By Sariah Perera, University of Southern California
Introduction: Genocide and Public Diplomacy
Genocide is a human creation – both the action and the word itself. In 1948, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew and international lawyer, coined the phrase “genocide” to describe the atrocities committed against Jews in Nazi Germany. Lemkin would go on to secure the passage of the first United Nations human rights treaty to ban the newly defined crime of genocide. Genocide, as an act, however, has stained human history long before the formal definition was established. One of the earliest recorded instances is the Assyrian Empire’s brutal campaigns in the 8th and 7th centuries BCE, involving mass killings, forced relocations, and widespread cultural destruction. Throughout human history, conquerors, colonizers, and regimes have engaged in the systematic extermination of indigenous or minority populations, such as the widespread Mongol invasions and European colonization of the Americas. While the term “genocide” was not coined until the mid-20th century, significant precursor events include the Armenian Genocide during World War I, where the Ottoman Empire orchestrated mass killings of its Armenian minority population, and the Holocaust during World War II, in which Nazi Germany systematically exterminated a population of six million Jewish civilians and five million Poles, Roma, homosexuals, political opponents, and others.
In the aftermath of the devastating carnage of the mid-20th century, the diplomatic community found itself at a crossroads, grappling with the undeniable reality that violence and death are integral to the human story. The echoes of two world wars reverberated across the global human consciousness. A collective commitment emerged as nations surveyed the smoldering ruins and contemplated the irrevocable toll on humanity. The aftermath of World War II witnessed the birth of a new era in international cooperation – the United Nations. Conceived as a bastion of hope and an embodiment of shared responsibility, the United Nations became the crucible in which the world’s leaders sought to forge a more just and harmonious future. In this spirit, the United Nations Geneva Conventions emerged as a testament to the commitment to mitigate the horrors of armed conflicts, establishing fundamental principles to safeguard the lives and dignity of civilians and combatants alike. However, perhaps one of the most poignant responses to the atrocities of World War II was encapsulated in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, creating a resolute international legal framework. The Convention defined genocide as a crime under international law, binding ratifying nations to prevent and punish acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
As the United Nations and its associated conventions crystallized, the stage was set for a global community united in purpose, poised to intervene and protect the inherent dignity of every individual, irrespective of their origin or identity. After World War II, however, Iraq targeted its Kurdish minority during the Iran-Iraq war; Bosnian Serbs set out to destroy Muslims and Croats during a Balkan civil war; and Rwandan Hutu nationalists exterminated roughly 800,000 Tutsi civilians amidst a civil war against a Tutsi rebel force. The continuous existence of genocide threatens the legitimacy of public diplomacy by compromising moral credibility, diminishing trust, and undermining a nation’s advocacy for human rights. Genocide – and the inability of the global community to condemn or stop genocide – stains a country’s image, eroding its soft power and diplomatic effectiveness, as it raises questions about its commitment to shared global values and collaborative efforts against mass atrocities. Within this historical backdrop, it is essential to navigate the complexities of United States public diplomacy in the face of genocide, scrutinizing the fidelity to these noble ideals and the intricate dance between rhetoric and action on the international stage. Through analyzing case studies of mass atrocities in Armenia, Cambodia, and Rwanda and the subsequent United States public diplomacy response, it is possible to formulate a comprehensive strategy to prevent and address genocidal atrocities in the 21st century.
The Armenian Genocide (1915-1923)
In 1915, the Young Turks presided over the killing by firing squad, bayoneting, bludgeoning, and starvation of nearly one million Armenians. Mehmed Talaat, the former Turkish interior minister, and the Young Turks justified the “deportation” of Armenians by asserting its imperative to quash Armenian revolts – a facade for the desired eradication of the Armenian minority in the Ottoman Empire. The international community, loosely established at the time, did not widely condemn the Ottoman horrors. Still, Britain and France, who were opposed to the Ottoman Empire during World War I, publicized the atrocities of the Armenian genocide. The British Foreign Office meticulously searched for and published photographs of massacre victims and Armenian refugees. Since Britain was already at war with the Ottoman Empire, many British officials believed the most efficient way to end the atrocities would be to defeat the German-Austrian-Turkish alliance. On May 24, 1915, the Allied governments delivered a joint declaration that took the unprecedented step of condemning “crimes against humanity and civilization.” The declaration further warned the members of the Turkish government that they would be held “personally responsible” for the massacres.
