Photos taken by Generation staff. All rights reserved to The Generation.
The minibus violently jostled left and right as we hit a road under construction. Awoken from my nap, I looked out the window half asleep. I figured I must still be dreaming as we passed Chinese signs, Chinese workers and Chinese machinery– wasn’t I in the West African country of Ghana? While accustomed to encountering diversity in Africa’s globalized metropolises, I was surprised to find a Chinese presence at a construction project en route to a small village in rural Ghana. As I traveled to more African countries, the image of Chinese investments against the continent’s cities and landscapes was a frequent recurrence.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has aggressively positioned itself in Africa through a host of economic activities ranging from infrastructure projects, construction, mining, social services, restaurants, retail and more. In what President Xi Jinping has deemed a “win-win” relationship, China extracts natural resources from the continent to fuel its economic development in exchange for cheap manufactured goods, roads, schools, hospitals, railways and more. A testament to its foreign policy commitment of “Go Global,” China surpassed the United States (US) as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009.
China’s appetite to forge international partnerships comes at a time when rising populism has forced many Western countries to look inward, with President Donald Trump notably proposing to cut foreign aid by one-third. The economic powerhouse is also ramping up its activities in Latin America in light of a diminishing US presence, doling out more development finance than the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation combined. China has also set its eye on the Middle East, releasing its first Arab Policy Paper which describes how the country hopes to increase trade with the region mostly in exchange for oil.
By pouring $2.25 billion into Africa annually, China has positioned itself as a viable, and often more attractive, alternative to traditional Western aid and development organizations. Chinese money is accompanied by a policy of no interference, meaning few strings are attached for the recipient country besides access to natural resources or a local market. Unlike Western money that often comes with conditionalities like enforcing good governance, human rights or environmental protection, Chinese aid is doled out efficiently and projects are often completed on schedule or earlier. Their non-interference policy also means that the Chinese are willing to indulge African despots that many Western development organizations dare not. One such dictator includes Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s dictator that is purportedly using Chinese funds to increase surveillance capacities rather than assisting the 72% of Zimbabweans who live in poverty (national poverty line).
China has been criticized by many Western countries and media outlets as a neo-colonial force that disregards local labor regulations, funds dictatorial leaders, destroys local markets and invests in construction projects that lack quality and lifetime in the name of profit. While these accusations are valid, China is providing desperately needed infrastructure to a continent that still struggles to achieve fundamental levels of development even after the $30 billion in aid Africa has received since the 1970s. Western development agencies are known for their bureaucratic and top down approach to development that often imposes, unsuccessfully for the most part, western cultural norms and institutions on a continent that frequently does not share the same values. The Chinese have been able to successfully execute projects that Africans can make use of like roads, schools and hospitals.
China’s African foreign policy strategy is deeper than the superficial goal of economic exploitation or neo-colonialism. In light of shifting global paradigms, where the US seems more and more like a decaying empire, China is seeking to build strategic partnerships across the continent that result in international signs of support like at the United Nations. In fact, one of China’s first projects in Africa was the construction of the Tazara railway in the 1970s, connecting Tanzania to Zambia. In exchange for the railway, China required support at the UN to be reinstated in the Security Council. AidData reveals that for every 10% increase in voting support at the UN, China increases aid by 86%. Another bargaining chip for access to Chinese money is often international recognition of China over Taiwan, which most recently occurred with the small, African island country of Sao Tome and Principe.
Another indication that China seeks strategic alliances rather than a form of pure exploitation is China’s establishment of the tri-annual Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. During the most recent FOCAC in 2015, where 50 African leaders attended compared to four in the first forum, President Xi promised $60 billion investment in Africa. In 2013, President Xi also revealed his One Belt, One Road initiative, an ambitious vision with a $1.6 trillion price tag, linking Asia, Africa and the Middle East’s trade routes to create a stronger Eastern trade bloc. Perhaps a flex of its geopolitical muscle and a wink to the West, China started building its first African military base in Djibouti— only about ten miles from the US’ largest African military base.
China is presenting itself as a champion of the East and an alternative option for financing the development of emerging economies. While characteristics of China’s foreign policy are accurately likened to economic exploitation, it appears China’s deeper goal in Africa is to forge lasting partnerships in exchange for political loyalty. This may also be influenced by the fact that the longevity of the Sino-African “win, win” relationship is contingent on the Chinese economy’s success. With Chinese economic growth consistently slowing and commodity prices fluctuating, a purely economic agenda may not be sustainable. China presents itself to African nations as an example of an alternative model for climbing out of poverty, an easier and more efficient financing partner and a global leader rivaling the Western hegemonic power structure. A testament to their attempt at cultivating an international image of partnership and leadership, the Chinese Ambassador to Ghana recently commented on the One Belt, One Road initiative, “The belt and road initiative comes from China, yet it belongs to the world.”
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the most revolutionary, comprehensive international agreement that any country has ever signed. Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has pursued a general policy of trade liberalization, and President Reagan began to more aggressively do so in the 1980s. This kicked off a new era of globalization largely defined by increasingly interconnected nations, cultures, and markets that continues to this day, and has come to define the world community. Unfortunately, this manner of embracing globalization through trade does not account for many of the most important societal developments and issues today. Instead, it favors an almost purely “economy-first” approach. In an age of rapid globalization-driven policy reforms, the TPP provides promising insights into potential future changes and new directions the expanding process of international interdependency could take.
