the end of the century. The era of climate migration is upon us, and it is essential that leaders establish an international legal framework to address the issue. The international community not only needs a paradigm shift in its understanding of the term ‘refugee’, but it also must translate that understanding into action before it is too late.

“What is a refugee?” United Nations Refugee Agency. https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/what-is-a-refugee/
Ibid.
“Global Migration Trends”. International Organization for Migration, 2017. https://www.iom.int/global-migration-trends
Gonzales, Carmen. “Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and the Global South”. Seattle University School of Law, 2015.
Climate change killing trees across the Sahel, says study”. The Guardian, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/20/climate-change-killing-trees-sahel
Sarkar, Soumya. “South and Southeast Asia most at risk by climate change”. Eco-Business, 6 Dec. 2018. https://www.eco-business.com/news/south-and-southeast-asia-most-at-risk-by-climate-change/
Gleick, Peter. “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria”. AMS Journals, 1 July 2014. https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/full/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1
“November Global Temperature Change”. CO2 Earth, Nov. 2018. https://www.co2.earth/global-warming-update
Ibid.
Ibid.
Anderson, Charles. “New Zealand considers creating climate change refugee visas”. The Guardian, October 31, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/31/new-zealand-considers-creating-climate-change-refugee-visas
Curtis, Kimberly. “Climate Refugees Explained”. UN Dispatch, April 24, 2017. https://www.undispatch.com/climate-refugees-explained/
Anderson, Charles. “New Zealand considers creating climate change refugee visas”. The Guardian, October 31, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/31/new-zealand-considers-creating-climate-change-refugee-visas
“Pacific Islands on the front line of climate change: UN Chief”. UN News, September 28, 2018. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1021342
“Future Climate Change”. Australian Department of the Environment and Energy, 2018. http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/climate-science-data/climate-science/climate-change-future

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