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Chad’s Election: Is Democracy on Trial?

The Sahel is a vast biogeographical region in Africa, stretching from Senegal to Sudan. Not only is it an epicenter of criminal activity, disinformation, illicit trafficking, and environmental degradation, but it has also seen the most extreme growth in violent militant activity on the continent. Due to the terrorism and conflict there – accounting for 43 percent of all deaths from terrorist activity in the world – the state of democracy is fragile. As put into perspective by Atlantic Council Distinguished Fellow J. Peter Pham, “One can literally travel eastward across the African continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean without once setting foot in a country with an elected civilian government.” Since 2020, this region of Africa has experienced seven coup d’etats, four of which were successful, arguably due to the economic stagnation and persistent insecurity of unstable governments.

In Mali, two coup d’etats occurred within nine months. The first coup was in August 2020, in which the military, led by Colonel Assimi Goita, ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keira. The military government decided to establish a transitional government with Goita serving as Vice President due to three months of protests, demands for security, and calls regarding respect for democratic norms. However, before the 18-month transitional period ended, Goita seized power from interim president Bah Ndaw on May 24, 2021, accusing Ndaw of administrative incompetence. Since May of 2021, Goita has remained in power as the interim President of Mali.

Burkina Faso, Mali’s neighbor, also witnessed two coups within a nine month period in 2022. Rebel groups from both countries cited insecurity and other forms of misgovernance as justifications for their military overthrows. Most recently in Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traore, head of an Armed Forces artillery unit, ousted the country’s leader, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, in September of 2022. Additionally, Niger, a relatively politically stable country with a decade-long democratic history, experienced a coup in July of 2023 when General Abdourahamane Tchiani ousted democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum.

While many view these coups as unconstitutional, unnecessary, and dangerous for democracy, such overthrows have garnered considerable support from the populations of the countries themselves. Many people in the Sahel are not necessarily worried about what type of government forms from a coup; rather; they care about a government that will deliver, simply, good governance. An increase in education and the widespread use of social media in this region have more young adults asking questions about how and by whom they are governed. In fact, as long as a so-called democratic government does not deliver positive dividends, citizens are likely to support almost any alternative, including military rule. Supporting a junta does not mean that the regime it is replacing was democratic or popular – hence, another reason for mass demonstrations supporting various coups. The issue in the Sahel may not necessarily be democracy itself but rather the inability to promote a strong democratic culture and ensure fair governance.

It is important to recognize that mass demonstrations supporting a coup often do not last for long periods of time, and if the military leaders do not quickly and consistently deliver security and development, support may begin to lean towards another junta. However, it is incorrect to believe that military juntas are the most effective choice to combat terrorism or human trafficking. Democratic states, according to Josep Borrel, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, are states with ambition, will, and means to create new opportunities for their people. The heart of this crisis in the Sahel is one of state legitimacy, in which citizens view their government as valid, equitable, and able to meet their needs. J. Peter Pham succinctly argues, “If you want to prevent democratic backsliding, establish governance first.”

In order to establish stability, African states have started to create regional partnerships, one of which is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Institutions like this have placed a large emphasis on the need for democracy, yet they have struggled to uphold democratic values and prevent unconstitutional coups. Some of this issue is rooted in the lack of ECOWAS’s ability to promote its mission without falling into traps set by regimes that “rely principally on manipulation and disinformation.” Juntas, for example, exploit anti-French sentiments, which often stem from Russian disinformation campaigns. The Russian campaigns also create false perceptions of military success to foster national cohesion – and to hide regime failures. In fact, while military juntas in the Sahel argue that the reason for the overthrow of the government is for increased security, it actually often leads to a power vacuum, increasing the violence and irregular warfare.

Military governments do not improve the lives of everyday peoples. Instead, they decrease the wealth and security of populations poorer and cause rates of violence to skyrocket by 150 percent in Mali, 77 percent in Burkina Faso, 38 percent in Mali, and 42 percent in Niger. Boubacar Moussa, once a member of a Mali-based, al-Qaeda-linked extremist group who now works in a deradicalization program, told AP News that the recent coup in Mali was welcomed by extremists as an opportunity to expand operations.

On May 6, 2024, Chad held its long-delayed presidential election after three years of military rule under interim president Mahamat Deby Itno. In 2021, Deby seized power after his father – who ruled the country for 30 years – was killed fighting rebels. When Deby took control of the government, he decided to hold an 18-month transition period to civilian rule…which was then extended by two more years. Scholars argue that the importance of democracy lies in elections and peaceful transitions of power; however, Chad has not had a free and fair transfer of power since its independence in 1960. Chad is viewed by the United States and France as one of the last remaining stable allies in the Sahel, as Mali and Niger have expelled French forces and turned to Russia’s mercenary groups for counterterrorism assistance. A large concern about the election was that it was just a seemingly legitimate mechanism to formalize the military’s hold on power.

The election was tumultuous. Leading opposition figure Yaya Dillo, who founded the opposition Socialist Party Without Borders, was killed in February 2024 in a largely disputed extrajudicial murder. His murder was a clear signal to all opposition candidates in Chad that Deby would not tolerate any threat to his power. Deby, in fact, was suggesting changes to a December 2023 constitutional referendum, in which Chadians voted “yes” on new measures, such as 1) a presidential term limit decrease from 6 to 5 years, 2) a reduction in the age limit of the president from 40 to 35, and 3) the creation of local councils to devolve power from the center.

Deby’s challenger at the polls was once a vocal critic of him. Succes Masra, who led opposition protests against the 2022 coup, was recently appointed Prime Minister of Chad by Deby himself, which greatly angered citizens. Such tactics either suppressing or elevating the powerful opposition leaders as well as extending election dates mirror Deby’s father, Idriss, who was able to hold six consecutive terms in a two-term-limit constitution. In fact, elections in 2011, 2016, and 2021 resulted in an easy defeat of opposition candidates – largely popular in urban areas – as they hold little support from the rural areas where 76 percent of Chadians live.

While this is “the first time a president and prime minister of Chad have tussled at the polls,” experts believed that the elections were merely a formality used to solidify his power. This strategy is called electoral authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarianism is characterized by the idea of presenting a democracy with multiple parties and free elections while actually removing the true efficacy of an election. The results of such elections are known in advance, as they are subject to state manipulation. For example, the new electoral code in Chad eliminated the obligation of the National Election Management Agency to publicly post the election results at every polling station. Instead, the only obligatory information for publication is regional tallies, making it impossible for observers to verify the results at individual polling stations.

Furthermore, the agency largely consists of members and associates of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS). And, the Constitutional Council, which confirms the official results of the election, is headed by Jean Bernard Padare, a former MPS executive – appointed by Deby himself.

Another concern for Chad’s future lies in the growing dissension of the Zaghawa clan. Deby’s family is a part of the Zaghawa clan, which represents just over 5 percent of the Chadian population. Yet, members of the clan have ruled the country for over 30 years. The recent conflict in Sudan has also been a parallel source of tension because the Deby government has been supporting the UAE’s supply of arms to Rapid Support Forces who have attacked the Zaghawa clan from within Chad. Deby’s lack of support to those of his own clan being attacked may lead to a coup against Chad backed by ethnic Zaghawans.