During World War I, the United States was determined to maintain its neutrality in the global conflict and refused to join the Allied declaration. President Woodrow Wilson chose not to formally protest or pressure either the Turks or their German backers under the justification that the Turks had not violated the rights of any Americans. Within the Ottoman Empire, however, the United States Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Sr., responded to the Ottoman deportation and slaughter of its Armenian minority by urging Washington to condemn the Ottoman Empire and pressure Germany. Morgenthau defied diplomatic convention by personally protesting the atrocities, denouncing the regime, and raising money for humanitarian relief. He was joined by former President Theodore Roosevelt, who went a step further, calling on the administration of Woodrow Wilson to enter World War I and forcibly stop the slaughter. However, the United States’ foreign policy remained committed to neutrality and insisted that the Ottomans’ internal affairs were of little concern to the American public. An estimated one million Armenians were murdered or died of disease and starvation as a result.
American media, however, gave Ottoman atrocities steady coverage. The New York Times published 145 stories in 1915, speaking of Ottoman “massacres” and “atrocities” against Armenians. These reports relayed accounts from missionaries, Red Cross officials, local religious leaders, and survivors of the mass atrocities, creating a multifaceted account of the crimes and garnering American awareness and support for condemnation. Viscount Bryce, former British ambassador to the United States, pleaded that the United States use its influence, stating, “If anything can stop the destroying hand of the Turkish Government, it will be an expression of the opinion of neutral nations, chiefly the judgment of humane America.” As casualties rose, the United States maintained its neutrality with the Ottoman Empire, even after entering the war against Germany in April 1917. In the end, Turkey broke off ties with the United States.
The lack of immediate public diplomacy efforts from the United States established a pattern that would be repeated. Throughout the remainder of the 20th century, the United States would constantly remain reluctant to cast aside its neutrality and formally denounce a state for mass atrocities until after the crimes had been committed. From a diplomacy standpoint, the United States wavered in its legitimacy as a global advocate for human rights. In the aftermath of World War I, the United States engaged in numerous diplomatic and public advocacy efforts to address the Armenian Genocide and seek accountability for war crimes committed by the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 included provisions for prosecuting Ottoman officials responsible for atrocities, but geopolitical shifts and the Turkish War of Independence led to the abandonment of this treaty. The King-Crane Commission, appointed by President Woodrow Wilson, highlighted the Armenian Genocide and recommended international measures for justice. Public awareness campaigns, congressional resolutions, and the presentation of evidence during the Paris Peace Conference underscored the United States’ commitment to acknowledging and addressing the genocide. However, the complex geopolitical landscape hindered immediate justice, and it would take decades for the international community, including the United States, to formally recognize the Armenian Genocide.
In April 1981, over sixty years after the Ottoman atrocities toward Armenians, President Ronald Reagan issued a proclamation marking Holocaust Remembrance Day. In that proclamation, Reagan referenced the Armenian atrocities, using the term “genocide” to describe the tragic events; he said, “Like the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it – and like too many other such persecutions of too many other peoples – the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten.” Reagan’s use of the term “genocide” in this context was a significant moment as it marked a formal recognition of the Armenian genocide by a sitting president. It laid the groundwork for subsequent discussions and efforts toward official recognition. More recently, in April 2021, President Biden’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide marked a significant moment in the ongoing debate over historical accountability. While carefully phrased, acknowledging the Ottoman authorities’ role, the statement unequivocally labeled the events as genocide, aligning with President Reagan’s similar usage in 1981. This move was unsurprising given the 2019 Congressional recognition of the Armenian genocide and the strained diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey. Ostensibly grounded in human rights, these declarations often serve as strategic moves in the geopolitical chessboard, serving as diplomatic tools to reconcile accountability.
