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European Union

On September 8, Moria, a refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, was engulfed in flames that burned down a majority of the camp and left more than 12,000 Syrian refugees sleeping on the streets of Greece. Although the destruction of the camp initiated promises from European Union officials for new measures to prevent refugee influxes in Greece, it also sparked conversation around the EU’s ineffective policies and Europe’s increase in populist sentiment.

While Syria’s civil war has raged on since 2011, the over 5.6 million refugees that have fled the country exist in a state of limbo between the jurisdiction of multiple countries, perhaps most notably Greece and Turkey. In 2015, the EU experienced a mass influx of close to 100,000 refugees fleeing predominately from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, prompting the bloc to form the 2016 EU-Turkey deal- to prevent the entrance of refugees at Greece’s shores, the EU bargained with neighboring Turkey to provide monetary aid in return for Turkey accepting all refugees attempting to seek asylum in Greece. Turkey received 6 billion Euros (6.7 billion USD) to aid the now 3.6 million Syrian refugees registered in the nation.

While the deal worked in Greece’s favor for several years succeeding its conception, recent dynamics have changed- Turkey has expressed that the monetary support from the EU is insufficient compared to the burden of millions of Syrian refugees as well as migrants from Afghanistan. In March 2020, Turkey opened its borders with Greece and openly bused refugees to the nations’ shared northwestern border as a means of exerting pressure on Greece and showcasing the threat of additional refugees. Many have accused Turkey of utilizing the struggling refugees as political pawns, prompting the EU to reassert that the bloc would not be “blackmailed” into exacerbating the migrant crisis for Greece.

While the current situation remains politically fragile and is only heightened with the threat of COVID-19, the challenges Greece is facing as its camps crowd with thousands of desperate migrants are reflective of the EU’s overall structural issues and policies on asylum-seekers. The EU’s Dublin Regulations, which mandates that the first nation an asylum seeker enters must process the asylum seeker’s registration, disproportionately places large responsibilities on Mediterranean states whose borders are common points of entry for those leaving North Africa and the Middle East. While the Regulations were originally conceived to ensure that those registering do not apply to multiple member states, nations, including Italy and Greece, have led the growing opposition to the Dublin Regulations.

In an attempt to create responsibility-sharing and ease pressures off of Italy and Greece, the EU initiated yet another lacking migration policy 一 the EU’s relocation scheme, devised after the 2015 influx of asylum seekers, planned to relocate over 160,000 asylum seekers across member states over two years. By the time 2017 arrived, a mere 29,144 people had been relocated.

In an attempt to remedy this, the EU released a new plan to improve its handling of Greece’s refugees following the incineration of Moria. The EU’s most recent migration pact will expedite pre-entry screening at borders by taking a maximum of five days while increasing responsibility sharing amongst member states by having nations contribute based on their populations and GDPs. Poland, Austria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, however, expressed a staunch opposition to the plan in stating that the borders of the EU should remain “perfectly sealed.”

While the EU’s policymaking and failure to prioritize the rights of asylum seekers are to blame for situations like Moria, the EU’s member states have experienced a recent rise in populism that hinder the success of any relocation or migration plans. Poland, Austria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic’s anti-immigrant stance is a trend across western Europe. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party has introduced multiple policies to cut back on welfare for migrants- one law requires that migrant children, or those of a “non-Western” background, take Danish language classes for their families to receive welfare. In the Netherlands, a burqa ban was put in place in August 2019 that restricts face-covering clothing from being worn in areas including public transport, government facilities, and healthcare centers. Similar laws exist in Denmark, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, and France, and are representative of xenophobic and discriminatory policymaking implemented to highlight migrants as “outsiders.”

A similar sentiment was also seen in many “Brexiteers”一 for members of the UK’s conservative party, an incentive to leave the EU was that the UK would no longer be part of the EU’s “free movement of persons” right, which allows individuals to move and reside freely amongst the EU member states. The conservative argument promoted leaving the EU to prevent refugees who entered through eastern Europe from residing in the UK. Now that Brexit has passed, the UK has already begun implementing policies to prevent immigrants from entering. A new set of laws will close the UK’s borders to immigrants who do not speak English and are unskilled laborers.