600,000 Sudanese refugees have recently fled to eastern Chad – in addition to the 500,000 refugees already there – which creates more pressure for the government to supply humanitarian aid and more competition for resources. On the one hand, Mahamat Deby has focused on security by strengthening ties with the President of the Central African Republic and the Field Marshall in Libya to carry out counterinsurgency military operations in the region. Moreover, Deby has strengthened ties with France and opened up economic partnerships with the UAE, Hungary, and Russia. Specifically, as Central Africa expert Enrica Picco writes, “The recent wave of coup d’etat in Western Sahelian states, along with the outbreak of war in Sudan, have made Chad look like an island of stability in the greater Sahel, as well as one of the few reliable allies for western powers.” On the other hand, the Deby government has failed to improve the country’s socio-economic situation, as fuel prices continue to rise and the government frequently cuts electricity and water. The southern and central regions are in constant tension, and farmers and herders there add to secessionist movements. Thus, the results of the election are crucial for the future of security and democracy in the Sahel.

The results: Mahamat Deby has been declared the official winner of Chad’s presidential election. According to the state election body, Deby won 61.3 percent of the vote compared to Prime Minister Succes Masra’s mere 18.5 percent. Masra, before the results had even been released, declared himself the winner. After hearing of his loss, he argued that the victory had been “stolen from the people.”
The Coalition of Moral Authorities for Mediation, an association that includes clerics, former government ministers, and female leaders, has observed violence, threats, and fraud in this election. And, not only were the results released two weeks earlier than expected, but the country’s Constitutional Council is the “only body empowered to proclaim definitive results,” and an official proclamation has not yet been released. This evident victory, however, means that the Deby family’s 34-year rule will persist, as democracy continues to exist just out of reach.

May 20, 2024 0 comment

Africa Featured

The Innocent Ones: The Escalation of Conflict between Congo and Rwanda

written by Nathan Akiyoshi

Since the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, tensions have been high between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. Thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees fled to the DRC during and after the genocide. Among the refugees were soldiers, many of whom were responsible for the killings of 800,000 Tutsis and some moderate Hutus.

As a result of the genocidal perpetrators moving to the DRC, Rwanda and its northern neighbor Uganda attempted to invade eastern Congo, seeking retribution. The result of this invasion led to the toppling of DRC president Mobutu Sese Seko.

After Seko was deposed, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and his allies installed Laurent Kabila as President of the DRC. But, in an attempt to decrease rumors about excessive Rwandan influence in his administration, Kabila turned on Rwanda. He attempted to remove the Rwandan influence from the DRC during the Second Congo War in 1998, even removing ethnic Tutsis from his administration and forcing Rwandan forces out to the resource-rich eastern DRC. This second war ended in 2001 when Kabila was assassinated in a coup, leading to Kabila’s son Joseph assuming power in 2002.

Rwanda and the DRC have made attempts at peace since 2002. However, in response to former President Kabila’s actions of removing Tutsis from his government, radical groups, such as the March 23rd Movement (M23), began trying to take control of the eastern region of the DRC. M23 claims its motivations are in response to the DRC government not abiding by the rules of the peace deal by incorporating more ethnic Tutsis into its administration.

Although Rwanda denies any ties with M23, the DRC, along with United Nations member states, is now accusing Rwanda of backing M23 to gain control of the resource-rich area in the eastern region of the DRC. Its resources, such as cobalt and copper, are minerals that are essential for the production of many modern electronic devices. More than 100 rebel groups are currently taking advantage of the political instability and engaging in armed conflict for control.

The unfortunate reality of conflict over this resource-rich area is the humanitarian cost. The Council on Foreign Relations estimates that the conflict has displaced 7 million people. Of that 7 million, around 1 million people are seeking refuge outside of Congo, many of whom are subject to violence. According to U.N. officials, many women and girls have been subjected to sexual violence on a “massive scale” in three of the DRC’s provinces. The United Nations has appealed to its member states for $2.3 billion to help alleviate the crisis. However, it has only received $764 million of that aid, meaning only “a fraction of the number of people in need” would receive it.

Within the northern Congolese town of Bambo, residents fleeing violence were the targets of bomb and mortar raids. 200,000 people have been displaced by attacks like these in the region north of Goma. The conflict between M23 and DRC militias has caused many civilian casualties, including the massacre of 171 civilians which the DRC accuses M23 of perpetrating.

Another example of the violence comes from an attack on a camp for displaced persons by a coalition of militia groups known as the Cooperative for Development of Congo (CODECO), leaving 45 people dead. According to the United Nations peacekeeping forces, they massacred the refugees at the Lala displacement site in the Djugu territory. The blatant attacks by militia groups on vulnerable groups constitute a severe violation of international law.

The displaced refugees place additional strain on the DRC government, which is already home to more than 500,000 refugees from other countries. Over a quarter of the DRC population is food insecure, and the World Food Programme estimates that 2.8 million children are acutely malnourished. Further strain was placed on the weakened government through outbreaks of cholera, measles, monkeypox, and ebola.

The conflict between the DRC and M23 is a mix of both ideology and control over resources. The instability of the DRC government seems to limit what it can do to prevent the armed conflict and protect its citizens. Yes, the United Nations is trying to raise funds and send peacekeeping forces, but conflict – and the suffering of the innocent civilians – is far from over.

Image source: United Nations on Flickr

May 20, 2024 0 comment

Africa Economics France International Trade

La Francafrique: Africa’s Last Colonies

written by Kosi Ogbuli

The era of what we referred to as ‘Françafrique’ is coming to an end. There is France and there is Africa. There is the partnership between France and Africa, with relationships grounded in respect, clarity and solidarity – Current French President François Hollande

With the official announcement of the replacement of the CFA franc by a new currency called “the eco” Saturday, December 21 2019 in Abidjan, French neo-colonialism of west Africa has run its course. France’s relations with Africa have been profoundly transformed in recent decades. Today they show little resemblance to the admittedly unhealthy relationship of the post-colonial years. The first Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny introduced the expression ‘La Francafrique‘ in 1955 to define the wish of some members of the African elite to maintain special relations with France after their independence. Since then, this term has been used several times in a pejorative meaning to describe French neo-colonial dominance in Africa. Today, the meaning of Françafrique is largely used to refer to France’s ‘sphere of influence’ in Sub-Saharan Africa hallmarked by its economic partnerships and military operations reminiscent of its colonial control of the 19^th and 20^th centuries. The nations within this sphere of influence have begun to separate themselves from the vestiges of French colonial control, but how France has maintained La Francafrique provides a rude awakening to the practice of neo-colonialism in modern times.

