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Assessment of U.S. Policy Options in the Face of Iran’s Nuclear Efforts

by Brad Rowe

The New York Times reported on Saturday that the U.S. and Iran have agreed to one-on-one negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. According to Obama administration officials, this is “setting the stage for what could be a last-ditch diplomatic effort to avert a military strike on Iran.”

This is encouraging as we are approaching a U.S. Presidential election that pits two candidates against each other who have vastly differing opinions on foreign policy. These negotiations fit in nicely with the policy suggestions put forth below. This article is meant to offer an objective dissection of the issues that face the United States and the world with regards to the issue of a nuclear Iran.

The ideas are based upon a policy memo created in June 2012 by UCLA Master in Public Policy candidates Chloe Cornuejols, Nobuko Goto, Masaaki Kishi, Celeste Miller, Brad Rowe and Isla Yao for their Methods in Policy course. In addition to conducting thorough research that went into the creation of the memo, these students conducted interviews with high-level policy and security experts who elaborated upon some of the concepts and findings.

* * * * *

Iran may be enriching uranium to levels that would be useful for developing a nuclear weapon. If they acquire a weapon of this type, it presents several potential concerns. There are a multitude of possible even probable dangers from this scenario. One is that Iran would use the weapon on the U.S. or elsewhere. Others come simply from their possession of the bomb: it could set off a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, it could provoke a military response from Israel, or an Iranian nuclear WMD could end up in the hands of terrorists.

It would serve the negotiating parties to embrace the fact that, at this point, we cannot prove they are not enriching uranium to weapons grade levels, but we most certainly cannot prove that they are either. Dealing with the argument that ‘you cannot prove the absence’ of something is akin to me saying that you cannot prove that I don’t have a nuclear device somewhere in my house. Indeed you would have to tear apart every square inch of my house to prove this.

The current U.S. course of sanctions, diplomatic negotiation, military threats, and cyber attacks seems like a prudent path for the time being. For now, the IAEA has been accommodated by Iran for unfettered access to existing nuclear power development facilities. If reliable information emerges signaling a shift to weapons enrichment efforts, we should consider alternate options.

In light of the unlikely but hugely consequential possibility that Iran is working toward acquiring ‘doomsday’ technology, it is critical to keep the full menu of strategy options available as actionable scenarios and as tools of negotiation.

Before Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the options are: do nothing; diplomatic intervention (which seems currently viable); economic sanctions and incentives; cyber attacks; military threat; and finally land, air, and sea attacks. These are not exclusive options and can be used in combination.

After Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the options would be: do nothing; diplomatic intervention; reduce US dependency on oil from the Middle East; regional defense system; secure Iran’s nuclear weapons system; regime destabilization; cyber attacks; military threat; and finally land, air, and sea attacks. Again, these are not exclusive options either and can be used in combination.

Policy Options

Let’s look at the policy options in two ways.

First, BEFORE acquisition: Should the United States dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons and if so, how? The top options in this scenario would be:

Cyber attacks to slow or prevent any nuclear weapon development
Diplomatic Intervention
Economic intervention: sanctions and incentives

Second, AFTER acquisition: If Iran did acquire nuclear weapons, how could the United States best minimize bad outcomes? The top options in this scenario would be:

Regional Defense System
Reduce US dependency on Middle East oil
Secure Iran’s nuclear weapons system

U.S. Priorities and Concerns

For the UNITED STATES: The major priorities and concerns relating to Iranian nuclear weapons acquiring activity are the international distrust and disbelief that Iran is developing its nuclear capabilities for peaceful uses only. Furthermore there is concern that Israel will act unilaterally against Iran via military efforts if Iran continues to grow its nuclear capacity overall and/or if Iran specifically develops nuclear weapons. This could have dire circumstances if Israeli leadership is less than rational.

We also need to give weight to the potential growth in and power of threats to U.S. interests posed by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan. As Colin H. Kahl stated in September’s Foreign Affairs article ‘Iran and the Bomb’: “Iran’s government currently sponsors terrorist groups and supports militants throughout the Middle East, in part to demonstrate a capability to retaliate against the United States, Israel, and other states should they attack Iran or undermine its interests.”

This threat is leveraged by Iran’s ability to destabilize world economy and oil markets through controlling their own oil exports and threats to free passage of Middle East oil through the Straits of Hormuz.

What no one wants is further proliferation resulting in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East especially among Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

There are homegrown concerns as well. U.S. leadership, such as House Speaker John Boehner, is very mercurial and has displayed hawkish tendencies recently.

And relating directly to the November elections, there is U.S. executive unpredictability. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney has surrounded himself with several neo-con military advisors from the George W. Bush era. Among them are a group born from the post 9-11 neo-con think tank Project for a New American Century (PNAC), now renamed the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI). One of the most prominent hawkish foreign policy advisors to Romney is John Bolton who has publicly equated diplomacy with weakness and indecisiveness. This could spell for contentious or non-existent future negotiations with Iran.