Public diplomacy initiatives in the United States regarding the Armenian Genocide encompass a range of projects aimed at raising awareness, fostering understanding, and commemorating the historical tragedy. Organizations such as the Armenian National Institute and the Armenian Genocide Museum of America actively contribute to the diplomatic aim of awareness and accountability through educational materials, exhibits, and events across the United States. The Armenian Assembly of America engages in advocacy efforts and organizes briefings to promote Armenian-American issues, including genocide recognition. Various documentary films, such as “Intent to Destroy” and “The Promise,” serve as powerful tools for reaching diverse audiences and creating public opinion through visual storytelling. Efforts to include the Armenian Genocide in school curricula, such as the “Teaching the Armenian Genocide” program, contribute to domestic educational diplomacy within the United States. The Congressional Armenian Caucus, composed of American lawmakers, plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion through briefings, statements, and resolutions on Capitol Hill. Social media campaigns, annual commemorations on April 24th, and the active engagement of Armenian-American communities further contribute to the multifaceted landscape of public diplomacy initiatives, shaping perceptions and fostering continued dialogue on the Armenian Genocide. United States public diplomacy regarding the Armenian genocide centered on post-crime accountability as opposed to real-time condemnation.
Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian Genocide (1975-1979)
The genocide in Cambodia occurred in the backdrop of the Cold War and the steadfast American desire to quash the spread of communism around the world. In Cambodia, two wars preceded the mass atrocities, the United States war in Vietnam and a subsequent civil war in Cambodia. The Cambodian genocide, orchestrated by the Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979, resulted in the mass killing of an estimated two million civilians. For nearly four years, the Khmer Rouge rendered Cambodia off the grid, making it impossible for outsiders to enter and allow media outlets to accurately report on the atrocities, resulting in the deaths of almost two million Cambodians. The United States’ public diplomacy response followed a similar pattern as in the Armenian genocide. In advance of the seizure of Phnom Penh, numerous early warning signs of the organization’s brutality were met with unfilled hope for a natural resolution. The Khmer Rouge sealed the country after their victory, delaying and misrepresenting the international reporting and opinion of their atrocities. However, even after the facts had emerged, United States foreign policy was once again poised towards non-engagement and non-condemnation.
The public diplomacy and foreign policy response from the United States is widely intertwined with its historical role in the region in the decade prior. In Vietnam, the United States intended to prevent South Vietnam from becoming Communist; however, massive American casualties and American brutality strengthened domestic opposition to the war. In 1968, as coverage of the My Lai massacre revealed American use of defoliants and napalm, American lives, as well as honor, were being lost in Vietnam. When President Richard Nixon took office, he expanded the Vietnam War into Cambodia, pointing to sanctuary being provided to North Vietnamese units in Cambodian territory. In March 1969, Nixon ordered American B-52s to begin bombing Cambodia. The operation was nicknamed “Operation Breakfast” after the setting in which National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and U.S. military advisors drafted their bombing plans. The mission was kept top secret for fear of domestic protest, now begging the question as to whether these bombing plans constitute war crimes under international law. The incursion into Cambodia had nothing to do with Cambodians but rather the United States’ position regarding the war in Vietnam. Cambodia’s civil war, a conflict in which the genocidal Khmer Rouge would win, would also mark this violence. Still, between March 1969 and August 1973, United States military planes dropped 540,000 tons of bombs in the Cambodian countryside, resulting in the deaths of countless Cambodian civilians.
In February 1974, Kenneth Quinn, a United States foreign service officer, sent Washington a detailed report entitled “The Khmer Krahom [Rogue] Program to Create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia.” In this forty-five-page report, Quinn wrote, “The [Khmer Rogue] programs have much in common with those of totalitarian regimes in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, particularly regarding efforts to psychologically reconstruct individual members of society.” Quinn’s reporting was unique from that of his State Department colleagues because, at the time, United States government officials rarely interviewed refugees and instead relied on official government sources. Ultimately, Quinn’s reports were never heeded.
When the Ford administration started citing “very factual evidence of the bloodbath” years later, the credibility of the United States had already faltered. Nixon and Kissinger had carpet-bombed Cambodia and tainted the reputation of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The American public had learned to dismiss what it considered official rumor-mongering and anti-Communist propaganda as a consequence of the Cold War. In the United States, media and editorial neglect regarding Cambodia resulted from “Southeast Asia fatigue,” making the decline in Cambodian coverage directly impact American public opinion – or lack of opinion. As a result, it would be nearly two years before most would acknowledge that the reports of mass atrocities and “bloodbath” were accurate, delaying the public diplomacy response until after the atrocities had concluded.