According to Franc Diplomatie, over a third of French exporters export to Africa.This skewed trading relationship is a legacy of French colonial rule and the special relationship it maintains with many of its former colonies. The CFA Franc is a modern symbol of this reality at play. The CFA Franc (African Financial Community or Cooperation Franc), created in December 1945 under the government of De Gaulle, is the last colonial currency still in circulation today. It is the common currency of 14 African States in Central and Western Africa (+ The Comoros) bounded by a policy of monetary cooperation incentivizing countries using the CFA Franc to give unrivaled market share to French imports. It is the French Treasury that guarantees the unlimited convertibility of the CFA Franc to the euro. In return, countries in the CFA Franc zone are required to deposit 50% of their foreign exchange surpluses into a French operations account. However, due to the fixed parity, countries that use the CFA Franc suffer from the highly valued euro and have difficulties exorting their goods. Consequently, La Francafrique nations have been economically bound to France until the announcement of “the eco” in late 2019.

However, while its economic influence wanes, France remains a major military force in sub-Saharan Africa. Today, France has a military presence in francophone areas of eastern, central, and western Africa, with a commitment of 8,700 troops, half of which are permanently stationed. France maintains four permanent bases in Africa: Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon and the Ivory Coast, all being former colonies. Those forces have a strategic role, which is to protect France and its economic interests as well as intervene quickly when necessary. Emmanuel Macron, president of France, inherited two external operations in Africa and on several occasions has expressed the ambition, like Hollande, to continue them. The first, Mission Corymbe, was originally aimed at preserving French oil exploitation and other economic interests in the Gulf of Guinea, but nowadays is intended to reduce maritime insecurity and contribute to capacity-building in fighting piracy and illicit trafficking, for example by hosting naval exercises for navies in the region. The second is Operation Barkhane, a counter- terrorist operation in the Sahel region. It was launched by Hollande in 2014, with a contingent of 4,000 French troops positioned in cooperation with the five countries concerned, all former French colonies: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, and Chad, a partnership known as the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5S). Exactly how France’s military presence and engagements may evolve is not dependent on its will alone. With their operations, France has married its national interests with the stability of La Francafrique, justifying a military presence that would be observed as foreign occupation in any other context. With the emergence of a new generation of leaders in many African countries, it remains to be seen how political support for French involvement might evolve over time.

The nature of ‘La Françafrique’ has changed with the shifting economic and geopolitical realities over time.Even if relations between France and Africa are weaker today than they were in the colonial times, ‘La Françafrique’ is not completely over as François Hollande affirmed. Indeed, insofar as the CFA Franc exists and there remains excessive French military presence in the region, France has the means to interfere in African affairs. We cannot speak of an eventual end of ‘La Françafrique’. Africa and its resources are still a topical issue in French politics but more worrisome is the model Francafrique gives for other nations to create monopolistic control within the continent. Today France is facing growing competition from emerging powers, such as China, which has become the largest trading partner of the continent in recent years.In fact, Chinese firms are challenging French firms in development contracts, investment, and trade agreements. The announcement of “the echo” has caused the last dominoes of colonialism to start falling. For African countries, both within Francafrique, and the continent at large, France’s ability to control the affairs and destiny of a multitude of countries must be warning enough as the world looks to Africa again for their “national interests”.

August 22, 2020 1 comment

Europe Featured

The Malignancy of Multinational Currency

written by Katherine Jones

“France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts,”

This hostile and controversial statement was leveraged by Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s populist deputy Prime Minister, in a counterproductive attempt to deflect shared responsibility for Europe’s migrant crisis. However the currency in question should be a part of the larger discussion on globalization and post-colonial institutions. If European leaders were to earnestly evaluate the CFA franc not from their perspective but from the perspective of the affected Africans, they may find some unsettling similarities to the eurozone.

The CFA franc represents two distinct multinational currencies in Western and Central Africa. The currencies are effectively the same, as both have an exchange rate pegged to the euro (1 euro = 655, 957 francs), however they are not interchangeable. The logic behind the fixed exchange rate is to prevent inflation and promote investor security in nations where poor governance may otherwise threaten market stability. However, this comes at a very steep price for the nations involved. In return, they must keep 50% of their reserves in the French Treasury, follow the strict monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), and attempt to develop their economies with an inevitably overvalued currency.

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In the current economic landscape, African nations should seriously consider if the sacrifice of sovereignty necessitated by the franc is worth the supposed increase in prosperity. The crux of the problem is that the CFA franc is essentially a version of the euro, and relatively weak economies using a strong currency is counterproductive to economic development. The strength of the franc encourages imports and makes exports less competitive on the global market, stagnating the development of member nations. Additionally, the main priority of the ECB is to maintain stable prices, with inflation at a maximum of 2%. This policy makes sense for the top members of the European Union (EU), but a developing nation should be focused on high employment rates and exports, ideally with inflation rates of up to 8%. Moreover, the 50% reserve requirement of the franc zone countries greatly limits their investment options. The French treasury gives them a return rate of only .75%, which sometimes does not even match the level of inflation, much less provide a desperately needed return on investment.

The franc becomes even less attractive when considering the performance of other African economies. Former French colonies that abandoned the franc, such as Morocco and Algeria, are more successful economically, despite using an independent currency. Overall income per capita, adjusted for inflation, has grown 1.4% in the franc zone and 2.5% in the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the line of credit extended to the franc zone is pitiful. In the western franc zone (see map) the credit to GDP ratio is 25% and in the central franc zone it is only 13%! This is in comparison with the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa around 60%.

So why keep the CFA franc? The franc is known to benefit a small percentage of upper and middle class African citizens by providing easy access to imports and the ability to invest abroad, while by and large disadvantaging the 75% of the citizenry who are working class. To exacerbate things further, France and other foreign interests greatly benefit from the franc zone as an export market, and France is granted special access to African resources as a part of the agreement. Furthermore, the franc’s status as a multinational currency provides greater benefit to outside nations wanting to facilitate trade, than the internal member states. The franc is after all very poorly integrated, with intra-regional trade accounting for only 15% of total trade, while trade with Europe accounts for 60%. The French, along with the remainder of the eurozone, clearly profit off of the CFA franc.

Many African economists and politicians acknowledge these flaws, yet the question of how to move forward still remains. The French have responded to the protestations of their former colonies by supporting the creation of a new multinational African currency independent of the euro, that will incorporate more– and larger–African states, including but not limited to Nigeria. However, this still appears self-serving. There is minimal justification for the existence of a new multinational currency in Sub-Saharan Africa, and as aforementioned, it primarily benefits outsiders. The best interest of the franc zone may be to follow the advice of former World bank director Carlos Lopes. He believes the CFA franc should be tied to a basket of other currencies, including the notoriously undervalued Chinese yuan, or to hover around a target exchange rate with the euro, both which will help to mitigate the overvaluation of the franc, while maintaining the currency as a pillar of stability.