Iran’s Key Drivers

Key among Iran’s drivers and positions concerning its potential status as a nuclear power with weapons capability are the current regime survival and increased nationalism/support of the population for the government. They are looking out for their national security and protection, including from external threats, such as the U.S. and other members of the international community. They are also not without ambition and are looking at expansion of Iranian regional influence as well as of the country’s global stature – overall and as a trading partner.

The current status of Iran’s nuclear efforts and situation includes sustained vows by Iran that their nuclear activities remain for peaceful civilian purposes only. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s (and other clerics’) repeated condemnation of nuclear weapons as being contrary to Islamic Law (he has expressed support for the development and use of nuclear resources for peaceful use but issued a fatwa in 2010 – and later reaffirmed it – on banning production and use of weapons of mass destruction).

As an international cooperator, Iran continues as a signatory to The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It should be noted that Iran is currently in compliance. Most importantly: there is no evidence – either from the limited International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observations, under General Director Yukiya Amano, or other monitoring or intelligence sources – that Iran has diverted any nuclear resources from civilian to military uses. To bolster Iran’s case here, there was an announcement on May 22, 2012 by the director general of IAEA, that he has reached an agreement with Iran granting nuclear inspectors wider access to Iranian atomic facilities.

To be noted however: Iran’s current ability to produce low enrichment uranium means that 90% of the necessary resources and effort to generate highly enriched uranium already have been brought together by Iran. This means simple nuclear weapons could at that time be delivered to a target in a small vehicle or boat; however it would still take several years of work and testing, for any weapon to be delivered by missile. Such undertakings – especially testing – would be hard to keep under wraps.

To understand the progress they have made, consider that having enriched to 20% means they are 90% they way to enriching to 90% weapons grade Uranium. This is on account of front loaded program building and the similarly front loaded Separative Work Units, or SWUs, needed to separate the Uranium isotope 235 from zero to 5% energy-producing levels.

A few points to highlight for further research are:

Recently uranium enriched above the 20% used for power was found, though the 27% enrichment number could have been attributed to equipment error.
In a 2005 speech, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad commented that he wished the State of Israel would collapse. (The translation of his “Wiped off the Map” comment has been widely disputed) Whether or not his statement was a declaration of military intent or simply a lament, it has resulted in an agitated condition for nuclear-armed Israel.

Based on review of existing research, analysis, and information on this situation as well as our own expert interviews[1], we also acknowledge that the highest objective of the Iranian government is to remain in power. Within the Iranian national dynamic, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei wants power over Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and vises versus.

Let us not underestimate the power of the masses however. Iran could become a fully representative democratic republic. Per our U.S. security and international diplomacy source, people of Iran currently appear favor or to have neutral feelings about America now, but would likely be swayed the other way by overly aggressive U.S. intervention. Extreme external pressure or military aggression will only increase Iranian nationalism and support of its citizens for the existing government there.

Regionally? Iran has scarce close regional allies on account that it feels ethnically and religiously isolated and has a sense of cultural and historical “exceptionalism.” While U.S. and international economic sanctions may have no direct effect on the progress of Iran’s nuclear efforts, they are causing enough pain to the government and country overall to potentially allow for more openness in discussions on the part of Iran as an example, both sides (Iran and US/P5+1) have dropped some prior intractable conditions for negotiation and Iran has agreed to grant wider access to IAEA inspectors.

Any military intervention would raise Iranian incentive for expansion of nuclear capabilities into weapons of mass destruction, while at the same time ensuring Iran’s expulsion of any IAEA observers and possible Iranian withdrawal from the NPT. Along these lines, we feel the Iranian government will act rationally. Iran is aware of and we all should be as well that U.S. future standing with the Middle East, Russia and Iran itself are critical considerations when weighing these policy options.

There is an important note regarding horizon type strategy relevance here. This long-term strategy is a valid exercise as Iran acquiring a nuclear device is still possible, even though they would have to violate the non-proliferation treaty and jump through several logistical and technical hurdles to get there. We also want to consider the possibility that Iran getting the bomb could potentially be a stable scenario *(i.e. Pakistan).

Finally, there is a special worst-case situation that needs sober consideration. While military intervention was not one of the more robust strategies when all criteria were considered, there is one situation in which experts believe it should be fully considered as a top option. That is when it is absolutely obvious that a missile attack by Israel on Iran is imminent and the U.S. and/or UN are unable to dissuade them. Under such circumstances, according to some security experts, the U.S. should then undertake any bombing attacks.

The reason for this is two-fold. First, Israel does not have the military capability and weaponry to launch an effective attack, which would ensure the elimination of the nuclear targets. The U.S. has the needed firepower and expertise to do so. Second, even if Israel acted unilaterally, both Iran and most of the international community would assume the U.S. was complicit. Therefore, if the U.S. will be facing the ramifications of such global opinion post-Israeli strike, then it would be prudent for the U.S. to ensure a surgical and fully efficient missile strike.