The TPP is a proposed agreement between twelve Pacific Rim nations that account for nearly forty percent of global GDP, with a value of intra-group trade at $2.08 trillion in 2014. The 5,500 page agreement contains thirty chapters on topics ranging from E-commerce to Investment to Intellectual Property. Although the reduction in barriers to trade is highly impactful and affects roughly 18,000 tariffs, the TPP goes beyond just trade liberalization. The TPP represents a historic move towards a more modernized and globalized society, and indicates a shift away from solely economic-based policy towards a more responsible global framework.
The TPP attempts to address modern challenges at the forefront of recent international debates. A prominent example of how the TPP is the most advanced, modern international agreement is the twentieth chapter, “Environment.” Many of the United States’ FTAs have included environmental provisions; however, these provisions have been rather toothless. The US-Australia FTA, for example, essentially contains an agreement to comply with the existing environmental transparency laws and excludes those laws from the agreement’s dispute settlement provisions. Japan, one of the most environmentally responsible countries in the world, has signed 24 FTAs (sometimes called Economic Partnership Agreements) and not a single one contains an environmental chapter or even a side agreement on environmentally responsible policy. Requirements within the TPP Environment chapter, like the ban on subsidizing fishing of overfished stocks, are subject to the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanisms. This means states will punish others for non-compliance. This new, more mandatory approach is indicative of a new set of policy initiatives aimed at pursuing a more conscientious form of globalization.
There are countless other sections in the Trans Pacific Partnership that represent unprecedented advances in achieving transnational regulatory harmonization. Nevertheless, there are plenty of counter-arguments cited as rationale for not signing the TPP. Liberal Democrats worry the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions will undermine the environment chapter, though even if they did that’s hardly an effective argument for tossing the agreement altogether. It’s better to have environmental protections that very occasionally are difficult to enforce than to have absolutely none at all. Moreover, some members of the U.S. Congress from both parties tend to argue (rather loudly and simplistically) that TPP will destroy jobs, even though anyone with even a basic understanding of economics knows that the effects of free trade on employment are far more complex and nuanced. Yes, liberalization of trade destroys jobs in certain industries. This is through a process known as “job churn,” by which liberalizing trade disrupts employment to the detriment of some industries and the benefit others. Critically, though, the number of jobs lost is outweighed by the number of jobs created by liberalizing trade. Perhaps that’s why most experts say that although some jobs, mainly manufacturing ones, will be lost due to the TPP, a higher amount of jobs will be created, and in higher-paying industries. These are just some of the many hotly contested issues that abound discussions on the TPP.
One can find countless responses to the vast majority of arguments in favor of ratifying the TPP. However, there is one main argument in favor of TPP that its opponents have yet to devise a viable counter-argument to: Failing to sign the TPP cedes the strategic and economic high ground to China, and potentially destroys any opportunity for spreading progressive regulation to some of the key economic powers in the world.
A common mistake made when analyzing the TPP is assuming a failure to ratify is tantamount to preservation of the status quo. It is very much not. As the US Congress quibbles over whether or not to ratify TPP, China is vehemently pushing an economic agenda of its own in East and Southeast Asia. For years, China has been racing to complete the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). RCEP includes all the TPP nations outside the Americas, in addition to India, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Taken in terms of population, RCEP nations account for nearly half of the world’s population. Crucially, RCEP includes virtually none of the countless progressive, modern regulatory advancements provided for in the TPP, like environmental protections, and would allow China to dictate the terms of economic activity for 50% of the world, leaving the United States to play by someone else’s far less comprehensive rules in Asia and elsewhere. In short, RCEP represents the sort of economy-first approach to international cooperation that has, for decades, failed to address some of the most pressing issues facing the global population.
Failing to ratify TPP and allowing RCEP to become to law of land in the world’s fastest-growing region would be nothing short of a catastrophe. Liberal Democrats would never see the improvements in human rights, labor, and environmental standards that they so-love to complain the TPP lacks. Conservative Republicans would have actively participated in the act of ceding greater economic authority to China, which they and their presidential candidate erroneously attribute much of America’s problems to; and the world would remain on its current course of globalizing trade that has failed to solve so many paramount issues.
This article says little of the highly complex economic implications of the agreement that both proponents and opponents often oversimplify to advance their positions. The TPP’s ratification, unfortunately, is far from guaranteed and if ratified, it will be some time before the public can get beyond mere projections and truly begin observing tangible impacts. This article is simply a recognition that in the era of rapid and seemingly uncontrollable globalization and ever-changing centers of economic growth, the TPP provides the global citizenry with a glimpse into one potential future of international cooperation. The TPP transcends the economic metrics and market-based approaches that have dominated international cooperation for decades, and endeavors to fundamentally improve the manner in which governments around the world embrace the phenomenon of globalization.
Last month, a Chinese delegation of engineers and contractors came to Los Angeles to explore the possibility of starting a waste management facility. Before they asked about investment opportunities and local regulations, their first question was about the likelihood of their potential investment running afoul with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS is a little-known agency that reviews foreign transactions that could result in control of an American business. Under President George W. Bush, it notably blocked Dubai Ports World’s attempted acquisition of six US ports, including the Port of New York and New Jersey. More recently, in 2012, CFIUS required Chinese-owned Ralls Corporation to retroactively divest from a wind farm in proximity to a military facility without due process; both settled the resulting suit in 2015.