The tragic irony is that France, along with a number of Southern European states, are the victim of the euro in much the same way that the CFA franc is. The euro is too strong for the economies of Southern Europe. Estimates peg overvaluation at 5% in France and 7% in Greece. Furthermore, the emphasis on low inflation within the eurozone is really to the benefit of the booming German bloc, at the expense of countries such as Italy and Greece that desperately need stimulus spending. In terms of real GDP, Italy was the same size in 2016 as it was in 2001. Much like the franc zone, Italy, among other countries, needs to focus on improving employment rates, infrastructure projects, and competitive exports, to ensure growth in coming years.

When comparing eurozone countries to those that chose not to adopt the currency, such as Sweden and Hungary, the results are disappointing at best. National Gross Income (NGI) per capita in the eurozone grew at a rate of 1.65% in 2015, whereas Sweden saw growth rates around 2.72%. Additionally, Hungary, an emerging European economy, witnessed even higher growth rates, with NGI per capita reaching 3.06% in 2015. The success of independent Eastern European economies makes evident the disadvantage Southern Europe suffers being a part of the euro. Furthermore, when examining the eurozone within the global context, it is evident that as a whole they have fallen behind other developed countries. The US economy was just 13% bigger than the eurozone at it’s genesis, but now it is over 27% larger.

So why keep the euro? This question is obviously more nuanced in light of the highly integrated European economy and greater cultural and political ties of the EU, than are present in the franc zone. Brexit, despite not having a monetary element, should be evidence enough that disintegration is not a feasible option for Europe at this point. However, the shortcomings of the euro must still be recognized. The euro, rather than being of overt benefit to a neocolonial power as the franc is, does disproportionately benefit Germany. The significant undervaluation of the euro in Germany (about 17%) makes its exports extremely competitive and creates greater economic prosperity. Unfortunately, this leads to a vicious cycle where Germany becomes more and more prosperous and the ECB creates tighter monetary policies to adjust for German strength (ie higher interest rates), all while neglecting the needs of the weaker economies in the eurozone. For the benefit of not only the European project, but the 147 million people who use the CFA franc, the Germans should ease their tyrannical monetary policy and cozy relationship with the ECB.

Realistically however, the prospects of Germany doing this are unfavorable, and as a result the euro’s most likely fate seems to be an eventual phase out. The currency once intended to unite Europe, has since contributed to the very economic stagnation and rise of isolationism that will eventually be its demise. But perhaps this is to be expected when inflicting stringent monetary policy on nations with diverse economic needs and dissonant fiscal policies. It may be time to reconsider multinational currencies as a whole.

March 15, 2019 0 comment

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Africa Featured Globalization International Trade

China’s Strategic African Exploitation

written by Tala Ahmadi

The minibus violently jostled left and right as we hit a road under construction. Awoken from my nap, I looked out the window half asleep. I figured I must still be dreaming as we passed Chinese signs, Chinese workers and Chinese machinery– wasn’t I in the West African country of Ghana? While accustomed to encountering diversity in Africa’s globalized metropolises, I was surprised to find a Chinese presence at a construction project en route to a small village in rural Ghana. As I traveled to more African countries, the image of Chinese investments against the continent’s cities and landscapes was a frequent recurrence.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has aggressively positioned itself in Africa through a host of economic activities ranging from infrastructure projects, construction, mining, social services, restaurants, retail and more. In what President Xi Jinping has deemed a “win-win” relationship, China extracts natural resources from the continent to fuel its economic development in exchange for cheap manufactured goods, roads, schools, hospitals, railways and more. A testament to its foreign policy commitment of “Go Global,” China surpassed the United States (US) as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009.

China’s appetite to forge international partnerships comes at a time when rising populism has forced many Western countries to look inward, with President Donald Trump notably proposing to cut foreign aid by one-third. The economic powerhouse is also ramping up its activities in Latin America in light of a diminishing US presence, doling out more development finance than the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation combined. China has also set its eye on the Middle East, releasing its first Arab Policy Paper which describes how the country hopes to increase trade with the region mostly in exchange for oil.

By pouring $2.25 billion into Africa annually, China has positioned itself as a viable, and often more attractive, alternative to traditional Western aid and development organizations. Chinese money is accompanied by a policy of no interference, meaning few strings are attached for the recipient country besides access to natural resources or a local market. Unlike Western money that often comes with conditionalities like enforcing good governance, human rights or environmental protection, Chinese aid is doled out efficiently and projects are often completed on schedule or earlier. Their non-interference policy also means that the Chinese are willing to indulge African despots that many Western development organizations dare not. One such dictator includes Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s dictator that is purportedly using Chinese funds to increase surveillance capacities rather than assisting the 72% of Zimbabweans who live in poverty (national poverty line).

China has been criticized by many Western countries and media outlets as a neo-colonial force that disregards local labor regulations, funds dictatorial leaders, destroys local markets and invests in construction projects that lack quality and lifetime in the name of profit. While these accusations are valid, China is providing desperately needed infrastructure to a continent that still struggles to achieve fundamental levels of development even after the $30 billion in aid Africa has received since the 1970s. Western development agencies are known for their bureaucratic and top down approach to development that often imposes, unsuccessfully for the most part, western cultural norms and institutions on a continent that frequently does not share the same values. The Chinese have been able to successfully execute projects that Africans can make use of like roads, schools and hospitals.

China’s African foreign policy strategy is deeper than the superficial goal of economic exploitation or neo-colonialism. In light of shifting global paradigms, where the US seems more and more like a decaying empire, China is seeking to build strategic partnerships across the continent that result in international signs of support like at the United Nations. In fact, one of China’s first projects in Africa was the construction of the Tazara railway in the 1970s, connecting Tanzania to Zambia. In exchange for the railway, China required support at the UN to be reinstated in the Security Council. AidData reveals that for every 10% increase in voting support at the UN, China increases aid by 86%. Another bargaining chip for access to Chinese money is often international recognition of China over Taiwan, which most recently occurred with the small, African island country of Sao Tome and Principe.

Another indication that China seeks strategic alliances rather than a form of pure exploitation is China’s establishment of the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. During the most recent FOCAC in 2015, where 50 African leaders attended compared to four in the first forum, President Xi promised $60 billion investment in Africa. In 2013, President Xi also revealed his One Belt, One Road initiative, an ambitious vision with a $1.6 trillion price tag, linking Asia, Africa and the Middle East’s trade routes to create a stronger Eastern trade bloc. Perhaps a flex of its geopolitical muscle and a wink to the West, China started building its first African military base in Djibouti— only about ten miles from the US’ largest African military base.

China is presenting itself as a champion of the East and an alternative option for financing the development of emerging economies. While characteristics of China’s foreign policy are accurately likened to economic exploitation, it appears China’s deeper goal in Africa is to forge lasting partnerships in exchange for political loyalty. This may also be influenced by the fact that the longevity of the Sino-African “win, win” relationship is contingent on the Chinese economy’s success. With Chinese economic growth consistently slowing and commodity prices fluctuating, a purely economic agenda may not be sustainable. China presents itself to African nations as an example of an alternative model for climbing out of poverty, an easier and more efficient financing partner and a global leader rivaling the Western hegemonic power structure. A testament to their attempt at cultivating an international image of partnership and leadership, the Chinese Ambassador to Ghana recently commented on the One Belt, One Road initiative, “The belt and road initiative comes from China, yet it belongs to the world.”