This is, of course very tricky as Israel cannot know that US will intervene on their behalf. This could cause them to act recklessly. Israel would be burning the ally bridge with US in either case. This is a difficult hand to play for sure.

It will be of great importance and interesting to see how the Iran negotiations play out. Hopefully cooler minds will prevail and the safety of the next generations will be more secure than they were before hand.

Brad Rowe is a second year Masters In Public Policy candidate at UCLA focusing in Education, Crime and International Affairs. Rowe is also a Rosenfield Fellow working on Educational Policy and Programs for the United Way of Greater Los Angeles.

[1]Research/Analysis: RAND Corporation, Congressional Research Service, American Enterprise Institute Iran Tracker. Media reports: New York Times, The Economist, Los Angeles Times, Financial Times.

October 21, 2012 0 comment

Middle East Security Security and Conflict Society and Culture Terrorism

Syria: A Case of Humanitarian Crisis Ignored?

written by thegeneration

by Lilit Arabyan

On Thursday, October 11th, the Burkle Center for International Relations invited prominent figures of academia to the UCLA School of Law, to discuss the current Crisis in Syria. Asli Bâli of UCLA Law, Dalia Dassa Kaye of the RAND Corporation, and Daniel Treisman of the UCLA Political Science Department gave us their perspectives on the likelihood of a halt to violence, while the somber tones of pessimism and urgency filled the room. This increasingly turbulent region of the Middle East has attracted much attention from the international sphere since the breakout of civil war in March of 2011, which pitted rebel forces against the Bashar al-Assad regime. Unfortunately, it seems that not much has been effectively carried out since then, in the direction of peace.

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan named the crisis a “humanitarian tragedy” in his critique of the U.N.’s failure to act. But the dichotomy inherent within any sort of solution is quite complex, and it is not as black and white as “status quo vs. intervention.” Our panelists analyzed the roles that the U.S., Turkey, Russia, Iran and other stakeholders would have in reaching a coherent diplomatic solution, and whether this option is still on the table. They weighed the pros and cons of multilateral intervention, as moderator Kal Raustiala of the Burkle Center posed some very critical questions. Raustiala asked the panelists to analyze the various reasons why a tenable diplomatic solution has not yet been achieved, and whether democracy awaits in the aftermath of bloodshed. In the end, our panelists agreed that any real solution must begin with an end to the flow of arms to the opposing sides. But while this critical international discourse took place, the death toll of innocent, civilian lives continued to rise and to remind us of the urgency of now.

The fastest way to peace now is containment, and our panelists were in agreement. Kaye expanded on the infeasibility of intervention by underscoring the very real possibility that the conflict may escalate into regional war. “The key is to figure out how to address the humanitarian problem, while keeping radicalization of separatist groups from occurring,” she said. But did this imply that we had ruled out any chance of a diplomatic solution?

From the offset, Treisman claimed, Russia has viewed the option of conflict resolution by diplomacy as being naive in the case of Syria. Perhaps to maintain its own interests, by refusing to sign on to any western remedy such as the Security Council resolutions, Russia has bold-facedly sabotaged any forced change-in-regime that may have ensued. With arms contracts of a $700 million per year to defend, as well as commercial interests, a military base and social ties that link the two regions historically, the supplier of weapons and long-time ally to Syria is unlikely to bend with any international pressures to enforce economic sanctions for Assad to step down. Moreover, there is no guarantee, from Russia’s perspective, that the region will be more stable if Assad is forced out without a credible plan.

And yet, Bâli argued, sustaining the status quo for much longer is equally unlikely. It might not be too late to bring Russia, Iran and the U.S. to the table once more. The outcome of such a meeting, however, will not necessarily be an ideal one for the U.S.. “Russia has interests, as does Iran, to maintain allies in this region,” Bâli said. “If the goal is to prevent escalation or civilian death,” she added, “[the people of Syria] might want a pro-Russian, pro-Iranian entity to remain in power.” In pushing for a western solution, we must be aware of what we are committing ourselves to in the long run. “The future that we would prefer is going to come at a large cost,” Bâli cautioned.

While some rebel forces, including the Free Syrian Army and other unarmed opposition groups, are able to operate their headquarters from Turkish soil, Turkey’s support is limited to financial and non-lethal assistance. Bâli frowned upon the Turkish government’s recent act of forcing down civilian planes and limiting its airspace. With these “foolish” acts that put pressure on Syria and Russia, she added, Turkey is risking escalation and the possibility of bringing in Russia or the NATO powers, in unfavorable ways. Turkey has most recently invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which calls for a consultation among NATO members. In the meeting this month, Turkey presented plans for a no-fly zone. The government of Turkey has also set up a de-facto buffer zone by making it clear to Syria that if it operates near the border with any artillery shells from either side, it will face Turkish fire.