US-China investments are, not surprisingly, filled with controversy. Business and commerce are becoming an increasing part of the countries’ rivalry. Both countries accuse each other of economic hostilities. China accuses the US of encirclement with the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and electronic intelligence collection in the country. The US accuses China of intellectual property violations and cyber and industrial espionage. The suspicion has led many in America to become wary of China’s investments, especially in military-sensitive areas like semiconductors. In February, Fairchild Semiconductors rejected a Chinese acquisition offer for an inferior US offer because of possible CFIUS intervention. In 2015, Tsinghua Holdings, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) invested in by Tsinghua University, attempted to purchase a number of semiconductor enterprises including a bid for a unit of Philips. Philips rejected the deal over concerns expressed by CFIUS revolving around gallium nitride, a next-generation microchip material, which US anti-air Patriot Missile systems use. These issues with Chinese investments partly stem from the fundamental economic nature of the Chinese state.
The Chinese state is very much an economic state, with the line between politics and business frequently blurred. SOEs consist of over 40 percent of China’s non-agricultural GDP. Even after extensive privatization within the past few decades, SOEs continue to occupy a significant position of power as strategic “pillars” of the economy; economic success is political success. Top executives of key SOEs are privileged with red phones that connect directly with China’s party elite and other SOE executives. The Chinese state frequently promotes “national champions,” companies that not only seek profit but also support national interests. SOEs are normally supported to keep an economic sector Chinese, or secure sectors like steel and telecommunications from failure. For example, UnionPay is considered “the champ of all national champions” by dominating the Chinese credit card industry as a monopoly. Critics attribute UnionPay’s supremacy to state protection with unwarranted foreign entry bans. It is easy to see the incentives for the Chinese to conduct industrial espionage if the state is literally invested in the economy. With an intimate state-business relationship, US concerns will not easily be mollified as Chinese investments continue to increase.
Fortunately, a US-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) that has been under negotiation since 2013 seems to be reaching its conclusion this year. Its details are not yet available to the public but the agreement could potentially offer clarity and protection to investors on both sides of the Pacific with clearer CFIUS determination criteria for foreign investors and proper regulations on SOE investments to alleviate American fears. By working out a proper agreement, legitimate investors will be able to make efficient economic decisions rather than take on suboptimal investments they think will be approved by CFIUS. But, as the Presidential election cycle winds up this year, more anti-trade and anti-treaty sentiments will rise. Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican candidate, has tapped and fomented anti-Chinese sentiments with vitriolic attacks on bilateral trade and economic relations, threatening the BIT’s future. This is a shame. The US stands to benefit the most from foreign direct investment because of its low domestic savings and, in some cases, by allowing investments to resurrect local economies. In setting up mutually agreed upon rules, both countries may reduce the mayhem and accusations that inhibit business and investment as well as a robust US-China relationship. Such stability will allow investors like last month’s waste delegation to first ask how their investment will thrive rather than how it will survive.
Will the “pan-democrat” camp of Hong Kong (HK) settle for anything short of “democracy” and “political sovereignty” from mainland China? Can there be a fair compromise? What influence still remains of the slogan “one country, two systems,” in 2014?
These and other unsettling questions have been propagating within pan-democrat HK residents, setting fire to pro-democracy movements referred to as the “Umbrella Revolution,” organized by prominent activist groups like “Occupy Central with Love and Peace.” The Umbrella Revolution in HK started with its nonviolent civil disobedience demonstration against Chinese electoral interference in HK in 2002, and retained momentum to this day. In July 2014 demonstrators on the streets taking part in “Occupy Central” were able to convince 800,000 residents of HK to join an informal voting demonstration in efforts to publicly show their disapproval of the current non- democratic electoral system. Although their referendum was dismissed by Beijing as illegitimate and illegal, such movements were also seen as threatening and disrupting to the financial hub of HK, alarming big investors and the big four accounting firms.
Hong Kong was released from British colonial rule 17 years ago, and discontent has been boiling up among the HK residents ever since. They have been forced to waive their rights to fairly choose their own chief executives for the city, giving this power instead to the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. Many pro-democracy activists question the political significance of HK’s Basic Law which has served as the legitimate constitutional document for order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) since it is supposed to guarantee “a high degree of autonomy,” “Hong Kong People administering Hong Kong,” and a “capitalist society.” Nonetheless, to this day, Beijing has completely denied the formation of a democratic electoral system in HK.
The release of the White Paper by Beijing in June 2014 symbolized a major turning point in the relationship between HK and the Chinese central government. This government proposal outlined several striking justifications for Beijing’s imposition on HK’s electoral and governmental affairs. Li Fei, the deputy secretary general of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, boldly stated that HK would become chaotic if HK were given the right to nominate 2 to 3 candidates for the Chief Executive (CE) position in 2017. Another justification from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress read that “One country, two systems”is a holistic concept. As a unitary state, China’s central government has comprehensive jurisdictionover HKSAR. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorization by the central leadership.”
Unfortunately, in August this year HK lost its only chance at open nominations of CE candidates when The National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing claimed authority over the case.This setback is inconsistent with the Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984), which clearly promised the citizens of Hong Kong a level of autonomy separate from mainland China as one of the conditions for China resuming the exercise of sovereignty in HK. The future of a fully democratic HK looks very bleak at this point.
Many pragmatic activists and businessmen have voiced their opinion that public demonstrations like “Occupy Central” do more harm than good. The city attracts many foreigners to do business; just last year, roughly 63 percent of all foreign direct investment that came into mainland China was through HK. The simple tax structure, liberal economic policies based on free trade, legal system that is geared toward supporting business owners, and reliable infrastructure make HK a very attractive place to invest in. However, keeping foreign investors and businesses in a country requires political stability and therule of law in the region, something that mainland Chinese and some Hong Kong residents believe is deteriorating.
