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Colombia’s Tumultuous Summer in Review

Earlier this year, surreal images poured out of major Colombian cities and into international news headlines. Videos emerged of thousands gathered in the streets, draped in Colombian flags and carrying posters composed of mismatched materials and biting phrases. Dramatic photos of collisions with policemen dressed in layers of black armor depicted dystopian-like scenes. These dramatic images are evidence of a nearly seven weeklong, nationwide protest that initially began as a resistance to a tax hike amidst the state’s economic crisis. The government’s security forces had countered the initial demonstrations with a militarized police response, and tales of abuse at the hands of officials escalated the situation. The protests soon evolved into a mass movement against police brutality as well as a cry for social and economic reform. It is important to note that 88.5% of the protests were peaceful, but it was these instances of excessive force that drew international condemnation from human rights groups, leaders of international organizations, and other governments alike. The National Protests called into question the taboo attached to peaceful protest in Colombia’s post conflict society.

As of July 20^th, the National Strike Committee has technically resumed these protests, although the initial movement between April 28^th to June 15^th of 2021 was an exceptional period of mass mobilization. The world will watch and anticipate any new reforms announced by the new Congressional session, and wonder if the relationship between security and the right to peaceful protest in Colombia will be reconceptualized. Until then, this article will review the timeline of the initial protests, highlight the findings of various human rights reports, and provide an update of the latest political and legislative outcomes.

In late April of 2021, President Iván Duque Márquez proposed a new tax reform policy that would have lowered the salary threshold that could be taxed, eliminated many current tax exemptions, and increased the amount of goods included in Value Added Tax (VAT). This anticipated financial burden catalyzed massive resistance. Colombians were already suffering from exorbitant poverty rates and rampant income inequality that is only being exacerbated by the pandemic: 3.6 million people have been pushed under the poverty line in just a year while the state’s three richest men own more than 10% of Colombia’s GDP. Protests broke out all over the country, and the National Strike Committee formed in order to represent a multitude of subgroups within the protest movement including unions, indigenous organizations, civil society, and student groups.

While a large majority of the protests were peaceful, demonstrators were met with violent force from the state security forces including Colombia’s police riot unit, ESMAD. According to an Atrocity Alert in early June by the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, “Colombian human rights organizations have identified almost 3,500 cases of abuse, including killings, excessive use of force, torture, disappearances and sexual violence”. Types of excessive use of force include tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and even live ammunition. The abuses committed by the police perpetuated and escalated the situation.

While protests broke out over the entire nation, the majority of the violence against protestors was centered in the city of Cali. This is most likely due to a culmination of factors such as the ongoing economic recession and instances of social inequality, but also structural racism against the large Afro-descent and indigenous populations within the city. Further complicating the situation and contributing to the social unrest is the region’s history of conflict with internal armed groups. One prominent lens of explaining why so much of the violence occurred in Cali is that the security forces in this region are equipped to fight against paramilitaries, and were not trained to handle peaceful protestors. In regard to such conflicts, the police have been regarded as a “critical player in a counterinsurgency strategy” which was key to holding territory and bringing about the 2016 Peace Agreements. Yet many are calling for a paradigm shift in use of the police, particularly how they view peaceful political protest: as a human right exercised by fellow citizens, not as an act of armed rebellion.

Throughout the first seven weeks of protests, Amnesty International found three major human rights violations that were committed in Cali, including an attack on the Indigenous Minga community, an attack near Valle University, and a joint incursion known as “Operation Siloé”. These violations were characterized by excessive and lethal force by National Police Officials or by armed citizens with the acquiescence of police officials.

Amnesty International published a recommendation that the Colombian authorities should not respond to peaceful protests by trying to “stigmatize” protestors as criminals. One could conclude that by painting such a narrative over the seven week period, the government incited enough fear to drive counter protests, enable armed civilians, and publicly justify the deployment of military troops. The situation seemed to be increasingly escalating as protestors responded to the troops by blockading roads and bridges trying to cause economic damage and block the flow of goods.

The situation deescalated when the National Strike Committee announced the pause of protests after nearly seven straight weeks in order to allow for political negotiations. While the initial negotiations for a pre-agreement failed, the National Strike Committee developed a 10-point plan of demands to propose at the next congressional session on July 20^th. Some of these asks included the dismantling of ESMAD (the riot police unit), health care reform, and universal income. Protestors also promised to restart the protests during the next legislative period to further pressure government officials for these demands.

So far into the new legislative period, President Duque’s administration has asked Congress to implement human rights training for police and measures such as visible QR codes on police uniforms, but has not called to dismiss ESMAD. Rather, Duque has said that Colombia “will seek international expert advice on best practice for the ESMAD”. Currently, three police officers are facing murder charges and seven will be tried for “failing to uphold their duties” when they allegedly stood by while civilians opened fire at protestors.

During this new session, the Duque administration has presented a $3.95 billion tax reform bill to congress. The bill is supposed to raise 15.2 trillion pesos per year, which is significantly less than the 23.4 trillion pesos per year that was defined by the tax reform bill back in April.