As for the position of the Syrian population, this is divided as well. There remain factions of Islamic extremists, and there is no telling whether there will be any democratic union even if Assad leaves. “Russia maintains that there may be further anarchy and war on the basis of religion,” Treisman said. The biological and chemical weapons of the Assad regime are at least being protected; if the regime falls, this may no longer hold true. “The Alawites will still be there,” he added, referring to the historically oppressed Syrian minority religious group. Russia sees no good choices here, and she is reluctant to sign on as cheerleader to the U.S. pattern of repeated intervention to change regimes and overthrow leaders using military force, under the veil of multilateral humanitarian intervention, as she feels was the case with Libya, Treisman said. He concluded, however, that Iran, as a supplier of arms to Syria, and Saudi Arabia, as a supplier to extremist fighters, hold more significant roles in this crisis than does Russia.

Through the panelists’ well-informed and logical analysis, it became clear that a diplomatic solution is not promising, insofar as regional sponsors on both sides do not feel tremendous pressure for a negotiated solution. Moreover, opposition groups have inflated expectations. According to Bâli, “Syrian parties are their first source of frustration, and second comes the international community’s inability to come together.” Does International Law even provide justification for a potential intervention in this region? Bâli concluded that “where the scale of humanitarian crisis on the ground is large, this is sufficient grounds for intervention.”

Kaye’s prescribed plan of containment seems most feasible after all. We must indeed first stop the flow of arms on both sides, regain focus on the many thousands of lives lost, increase funding for refugees, find more sustainable ways of humanitarian support, try to change sectarianism, provide an off-ramp for the Alawite, the Christians and other minorities, and offer some hope that the people’s welfare will be protected. To the extent that we can create a solution that underscores these points, we will have somewhat succeeded.

When asked by an audience member about the likelihood that Syria will end up democratic, Treisman listed such determining factors as the country’s level of modernization, sophistication and higher media; he said the extreme sectarian divides would be the largest obstacle to overcome. If that is the Syrians’ intended outcome, then perhaps the only way the Syrian civil war will produce an orderly democratic outcome is by burning out. Raustiala closed the panel with this uncomfortable quasi-truth. Our panelists likened the crisis in Syria to the civil war of Lebanon, it being perhaps the closest regional model; but my colleague Rujuta Gandhi suggests this dire situation actually resembles the Rwandan genocide from a distance.

Will Syria Become the Next Rwandan Genocide?

by Rujuta Gandhi

Crisis in Syria Panel hosted by the Burkle Center for International Relations. Photo by Emily Moon, the Center’s Program Manager.

There lies an irony in the effect of media – it creates a small world, yet non-physical distances remain a discomforting reality. While Syrian diasporic societies and the global community alike receive news of the perpetuating fatalities in Syria, a row of digits is not prompting an adequate response – marking the beginning of a timeline that could foreseeably mirror the Rwandan genocide. However, the panelists compared the crisis in Syria to the Lebanese civil war. Both conflicts are abundant in political and sectarian conflict, which affects neighboring countries. In Lebanon, the Christian Maronite government fought against Muslim organizations. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, one of the Muslim organizations, was charged with attacking Israel and prompting their intervention. Similarly in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite government fights against the Sunni Muslim majority. Recently, Syria shelled Turkish border towns, inviting a warranted response.

Current events parallel the length and chronology of the Syrian conflict to the roughly sixteen year Lebanese civil war, but future occurrences may set the crisis in par with the Rwandan genocide. Syria’s death toll has surpassed 33,000 since fighting began last year. Although starkly different from the 800,000 killed in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the future may hold the same fate for Syria. Recent reports expose Syria’s use of cluster bombs, indiscriminately maiming the population. The coming winter and ongoing food shortage will also quickly inflate the figure. Furthermore, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon announced that 2.5 million Syrians require assistance. Without intervention, violence in Syria will ensue until the factions tire of a net stalemate, causing thousands more in fatalities, or worse, a genocide may occur, resulting in hundreds of thousands of lives lost.

Syria and Rwanda have comparable sociopolitical tensions. Hutu-Tutsi discrimination existed since Belgium’s colonial rule and detonated with assassination of Hutu President Juvénal Habayarimana. The Tutsi minority served as a scapegoat until investigation revealed that Hutu extremists shot down the plane as a pretext for genocide. As a former French colony, Syria is equally affected. France bestowed subsidies, legal rights, and lower taxes for Alawites while permitting subjugation of Sunni Muslims. A potential assassination of President Assad or another leader may trigger a response proportional to that in Rwanda. If such a response occurs, Bâli agrees that the Alawite population will be in danger.

Furthermore, according to Genocide Watch, Rwanda met the eight stages of genocide: classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, denial. The organization has already declared a genocide emergency, and Syria is arguably at the seventh stage: extermination. President Assad also denies mass killings.