Business leaders and investors alike know HK as one of Asia’s prime financial hubs of international business transactions. Due to rigorous economic competition around the world, as soon as word spread that HK was politically unstable, other major cities in the Asia-Pacific Region such as Tokyo tried to snatch up the opportunity to sell itself as a stable and free alternative place to do business. In addition, many investors see Singapore as a great alternative of HK. Political instability could have very real and devastating implications in HK, enough to demote it as one of Asia’s economic capitals and harm its international image.
Because of HK’s important role in the global economy, many key nations have taken action to condemn the way Beijing has been treating the peaceful protesters. Great Britain has held bilateral conversations with China to reach an agreement not to use force against protesters, to avoid stationing troops in the city, and to propose revisions to the Basic Law. The United States along with other Western allies have sent disapproving messages by refusing any military negotiations with China, although these Western countries are taking care to avoid economic sanctions. This shows that universal suffrage in HK is not only a domestic issue, but is a transnational issue that must be resolved. Many political scientists predict that political sovereignty in Taiwan will vanish next if China continues to fail to deliver its promises to the people of Hong Kong. China is most likely going to further tighten its grip on Tibet and Xinjiang to control its separatist movements as well.
Other wealthy democratic nations such as Japan and South Korea should mediate productive talks between Beijing and the pan-democrat camp in HK. The international community must address the growing fear in HK pro-democracy activists that they will never have “checks and balances” on the chief executive and the administration. Many left-wing groups in HK also fear that their right to freedom of speech and of association will be threatened, along with other crucial civil rights. The deterioration of the current flexible and independent judiciary system is a legitimate concern as well.
This year the symbol of this pro-democracy movement is an umbrella, which shields non-violent protestors from tear gas and pepper spray police crackdowns. Photography and videos of such violence in a supposedly peaceful protest in HK has been blowing up in the media, threatening the movement’s practicality and questioning the rationality behind it all. While democracy and autonomy in HK are solid reasons worth fighting for, it is difficult to ignore the negative effects of the protests on tourism, business, and everyday life.
It seems for now that the protestors on the streets should pause protesting on the streets and carefully map out their next big move. The people of HK must convince multilateral corporations and big foreign investors that HK’s political sovereignty is in their best interests to get their support. They must be bold enough to claim that an imposition by a country that supports state capitalism will eventually limit their horizons. They should take advantage of the 2017 Chief Executive Election as the next most politically significant event to get more citizens involved to effectively make a bold statement, that enough is enough.
Will the “pan-democrat” camp of Hong Kong (HK) settle for anything short of “democracy” and “political sovereignty” from mainland China? Can there be a fair compromise? What influence still remains of the slogan “one country, two systems,” in 2014?
These and other unsettling questions have been propagating within pan-democrat HK residents, setting fire to pro-democracy movements referred to as the “Umbrella Revolution,” organized by prominent activist groups like “Occupy Central with Love and Peace.” The Umbrella Revolution in HK started with its nonviolent civil disobedience demonstration against Chinese electoral interference in HK in 2002, and retained momentum to this day. In July 2014 demonstrators on the streets taking part in “Occupy Central” were able to convince 800,000 residents of HK to join an informal voting demonstration in efforts to publicly show their disapproval of the current non- democratic electoral system. Although their referendum was dismissed by Beijing as illegitimate and illegal, such movements were also seen as threatening and disrupting to the financial hub of HK, alarming big investors and the big four accounting firms.
Hong Kong was released from British colonial rule 17 years ago, and discontent has been boiling up among the HK residents ever since. They have been forced to waive their rights to fairly choose their own chief executives for the city, giving this power instead to the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. Many pro-democracy activists question the political significance of HK’s Basic Law which has served as the legitimate constitutional document for order in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) since it is supposed to guarantee “a high degree of autonomy,” “Hong Kong People administering Hong Kong,” and a “capitalist society.” Nonetheless, to this day, Beijing has completely denied the formation of a democratic electoral system in HK.
The release of the White Paper by Beijing in June 2014 symbolized a major turning point in the relationship between HK and the Chinese central government. This government proposal outlined several striking justifications for Beijing’s imposition on HK’s electoral and governmental affairs. Li Fei, the deputy secretary general of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, boldly stated that HK would become chaotic if HK were given the right to nominate 2 to 3 candidates for the Chief Executive (CE) position in 2017. Another justification from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress read that “One country, two systems”is a holistic concept. As a unitary state, China’s central government has comprehensive jurisdictionover HKSAR. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorization by the central leadership.”
Unfortunately, in August this year HK lost its only chance at open nominations of CE candidates when The National People’s Congress Standing Committee in Beijing claimed authority over the case.This setback is inconsistent with the Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984), which clearly promised the citizens of Hong Kong a level of autonomy separate from mainland China as one of the conditions for China resuming the exercise of sovereignty in HK. The future of a fully democratic HK looks very bleak at this point.
Many pragmatic activists and businessmen have voiced their opinion that public demonstrations like “Occupy Central” do more harm than good. The city attracts many foreigners to do business; just last year, roughly 63 percent of all foreign direct investment that came into mainland China was through HK. The simple tax structure, liberal economic policies based on free trade, legal system that is geared toward supporting business owners, and reliable infrastructure make HK a very attractive place to invest in. However, keeping foreign investors and businesses in a country requires political stability and therule of law in the region, something that mainland Chinese and some Hong Kong residents believe is deteriorating.
Business leaders and investors alike know HK as one of Asia’s prime financial hubs of international business transactions. Due to rigorous economic competition around the world, as soon as word spread that HK was politically unstable, other major cities in the Asia-Pacific Region such as Tokyo tried to snatch up the opportunity to sell itself as a stable and free alternative place to do business. In addition, many investors see Singapore as a great alternative of HK. Political instability could have very real and devastating implications in HK, enough to demote it as one of Asia’s economic capitals and harm its international image.