“‘The social investment law, which we will build between all of us, is the largest jump in human development in recent decades’” Duque said on July 20^th. His administration also spoke on how important the new bill is to ensuring social programs. Yet, do the reforms represent a meaningful shift in how the state views the right to protests and the role of security forces, or are these reforms just designed to be enough to placate domestic and international pressure?

Some Colombians worry that the reforms in the new bill are superficial. Journalist Mario Murillo describes one particular example of this outcome in an interview by Democracy Now. He referenced one component of the 10 reforms, the demand to move the National Police from the Defense ministry into the Interior Ministry, which was hoped to bring about the demilitarization of the police and to encourage a paradigm shift to thinking of protestors as citizens, not as combatants. Yet, instead of removing the National Police from the military, the new reform bill simply gives them new, different color uniforms that are supposed to be less threatening.

The international community spoke out throughout the summer about the right to peacefully protest in Colombia, and recently human rights groups and international organizations have compiled and published reports on the violence that occurred during this period. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR) released its reports and recommendations in July, finding human right violations and urging social reconciliation. Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission will be conducting a Special Monitoring Mechanism for Human Rights in Colombia “to support the consolidation of peace within the various sectors of Colombian society”(OAS).

While these protests and political movements and reforms are still unfolding, the international community envisions a Colombia where the rule of law, security, and the human right to peacefully protest all coexist.

August 24, 2021 0 comment

Featured Geopolitics Mexico and Latin America National Security South America

Still No Solution: Bolivia’s Transition of State Power

written by Herman Luis Chavez

At the end of 2019, each of Bolivia’s nine regional departments experienced protests for nearly two months following the Oct. 20 national election, where former leftist President Evo Morales declared himself president for the fourth consecutive term. Under claims of fraud, he resigned from the presidency in November and ultimately fled the country with many of his party’s high-ranking officials, leaving the country with conservative Jeanine Añez as their interim president. However, after COVID-19 led to delayed elections and renewed protests, the state of the country’s power remains at a standstill.

Morales’ presidency was fraught with controversy. He had been president for thirteen years, having been elected in 2005 and reelected in both 2009 and 2014. Before Morales, this number of reelections was unheard of. Controversy rose after Morales’ constituent assembly and Bolivia’s Constitutional Court approved a 2009 referendum and early election, rising out of a changed constitution that allowed the president to pursue one consecutive reelection. Although the economy rose under Morales’ rule—such as the country’s poverty population percentage dropping by more than half from 36% to 17%—his increasingly leftist politics caused tension among the general population. After claims of fraud arose due to the results of the Oct. 2019 election, citizens set up roadblocks among violent clashes to challenge his continuation as president.

Bolivians took the streets claiming that Morales had engaged in electoral fraud. While observing the counts of the vote, the nation was surprised when results froze; Morales was falling behind other candidates at this time, but when final numbers were released, Morales had seemingly managed to best all his competitors. Although he was still in the margin of a runoff with the second-highest candidate, Morales declared himself victorious in the election. He resigned at the bequest of Bolivia’s then-chief of military in response to growing chaos from protests around the country.

Morales and several high-ranking Bolivian governmental figures fled the country following the civil unrest and the former president’s resignation. Morales first went to Mexico, where he urged his followers to denounce the transition of power to Añez. However, Morales was eventually granted refugee status in Argentina, where he currently resides. Although it is presumed his move to Argentina was to facilitate his organizing near Bolivia, it raises the question of the already-strained relationships in Bolivia’s foreign relations. When Bolivia’s foreign ministry challenged Argentina for protecting Morales after he continued to ask for political revolution from his party, the country’s foreign ministry responded by stating that they would not recognize Bolivia’s interim government. As elections have been pushed back, Morales continues to organize for his political party, Moviemiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism, or MAS), from Argentina, frustrating Añez and her current government.

Añez has been in power since Nov. 12th, 2019, declaring her interim presidency after the vacancy of higher-ranking officials left her at the top of the line of succession. Morales and MAS attempted to claim that her ascension was illegitimate, but she maintained her power through congressional support. Although she originally announced that her role would be only to facilitate a fair election free of fraud, she eventually announced that she would run for the presidency herself, and her administration proceeded to charge various MAS members and officials with crimes against the state. The election was originally scheduled for May, but Añez decided to push back the date due to concerns regarding COVID. However, despite taking measures such as an early lockdown, COVID rates across Bolivia are still rising, with a lack of oxygen and personal protective equipment in a damaged healthcare system from Morales’ rule. Bolivian citizens—largely those affiliated with MAS—are frustrated with Añez’ use of the pandemic to interfere with election proceedings.

The struggle for power between MAS and the interim presidency has wider implications for Bolivia’s population. The protests, both last year and now, highlight the tensions felt by the largely Indigenous leftists and the long-unrepresented conservatives in the country. They also illustrate how Morales’ presidency has strained foreign relations, as Bolivia only reestablished diplomacy with the United States during Añez’ interim administration with a visit from a White House senior advisor. As the country looks forward to finally resolving the question of the presidency, nearly a full year after the initial fateful election, these tensions will underscore the country’s final election in the age of COVID.

