The Sahel is a vast biogeographical region in Africa, stretching from Senegal to Sudan. Not only is it an epicenter of criminal activity, disinformation, illicit trafficking, and environmental degradation, but it has also seen the most extreme growth in violent militant activity on the continent. Due to the terrorism and conflict there – accounting for 43 percent of all deaths from terrorist activity in the world – the state of democracy is fragile. As put into perspective by Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow J. Peter Pham, “One can literally travel eastward across the African continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean without once setting foot in a country with an elected civilian government.” Since 2020, this region of Africa has experienced seven coup d’etats, four of which were successful, arguably due to the economic stagnation and persistent insecurity of unstable governments.
In Mali, two coup d’etats occurred within nine months. The first coup was in August 2020, in which the military, led by Colonel Assimi Goita, ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keira. The military government decided to establish a transitional government with Goita serving as Vice President due to three months of protests, demands for security, and calls regarding respect for democratic norms. However, before the 18-month transitional period ended, Goita seized power from interim president Bah Ndaw on May 24, 2021, accusing Ndaw of administrative incompetence. Since May of 2021, Goita has remained in power as the interim President of Mali.
Burkina Faso, Mali’s neighbor, also witnessed two coups within a nine month period in 2022. Rebel groups from both countries cited insecurity and other forms of misgovernance as justifications for their military overthrows. Most recently in Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traore, head of an Armed Forces artillery unit, ousted the country’s leader, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, in September of 2022. Additionally, Niger, a relatively politically stable country with a decade-long democratic history, experienced a coup in July of 2023 when General Abdourahamane Tchiani ousted democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum.
While many view these coups as unconstitutional, unnecessary, and dangerous for democracy, such overthrows have garnered considerable support from the populations of the countries themselves. Many people in the Sahel are not necessarily worried about what type of government forms from a coup; rather; they care about a government that will deliver, simply, good governance. An increase in education and the widespread use of social media in this region have more young adults asking questions about how and by whom they are governed. In fact, as long as a so-called democratic government does not deliver positive dividends, citizens are likely to support almost any alternative, including military rule. Supporting a junta does not mean that the regime it is replacing was democratic or popular – hence, another reason for mass demonstrations supporting various coups. The issue in the Sahel may not necessarily be democracy itself but rather the inability to promote a strong democratic culture and ensure fair governance.
It is important to recognize that mass demonstrations supporting a coup often do not last for long periods of time, and if the military leaders do not quickly and consistently deliver security and development, support may begin to lean towards another junta. However, it is incorrect to believe that military juntas are the most effective choice to combat terrorism or human trafficking. Democratic states, according to Josep Borrel, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, are states with ambition, will, and means to create new opportunities for their people. The heart of this crisis in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy, in which citizens view their government as valid, equitable, and able to meet their needs. J. Peter Pham succinctly argues, “If you want to prevent democratic backsliding, establish governance first.”
In order to establish stability, African states have started to create regional partnerships, one of which is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Institutions like this have placed a large emphasis on the need for democracy, yet they have struggled to uphold democratic values and prevent unconstitutional coups. Some of this issue is rooted in the lack of ECOWAS’s ability to promote its mission without falling into traps set by regimes that “rely principally on manipulation and disinformation.” Juntas, for example, exploit anti-French sentiments, which often stem from Russian disinformation campaigns. The Russian campaigns also create false perceptions of military success to foster national cohesion – and to hide regime failures. In fact, while military juntas in the Sahel argue that the reason for the overthrow of the government is for increased security, it actually often leads to a power vacuum, increasing the violence and irregular warfare.
Military governments do not improve the lives of everyday peoples. Instead, they decrease the wealth and security of populations poorer and cause rates of violence to skyrocket by 150 percent in Mali, 77 percent in Burkina Faso, 38 percent in Mali, and 42 percent in Niger. Boubacar Moussa, once a member of a Mali-based, al-Qaeda-linked extremist group who now works in a deradicalization program, told AP News that the recent coup in Mali was welcomed by extremists as an opportunity to expand operations.
On May 6, 2024, Chad held its long-delayed presidential election after three years of military rule under interim president Mahamat Deby Itno. In 2021, Deby seized power after his father – who ruled the country for 30 years – was killed fighting rebels. When Deby took control of the government, he decided to hold an 18-month transition period to civilian rule…which was then extended by two more years. Scholars argue that the importance of democracy lies in elections and peaceful transitions of power; however, Chad has not had a free and fair transfer of power since its independence in 1960. Chad is viewed by the United States and France as one of the last remaining stable allies in the Sahel, as Mali and Niger have expelled French forces and turned to Russia’s mercenary groups for counterterrorism assistance. A large concern about the election was that it was just a seemingly legitimate mechanism to formalize the military’s hold on power.