Because of HK’s important role in the global economy, many key nations have taken action to condemn the way Beijing has been treating the peaceful protesters. Great Britain has held bilateral conversations with China to reach an agreement not to use force against protesters, to avoid stationing troops in the city, and to propose revisions to the Basic Law. The United States along with other Western allies have sent disapproving messages by refusing any military negotiations with China, although these Western countries are taking care to avoid economic sanctions. This shows that universal suffrage in HK is not only a domestic issue, but is a transnational issue that must be resolved. Many political scientists predict that political sovereignty in Taiwan will vanish next if China continues to fail to deliver its promises to the people of Hong Kong. China is most likely going to further tighten its grip on Tibet and Xinjiang to control its separatist movements as well.
Other wealthy democratic nations such as Japan and South Korea should mediate productive talks between Beijing and the pan-democrat camp in HK. The international community must address the growing fear in HK pro-democracy activists that they will never have “checks and balances” on the chief executive and the administration. Many left-wing groups in HK also fear that their right to freedom of speech and of association will be threatened, along with other crucial civil rights. The deterioration of the current flexible and independent judiciary system is a legitimate concern as well.
This year the symbol of this pro-democracy movement is an umbrella, which shields non-violent protestors from tear gas and pepper spray police crackdowns. Photography and videos of such violence in a supposedly peaceful protest in HK has been blowing up in the media, threatening the movement’s practicality and questioning the rationality behind it all. While democracy and autonomy in HK are solid reasons worth fighting for, it is difficult to ignore the negative effects of the protests on tourism, business, and everyday life.
It seems for now that the protestors on the streets should pause protesting on the streets and carefully map out their next big move. The people of HK must convince multilateral corporations and big foreign investors that HK’s political sovereignty is in their best interests to get their support. They must be bold enough to claim that an imposition by a country that supports state capitalism will eventually limit their horizons. They should take advantage of the 2017 Chief Executive Election as the next most politically significant event to get more citizens involved to effectively make a bold statement, that enough is enough.
by James Walker
Editor
During the collective insanity that gripped the United States in the late 1940s and 50s, political agitators and right wing demagogues alike created the specter of a sinister, lurking boogeyman poised to overthrow civilization as we knew it. The “Red Scare” of insidious communism – literally posited as “reds under the bed” – swept throughout the political narrative of the post war landscape, as well as Cold War international relations. The poster child, and some would say architect, of this paranoia was Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) who managed through sheer strength of personality and calculated populism to bring this specter to the forefront of the national dialog. The term “McCarthyism” has since come to encapsulate the notion of ideological determination, combined with a blinkered perspective, ad hominem attacks, and a willingness to ignore reality when it does not fit into your chosen narrative. At the time, however, the hysteria whipped up was all too real, and had numerous real world effects – particularly here in Los Angeles, in regards to the film industry.
By the time that McCarthyism was in full swing in the early 50s, Hollywood had become a center of attention in an effort to root out what Walt Disney described as “subtle communist touches” in the film industry. Many people know about the famous “Hollywood Ten” blacklist of suspected communists, but by 1950, the “Red Channels” list included 151 major industry players, including Orson Wells, Arthur Miller, and even Gypsy Rose Lee (presumably because her duel roles as a “communist sympathizer” and a burlesque dancer posed a double threat to the morals of the nation). In essence, the fear being exploited by McCarthy was the notion that popular media (as represented by Hollywood) had a strong influence on the development of public opinion, and that the “commies” were poised to exploit this to their advantage – a kind of subliminal fifth column for the “Fourth International.”
Flash forward 60 years, and the situation in Hollywood is very different. The movie industry is a powerhouse of the globalized world, and often posited as a prime example of American “Cultural Imperialism.” Combined, the six major US studios captured 64% of global ticket sales in 2012, bringing in a total of $ 22 billion in income. Literally hundreds of millions of people went to the cinema and consumed their own little slice of Americana, all over the world. By that measure, McCarthy was on to something – he just had the flow of influence backwards.
The difference between Hollywood then and Hollywood now is that McCarthy suspected outside influence where there was none, while today the industry openly acknowledges that foreign entities influence the production and content of the movies produced. The number one film in both the US and China currently is Iron Man 3, starring Robert Downy Jr. as Tony Stark— metal clad super-hero and quintessential Neo-Liberal American entrepreneur. However, the version you see in Los Angeles is different from the one you see in Beijing. In an effort to appease Chinese authorities, Foreign Policy’s Suzanne Nossel points out that the Beijing version has additional modified footage (including a special Chinese scene for domestic consumers), product placements for Chinese goods, and the villain of the piece has been renamed from “the Mandarin” (offensive to Chinese sensibilities) to “Man Daren” or “Big Man” in Chinese. These changes could be viewed as attempts to selectively market to a distinct target audience (China overtook Japan as the single largest foreign market for US films in 2012), if it were not for the fact that they demonstrate what Nossel describes as the “meddling hand of the Chinese censor.” As such, you could view the censor’s heavy hand as a sort of homegrown Chinese McCarthyism.