The international community is wholly aware of the daily atrocities in Syria but hasn’t addressed the humanitarian situation within the nation. Instead, the diplomatic and political aspects are seemingly more important both globally and locally.

While Kaye acknowledged both humanitarian and geopolitical interests in the Syrian crisis, the former was denied attention for the bulk of the conversation. Kaye, Bâli, and Treisman geared the conversation toward future and potential Turkish, Russian, U.S., and Iranian diplomatic and military involvement.

Reactions to murders in Rwanda were knowingly set aside, while nations and institutions negotiated solutions. Today, there is an atmosphere of regret for their lack of humanitarian intervention. Remorse will emerge again if leaders do not provide medical and dietary support to victims of the Syrian crisis. Although a diplomatic solution may be safe, it does not mean that leaders will not be sorry.

—

Do you think the international community is doing enough?

The Shooting of a 14-Year-Old Pakistani School Girl: A Solidification of the Female Threat to the Middle East

written by thegeneration

by Shadee Ashtari
Editor

January 3, 2009: “I had a terrible dream yesterday with military helicopters and the Taleban […]I went off to school. I was afraid going to school because the Taleban had issued an edict banning all girls from attending schools […] Before the launch of the military operation we all used to go to Marghazar […] for picnics on Sundays. But now the situation is such that we have not been out on picnic for over a year and a half.” –Malala Yousafzai in her “Diary of a Pakistani schoolgirl” for BBC.

Two days ago, a fourteen year old girl by the name of Malala Yousafzai was on her way home from school when a man with a gun approached a young girl waiting to leave school and asked her which one of them was Malala. One of the girls pointed to Malala, but when Malala denied it, the man shot both of the girls. This is not some random psychotic-snap shooting—the man is a member of the Taliban occupying the Swat Valley region of Pakistan and the girl is an activist for girls’ education and recipient of the National Peace Award. The young girl is a symbol of equality and courage and the Taliban’s gunman is a symbol of cowardice and humanity’s darkest hole of unenlightenment, insecurity and violence.

Although both girls survived, Malala remains in critical condition in a hospital in Peshawar after being shot in the head and neck. Malala Yousafzai garnered public attention in 2009, at the age of 11, when she began blogging for BBC (under the pseudonym Gul Makai) about living under the occupation of the Taliban. When the Taliban arrived in Swat Valley, so did a harsher set of rules for its people: men forced to grow beards; women restricted from attending the bazaar; the whipping of women deemed immoral; the beheading of opponents; and most crucial for Malala, an edict banning girls from attending school.

Hence, the Taliban’s staunch opposition to Malala’s public advocacy for girls’ education materializes into a repulsive assassination attempt and a shamefully boastful announcement of responsibility for shooting her:

Taliban spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan commented on her shooting via telephone, “She has become a symbol of Western culture in the area; she was openly propagating it. This was a new chapter of obscenity, and we have to finish this chapter. Let this be a lesson.”

Public outrage now amplifies at the shameless proposal by the Taliban to attack the young girl again.

Malala attended school despite the edict, wore her favorite pink dress in place of the uniform, and voiced a message of liberation through education in the face of death threats. Clearly, her message was so strong and so threatening that the fundamentalist Muslim militia felt the need to silence her. In attacking this young girl, the Taliban has done nothing but legitimize her claims for girls’ education. Clearly, the future of an educated female population is so threatening to the fundamental control-tactics of the Taliban’s occupation that they feel the need to assassinate a child.

Words that come to mind include pathetic and disturbing but more significantly, symbolic—symbolic of a powerful oppressed population of citizens that are becoming so threatening for the Middle East that not only have Pakistan and Afghanistan issued edicts banning girls’ education, but even Iran has now banned women from 77 majors at 36 universities. The forbidden majors are of course heavily mathematics and science oriented, aimed at preemptively limiting the amount of independence women in the Middle East can acquire through higher paying jobs. Just as the extremist Iranian government is back-lashing against the 2009 Green Revolution with banning women from universities, the Taliban is fighting off the threat of Malala’s plea for a fundamental basis of empowerment though education by attempting to stifle her and incite fear in other advocates.

Let the rage of Pakistan be a “lesson” to Swat Valley’s occupiers: attacking a 14 year-old school girl solidifies the powerful threat she and her message represent for unbinding a bound population of young girls. The attempt to stifle her amplifies her voice, emboldens the Taliban’s opposition to rebel, and solidifies her message.

Although many may think twice now before allowing their children to advocate for their rights, Malala’s own father, a teacher and girls’ education advocate, told BBC, “Of course, it was a risk [to let her write the blog], but I think that not talking was a greater risk than that because then ultimately we would have given in to the slavery and the subjugation of ruthless terrorism and extremism.”

Facts and figures from Aljazeera and BBC.