In response to the genocide in Cambodia orchestrated by the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979, the United States engaged in various public diplomacy initiatives to address the humanitarian crisis. The United States government condemned the Khmer Rouge’s brutality and inhumane actions, with President Jimmy Carter expressing concern over human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, and mass killings. Public statements, including speeches and press releases, aimed to raise awareness about the atrocities and urged the international community to take restorative action. Additionally, the United States contributed significant humanitarian aid to assist survivors, particularly in the form of food assistance, medical support, and refugee relocation programs. United States diplomatic efforts included pushing for independent investigations into the genocide in Cambodia and advocating for accountability on the international stage – ranging from Amnesty International to the United Nations. Today, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum hosts a special exhibition on the heinous reign of the Khmer Rogue in Cambodia. While the overall public diplomacy response faced challenges due to the lingering impact of the Vietnam War, these specific initiatives demonstrated a commitment to addressing the Cambodian genocide on both humanitarian and diplomatic fronts.
The Rwandan Genocide (April 1994- July 1994)
In December 1990, the Hutu newspaper Kangura published its “Ten Commandments of the Hutu,” resembling Hitler’s Nuremberg laws and the Bosnian Serbs’ 1992 edicts. The commandments included divisive and inflammatory statements towards the Tutsi population in Rwanda, claiming “every Tutsi is dishonest in business,” all positions of power “should be entrusted to Hutu,” and “the Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi.” In addition, the precursors of the Rwandan genocide witnessed the appalling role of media manipulation through the infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). RTLM played a central role in spreading hate propaganda, fueling ethnic tensions, and inciting violence against the Tutsi population. The radio station, known for its extremist broadcasts, dehumanized Tutsis, encouraged mass killings, and served as a tool for coordination among perpetrators. The broadcasts not only fueled the intensity of the genocide but also contributed to the dehumanization and vilification of the Tutsi community. The RTLM highlights the dangerous potential of media in exacerbating ethnic strife during times of conflict, underscoring the importance of responsible journalism and the prevention of hate speech to mitigate the risk of mass atrocities from occurring.
The Rwandan genocide of 1994, marked by the mass slaughter of approximately 800,000 ethnic Tutsis by the Hutu majority, posed a significant challenge to United States public diplomacy. The United States’ response to the genocide was widely criticized for its perceived inaction and lack of robust intervention. Despite mounting evidence of the unfolding atrocities, the international community, including the United States, hesitated to intervene militarily. The most frequently cited reason for United States non-intervention in Rwanda is President Clinton’s intention to avoid another failed mission, like the one that occurred in Somalia just six months earlier. However, like in the case of Vietnam and Cambodia, salient foreign policy measures should not hinder the American obligation to prevent mass atrocities from occurring. The United States’ public diplomacy efforts during the crisis were marred by a sense of regret and the acknowledgment of a failure to prevent the genocide. In later years, President Bill Clinton expressed remorse for the international community’s insufficient response. The Rwandan genocide stands as a sobering chapter in United States foreign policy, prompting reflections on the ethical responsibility of nations to prevent and respond to mass atrocities and emphasizing the crucial role of public diplomacy in shaping international perceptions of such crises.
In the course of 100 days in 1994, the Hutu government of Rwanda virtually succeeded in exterminating the country’s Tutsi minority. It was the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century. The warning signs were early and evident, pointing to an increasingly unstable situation capable of sliding into genocide. The United States understood the conditions in Rwanda before and during the genocide, but the United States officials decided against taking a leading role in confronting the slaughter in Rwanda. A declassified White House email from Eric Schwartz to Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg on April 19, 1994, warned of a possible genocide. This email, however, would be of no actionable use. Instead of intervening in the conflict, United States officials confined themselves to public statements, diplomatic overtures, and initiatives for a ceasefire – all while never using the word “genocide.”