There are more direct influences on US productions though. Originally scheduled for release last December, the upcoming Brad Pitt blockbuster World War Z has been delayed for 6 months in order to re-shoot a number of scenes. This arose because of objections from the Chinese government over significant plot elements in the storyline, including the idea that the zombie outbreak (on which the film is based) originated in China. This is not the first major film to treat the Chinese hinterland as a source of worldwide pandemic – 2011’s Contagion starring Jude Law and Kate Winslet also used rural China as the birthplace of a plague. It is not hard to see why China is unimpressed with that sort of publicity, especially after the negative worldwide attention that revolved around the Asian Bird Flu and H1N1 outbreaks of recent memory. However, the difference between Iron Man 3 and World War Z is that in the latter case there will only be one version of the finished product available for your viewing pleasure– the Chinese censor-approved version.
To be clear, this kind of influence is not the insidious creeping boogeyman of McCarthy’s paranoid delusions. Los Angeles’s homegrown industry is quite open about the effects of market forces, the need to sell and succeed in major markets such as China, and the desire to collaborate with national entities. In another Iron Man-related movie, this year’s Avengers superhero spectacular also had some interesting international relations related issues, but of a distinctly domestic nature. Specifically, the US military withdrew their technical assistance from the production due to the unspecified nature of SHIELD — the shadowy international power hierarchy that controls the actions of a quasi UN-like military force. Apparently, the implication that US troops might somehow fall under the command of a non-US military command structure —even in a comic book adaptation —was simply not acceptable. This was a pity really, as the other major movie that came out at the same time, Battleship, had full US military cooperation but still turned out to be a terrible film. Political considerations do not appear to be very good at backing a winner, alas.
As we look forward over the next few years it is clear that China as a consumer market will exert ever-greater influence over film production. Hollywood will continue to do what it does best—namely, make expensive blockbusters that reel in billions of dollars from across the globe. How much the impositions of foreign censorship will affect the freedom of expression we take for granted is unknown, but it is worth taking note of. The Chinese Communist Party structure and its efficient, dedicated, and ever-present censors have established that they have a role to play in what we consider to be a distinctly US industry. But instead of imaginary “reds under the bed,” in this case, the pressure being excerpted is quite openly done while sitting at the writer’s table.
All facts/figures taken from Foreign Policy, The Guardian, BBC, and ScreenRant.com.
James Walker has just finished his BA in Global Studies, and is currently a first year MA student in Political Geography at UCLA. He is also an avid movie-goer, Sci-Fi geek, zombie apocalypse aficionado, and an editor for the Generation.
by Akbar Khan
Contributing Writer
In the words of Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military tactician, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” To some, this may seem an unattainable naivety, and yet for 800 years, the Zhou dynasty adopted Sun Tzu’s advice, resulting in its reputation as the longest-lasting imperial reign in Chinese history. In contrast, conflict in the West has embodied a different meaning, one that involves direct military engagement. But to Sun Tzu, conflict was just as much about perception, domestic unity, and indirect engagement as it was about actual warfare. In fact, what Sun Tzu was proposing was that the greatest victory is not the one that comes from physical battle–but the one achieved without military confrontation.
Beginning in the mid-19th century, the “Century of Humiliation” refers to an era of British and Japanese subjugation of China. In the mid-20th century, Mao Zedong ushered in a new period of communist revolution. These two time frames represent an era of foreign domination and poor economic development in China. However, the contemporary era has witnessed the re-emergence of Chinese leadership in East Asia. Some even speculate that the Chinese economy will soon rival the American economy, after more than two decades of United States international economic dominance while others dismiss China’s recent emergence as a short-lived phenomenon. Let’s take a closer look.
As the U.S. has become pre-occupied with fiscal hardship and overseas engagements, China has been rapidly, yet steadily, honing in on American economic prowess. Over the last two decades, China’s annual GDP growth has hovered around 10%. With an abundance of cheap labor, European and American companies have developed supply chains in China to reap the benefits of low production costs, transforming the country into the global manufacturing hub. Even high-end brand names like Armani employ Chinese manufacturing. Cliché as it is, “Made in China” is increasingly stamping itself on American consumer products.
Some economists have predicted that China’s growth rate is unsustainable. They suggest that China’s capital endowments will yield diminishing returns, and, as a result, China’s impressive growth will drop considerably. However, this is not expected to significantly slow Chinese growth for at least another decade. In fact, the International Monetary Fund predicts that in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), China’s GDP will surpass America’s in 2016. PPP is measure that uses currency exchange rates to adjust for differences in prices between rich and poor countries. Even if Chinese growth slows from present rates, America’s economic advantage over China is shrinking.
Not convinced on China’s prospects? There’s more.
The Chinese government, in a rather brilliant maneuver, has created export quotas on its rare earth metals, which is surprising considering China wholly dominates the market. One may wonder why Chinese leaders have pursued this policy. By limiting its own output of rare earth materials, China is creating incentives for foreign businesses to relocate to China in order to get around the quota.
Still not convinced?
In 2006, the Pentagon confirmed that China successfully tested a ground-to-space laser to block U.S. satellite imagery. Reports on exactly which satellite was targeted are difficult to discover, perhaps because the event is not something the American media are eager to reveal. In a report by Defense News, the National Reconnaissance Office Director, Donald Kerr, admitted that China had the technological capability to affect U.S. satellites. This revelation demonstrates the increasing technological capacity of China but the incident signals a more profound implication–China has stepped on America’s toes without repercussions.
China is increasingly doing as it pleases: trading weapons for oil to Iran, violating environmental restrictions, trading with North Korea, and keeping foreign imports out of its borders. Were China a weaker nation, the U.S. would be able to put much more pressure on China to cooperate. However, as a result of the extensive U.S. trade deficit, China owns over a trillion dollars of American debt. This gives China leverage over the U.S. economy in being a creditor to the United States.