Shadee Ashtari is a senior at UCLA majoring in Communications with a minor in Political Science. She is a co-editor with The Generation.

October 11, 2012 30 comments

Security Security and Conflict Terrorism The International Economy

South Africa Regresses after Deadly Marikana Mine Incident

written by thegeneration

by Christine Smith

A country known for its brutal apartheid policies from 1948-1994, South Africa is still reeling from Thursday, August 16th’s violent episode between police officers and striking miners. Specifically, police officers resorted to the use of barbed wire to contain the miners, followed by tear gas, stun grenades, and firearms to disperse them. The Marikana mine where the strikes have been occurring for over a week is operated by the world’s third largest platinum producer, Lonmin, and currently employs roughly 28,000 people. Of the 28,000 employees, 3,000 have been a part of the ongoing strikes. While many following the story sympathize with the police’s use of force and claim it was a necessary response to the striking miners who were waving machetes, few are digging deeper to better understand why the Marikana miners felt it was necessary to carry machetes while striking.

With wages at just $9,000 per year (or a monthly wage of $400-$600), it hardly comes as a surprise that South African miners, including those at the Marikana mine, would seek wage increases that place them closer to Australian miners’ $110,000 a year salaries. Consequently, South African miners have sought help from both unions present – the dominant and older National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) which has ties to the current administration’s African National Congress, and the increasingly more appealing Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) who often uses aggressive tactics to win wage increases. Both unions, however, are fierce rivals who often let politics trump the miners’ best interests.

Although carrying machetes seems unnecessary, to the Marikana miners on strike, if waving machetes meant a better chance of securing higher wages at their job, then it was most likely viewed as a vital step to take, especially if the move was supported by the AMCU as reports suggest. Additionally, the deadly police violence against miners at Impala Platinum mine in February, which resulted in a 125% increase in wages, potentially served as another reason and possible catalyst for the Marikana miners’ behavior.

It would seem natural, then, that when negotiations between Lonmin, the miners, and the two unions fell through in the days leading up to the August 16th killings, the miners used their machetes to hack two police officers to death out of frustration and because of AMCU involvement. The violence that erupted on August 16th, which left 34 miners dead and 78 wounded, also started after another round of negotiations failed.

The violence, however, has not merely affected those living in South Africa, but has also had an impact on international diplomacy and trade. Because Lonmin is a London-based mining company, it must now undergo damage control to not only repair its image as a company, but to ensure that management practices, like determining employee salaries, do not echo Britain’s colonial policies. If such a connection between the Marikana mine violence and apartheid policies becomes widely accepted by the public, both the British and South African governments will be forced to reevaluate their diplomatic relations. Additionally, because of the Marikana incident, Lonmin shares fell by 8% between August 16th and 17th and by over 12% since the violence began. International platinum prices additionally reacted to the violence by rising 4% the following day, showing just how easy it is for a national dispute to become a concern for global markets.

Even though the use of violence for personal gain is never justifiable, by ignoring the circumstances leading up to August 16th’s deadly strikes, people wrongly place sole blame on the South African miners and police officers who were directly a part of the violence. By doing this, people ignore companies like Lonmin and miners unions who purposely underpay their employees in order to increase their profits. Critics, therefore, should not be so quick to place blame, especially when so many of those bearing the brunt of it all are still grieving from the loss of loved ones. Instead, critics should demand South African policymakers create better practices for mining companies and unions so that mining employees will no longer desperately resort to violent protests to gain better benefits and working conditions. Doing so will not only protect the miners, but will also prevent another unnecessary disturbance to the global order.

Facts and figures obtained from CNN, BBC News, and The New York Times.

Christine Smith recently received her B.A. in Political Science and two minors in African Studies and Anthropology from Boston University. She will be starting her M.A. in African Studies this fall at UCLA.

August 25, 2012 21 comments

Middle East Security Security and Conflict Terrorism

If Afghanistan Were a Television Show

written by thegeneration

by Reza Hessabi

In the 1990s Afghanistan was a hodgepodge country, made up of many different lands, each owned, operated, and lorded over by thick-bearded men with little patience for luxuries like compassion, mercy and beneficence. The country already divided by ethnicity and languages had become stratified by guns and dope. These warlords became the centerpieces of political, economic, and societal power during the heyday of the Afghan Civil War. But that name, the Afghan Civil War, is a misnomer. It was more like an unorganized fracas. It was more like Game of Thrones.

If you’ve seen the television show Game of Thrones (GoT), or read the Song of Ice and Fire series of novels it is based on, you’ll see where I’m going with this. Just like the five Kings of Westeros (the fictional setting of the novel and TV series) pitted their armies against each other from all corners of the continent, so too did the warlords of Afghanistan pit their ragtag bands of guerrilla fighters against each other. Instead of the Iron Throne, they were fighting for the city of Kabul. And instead of swords, they had AK-47s. But the damage to the surrounding countryside, civilians, and ultimately the soul of Afghanistan was the same as the fictionalized trauma suffered in the novels.