As the election nears, seven candidates are in the running. According to a Jubileo Foundation Poll in September, Luis Arce, the candidate from MAS, led with roughly 40% of the polled vote. Former president Carlos Mesa polled second. Añez dropped out of the race on September 17th after polling with less than 10%, most likely due to citizens’ concerns over her interim government’s handling of the pandemic.

The final election date is scheduled for Oct. 18th, 2020. After a failed election, an unstable interim government, and continued political tensions during a global pandemic, this new election will define which direction Bolivia’s domestic and international turmoil will take.

October 2, 2020 3 comments

Students clash with National Guards members during an opposition demontration against the government of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Leo Ramirez/Flickr, 2015. CC0 3.0

Featured Security and Conflict South America

Venezuela’s Resource Curse

written by Katie Linder

Venezuela’s backslide has been rapid and devastating. Perhaps the most stunning example of the deterioration of the state has been the reemergence of malaria. By 1960 Venezuela had eradicated the disease from its urban areas, which helped set it on a path to economic prosperity for the next few decades. Despite political turmoil and a recession in the late 20th century, Venezuela was regarded as the wealthiest nation in South America up through 2001. Its comfortable perch atop the largest proven petroleum reserves in the world seemed to ensure lasting dominance in the region. Flashforward to today, malaria has spread at the highest levels in 75 years, and sick and dying people are met by extreme shortages of medical supplies in crumbling hospitals. The nation is now engulfed by massive political protests, sparked by widespread frustration over the failing healthcare system, severe shortages of food and rampant government corruption. While the situation may perplex the outside observer, a culmination of problems had been simmering for decades. Above all, the massive reserves of oil that were expected to be a catalyst to prosperity have instead catalyzed its downfall. Venezuela, like many other resource rich countries around the world, has fallen victim to the resource curse.

The first seeds of the crisis were planted in 1999, when the charismatic and deeply polarizing president, Hugo Chavez, came to power. As the price of oil soared in the beginning of the 21st century, Chavez amped up public spending and became the champion of the lower class. His policies – such as fixing the price of foodstuffs and using resource rents to build homes and clinics for the poor – were fueled by profits from the state-run oil company, PDVSA. The initially prosperous regime hinged entirely on the performance of oil in the world markets. When Chavez passed away in 2013, this fragile system was inherited by his political successor, Nícolas Maduro.

In 2014 oil prices fell, PDVSA saw its profits dry up and Venezuela began its tailspin. By several measures, Venezuela has the world’s worst performing economy. In 2016 inflation rose by an astounding 800% and the economy contracted by 18.6%. Hyperinflation has obliterated the salaries of many middle class citizens. Desperate to make ends meet, people have flocked from cities to the gold mines. The swampy mines are a breeding ground for malaria infested mosquitos, and thus are culpable for the return of the disease. No longer able to rely on profits from PDVSA to import essential goods, the effects of the disease have been exacerbated by severe shortages of medicine. Hospitals lack access to such basic necessities as sutures, gloves and electricity. Similarly, the plummeting value of the bolivar has limited Venezuela’s capacity to afford basic food imports, and as a result the nation faces severe food shortages. Today buying groceries entails waiting in line for hours, with no guarantee of getting what you came for.

Massive political protests and and civil unrest have erupted around the nation as citizens grow increasingly frustrated by Maduro’s inaction. Rather than instituting economic reform he has pointed a finger at the US and political adversaries, and accused them of crafting an “economic war” to ruin the country. Unable to address the crisis and lacking in Chavez’s charisma, Maduro has become deeply unpopular with the Venezuelan people. His approval rating fell to a nine month low of 21% in July 2016. Maduro has reacted by tightening his grip on power and violently suppressing protests. Calls for a referendum to oust him from the presidency have thus far been stamped out by the National Electoral Council, and in March the Supreme Court annulled the democratically elected National Assembly. For all intents and purposes, Maduro has assumed the role of dictator with minimal checks and balances on his power.

Unfortunately, Maduro’s failure to acknowledge the root cause of the crisis has made it impossible for any meaningful changes to occur. Venezuela’s economic woes are not the design of political opponents, but rather the result of the gross mismanagement of oil wealth. The problem may seem counterintuitive; massive reserves of crude oil should be a blessing to a developing country. Nonetheless, this phenomenon can be observed in resource rich countries all over the world. The resource curse is multifaceted and complex, however there are three components that are especially relevant to Venezuela’s current situation: Dutch disease, trade shocks and corruption. Dutch disease occurs when resource exports cause a country’s currency to rise in value, which makes other export activities – such as manufacturing – uncompetitive in world markets, and effectively crowds them out. Dutch disease creates an economy that is vulnerable to trade shocks and the volatility of natural resource revenues. In Venezuela, crude oil now accounts for 96% of total exports, and thus the economy is extremely sensitive to any fluctuations in oil prices.

Perhaps the most fundamental consequence of the resource curse in Venezuela, however, has been widespread corruption. The government’s ability to use oil wealth to fund projects decreases tax burdens placed on its citizens. While this may seem like a benefit to Venezuelans, it also has the effect of decreasing the government’s accountability. Massive influxes of oil wealth combined with weak institutions and low transparency have created an environment of rampant corruption.