China has shown it has the potential, the ingenuity, the technology, and the swagger–a seemingly complete package. But, the one serious disadvantage for China with respect to the U.S. comes down to raw, material capability. According to the World Bank, America consistently spends above $600 billion on its defense budget while China spends over $100 billion. The U.S. GDP is approximately $14 trillion; China’s GDP is about half of the U.S. GDP.
Yet, consulting the timeless advice of our old friend Sun Tzu in his military guidebook The Art of War, we come to realize that material assets are not everything. Rather, strategic, non-violent tactics are the most effective method for combating opponents. In a world with strong international peace agencies, increasing globalization and an implicit fear of nuclear holocaust, direct military engagement between major powers is unlikely; this means that China may be able to rival America without ever having to fire a single bullet. Now that is a victory Sun Tzu would be proud of.
Fact and Figures from the World Bank, The Economist, and Bloomberg Business.
Akbar Khan is a third-year Political Science student with a minor in Global Studies. He is an intern at the Burkle Center for International Relations.
by Rujuta Gandhi
Editor
First, China constructed multibillion-dollar cities, or ghost cities, dubbed as such because of the empty high-rises, parking lots, and playgrounds. Then, it “gifted” the $200 billion African Union headquarters. Now, China Daily, a global Chinese newspaper, blesses the continent with its Africa edition. Why is China burdening itself with a responsibility to develop Africa, and why expand its media presence? Perhaps the communist nation hopes to find amity by extending a hand of friendship—a gesture riddled with soft power ambitions.
Slowly developing Chinese media in Africa is a geostrategic move against western media, which already hold the upper hand by bashing Chinese involvement throughout the continent. Since 2008, these sources have increasingly been exposing China’s harmful role—its contribution to the genocide in Darfur is only one example. Non-media sources, such as the book China and Africa: A Century of Engagement, also contribute to this condemnation. Therefore, by establishing a media presence, China hopes to combat what it perceives as “misrepresentations” of its purpose in Africa. Such misconceptions could harm future economic ties and political support in Sino-African relations. Consequently, China is using the media as a tool of soft power.
This power play will help protect China’s future in both the long and short term. In the long term, it is likely that they aim to secure their economic presence and ability to extract natural resources or to resettle their burgeoning population, among other motives. However, in the short term, the government is taking swift action to survive on the new battlefield of state-financed satellite television news, a notion voiced publicly by former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Already, foreign news services, such as France24 and Russia Today, have moved their metaphorical pawns, bishops, and knights to gain ground and mitigate negative images of their respective countries. China is merely following suit.
Xinhua News Agency, China’s state-owned press, established its presence in Africa beginning in the 1970s and now operates more than 20 bureaus continent-wide. In 2011, it began broadcasting a subsidiary television station, CNC World. A year later, the state-run but market-funded Chinese Central Television (CCTV) rooted its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. Most recently (and another year later), China Daily launched its Africa edition. However, both broadcasting companies incorporate heavy biases in favor of China; they highlight social and cultural topics and positive narratives while avoiding controversial ones, including political issues. In the April 12–18, 2013 weekly edition, the article “Strong China-Africa Cooperation Pays,” endeavored to convince Africans that, with China’s aid, Africa can be an “Asian tiger,” while “Good Hair Days” discussed the relationship between women’s hairstyles and social change in China. Furthermore, in an attempt to gain an upper hand on the U.S., the cover story “Advent of a Banking Superpower” was followed with this sub-heading: “Country has massive lead over the United States in terms of availability of savings, says expert.”
The appearance of Chinese media parallels government motives and initiatives. Soon after the decolonization of Africa, the Chinese government began to establish diplomatic relations with African states. With these ties came Xinhua, the Xinhua News Agency’s online newspaper. These actions can arguably be perceived as part of the rewards package for African nations that supported Chinese Security Council membership. From post-colonization until 2000, media coverage contained little substantive analysis.
Since then, the need to increase their soft power drives the Chinese government’s new $7–9 billion policy. During the Chinese-dubbed Year of Africa in 2006, Chinese journalism and media relations were among many of the topics discussed during high-level exchanges and forums. The roadmap effectively institutionalizes soft power by assisting in the development of media infrastructure, revealing a long-term soft power mission to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties.
However, the survival and effectiveness of Chinese media are still questionable. In terms of journalism itself, the government is reportedly exporting its domestic censorship laws, which will likely result in declined legitimacy. On the other hand, China is making strides on the front of public diplomacy and institution-building assistance. Since 2006, Xinhua has trained a growing number of African journalists. Additionally, CNC World and CCTV’s bureaus both employ African journalists (though the executives and editors are Chinese). Meanwhile, the Chinese government provides media equipment as to support institutional development throughout Africa.
If Chinese media advances, Sino-African relations will strengthen. And if western media cannot wage its own soft power to fight back, a continuing shift in global power will be progressively more inevitable as the U.S. may lose ground on the resources and benefits that Africa can offer.
Facts and figures from BBC, China Daily Africa Weekly, and South African Institute for International Affairs.
By Tina Kim
Editor
Often hailed as the economic spotlight of the world, China has enjoyed its robust growth in manufacturing, waves of foreign investments, and increasing economic power. In recent months the media have been covering stories indicating a looming housing bubble threatening to stagnate the growth of China’s economy. Reports have highlighted China’s high housing prices, millions of vacant apartments, and tax measures from the government to contain the housing bubble. One of the most striking examples has been “ghost cities,” entire developments of luxury apartments and high-end shopping malls completely empty of residents. Meanwhile, housing prices have supposedly skyrocketed while real estate development has stalled—allowing construction, steel and cement production, and furniture and interior manufacturing to come to a halt. Will China’s rapid urbanization and growth finally come to an end?