Evidence is abundant that this has continued despite the best efforts of the 2001 invasion by the Coalition Army. And the potential comparisons between Game of Thrones haven’t stopped growing either. The former rulers of Westeros were the Valyrians, a brutal, high-minded people with a severe superiority complex. The former rulers of Afghanistan were the Taliban, a vicious, hypocritical bunch with an often violent holier-than-thou mentality. Both were driven out by the current rulers, the Baratheons in GoT and the clunky Kabul government in Afghanistan, and both are making plays to regain their power – the Taliban’s resurgence in the south and the Valyrians machinations in the later novels of the series.

When one searches for some semblance of nobility in the novels of GoT, the only place you’ll find it is in the North with the Starks of Winterfell. Strangely enough, the most ennobled group of violent miscreants in Afghanistan is the much lauded Northern Alliance. The similarities are uncanny. The reigning lord of House Stark, Ned Stark, was wrongfully killed by the ruling clan of Westeros. Ahmad Shah Massoud, the beloved leader of the Northern Alliance, was assassinated by the rulers of Afghanistan – the Taliban. The Northern Alliance has grown in stature and prominence, but just like the Starks in the novels, they haven’t quite grasped the seat of power in Afghanistan.

Yet there is one difference between the novels and the current situation in Afghanistan. Instead of fighting with a specific goal in mind, the Kings of Afghanistan seem to be killing for killing’s sake. Or rather, for Islam’s sake. Or for the Pashtun’s sake. Or for their fallen brothers. Or for their families. Really, they’re all fighting for whatever reason is most expedient at the time. Which begs the question, what is truly driving this bloodshed? It’s not money, that’s too easy of an answer and it’s become clichéd at this point. No, everyone in Afghanistan right now is fighting for their survival. In every sense of the word, the Graveyard of Empires has become the most primordial place on Earth.

This doesn’t bode well for the Coalition forces that will be staying in Afghanistan for the next few years, unless the withdrawal is sped up drastically. The chaos that is the true ruler of Afghanistan, and Westeros, will go on for the foreseeable future. The abject poverty will continue. The desecration of human rights, life, and happiness won’t stop. And all because a few bearded men with too many guns, too much money, and very little decency think that survival is equal to murder. It’s sad that a novel that has so many deprave characters is actually being acted out in real life. It’s sad that nothing so far has been able to stop this tide of suffering.

If ever there was a time for the Afghan diaspora to finally stand up and repopulate the braintrust of Afghanistan, it is now. Repatriation is not the goal, rejuvenation of a broken land is. And as a people, Afghans don’t have to suffer the fate of fictional characters. Pride must be foregone; lust for power must be tamed. With all of these comparisons, hopes for peace seem futile. GoT doesn’t have any good endings. Then again, Game of Thrones isn’t real. Afghanistan is.

Reza Hessabi is a recent graduate of UCLA and former co-editor of The Generation. He runs the blog Common Sense, where for the past three years he has written over sixty essays discussing life in America as a Muslim.

August 20, 2012 4 comments

Middle East Security Security and Conflict Terrorism

Does American Film’s Portrayal of Iran Shape Public Perception?

written by thegeneration

I recently saw the trailer for Ben Affleck’s upcoming film Argo, set during the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-81. It follows an unorthodox exfiltration attempt by the CIA of six American hostages who managed to hide from Iranian authorities and take shelter with the Canadian ambassador to Iran.

As I watched strategically integrated clips of angry Iranian mobs harassing a bus carrying Americans and the Revolutionary Guard marching in the streets with guns, I couldn’t help but wonder how much the public perception of Iran played into the timing of the film’s release. That is to say—does the fact that many politicians and media outlets have recently been vilifying Iran guarantee higher public interest and, in turn, profit for the movie-makers?

Now for all I know the film may have a message that somehow paints the Iranian people in a pacifistic light, emphasizing the distinction between the people and the government. But regardless, it appears that advertent or not, these filmmakers are fueling the vilification of a country by means of trailers that look like news clips.

That is to say, vilifying the Iranian people through reminding the public of a crisis that took place thirty years ago seems like a morally questionable act at a time when relations between Iranians and Americans are at an extremely dangerous place.

The proposal of denying or altering historical reality to protect people from skewed opinions or perceptions is a way this article might be misinterpreted, but I assure you this is not my intention—I’m merely attempting to weigh the moral obligation of filmmakers (or any artist for that matter) in playing off of the popular perception of “other” people. It seems filmmakers sometimes forget that though these perceptions may help their work be successful, it also has the cyclical effect of feeding into that perception and, in a sense, confirming it.