The good news is that the resource curse can be broken. The evidence is in the case of Botswana. Botswana is one of the most resource-rich countries in the world, especially notable for its abundance of diamonds. Unlike most resource-rich developing countries, Botswana has experienced marked economic growth and stability for the past several decades. In fact, the government has been so stable that in 2013 the leading diamond conglomerate, Da Beers, relocated its sales department to Botswana’s capital city. Botswana’s success has been attributed to sound democratic institutions and strong private property and anti-corruption laws. Of course, Botswana and Venezuela are different nations with different histories, and thus policies that work in Botswana may not apply to Venezuela. However, it should be noted that corruption in Venezuela has not been a constant. In the 1960s, Venezuela boasted a democratic government with high levels of transparency, which served as a model to other developing Latin American countries. The increase in corruption in the 1970s directly coincided with a boom in the oil industry. If nothing else, Botswana is a testament to the importance of strong institutions and transparency in the management of natural resource wealth.

Venezuela has now reached a breaking point. Maduro repeatedly demonstrates his unwillingness to implement critical reforms, and with each passing day it seems less likely he will surrender power peacefully. A political change is necessary, and as pressure mounts, a regime overthrow appears imminent. Maduro’s successor will have to act quickly to pull Venezuela back from the brink. With proper leadership and reforms, Venezuela could return to pre-crisis oil production within five years, and would be able to import enough basic goods to alleviate crushing shortages. To start, the new government must increase transparency and move away from Chavista socialist economics by adopting market-friendly policies and ending its reliance on PDVSA to fund social programs. In the long-term, major institutional reforms will be necessary to ensure a stable democracy and a prosperous economy. Furthermore, reviving idling manufacturing and agricultural industries will be vital to diversifying the economy and curing Dutch Disease. These changes will not happen overnight. However, with the responsible management of oil wealth and good governance, Venezuela could eventually transform its resource curse into a blessing.

June 6, 2017 0 comment

Featured Mexico and Latin America Security and Conflict South America The International Economy

Los Muertos no Pagan: The Case for New Institutions to Resolve Sovereign Debt Disputes

written by Kurt J. Klein

In 1776, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations asserted: “When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least dishonorable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor.” Yet, 238 years later, international financial institutions still fail to answer Smith’s call. Recent turmoil in financial markets has brought both advanced economies such as Spain, and developing nations like Argentina, dangerously close to default. The global threat by destabilized markets makes it imperative that the State of New York, the federal government, and international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), create new mechanisms to resolve the unique cases of sovereign debt defaults. Just as bankruptcy laws and courts are used domestically to resolve debt repayment conflicts, a similar framework needs to be created to handle sovereign debt disputes. This system needs to be focused on producing economic growth in the interest of both creditors and debtors. This idea is not new: Anne Krueger, while in the office of First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, proposed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) in 2002. The proposal was vetoed by the George W. Bush administration. Now it is time to raise the issue again, as the absence of an adequate forum to handle these disputes is apparent in the ramifications of recent US court rulings against the Republic of Argentina.

In Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling by Thomas Griesa, Federal Chief Judge for the Southern District of New York, stating that Argentina must pay the full value of $1.33 billion in bonds that are possessed by NML Capital before paying its obligations on other bonds. NML Capital is a hedge fund that owns Argentine bonds that were not exchanged during the country’s attempts in 2005 and 2010 to restructure debt after its 2001 default. As a result of the ruling, the nation fears that it could be liable for $15 billion when it is applied to all holdouts. This $15 billion albatross would be equal to roughly half of Argentina’s central-bank reserves. Yet the most important aspect of the ruling is Griesa’s understanding of the bonds’ pari passu clause. His interpretation prescribes that Argentina cannot make payments to the exchange bondholders until it comes to an agreement with NML Capital regarding its holdout bonds. When no agreement was reached and the Republic’s payment to exchange bondholders was blocked, Standard & Poor’s declared Argentina in default on July 30.

Argentina will not be the only party to endure the negative consequences of this ruling: the future of all sovereign debt restructuring is in jeopardy. Under Griesa’s interpretation of pari passu, bondholders will have no incentive to accept a debt swap after a default. Furthermore, even one bondholder who holds out can nullify an entire debt restructure and force the debtor back into default. As a result, countries with troubled economies become bigger prey for “vulture funds”: a pejorative term used to describe hedge funds such as NML Capital who buy up distressed bonds at fractions of their initial prices with the intent to litigate to be paid the bonds’ full nominal value. The ruling sets a precedent that would prevent nations from restructuring their debt, making good with creditors, and rebuilding after a default.

On the international level, Bolivia, with the support of the G77+China and alerted by Argentina’s tribulations, proposed a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes at the UN General Assembly. On September 9, the assembly overwhelmingly adopted the measure with 124 votes in favor, 11 votes against and 41 abstentions. The US was among the 11 nations that voted against the resolution. The proposal is short on specifics but it includes an element that would bind all creditors to a restructuring agreement if a majority accept. It is improbable that the US would yield jurisdiction on local contracts to a global institution. Thus this hypothetical framework would have little power over existing bonds issued in New York markets. However, this is a clear call by the developing nations who are most likely to issue bonds in foreign markets such as New York that such mechanisms are badly needed.