August 6, 2017 0 comment

Violence Against Women Source

Africa Featured Society and Culture Women's Rights

Domestic Violence in Ghana: Socially Accepted and Judicially Trivialized

written by Tala Ahmadi

The West African country of Ghana’s deeply entrenched patriarchal culture, where the husband’s exclusive rights to his wife trump her own, condones domestic violence. Most Ghanaian women are told that to be successful in life, they must find a husband and serve him adequately by fulfilling gender roles and continuing his lineage. Wives are told to be socially smaller than their husbands, who are their superiors, breadwinners and protectors. Across all the hundreds of ethnic groups in Ghana, women are viewed as inferior to men. One of the many social dimensions arising from this gendered culture includes an acceptance of domestic violence. The few women that legally report their instances of abuse are supposed to be supported by Ghana’s Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU), a branch of the Ghana Police Services. However, Ghanaian women still face extreme obstacles in preventing and reporting domestic violence as well as seeking and receiving justice from the Ghanaian criminal system. Despite the normal inefficiencies that plague most of Ghana’s institutions (the DOVVSU does not even have a website), the root of the Unit’s ineffectiveness remains Ghana’s deeply entrenched gendered culture.

Traditionally, when women are born they belong to their fathers. Once married, their cultural property title moves to their husband and his family— a sister-in-law can refer to her husband’s wife as, “my wife.” If a wife is disobedient, which includes failing to fulfill her traditional obligations like cooking, cleaning, taking care of children and being sexually available whenever her husband desires, domestic violence is often socially accepted by both men and women. According to Ghana’s 2003 Demographic and Health Survey,19.8% of men and 34% of women found it socially acceptable for a husband to beat his wife if she went out without telling him. The survey also showed that 10.1% of men and 19.9% of women considered it acceptable for a husband to beat his wife for refusing to have sex with him. These statistics are unfortunately not unique to Ghana and are part of an international and regional epidemic.

Within West Africa, domestic violence is widespread and often legally allowed. Globally, 30% of women experience violence from intimate partners and 36.6% of African women experience lifetime intimate partner violence. Section 55(1)(d) of Nigeria’s Penal Code legally condones an assault by a husband on his wife for, “the purpose of correcting his wife, such husband and wife being subject to any native law or custom in which such correction is recognized as lawful.” Spousal rape is also not criminalized in Togo, Ghana’s neighbor. In Benin, 68.6% of women experience violence at the hands of men, and 69.5% of those perpetrators are spouses or partners. One in four women in Senegal are victims of domestic abuse. These high statistics are the consequence of deeply gendered cultures where domestic abuse is socially accepted and frequently legal.

These embedded cultural norms were challenged in the past four decades by a global wave of women’s rights advocacy. Several international and regional treaties, bills, covenants and conventions geared towards women’s rights were adopted, including the UN’s notable Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. One of Ghana’s responses to this push included establishing the DOVVSU in February 2007. However, women who seek the DOVVSU’s support are often discouraged to report their claims and rarely see their spouses brought to justice. The DOVVSU fails in its mission to provide victims with adequate support services because it remains shackled to Ghana’s patriarchal culture.

Many Ghanaians traditionally believe that domestic abuse should be resolved within the household rather than externally via the justice system. This mindset causes judges to trivialize domestic violence cases or pressure women to drop their claims. Often times, Ghanaian women are too embarrassed, disheartened or discouraged to even report their cases of abuse—95% of Ghanaian women who have been raped do not report the incident. Even when women do pursue criminal charges many of their claims never get sent to court, they experience societal shaming and hardly any cases lead to convictions. A statistic from 2010 found that out of 12,706 cases in the country, only 954 were sent to court and of those only 118 convictions were obtained. These numbers are unacceptable given that the DOVVSU’s intent is to provide victims with the support necessary to seek justice. In actuality, those who are entrusted with the power to help victims find justice convince and encourage women to drop their claims and return to their abusive relationships to avoid disturbing the peace of their communities.

Another traditional belief contributing to the DOVVSU’s ineffectiveness and the prevalence of domestic violence is the cultural mindset that marriage equals consent. A 2007 survey found that 20.6% of Ghanaian women have experienced intimate partner violence in their lifetime and 44.5% have experienced physical and/or sexual abuse from intimate partners and/or non-partners in their lifetime. These high numbers are not surprising considering until 2007, Ghanaian Criminal Code section 42 (g) explicitly allowed marital rape by stating, “the consent given by a husband or wife at marriage, for the purposes of marriage, cannot be revoked until the parties are divorced or separated by a judgment or decree of a competent Court.” After the DOVVSU was established, section 42 (g) was revised to state, “The use of violence in the domestic setting is not justified on the basis of consent.” While the changes imply husbands can be criminally prosecuted for marital rape, there is no direct prohibition of marital rape statutorily in the Ghanaian Criminal Code. In addition, the revision in the law has yet to change cultural and patriarchal mindsets that contribute to the extent of marital rape and the attitudes of law enforcement officers who trivialize domestic violence cases.

The DOVVSU’s establishment marked a significant first step in improving the Ghanaian domestic violence landscape, however its effectiveness is marred by prevailing cultural norms. How can Ghana create an effective DOVVSU when major sources of its inadequacy are beliefs that can only be changed with time? This is a difficult question to answer, but the solution must include more rigorous sensitivity training for judges, police officers and leaders of communities, national emphasis on the issue and increased marketing about the DOVVSU. Queen mothers, who are the female leaders of many Ghanaian communities and dedicated advocates for women and children, and DOVVSU representatives should organize community discussions about gender roles and domestic violence. Similar conversations should be conducted in classrooms so from a young age children can start a normally nonexistent discussion regarding domestic abuse. Queen mothers should also spearhead female support groups as forums for women to talk freely about sexism and gender roles. Female focused NGOs must also work with Queen mothers and take advantage of their unique position with women and children. These open conversations regarding gender constructs and their societal influence will work to challenge the prevailing norms and change the mindsets that leave many Ghanaian women disentitled to their own bodies.

May 26, 2016 4 comments

Africa Featured Security and Conflict

Laurent Gbagbo and the Future of the International Criminal Court

written by Holt Alden

In November 2010 Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo lost the presidential election to rival Alassane Ouattara in an extremely tight and fiercely contested race. Gbagbo refused to step down, denying the results of the election, while Ouattara, as well as the Ivory Coast’s Constitutional Council and international leaders, claimed Gbagbo had lost. The stand-off continued for months as violence spread in Abidjan, the nation’s capital. Gbagbo supporters were accused of murdering civilians from the opposition party and burning people alive, while others claimed pro-Ouattara groups also engaged in human rights abuses. By April of 2011 more than 3,000 people had died and claims of crimes against humanity surfaced in the international press. Soon after, Gbagbo was arrested and extradited to The Hague where he awaited trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). This January, Gbagbo’s trial began and is still ongoing. Ouattara on the other hand, has not been charged, leading to pro-Gbagbo groups joining the chorus of critical opposition to ICC indictments, its current justice process and the court itself.