In the wake of mounting evidence and international media coverage, the United States finally launched substantial operations in July 1994, in a supporting role to assist humanitarian relief efforts for those displaced by the genocide. If the United States had responsibly intervened earlier and identified the crime of genocide, the tragic outcome could have been altered. In future scenarios, the United States must lead and bring all national elements of power to prevent genocide and mass acts of violence. The United States and the international community should prioritize robust public diplomacy campaigns that emphasize early recognition of potential crises, a commitment to prevention, and the swift mobilization of coordinated international efforts in the face of mass atrocities.
Overarching United States Public Diplomacy Response
In times of mass atrocities, the United States has generally fostered a public diplomacy response of non-engagement and non-condemnation. Once atrocities have concluded, the United States usually engages in public awareness and memorial efforts, focusing on post-atrocity diplomacy instead of preventative genocidal diplomacy. Preventing genocide using public diplomacy is achievable, with a committed international community required to lead the effort. The United States must embrace the reality that a failure to responsibly intervene when genocide conditions surface does not absolve it from future intervention. Instead, a failure to prevent genocide guarantees future involvement – too late and after millions of innocent lives are lost. By recognizing early warning signs, United States public diplomacy can be used to counter messages of divisiveness and hateful propaganda.
Lessons for Future Public Diplomacy
Instances of genocide in the 20th century, including the Armenian Genocide, Cambodian genocide, and Rwandan genocide, provide valuable lessons for future public diplomacy endeavors, particularly in the face of mass atrocities. First, timely and accurate communication is paramount to preventing and addressing mass atrocities. Swift and transparent responses from the international community and effective public diplomacy campaigns are essential in mobilizing support and raising awareness. Second, acknowledging historical wrongs and expressing genuine remorse enhances the credibility of public diplomacy efforts. The importance of aligning rhetoric with concrete actions cannot be overstated, as demonstrated by the impact of perceived inaction in cases like Rwanda. Additionally, proactive diplomacy and early intervention are critical to preventing the escalation of conflicts into genocidal acts. Future public diplomats should consider the insights of foreign service members and media sources with weight and importance, especially in times of crisis. Future public diplomacy initiatives should prioritize the ethical responsibility of nations to protect vulnerable populations and uphold human rights. By learning from these historical cases, the international community can strengthen its commitment to preventing, responding to, and learning from genocides through principled and effective public diplomacy strategies.
Drawing from the historical lessons of the Armenian genocide, it is imperative to apply these insights to the contemporary context of the Azerbaijani seizure of the Nagorno-Karabakh region – an enclave with a predominantly Armenian population. The tragedy of the Armenian genocide serves as a poignant reminder of the catastrophic consequences that can unfold when the international community remains passive in the face of mass atrocities. As tensions escalate in Nagorno-Karabakh, there is an opportunity to leverage these historical lessons to advocate for proactive measures that prioritize diplomacy, conflict resolution, and the protection of human rights. By heeding the warnings embedded in history, there is a chance to prevent the recurrence of similar patterns of violence and displacement, fostering a commitment to international cooperation and peacebuilding in the pursuit of a just and equitable resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
United States involvement in Vietnam undoubtedly cast a shadow over its public diplomacy efforts in the wake and aftermath of the Cambodian genocide. The contentious Vietnam War, marked by significant loss of life and deep societal divisions, created a context where public trust in government actions was strained. When news of the Cambodian genocide emerged, the general skepticism fueled by the Vietnam War undoubtedly influenced perceptions of the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia. The trauma and disillusionment from Vietnam likely contributed to a lack of public faith in United States diplomatic initiatives, hindering effective communication about the Cambodian genocide. Similarly, fears of a failed mission in Rwanda grew from prior experiences in Somalia. Future public diplomacy efforts should prioritize transparency, accountability, and clear communication to prevent such challenges. This includes a salient approach to every diplomatic situation in which prior mistakes inform future actions rather than halting any action altogether. Acknowledging historical mistakes and actively engaging in open dialogue about the complexities of international interventions can help rebuild public trust. Additionally, emphasizing shared values, ethical considerations, and a commitment to humanitarian principles can enhance the credibility of United States public diplomacy in addressing and preventing mass atrocities. Learning from past experiences is crucial in ensuring that public diplomacy effectively navigates the complexities of international crises.
Image source: Joshua Sukoff on Unsplash