Understandably, if US law is more concerned about protecting creditors than permitting nations with a troubled past a chance to start over, sovereigns will reconsider issuing bonds in New York or other capital markets in the US. This has the potential for New York to lose its place as an international financial center in regards to issuing sovereign debt. On July 15, with the Argentine President in attendance as a special guest, the heads of state from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa inaugurated the $100 billion New Development Bank (NDB) at the sixth BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil. These nations hope that the NDB will serve as an alternative to the western dominated IMF and World Bank. The BRICS’ NBD will be an alluring alternative to US financial markets for developing nations in the future.

If New York desires to preserve its place as an international financial center, new laws to preside over the unique cases of sovereign debt default need to be adopted. A sovereign is not a normal partner in a contract such as a person, business, or corporation. Hence, a special bankruptcy court for sovereign nations overseen by judges with advanced training in economics should be created by the State of New York or the federal government. A mechanism for negotiation, mediation and arbitration needs to be in place with a focus on restoring a nation’s economy so it has the ability to pay back its creditors. Among its many tools, it could swap debts for new bonds that pay according to macroeconomic statistics such as GDP growth similar to Argentina’s bond swap offers in 2005 and 2010.

But these measures can augment more than a developing country’s economic growth and New York’s standing as a hub of finance; they will promote global economic justice. Social utility is completely absent in the process where a cabal of hedge funds purchases distressed debt at a fraction of its titular value and subsequently litigates to be paid in full. A common counter argument is that Griesa’s and similar rulings are in line with what is in the bond contract. Thus, in order to observe rule of law, debtors must be held accountable. The fact that the legal process supports this practice is the very reason it needs to be reformed. The consequences aren’t beared by the corrupt politicians who wantonly accepted too much in loans and ensuingly misspent them in order to maintain political power. They fall on a country’s citizens who pay for both the creditor’s and debtor’s avarice in increased taxes, substandard public services, and stagnant economic growth.

The US’ foreign policy in regard to sovereign defaults must be reexamined and made coherent as well. With a large mandate from the aforementioned UN resolution, the world has asked the US to bring its actions in line with its commonly stated foreign policy goals of long term economic and social progress in the developing world. It should start by advocating and ratifying a SDRM at the IMF. The Anne Krueger proposed SDRM with collective action clauses from over a decade ago would be a great example to follow. This would set insolvent nations on a feasible path to grow while making good with all their creditors. The alternative is an eternal cycle of debt and default for nations with a dolorous economic past such as Argentina

”Los muertos no pagan las deudas” – ”The dead don’t pay their debts” is a phrase from late President Nestor Kirchner’s 2003 speech to the UN General assembly. Frequently, the current president borrows her late husband’s proverb in speeches regarding the external debt and the holdouts.

November 28, 2014 4 comments

Africa Asia Europe Featured Mexico and Latin America Middle East Security Society and Culture South America UCLA and the World

State of the (Student) Union – 2014

written by James Walker

by James Walker – Editor in Chief

Summer has begun, and life at UCLA has taken on the gentle ambiance of a half empty campus, basking in the glorious SoCal sunshine. Nervous freshmen and transferees can be spotted exploring the buildings in anticipation (or perhaps dread?) of the Fall, half the faculty have vanished to do research, and the other half wish they had, too. During this lull, it behooves us as students to reflect upon the past academic year, in order to take stock of where things stand for those of us fortunate enough to be in college, both here in California, and across the globe.

As the (retiring) Editor in Chief for the Generation, I like to think that there is a kind of fraternal connection between all of us who strive to increase our understanding of the world. As students with an interest in foreign affairs, it is important that we look not only at the academic objects of our interest, but also the people who will be our contemporaries in the years to come – the students who make up the global cohort of tomorrow’s leaders, researchers, (and with any luck) friends with whom we hope to make the world a better place. Therefore, as we cast a wary eye across the past year, it is a little sad to see just how many challenges have been faced by our contemporaries, and how many more they are likely to face in the future.

Perhaps there is no better example of this than Egypt. As regular readers of the Gen will know, we were fortunate enough to host Ahmed Maher on campus last year. Subsequent to his visit with us, he was arrested and sentenced to three years hard labor, and his youth and student based organization, the April 6^th movement, was declared a terrorist organization and banned outright. Other student groups have also been targeted by the security forces, with tactics that included the use of tear gas and baton charges at Cairo University, resulting in multiple injuries, and even death.

Much the same (depressingly familiar) tactics were also on display in Sudan, where student protesters are regularly attacked by government forces with tear gas and riot police. One incident earlier this year resulted in multiple arrests, injuries, and the death of a third year economics student at the University of Khartoum, Ali Abaker Mussa Idris. Not to be outdone, the Ethiopian government has apparently instigated a shoot to kill policy, with up to 47 students killed during protests at secondary and university campuses around the country.