The Gbagbo case marks an integral test for the ICC’s effectiveness and legitimacy, as it exemplifies both the potential importance of the ICC in prosecuting heinous crimes and the problems associated with a supranational criminal court that tries individuals. The high-profile nature of the trial is also important, as it turns international media focus to the ICC and allows for a close inspection of how the court has evolved since opening in 2002.

The ICC–currently supported by 123 nations–was established through the Rome Statute with the mandate of prosecuting cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression and crimes against humanity. However, since 2002 the ICC has only completed twelve proceedings, resulting in two convictions. Gbagbo is the first former head of state to reach trial at the ICC, making this a landmark case for the court. The case’s high-profile status will test the ICC’s ability to act effectively and justly under intense scrutiny.

One of the most common issues surrounding the ICC is the possibility of political manipulation and unbalanced use of judicial power. The explicit purpose of the ICC is to fight impunity in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity; moreover, as a criminal court, it is also meant to prevent retaliatory vengeance by monopolizing legitimate justice. Gbagbo may have incited the violence in Ivory Coast by refusing to step down from the presidency, but the accusations that Ouattara groups also assaulted and murdered civilians shows that, in this instance, the ICC’s theoretical premise of preventing vengeance failed. The threat of punishment from the ICC did not stop Ouattara groups from attacking Gbagbo supporters. That being said, an increased efficiency in the court and the cooperation of international leaders in apprehending those indicted by the ICC may inhibit future groups from retaliating with violence. Prosecuting Gbagbo fairly, while also thoroughly investigating Ouattara and his actions in 2010-2011, would show the world there will not be impunity for similar crimes nor violent and heinous reactions from the victims.

Critics of the court, including pro-Gbagbo groups, also cite imbalanced investigations and prosecutions, as well as negative African bias. So far, the ICC has failed to adequately investigate Ouattara’s influence on the unrest, even as news reports claim both Gbagbo and Ouattara’s forces perpetrated extreme violence in the months following the presidential election in 2010. In this vein, the court is caught between domestic groups hoping the ICC can provide justice and others, such as African leaders, who critique neocolonial tendencies and bias. The Gbagbo case also continues the ICC’s questionable record of only indicting Africans, which must change. Much of Africa is mired in violence, as seen in the cases of Joseph Kony and others, but there are many conflicts outside the continent that deserve equal investigation. For instance, there is much evidence that Bashar al-Assad’s regime perpetrated crimes against humanity in Syria. France is currently investigating Assad’s possible war crimes, though it would show a strong commitment to unbiased justice if the ICC were to indict him as well. Each of these elements fuel claims that the ICC lacks legitimacy as an impartial justice institution.

The Gbagbo case alone will not solve these issues but a focus on thoroughness and unbiased justice for all those involved, as well as others in similar conflicts, will create an opportunity for legitimacy. Each of the previous critiques is important and relevant, yet they must not spell the closing of the ICC. Here, the importance of Gbagbo and the Ivory Coast becomes evident. Gbagbo’s trial is an important first step toward justice for those involved in the violence in Ivory Coast but it is only the beginning of a long process. The ICC’s investigation into possible violent crimes by Ouattara and his supporters groups is ongoing; investigations that involve issues of national sovereignty or that scrutinize governments currently in power are time-intensive and must be treated with patience.

Although the ICC’s negative African bias should be criticized, the court only has a short history of indictments. The method and focus of their investigations can easily be changed to incorporate trends of equality and objectiveness regarding who is charged and tried. Laws that are enforced unevenly are often illegitimate and discriminatory, which makes it imperative that the ICC broaden its gaze beyond Africa. Indicting Bashar al-Assad would be a promising step forward, showing the ICC’s commitment to equality under the law.

The ICC’s implicit narrative of vengeance prevention should also be looked at from a broader, long-term perspective. Many cases of crimes against humanity or genocide stem from intra-state conflicts or civil wars. The court will not be able to stop violent acts of retaliation by immediately indicting and trying national leaders. If the ICC gains legitimacy and more countries sign the Rome Statute, retaliation by victims in these horrific instances may be prevented. As the ICC grows into a meaningful supranational criminal court, its full body of work and unbiased effectiveness in prosecuting violent criminals should provide these incentives against vengeance. Victims of heinous crimes will feel confident that their persecutors will be brought to justice and will not think it necessary to seek out individual revenge. The successful prosecution of Gbagbo and a non-partisan investigation of Ouattara’s actions may be the first step in ending any future attempts at retribution.

The Gbagbo case allows the ICC an opportunity to prove to the world that it has grown and evolved over the past fourteen years. The international community must also pay attention, without focusing on the court’s failures or shortcomings. We must instead comment with a critical eye and support change that will allow the ICC to be more effective and just. The ICC is unlike any other criminal court or international institution created and it is still in its earliest stage. In order to reach the ultimate goal of denying impunity to warlords and leaders who commit crimes against humanity, the court must be allowed to push through growing pains and mold itself to the nuances of the world in which we currently live.

April 4, 2016 0 comment

Africa Featured Security Security and Conflict

The Unnoticed Conflict in the Central African Republic

written by thegeneration

While news networks have assiduously covered the tumultuous events taking place in countries like Syria and Ukraine, the media has largely seemed indifferent to a similar conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR). As a result, much of the international public is unaware of a rapidly deteriorating situation. While camera lenses focus on places like the Middle East and Eastern Europe, this struggling African nation is being pushed further toward widespread slaughter. Increased media coverage of CAR is absolutely essential to spur the international community into action, inspiring them to do something rather than remain in a state of blissful ignorance.

Although the current episode of violence in CAR began in 2012, the country has had an unstable history since it declared independence from France in 1960. Corruption in government and a lack of political stability has led to numerous regime changes, coups, and counter-coups. The current conflict, though ostensibly between Muslims and Christians, is not truly a religious war. Rather, it is one stemming from mistrust and hopelessness. Feelings of political disenfranchisement and frustration born out of lack of economic and educational opportunity has led many Central Africans to join militias, often organized along religious cleavages. As a result, normal citizens have taken up arms, killing, pillaging and driving their fellow countrymen from their homes. The fact that no more recent survey has taken place than an Associated Press tally from September of last year speaks volumes about the lack of coverage. That outdated poll shows that more than 5,000 Central Africans have fallen victim to sectarian violence, a figure up more than 150% from the UN‘s April 2014 estimate issued along with their approval of the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission. According to a European Commission report released late last year, another 500,000 plus Central Africans have been internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands have fled to neighboring countries. CAR’s entire population is only about 4.5 million. The sobering reality is that more than one out of every five Central Africans has been uprooted and forced from the security of home and routine into sometimes uncertain, often horrific living conditions. Clearly, the conflict has not been contained, let alone resolved.