So while I do not have a prescription for how long someone should wait to remind people of atrocities that question the character of a group or country, I think it’s important to keep in mind that filmmakers are not necessarily more educated on current events than the average American, and that their work being played very loudly on a large screen in front of a lot of people gives them artificial authority in terms of broader things like politics and current events.

While it may be argued that the movie’s timing is appropriate since it is, in theory, only vilifying the Iranian government which, now more than ever is disconnected from its own people, this argument assumes prior knowledge of this disconnect. The reality of the American public’s knowledge on Iran, let alone the silenced tensions between the government and the people, is that it is simply lacking.

A CNN Gallup poll from February of this year showed 71 percent of Americans think that Iran currently possess a nuclear bomb, and another poll shows roughly 25 percent want to take action to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The sentiment reflected by these numbers is one that does not mesh with an understanding of the complex state of Iranian politics, nor the history surrounding Iranian resources.

For most of Iran’s recent history, great powers have forced themselves into the country, calling themselves “business partners,” but functionally acting as bullies. Specifically, beginning in the early nineteenth century the Great Game took place, during which Great Britain and Russia were in competition with one another for control over Central Asia. During this period the two countries fought over the resources of the Iranian Plateau and took over the Persian Empire’s most lucrative industries, including that of oil. This continued into the twentieth century and the Iranian people suffered mass inflation and starvation.

For Iran, nuclear energy means independence at last, looking toward France as a model, a country that gets over 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Petroleum exports are the main source of economic surplus for the Iranian government, and abandoning the development of its nuclear power projects means risking using up all oil for potential exports domestically. No oil exports means no economic surplus for the government, a huge incentive to maintain nuclear development.

Furthermore, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khameini reiterated afatwah (a religious ruling by an authority on Islam) in April of this year that deemed nuclear weapons haram (forbidden in Islam) on the basis that they necessarily kill innocent civilians. He explicitly forbade the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons, meaning his pursuing nuclear weapons would entirely undermine his own religious authority—which is, of course, the basis for his claim to political authority.

Logically, signs thus do not necessarily point to Iranian desire to create a nuclear weapon to strike the United States. Actually, it seems almost vain to assume such motive. Iran is acting rationally in its own best interest on the nuclear question, and until the International Atomic Energy Agency reports say something more than the informal equivalent of “hey, it could happen!” the risks involved in a strike on Iran cannot conceivably be outweighed by much of anything.

Though Argo features the rise of what is technically the same government that maintains power in Iran today, it also perpetuates the idea of this government as a resolute one, which emboldens it in the minds of watchers and makes it seem much more threatening.

But the reality of the current dynamics at play in Iran is one of great complexity that involves cleavages within the government itself. And if people continue to assume the Iranian government exists as one cohesive, strong entity, they are missing an extremely important element of Iranian state of affairs that could, almost ironically, be the key to taking down the unpopular, abusive regime.

At a time when waging war on this country is currently being seriously discussed by many unenlightened politicians, it is unquestionably risky to increase vilification of Iran in the minds of American moviegoers. They are, after all, citizens with voting power.

Cheney’s one percent doctrine, the idea that war against Iraq was justified by even a “one percent risk” of their possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction, played off of the fears of a public that did not know anything about their new so-called enemy, which is a testament to the fact that bad things happen when the public doesn’t know any better and looks to assumed authorities for wisdom. Thousands have been killed in a war that should never have taken place, as it was justified by fabricated facts and flawed logic.

If nothing else, this piece is intended to remind people that every country has a dark past and, often, even a dark present, but that there are also competing perspectives and complicating factors at play that are often neglected out of ignorance or convenience. Though there is surely not malicious intent on the part of the Argo creators, they may be inadvertently helping to shift public opinion in such a way that creates undesirable outcomes.

After all, the fact is that the goal of movie makers is to make money, and sometimes reality doesn’t sell.

Gabrielle Cherney is a senior at Indiana University Bloomington studying Near Eastern Language & Culture and Political Science. She is a founding member of the IU Debate Team and pursuing Language and Area Certification in Iranian Studies.

June 27, 2012 5 comments

Mexico and Latin America Middle East Security Security and Conflict Terrorism Uncategorized

Petri Dish for Terrorists

written by thegeneration

What are the major terrorist threats not yet on our radar? How are New York and other cities around the world adjusting to modern security threats? Just ask Mitchell Silber.

He sat down with The Generation co-editor Brad Rowe in UCLA’s Murphy Sculpture Garden to discuss his new book The Al Qaeda Factor, terrorist threats in the Western Hemisphere, and his inspiring personal journey from Wall Street to NYPD (which he has served for seven years).

Silber is the Director of both the NYPD Intelligence Division’s Analytic and Cyber Units. He supervises the analysis of the portfolio of terrorism-related investigations within the Intelligence Division.

Please both join us for a captivating interview and share your thoughts on The Generation comments page.

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Image is the author’s own.

January 30, 2012 30 comments

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