Not all students are subject to deliberate violence by their governments, however – some are simply exposed to horrific violence through neglect and indifference. This was the case at the Rift Valley Institute of Science and Technology in Kenya, where hundreds of students battled with the police for several hours after the brutal rape of a first year female student. The students were protesting the lack of security available to them – the police responded by attempting to disperse the crowd with tear gas and live rounds.

Lest anyone think I am focusing too much on Africa, a quick look over the state of play in Europe will demonstrate that there are no regional boundaries to the challenges that students face. For example, it is worth remembering that students were one of the most vocal groups to take to the streets in the Ukraine earlier this year. They participated in many of the protests against the Yushchenko regime, and were targeted by the security forces in the lead up to the current geopolitical crisis that is enveloping the state.

Likewise, in Turkey the role of students as the advanced guard of social protest has singled them out as primary targets by the state. A recent funeral for a student killed in the Gezi Park protests quickly degenerated into a battlefield when the security forces used tear gas and water cannons on the gathered mourners, resulting in two additional deaths. The number of students arrested by the Erdogan government over the past year is simply astounding, turning what was a small, localized protest against the destruction of a city park into a fully fledged social movement for regime change.

In a somewhat less violent, yet still politically charged crisis, students across Spain brought major cities to a standstill over the issue of tuition rises and spending cuts – both of which are problems that should resonate with UC students. Unlike here at UCLA, however, the protests in Spain involved hundreds of riot police in full gear, burning trash cans, and running street battles with stone throwing and mass arrests. This link contains some jarring pictures of a modern day student protest in a developed state, and is well worth a look.

Turning to the Americas, the formula looks pretty much the same: student protesters met with tear gas, water cannons, live rounds, mass arrests, and death. A case in point, the students of Chile have been out on the streets for years now in ever increasing numbers. In one incident this year over 20,000 students attended a mass rally in Santiago, to protest for education reform. The tear gas and water cannon quickly followed.

Taking a more proactive route, in Venezuela pro-government militias have apparently taken to simply executing student leaders who dare to stand up to the regime. Daniel Tinoco, a prominent student leader, was gunned down in the street while manning a barricade in the city of San Cristobel. He is probably the most prominent of more than 20 people murdered over the past few months due to their participation in such activities.

So what are we UC students supposed to make of all this? We have troubles of our own, of course, as the graduate and undergraduate protests of last quarter can attest. However, they do seem somewhat tame in comparison. This is not to suggest that the issues faced by students right here are not challenging – simply that the environment in which we find ourselves is less dangerous than for our contemporaries.

Having said that, it is with a heavy heart that we must turn to the epidemic of campus shootings that continue to plague the United States. It is beginning to feel as if you cannot turn on the news without hearing about another mass killing at a US campus. I would list the incidents from the past year, but it is simply too long, and too damned depressing. As UC students we are directly affected, due to the horrific events at our sister campus last month, in which six people lost their lives, and we collectively lost our naivety.

The heartbreak of the UCSB shooting is only compounded by the fact that, as opposed to the deaths of students cataloged above, in many ways the events here are self-inflicted. It is not an oppressive government we need fear, but the kid sitting next to us in class. This is a challenge every bit as desperate as any of the ones covered, but it is also one that we can play a part in helping to solve.

If I can offer one piece of advice from looking at the world of student activism, it is that change only comes about through action. All across the globe students are standing up for what they believe in. They put everything on the line to try and improve their situation, their lives, their countries, and we must try and do the same. Take the summer to reflect, and then take a stand and help to make things better – work on gun control, or mental health access, or campus safety training, or whatever else it is you feel is the most significant way to make a difference – just do something. After all, your job is to help mold the future, and there is no time like the present to get started.

July 11, 2014 0 comment

Mexico and Latin America Society and Culture South America The International Economy

Brazil’s World Cup, a Reflection of Flawed Priorities?

written by thegeneration

By Emily Milstein

International sporting events provide platforms for host countries to broadcast their national glory. With the world watching, a host nation can showcase its achievements and further dazzle audiences with its ability to successfully organize a massive undertaking. The world watched this story play out with the Olympics in Athens, Beijing, London, and Sochi, as well as the World Cup in South Africa recently.

As host of the 2014 World Cup which began in June, Brazil hoped to use the event to fulfill similar aspirations. Hosting the Cup can publicize Brazil’s progress and growth as a developing nation, worthy of hosting not only the 2014 World Cup, but also the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. Furthermore, Brazil is considered by many to be the “spiritual home of soccer.” This gives the country’s role as host even greater significance to the nation’s population, many of whom are avid soccer fans.

However, global sporting events such as the World Cup require huge investments and a massive amount of capital from host countries. China spent approximately $40 billion to host the 2008 Summer Olympics, Russia spent an estimated $50 billion on the 2014 Winter Olympics, and South Africa spent $3.5 billion to host the World Cup in 2010. While FIFA, the international governing association of soccer, provides some of the capital needed for each tournament, host countries are responsible for providing money needed for projects like infrastructure improvements. These improvements often cost billions of dollars. Such expenditures can generate considerable popular resentment but host governments often justify these costs with claims that the event will bring economic benefits to the country. Brazil is no exception. The country’s leaders have claimed that hosting the tournament will bring economic prosperity to Brazil through increased tourism, job creation, and infrastructure development. In fact, at a cost of $11 billion the 2014 World Cup is set to be the most expensive World Cup ever held, even before expected overrun costs.