The UN’s charter gives as one of its primary objectives the maintenance of “international peace and security.” Thus, the UN bears some of the blame for the lack of progress in solving thecurrent situation. However, the UN derives its power from member states. Without cooperation and active involvement from individual nations, the UN’s ability to respond to world crises is severely undermined. In 2013, several nations expressed hesitance during the planning stages for intervention in CAR; the UK placed higher priority on funding an African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia, while the US balked at the potential cost of putting the plan into effect.

As far as individual nations taking on a leading peacekeeping role, France has displayed some willingness, and currently has about 2,000 troops in CAR. However, the country’s colonial history in CAR has produced resentment and accusations of favoring Christian victims over their Muslim counterparts. Resolving the conflict clearly requires wider cooperation and participation by more neutral participants –ideally both Christian and Muslim nations– whether it comes in the form of funding or manpower. And yet, the response from other leading nations continues to be subdued at best.

Although funding for funding for humanitarian aid has trickled in little by little, there is still a significant deficit. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the 2014 response plan for CAR is 40% short of promised funds; in other words, humanitarian efforts are operating with $220 million less than needed. With the number of displaced Central Africans growing steadily, increased spending, involvement, and coordinated efforts from members of the UN is vital to moving towards a solution.

Could it be possible that the events in CAR attract such little attention from world leaders, because they see nothing material to be gained in intervening there? CAR is not oil rich. Wood, not a particularly coveted resource, makes up 60% of the country’s exports. Further, CAR’s location offers no real strategic advantage; it is landlocked and military bases there would offer little benefit. Without any incentives to motivate them, any nation that intervened in CAR would have to act out of altruism. Needless to say, this hurts the African nation’s chances of receiving help.

However, the UN and its member states are not the only ones able to effect change in CAR. Just as the nations that make up the UN give it power, and influence its decisions, the citizens of those nations can influence their own government’s actions. The international public’s awareness of a conflict certainly plays a considerable role in conflict resolution. A sympathetic and active public can exert pressure on their governments to enact top-down solutions to the conflict, while supporting efforts in CAR by donating to humanitarian organizations on the ground. The international public has thus far failed CAR. On some level, this is understandable. Economic conditions hamper the average person’s ability to make the donations that non-profits rely on to provide relief. Further, citizens confronted with rapid-fire elections often confront the same kind of fatigue that may be at work here. Higher-profile world crises may drain the public willingness to respond to less visible conflicts like the one in CAR. While it is understandable that the citizens of many privileged nations are exhausted from intervening in foreign countries, one must look no further than Rwanda for a history lesson on just how quickly and severely a forgotten conflict like the one in CAR can escalate.

Whether it is the sight of entire cities reduced to rubble in Syria, the return to the international stage of an expansionist Russia, or the paranoia and fear brought on by the spread of Ebola, other stories have monopolized the world’s attention. Considering the gravity of the situation in CAR, why don’t our morning papers jolt us awake with grim pictures of militia members wielding machetes?The answer is they and their readers or viewers have already moved on to newer, fresher disasters and atrocities. Instead of shedding light on the conflict in CAR, the media has largely forgotten it, allowing the situation there to quietly unravel.

If the public is to be roused to insist on action in CAR, the media must play a critical role by providing more coverage. Instead of paragraph-long updates published on the 12^th page of a newspaper or relegated to an unvisited corner of a news website, resolving the conflict in CAR requires feature pieces and exposés. If media coverage turned in the direction of exposing the misery of everyday life and the scarcity of essential, life-sustaining resources, the press could awaken human sympathy, stirring high-profile celebrities, powerful officials, and normal citizens alike to act. This surge of human energy and involvement could be a vital force in ending not just the conflict in CAR, but also many others in the often forgotten continent of Africa.

By Penn Scoble

March 15, 2015 0 comment

Africa Featured Society and Culture The International Economy

Old Problems, New Scapegoats

written by Erica Anjum

By Erica Anjum

Africa is a continent of profound diversity. Nonetheless, many African countries share something in common: most are considered “underdeveloped.” While there have been several theories advanced as to why, recently some African politicians have suggested that homosexuality is to blame for Africa’s problems.

Many African states have long had anti-gay laws in place, but for the most part, they remained neglected. However, 2014 witnessed the passing of new laws and the implementation of old ones in several states. For example, the Kenyan Penal Code defines “…carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature…” as a felony punishable with up to 21 years of imprisonment. While this law has existed for decades, Kenya has only recently undertaken aggressive enforcement. Meanwhile, on January 7, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan signed a new law prohibiting same-sex marriage. Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni followed suit and signed a similar law into effect only a month later.

These laws go well beyond banning gay-marriage. For instance, in Nigeria, any show of love between two people of the same sex can now earn offenders up to ten years in jail. In Uganda, the death penalty was originally proposed as a punishment for same-sex relationships. This was ultimately changed to life in prison before being passed. Moreover, authorities frequently deny bail to individuals arrested on charges of homosexuality.

Politicians and legislators are not the only ones expressing anti-gay sentiments. Animosity seems widespread amongst the general public. For instance, Bauchi State in Northern Nigeria follows both the Western style penal code and Sharia law (by which sodomy is punishable with death by stoning). Earlier this year in Bauchi, thousands of protesters gathered outside the trial of seven men who allegedly belonged to gay organizations. As the mob turned violent and began throwing stones at the accused, the judge halted the hearing and ordered the guards to return the defendants back to the safety of the prison.

Similar events have unfolded in many African countries, coupled with a growing focus on anti-gay laws. What explains the recent trend in targeting homosexual behavior?

Kwado Osei-Opare, a Ghanaian doctoral student in UCLA’s History Department, points out that it is important to remember that homosexuality is not new to Africa. Throughout history, African societies have tolerated, or at least ignored, some forms of LGBTQ relations. The yan daudu subculture in northern Nigeria is one such example. Yan daudu translates to “men who act like women” and members have peacefully coexisted with the Hausa Muslim communities in the North for over a century. The recent legislation and social hostility has broken that peace. Osei-Opare suggests that Western colonial powers first introduced the labels and negative attitudes towards homesexuality currently prevalent. These norms were eventually institutionalized. He points out that, ironically, much of the international pressure on African Governments to protect gay rights now stems from ex-colonial powers.

One theory analyzing the current trend suggests that the recent expansion of anti-gay sentiment stems from a continuance of culture clash between Western and traditional African values. However, the situation may not be that simple.

The recent wave of anti-gay legislation can also be viewed as an attempt to divert attention from the political, economic, and social issues national leaders have thus far failed to mitigate. In many of these states, while politicians have employed corrupt means to privately profit from national resources and revenues, the government has failed to deliver on promises to citizens for better lives. For example, Nigeria has an abundance of natural resources, most notably oil. While such abundance should improve the lives of citizens, profits from oil have primarily benefited a handful of elites. Politicians have lined their own pockets, sharing the wealth with a few select supporters. Meanwhile, many Nigerians struggle to make ends meet. General awareness of such practices have resulted in political leaders losing support and credibility over the years.