While the EU itself has a history of failed migration plans, there is only so much the commission can do; with raging anti-immigrant sentiment and an increase in European populism, member states are increasingly unwilling to welcome any new migrants, much less carry out responsibility-sharing plans released by the EU. Close to 12,000 asylum seekers will be left on the shoulders of Greece and perhaps exacerbate the already tense relations with Turkey. As the European Commission has already begun financing the construction of new camps to replace Moria, the futures of many refugees may be in cramped, under-resourced camps while the EU attempts to persuade nativist leaders and member states or bribe neighboring states to ease some of Greece’s burdens. Either way, the EU has much work to be done to handle this migrant crisis adequately and humanely, perhaps starting with urgency for more tolerant and inclusive policies in its own member states.

November 9, 2020 0 comment

Europe Featured

The Malignancy of Multinational Currency

written by Katherine Jones

“France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts,”

This hostile and controversial statement was leveraged by Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s populist deputy Prime Minister, in a counterproductive attempt to deflect shared responsibility for Europe’s migrant crisis. However the currency in question should be a part of the larger discussion on globalization and post-colonial institutions. If European leaders were to earnestly evaluate the CFA franc not from their perspective but from the perspective of the affected Africans, they may find some unsettling similarities to the eurozone.

The CFA franc represents two distinct multinational currencies in Western and Central Africa. The currencies are effectively the same, as both have an exchange rate pegged to the euro (1 euro = 655, 957 francs), however they are not interchangeable. The logic behind the fixed exchange rate is to prevent inflation and promote investor security in nations where poor governance may otherwise threaten market stability. However, this comes at a very steep price for the nations involved. In return, they must keep 50% of their reserves in the French Treasury, follow the strict monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB), and attempt to develop their economies with an inevitably overvalued currency.

Source

In the current economic landscape, African nations should seriously consider if the sacrifice of sovereignty necessitated by the franc is worth the supposed increase in prosperity. The crux of the problem is that the CFA franc is essentially a version of the euro, and relatively weak economies using a strong currency is counterproductive to economic development. The strength of the franc encourages imports and makes exports less competitive on the global market, stagnating the development of member nations. Additionally, the main priority of the ECB is to maintain stable prices, with inflation at a maximum of 2%. This policy makes sense for the top members of the European Union (EU), but a developing nation should be focused on high employment rates and exports, ideally with inflation rates of up to 8%. Moreover, the 50% reserve requirement of the franc zone countries greatly limits their investment options. The French treasury gives them a return rate of only .75%, which sometimes does not even match the level of inflation, much less provide a desperately needed return on investment.

The franc becomes even less attractive when considering the performance of other African economies. Former French colonies that abandoned the franc, such as Morocco and Algeria, are more successful economically, despite using an independent currency. Overall income per capita, adjusted for inflation, has grown 1.4% in the franc zone and 2.5% in the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the line of credit extended to the franc zone is pitiful. In the western franc zone (see map) the credit to GDP ratio is 25% and in the central franc zone it is only 13%! This is in comparison with the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa around 60%.

So why keep the CFA franc? The franc is known to benefit a small percentage of upper and middle class African citizens by providing easy access to imports and the ability to invest abroad, while by and large disadvantaging the 75% of the citizenry who are working class. To exacerbate things further, France and other foreign interests greatly benefit from the franc zone as an export market, and France is granted special access to African resources as a part of the agreement. Furthermore, the franc’s status as a multinational currency provides greater benefit to outside nations wanting to facilitate trade, than the internal member states. The franc is after all very poorly integrated, with intra-regional trade accounting for only 15% of total trade, while trade with Europe accounts for 60%. The French, along with the remainder of the eurozone, clearly profit off of the CFA franc.