Brazilians from a variety of backgrounds have heaped criticism on the Brazilian government for spending so much money on a month-long sporting event in a country where many live in poverty. Brazil is a rapidly developing nation where, according to the World Bank, 15.9% of the population still lives in poverty. Social services such as education, healthcare, and housing remain woefully inadequate. Recent demonstrations in Brazil reflect these grievances, as teachers, bus drivers, police, and even bank workers have mounted protests and strikes against poor working conditions and inadequate wages.

The discontent throughout Brazil in the lead up to the World Cup reflects questions that need to be asked, questions that have come up time and time again as countries continue to spend outrageous amounts on such events. Can a country justify spending huge amounts of money on a sports tournament while many of its people live in poverty? Shouldn’t the $11 billion spent by Brazil to host the Cup be used instead to improve necessary services such as healthcare? Lastly, are the potential benefits worth the immense financial costs that come from hosting large sports events, such as the World Cup or the Olympics?

Ultimately, the benefits promised by organizers of global sports tournaments often fail to materialize. Sydney for instance, did not experience the transformation and increase in tourism promised by its leaders after the city hosted the 2000 Olympics. The 2002 World Cup in Japan brought minimal benefit to the downtrodden Japanese economy. After the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, the country struggled to recoup the $3 billion it invested in hosting the tournament.

For Brazil, the costs of the World Cup will most likely exceed any benefits the country may gain from hosting the tournament, especially given the fact that the corruptionthat has long haunted the country has infiltrated even its preparation for the Cup. For instance, building contracts for World Cup projects have been awarded to friends and cronies of politicians. Given such corruption, any of the economic benefits generated by thegames will benefit already wealthy Brazilians. An auditor’s report assessed the cost of the ready-made grandstands in Brasilia’s stadium at $4,700. The construction firm that installed the stands however charged the government $1.5 million. That price increase amounted to a 31,000% mark-up of the grandstand fees. Such instances of corruption siphon public funds into the hands of construction magnates and away from other possible uses, such as education.

Furthermore, while Brazil will earn revenue from the Cup, FIFA will also pocket a significant portion of Cup revenues by pursuing tax exemptions and through licensing and advertising. Unfortunately, this means that most Brazilians will accrue few benefits and have limited access to World Cup profits, as such earnings remain concentrated in the hands of Brazil’s elite and FIFA. FIFA has attracted significant condemnation in the international news media about its pocketing much of the revenues generated by the Cup. Hopefully, such criticism will push the organization to rethink its business model. FIFA and Brazil’s leaders ought to take steps to ensure that at least some portion of the Cup’s profits are spent on necessary projects such as improving poor Brazilians’ access to high quality education or healthcare.

Questions about excessive spending for sports tournaments apply not just in the context of Brazil, but to the world at large. The practice of spending huge amounts of money on sporting events is wasteful because that money could be invested in essential programs or services. All countries have people who live in poverty and who would benefit from improved social services and increased investment in areas like healthcare and education. Nonetheless, the drive to host events like the World Cup is strong in many countries because playing host on a world stage allows them to showcase their ability to plan and organize an event on such a large scale. This is particularly important for recently industrializing nations like China or Brazil who want to showcase their nations’ advancing development programs in order to raise their national profile and attract business investors. Nations that host large sporting events do experience these tangible benefits, however the costs of these endeavorsoutweigh their benefits. This is especially true given the short term nature of some of the primary gains, including job creation and tourism, which end with the closing of any tournament.

Given the lack of long-term financial benefits that comes from hosting large sporting events, the international community needs to reconsider the grand expenditures that go into such tournaments. Citizens and their governments need to re-assess their priorities and come to the realization that rather than investing money in sports, nations should increase spending on issues like fighting the effects of climate change and social services. Brazil’s World Cup and the protests experienced in the weeks leading up to the tournament highlight these problems, revealing the flawed priorities at play, as the country spends billions on sports while many Brazilians live in poverty. Far too often, people question sports spending during tournaments and then promptly forget the issue at the close of the event. Let this summer be a moment for the world as a whole to reevaluate and redirect its priorities regarding the exorbitant spending on global sports tournaments. Rather than forgetting these issues after the World Cup, we need to continue to raise questions about spending in order to ensure excessive spending practices do not continue in the future.

July 3, 2014 5 comments

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Sorry for the Inconvenience – Brazil is Under Construction

written by thegeneration

by Michelle Sinness

Contributing Writer

When Brazil won the Confederations Cup final soccer game on Sunday night, June 30th, 2013, the streets of Brazil’s first capital city, Salvador, erupted into a celebration. Fireworks illuminated the sky, and cheers, laughter, and applause resounded through the small bar where over one hundred people were gathered to watch the match on two small televisions.