Within this context, advancing anti-gay laws have provided a way for politicians to distract the public from the problem of corruption and simultaneously rebuild a dying support base. For instance, Museveni’s support of the new anti-gay bill is one of his few actions that has garnered popular approval from Ugandans as of late. This strategy has enjoyed success because, unfortunately, despite their awareness of corruption citizens often have no power to increase government accountability and effectiveness. Lacking outlets, they focus their frustrations on other issues and sometimes lash out against each other. Political leaders have made the most of this. While they privately profit through corruption, leaders publicly express their opinions against homosexuality and sign laws into place. The LGBTQ community thus serves as the most recent distraction and scapegoat for problems that have long plagued many African states.

While some of the recent developments stem from endogenous factors, the clash between Western norms and traditional values have shaped events in important ways. Many Western nations have expressed alarm over recent developments. The United States government has been fairly conservative on the topic: President Obama’s response has been limited to reiterating that Americans value equal rights for all. His administration has also set aside $3 million for organizations dedicated to protecting gay rights in other countries. Britain, on the other hand, has been much more aggressive. Prime Minister David Cameron recently declared that Britain would begin to withdraw aid if African leaders continued to support anti-gay legislation.

Unfortunately, such statements may have caused more harm than good. Although Cameron initially directed his statement at Ghanaian President John Atlas Mills, leaders and citizens from many African states have responded in outrage. In an already tense atmosphere, Cameron’s statement has served as a rallying point. Some people care about the LGBTQ issues, but others are more perturbed by what they perceive as continuing Western interventionism and bullying. Many Africans have consequently interpreted Cameron’s statement as an attempt to superimpose Western values on traditional African societies and as an affront to national autonomy. Furthermore, African citizens and leaders have been especially critical of the fact that the same countries that are attacking African policies have failed to agree on these issues within their own borders.

There is a striking difference, of course, between unresolved debates over gay marriage (such as those ongoing in the United States) and discussions surrounding life imprisonment and the death penalty. The latter is viewed internationally as an affront to fundamental human rights. Despite national claims to autonomy, African states willingly participate as members of the global community. This membership can render many benefits, but it also entails a special relationship between national autonomy and international norms. Members are expected to adhere to internationally established guidelines such as human rights laws. At the least, each country may be subjected to scrutiny over how international norms are embodied within national politics.

In the face of such scrutiny, accusing Western states of cultural hegemony adds nothing of value to the argument. African leaders and peoples have complained in the past that even in the post-colonial era, they continue to be marginalized from world politics and treated as recipients rather than partners. If African nations wish to author a new story, they must join the conversation rather than retreating behind stale boundaries between western and traditional values.

May 20, 2014 0 comment

Africa Featured Society and Culture

Battle on a New Front: Chinese Media in Africa

written by thegeneration

by Rujuta Gandhi
Editor

First, China constructed multibillion-dollar cities, or ghost cities, dubbed as such because of the empty high-rises, parking lots, and playgrounds. Then, it “gifted” the $200 billion African Union headquarters. Now, China Daily, a global Chinese newspaper, blesses the continent with its Africa edition. Why is China burdening itself with a responsibility to develop Africa, and why expand its media presence? Perhaps the communist nation hopes to find amity by extending a hand of friendship—a gesture riddled with soft power ambitions.

Slowly developing Chinese media in Africa is a geostrategic move against western media, which already hold the upper hand by bashing Chinese involvement throughout the continent. Since 2008, these sources have increasingly been exposing China’s harmful role—its contribution to the genocide in Darfur is only one example. Non-media sources, such as the book China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, also contribute to this condemnation. Therefore, by establishing a media presence, China hopes to combat what it perceives as “misrepresentations” of its purpose in Africa. Such misconceptions could harm future economic ties and political support in Sino-African relations. Consequently, China is using the media as a tool of soft power.

This power play will help protect China’s future in both the long and short term. In the long term, it is likely that they aim to secure their economic presence and ability to extract natural resources or to resettle their burgeoning population, among other motives. However, in the short term, the government is taking swift action to survive on the new battlefield of state-financed satellite television news, a notion voiced publicly by former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Already, foreign news services, such as France24 and Russia Today, have moved their metaphorical pawns, bishops, and knights to gain ground and mitigate negative images of their respective countries. China is merely following suit.

Xinhua News Agency, China’s state-owned press, established its presence in Africa beginning in the 1970s and now operates more than 20 bureaus continent-wide. In 2011, it began broadcasting a subsidiary television station, CNC World. A year later, the state-run but market-funded Chinese Central Television (CCTV) rooted its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. Most recently (and another year later), China Daily launched its Africa edition. However, both broadcasting companies incorporate heavy biases in favor of China; they highlight social and cultural topics and positive narratives while avoiding controversial ones, including political issues. In the April 12–18, 2013 weekly edition, the article “Strong China-Africa Cooperation Pays,” endeavored to convince Africans that, with China’s aid, Africa can be an “Asian tiger,” while “Good Hair Days” discussed the relationship between women’s hairstyles and social change in China. Furthermore, in an attempt to gain an upper hand on the U.S., the cover story “Advent of a Banking Superpower” was followed with this sub-heading: “Country has massive lead over the United States in terms of availability of savings, says expert.”

The appearance of Chinese media parallels government motives and initiatives. Soon after the decolonization of Africa, the Chinese government began to establish diplomatic relations with African states. With these ties came Xinhua, the Xinhua News Agency’s online newspaper. These actions can arguably be perceived as part of the rewards package for African nations that supported Chinese Security Council membership. From post-colonization until 2000, media coverage contained little substantive analysis.

Since then, the need to increase their soft power drives the Chinese government’s new $7–9 billion policy. During the Chinese-dubbed Year of Africa in 2006, Chinese journalism and media relations were among many of the topics discussed during high-level exchanges and forums. The roadmap effectively institutionalizes soft power by assisting in the development of media infrastructure, revealing a long-term soft power mission to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties.

However, the survival and effectiveness of Chinese media are still questionable. In terms of journalism itself, the government is reportedly exporting its domestic censorship laws, which will likely result in declined legitimacy. On the other hand, China is making strides on the front of public diplomacy and institution-building assistance. Since 2006, Xinhua has trained a growing number of African journalists. Additionally, CNC World and CCTV’s bureaus both employ African journalists (though the executives and editors are Chinese). Meanwhile, the Chinese government provides media equipment as to support institutional development throughout Africa.

If Chinese media advances, Sino-African relations will strengthen. And if western media cannot wage its own soft power to fight back, a continuing shift in global power will be progressively more inevitable as the U.S. may lose ground on the resources and benefits that Africa can offer.

Facts and figures from BBC, China Daily Africa Weekly, and South African Institute for International Affairs.

April 21, 2013 0 comment

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