Many African economists and politicians acknowledge these flaws, yet the question of how to move forward still remains. The French have responded to the protestations of their former colonies by supporting the creation of a new multinational African currency independent of the euro, that will incorporate more– and larger–African states, including but not limited to Nigeria. However, this still appears self-serving. There is minimal justification for the existence of a new multinational currency in Sub-Saharan Africa, and as aforementioned, it primarily benefits outsiders. The best interest of the franc zone may be to follow the advice of former World bank director Carlos Lopes. He believes the CFA franc should be tied to a basket of other currencies, including the notoriously undervalued Chinese yuan, or to hover around a target exchange rate with the euro, both which will help to mitigate the overvaluation of the franc, while maintaining the currency as a pillar of stability.

The tragic irony is that France, along with a number of Southern European states, are the victim of the euro in much the same way that the CFA franc is. The euro is too strong for the economies of Southern Europe. Estimates peg overvaluation at 5% in France and 7% in Greece. Furthermore, the emphasis on low inflation within the eurozone is really to the benefit of the booming German bloc, at the expense of countries such as Italy and Greece that desperately need stimulus spending. In terms of real GDP, Italy was the same size in 2016 as it was in 2001. Much like the franc zone, Italy, among other countries, needs to focus on improving employment rates, infrastructure projects, and competitive exports, to ensure growth in coming years.

When comparing eurozone countries to those that chose not to adopt the currency, such as Sweden and Hungary, the results are disappointing at best. National Gross Income (NGI) per capita in the eurozone grew at a rate of 1.65% in 2015, whereas Sweden saw growth rates around 2.72%. Additionally, Hungary, an emerging European economy, witnessed even higher growth rates, with NGI per capita reaching 3.06% in 2015. The success of independent Eastern European economies makes evident the disadvantage Southern Europe suffers being a part of the euro. Furthermore, when examining the eurozone within the global context, it is evident that as a whole they have fallen behind other developed countries. The US economy was just 13% bigger than the eurozone at it’s genesis, but now it is over 27% larger.

So why keep the euro? This question is obviously more nuanced in light of the highly integrated European economy and greater cultural and political ties of the EU, than are present in the franc zone. Brexit, despite not having a monetary element, should be evidence enough that disintegration is not a feasible option for Europe at this point. However, the shortcomings of the euro must still be recognized. The euro, rather than being of overt benefit to a neocolonial power as the franc is, does disproportionately benefit Germany. The significant undervaluation of the euro in Germany (about 17%) makes its exports extremely competitive and creates greater economic prosperity. Unfortunately, this leads to a vicious cycle where Germany becomes more and more prosperous and the ECB creates tighter monetary policies to adjust for German strength (ie higher interest rates), all while neglecting the needs of the weaker economies in the eurozone. For the benefit of not only the European project, but the 147 million people who use the CFA franc, the Germans should ease their tyrannical monetary policy and cozy relationship with the ECB.

Realistically however, the prospects of Germany doing this are unfavorable, and as a result the euro’s most likely fate seems to be an eventual phase out. The currency once intended to unite Europe, has since contributed to the very economic stagnation and rise of isolationism that will eventually be its demise. But perhaps this is to be expected when inflicting stringent monetary policy on nations with diverse economic needs and dissonant fiscal policies. It may be time to reconsider multinational currencies as a whole.

March 15, 2019 0 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics Uncategorized Women's Rights

The Double-Edged Sword of Female Leadership

written by Katie Linder

The 2016 presidential election will no doubt remain a controversial subject in the coming years. Many feminists, excited at the prospect of America’s first female president, must now come to terms with the reality that the “highest and hardest” glass ceiling will remain unbroken for at least four more years. However, the United States is not alone in its continued failure to elect a woman to its highest government office. Despite the progress made around the world to expand the rights of women, a lack of gender parity remains painfully clear in the realm of leadership. Women occupy around 10% of the highest offices in national governments around the world, with 19 women currently serving as head of state/government. One of the most formidable female leaders today is Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel’s unconventional rise to power serves as an inspiration to aspiring female leaders and further dismantles society’s male-centric conception of power and leadership. However, her legacy also highlights the many double-edged swords facing women in power that make the glass ceiling so difficult to break through.