However, it was not only the win that was cause for celebration. Periodically, during pauses in the game and during halftime, the television coverage cut to the protesters that were marching outside of the stadium. Just as they would if Brazil had scored a goal, the people that were gathered in the bar jumped out of their seats to whoop and cheer in support of the protests. The movement that recently exploded onto the streets of Brazil had become a source of pride.

Soccer has been a part of Brazilian national identity since the 1930 to 1954 military dictatorship used the game to unify the population and construct a strong sense of nationalism. The arrival of the FIFA Confederations Cup in 2013 and World Cup in 2014 seems long overdue for a country that lives and breathes soccer. Most Brazilians are proud to finally have the opportunity to host the games and consider it a testament to Brazil’s place as an emerging world power. Hosting the World Cup and the 2016 Olympic games is an integral part of Brazil’s soft power approach to foreign policy as the state continues to lobby for Security Council reform and equitable IMF representation.

The shining new stadiums that have been constructed in many capital cities are not enough, however, to mask the crumbling infrastructure that surrounds them. Taxpayers have footed the bill for the FIFA preparations, but few expect to see any return on their investment. In fact, the vast majority of Brazilians will not be able to afford to attend a single match in the new structures. And while the construction projects have offered short-term employment to some, the benefits will hardly be long-term. The stadiums are expected to remain vacant for decades to come, and the people that sold tickets and popcorn will return to their previous jobs or go back to being unemployed. Nevertheless, in a matter of several months and several billion dollars, the colossal structures were erected. This was no easy feat for a country where bureaucracy burdens reform and corruption hinders progress, and Brazilians took notice.

One June 13, 2013, frustration over lack of infrastructural improvements turned into fury when several states enacted a bus fare increase. Residents of Sao Paulo that make minimum wage spend an average of 26 percent of their income on public transportation to get to and from work. A group of disgruntled students in Sao Paulo took to the streets, igniting a movement that took the Brazilian government and the world by surprise.

Over the course of the summer, the demonstrations grew to be the largest in Brazilian history, surpassing the 1992 protests that brought about the impeachment of President Collor de Mello. Although the movement lacked central leadership, demonstrations were effectively organized in cities across the country via social media. The majority of the protesters were educated, middle class Brazilians, yet they were fighting for causes that more directly affect the poorest sectors of Brazilian society. Perhaps this is because the height of the protests occurred while university students were on winter break, and wealthier Brazilians could afford to take time off from work to participate in the movement while poorer Brazilians could not. Regardless, Brazilians strategically capitalized on the worldwide media coverage of the FIFA Conferations Cup and the World Cup preparations to amplify their voices and make their demands heard.

The demonstrators that swarmed the streets in June and July had three main demands: the elimination of bus fares for students, more money for healthcare and education, and political reform to reduce governmental corruption. Brazilians bear a tax burden comparable to that of Germany, yet do not see the investment of their money to improving hospitals, schools, or infrastructure. Valéria Figueira, a Brazilian supporter of the movement who lives in Salvador, said, “I am angry every day that I pay first world taxes to live in a third world country. That’s why I admire and support the movement completely. It’s interesting to note that there are so many middle class and upper-middle class youths demanding lower prices for a public transportation system that they don’t even use. This is because they were educated, which is, unfortunately, an opportunity limited to only a select class of our society.” Brazil has the lowest rates of college enrollment in Latin America, and its public education system was ranked 39 out of 40 in an evaluation by the Economist Intelligence Unit last year. Clearly, Brazilians have reason to be upset.

The initial effects of the movement were impressive. President Dilma Rousseff was slow to react at first, and her approval rating plummeted. When she finally held a press conference to address the protesters’ concerns, President Rousseff commended them for exercising their right to demonstrate and promised that her government would work to control inflation and reform healthcare, education, and public transportation. Several states retracted the bus fare increase, and Rousseff’s cabinet met to discuss and implement further reforms, such as increasing the amount of government funds allocated on public transportation and infrastructure. As she prepares to campaign for reelection next year, Rousseff will need to implement much-needed economic reforms and streamline public spending in order to regain the public’s trust.

Although the movement made progress on some of its demands, it has struggled to keep its momentum going since the Conferations Cup has ended. The protests have largely died down and are no longer making national and international headlines. Whether the protesters are satisfied with their gains or they are just waiting until the spotlight returns to Brazil during the 2014 World Cup is yet to be seen. Whatever the outcome, the protesters’ strategic capitalization on a moment in history when the whole world was watching Brazil was powerful. Brazilians effectively held the games hostage in exchange for social reform, setting a precedent for future World Cup host countries and sending a powerful message about the balance between international soft power interests and national development.

The Brazilian flag was raised after Brazil won the Confederations Cup final game, and the people gathered in the small bar stood to sing the national anthem together. With tears glistening in many of their eyes, they sang the chorus with a glimmer of hope for the future of their country:

O country vast by nature,

Fair and strong, brave and colossal,

Thy future mirrors this thy greatness.

Michelle Sinness is a first year MA student in Latin American Studies at UCLA, specializing in Brazil. She spent the summer in Salvador, Brazil under a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship.

October 22, 2013 1 comment