The election was tumultuous. Leading opposition figure Yaya Dillo, who founded the opposition Socialist Party Without Borders, was killed in February 2024 in a largely disputed extrajudicial murder. His murder was a clear signal to all opposition candidates in Chad that Deby would not tolerate any threat to his power. Deby, in fact, was suggesting changes to a December 2023 constitutional referendum, in which Chadians voted “yes” on new measures, such as 1) a presidential term limit decrease from 6 to 5 years, 2) a reduction in the age limit of the president from 40 to 35, and 3) the creation of local councils to devolve power from the center.
Deby’s challenger at the polls was once a vocal critic of him. Succes Masra, who led opposition protests against the 2022 coup, was recently appointed Prime Minister of Chad by Deby himself, which greatly angered citizens. Such tactics either suppressing or elevating the powerful opposition leaders as well as extending election dates mirror Deby’s father, Idriss, who was able to hold six consecutive terms in a two-term-limit constitution. In fact, elections in 2011, 2016, and 2021 resulted in an easy defeat of opposition candidates – largely popular in urban areas – as they hold little support from the rural areas where 76 percent of Chadians live.
While this is “the first time a president and prime minister of Chad have tussled at the polls,” experts believed that the elections were merely a formality used to solidify his power. This strategy is called electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism is characterized by the idea of presenting a democracy with multiple parties and free elections while actually removing the true efficacy of an election. The results of such elections are known in advance, as they are subject to state manipulation. For example, the new electoral code in Chad eliminated the obligation of the National Election Management Agency to publicly post the election results at every polling station. Instead, the only obligatory information for publication is regional tallies, making it impossible for observers to verify the results at individual polling stations.
Furthermore, the agency largely consists of members and associates of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS). And, the Constitutional Council, which confirms the official results of the election, is headed by Jean Bernard Padare, a former MPS executive – appointed by Deby himself.
Another concern for Chad’s future lies in the growing dissension of the Zaghawa clan. Deby’s family is a part of the Zaghawa clan, which represents just over 5 percent of the Chadian population. Yet, members of the clan have ruled the country for over 30 years. The recent conflict in Sudan has also been a parallel source of tension because the Deby government has been supporting the UAE’s supply of arms to Rapid Support Forces who have attacked the Zaghawa clan from within Chad. Deby’s lack of support to those of his own clan being attacked may lead to a coup against Chad backed by ethnic Zaghawans.
600,000 Sudanese refugees have recently fled to eastern Chad – in addition to the 500,000 refugees already there – which creates more pressure for the government to supply humanitarian aid and more competition for resources. On the one hand, Mahamat Deby has focused on security by strengthening ties with the President of the Central African Republic and the Field Marshall in Libya to carry out counterinsurgency military operations in the region. Moreover, Deby has strengthened ties with France and opened up economic partnerships with the UAE, Hungary, and Russia. Specifically, as Central Africa expert Enrica Picco writes, “The recent wave of coup d’etat in Western Sahelian states, along with the outbreak of war in Sudan, have made Chad look like an island of stability in the greater Sahel, as well as one of the few reliable allies for western powers.” On the other hand, the Deby government has failed to improve the country’s socio-economic situation, as fuel prices continue to rise and the government frequently cuts electricity and water. The southern and central regions are in constant tension, and farmers and herders there add to secessionist movements. Thus, the results of the election are crucial for the future of security and democracy in the Sahel.
The results: Mahamat Deby has been declared the official winner of Chad’s presidential election. According to the state election body, Deby won 61.3 percent of the vote compared to Prime Minister Succes Masra’s mere 18.5 percent. Masra, before the results had even been released, declared himself the winner. After hearing of his loss, he argued that the victory had been “stolen from the people.”
The Coalition of Moral Authorities for Mediation, an association that includes clerics, former government ministers, and female leaders, has observed violence, threats, and fraud in this election. And, not only were the results released two weeks earlier than expected, but the country’s Constitutional Council is the “only body empowered to proclaim definitive results,” and an official proclamation has not yet been released. This evident victory, however, means that the Deby family’s 34-year rule will persist, as democracy continues to exist just out of reach.