UCLA Professor of Urban Planning Paavo Monkkonen says a housing bubble is not the right way to frame China’s current housing market. Although high housing prices may be the case for large cities such as Shanghai or Beijing, there are lower prices in areas where there is not as much economic activity. Similar to the U.S. and elsewhere, the high prices are relative to the location: the closer to the hub of the city, the more expensive, and the farther away, the cheaper. Rather than high housing prices, limited investment opportunities and income inequality are greater explanations for unaffordable housing.
China is generally a “savings” oriented nation and has one of the highest savings rates in the world. According to Forbes, this fact may reflect the cultural preference for sons; “about half of the increase in the savings rate of the last 25 years can be attributed to the rise in the sex ratio imbalance.” One hundred and twenty-two boys are born for every 100 girls today, which means one of five Chinese men will not marry. As a result, men have tried to become more “competitive” bachelors by increasing their savings and owning an apartment.
However, there is constant insecurity from the cost of health care, education, and age-old pensions that may change in the future despite these savings. The natural reaction would be to invest one’s earnings. But for an individual in China’s middle and working class, there are very limited options. The government sets interest rates for banks, which yield very little return. As a result, individuals have turned to buying second or third apartments in order to secure their future. However, as more people began investing in real estate, prices have risen. In response, the Chinese government issued a 20% capital gains tax on sales of second homes in Shanghai (and later throughout the country) to discourage real estate investment and dampen fears of a housing bubble.
Interestingly, many couples have gone as far as divorcing to circumvent the tax. While remaining divorced on paper, couples would live as a married couple to buy a second home. But this does not fully explain why individuals would invest in developments of ghost cities, where there are no tenants or returns on investment, or pay for infrastructure like a new subway or terminal, where there are no people.
Monkkonen, who has taught at the University of Hong Kong, explains that ten years ago, this same phenomenon occurred. Local Chinese governments in the past built massive terminals, roads, high-speed railways and other infrastructure at the edges of cities. For a few years, these areas would remain empty, but ten years later, people would eventually occupy to a point where the government needed to build more.
People from rural areas moving to cities have primarily fueled this expansion. At the end of 2011, 691 million people were living in urban areas and about 657 million were still left in the rural areas. With a large supply of rural migrants, the expanding infrastructure and ghost cities are literally developments years ahead of their time, waiting for these people to fill the streets and sustain economic growth. However, at some point, China will run out of rural migrants moving to cities.
“So far everything has been about growth,” Monkkonen explains. “But eventually the expansion is going to stop and the whole way that cities get money is going to disappear or get very limited. They have to learn new ways to get money or else there’s going to be a huge disaster.”
The new property taxes, therefore, may be a transition for local governments to obtain new sources of revenue other than through expanding cities. Moreover, a new wave of tax reforms may also indicate a greater and ubiquitous problem in China’s economy: income inequality.
The gap between rural farmers and the rural elite has contributed greatly to this income gap. According to the New York Times, half of China’s 1.3 billion people live on incomes “less than a third of those in cities,” but “many outside analysts say [income inequality] has actually gotten worse, making China among the world’s most unequal societies.” New tax reforms and taxes are thus attempting to bring greater access to social programs to the poor and elderly. China’s new rural pension has added over 240 million people since 2009 and in 2011 over 55% of adults had pensions. However, China’s funding for pensions and the overall welfare system has been drastically underfunded. In some rural areas, pensions are as low as 55 yuan (about $8.75) per month.
“Welfare spending has been inadequate, amounting to about half the level of comparable middle-income countries,” as stated in the Wall Street Journal. In addition, there are more than 200 million migrant workers in cities who are systematically blocked from obtaining social services and jobs (despite cities’ high dependence on rural migration). This system, called Hukou, continues to divide income levels between the rural and urban people. Moreover, as rural migration continues and urban populations expand, the issue of affordable housing has become an increasing problem.
In Beijing, 2 million people of its 20 million population live in apartment-style bomb shelters underground. These are informal markets, with landlords and advertisement in websites for people attempting to find affordable housing in the city. The 2 million individuals are drivers, waiters, students (estimated at 30%), and people of lower income. A new policy in Beijing has ordered the eventual eviction of these residents, sometimes referred to as the “rat population,” according to Professor of Urban Planning at MIT Annette Kim’s research in Beijing.
China has taken measures to address income inequality; however, social programs have been significantly underfunded and the rural migrants in cities have been marginalized from social programs and services. Moreover, a more fundamental method to address inequality would be to invest and improve the livelihood of the younger generation. Due to China’s one-child policy, there is a greater burden for only children to someday financially support and look after their elderly parents. According to Brookings, “In 2010, there were 116 million people aged 20 to 24 and by 2020, the number will fall by 20% to 94 million;” however, the number of the elderly, which is already greater than the youth population, is projected to increase to 240 million by 2020.
Greater access to affordable housing, more investment opportunities, and social programs for lower income and the elderly must occur to secure China’s future middle and working classes and maintain China’s growth. Sensational policies such as building glamorous infrastructure, tackling corruption scandals, and containing the “housing bubble” may be helpful to a degree. However, for China—and any other country for that matter—its future economic power lies within the productivity of the younger generation, not in its buildings. China’s youth is the country’s greatest asset and will be the country’s greatest impediment if its government fails to recognize them its most sustainable investment.
Facts and figures from Forbes, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, The Economist, Bloomberg, CBS News, a personal interview with UCLA Professor of Urban Planning Paavo Monkkonen, and a guest lecture by MIT Professor of Urban Planning Annette Kim.