As a politician in Germany, Merkel is an outlier. She grew up in East Germany during the Cold War and was originally trained in the sciences. Her origins made her an outsider in German politics, which were dominated by men from the West. Nevertheless, she turned her perceived weaknesses into strengths. She used the patience, intellect and inconspicuousness that she cultivated in the East to propel her political career. Furthermore, her background in science allowed her to grow more comfortable working in a male dominated field, and has influenced many aspects of her political style. She is an unanimated public speaker; her speeches are devoid of the pompousness and inflated rhetoric that are characteristic of many other world leaders. She is notorious for delaying her decisions for as long as possible in order to analyze all the available data, and has developed a political style that is based on pragmatism and facts rather than any ideological convictions. In fact, it has been said her only deep seated conviction is her value for freedom, everything else “is negotiable”.

Merkel’s unique style of leadership has allowed her to cultivate a level of respect among the German people that secured her three consecutive terms as chancellor. However, despite her success, she has faced more than her fair share of obstacles in the form of both overt and subtle sexism. While she has risen above the insults and criticism admirably, her experiences reveal the contradictory attitudes surrounding female leadership, and the fine line women in power must walk. While every country and culture has a unique set of standards for their leadership, many of the challenges faced by Merkel are universal to women seeking power.

Merkel developed an ability to restrain herself and lead from behind through her experience studying alongside primarily male colleagues at Leipzig University. She once joked, “The men in the laboratory always had their hands on all the buttons at the same time. I couldn’t keep up with this, because I was thinking. And then things suddenly went ‘poof,’ and the equipment was destroyed.” Throughout her political career she has stood her ground and dealt with the particularly “macho” male leaders, such as Vladimir Putin, in a similar fashion. Merkel’s tactics can serve as a model for other aspiring female leaders, but her experiences also reveal a troubling truth. Female leaders must remain composed in order to avoid being labeled emotional or abrasive, but if they are too diffident they risk having their voices drowned out. Merkel’s lead from behind style of leadership has allowed her to work around this double-edged sword, but it is not necessarily the most efficient way to lead. Ultimately, placing rigid expectations on women hinders their ability to be effectual leaders.

Contradictions between expectations of Merkel’s femininity and masculinity also came into play during her rise to power. The now popular and affectionate nickname “Mutti” (German word for mother), was originally thrown at her as an insult. She has since gracefully reclaimed the name, arguing that it implies her responsibility to the German people. Her appearance has come under scrutiny as well, particularly at the beginning of her career. She has updated her style over time but has largely ignored the critics and maintained a plain and unassuming wardrobe. In this way she has sent the message that she prioritizes her work over her appearance and wants to keep the focus on her policy. These experiences reveal another double-edged sword: as a woman Merkel is expected to be feminine, matronly and stylish, although these traits are often seen as incompatible with strong leadership. After centuries of primarily male leaders, our notions of masculinity and leadership are intimately intertwined. In order to be taken seriously, a woman must adopt more traditionally masculine traits such as resoluteness and aggression. However, acting too masculine often makes a woman less likeable to a broad audience.

Merkel has also received criticism at the other end of the spectrum from feminists who are dismayed by her failure to adequately address women’s issues in Germany. Merkel herself has said she doesn’t consider herself a feminist. Although she has made efforts throughout her career to advance women’s rights, such as adding gender equality in the workplace to the G7 summit agenda in 2015, women’s issues have remained largely on the periphery of her policy goals. The harsh criticism Merkel has received from feminists is fueled in part by the idea that women understand the challenges posed by gender barriers, and thus have an obligation to help each other whenever possible; as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once said, “There’s a special place in hell for women who don’t help each other”. Merkel’s actions reveal another troubling double-edged sword: those with the most power to advance women’s rights—women in the highest offices of government—often adopt passive stances, perhaps because acting otherwise could amount to political suicide. When a woman seeking a high leadership role champions women’s rights and runs on a feminist platform, it is seen with suspicion by many and cast as self-serving. Thus, it is very difficult for an outspoken feminist to get elected to a high office. There is no doubt that having more female leaders is a positive step towards gender equality. However, their power would be much more consequential if it were wielded to directly advance women’s issues.

While more active advocacy for women’s issues from Merkel is necessary, her contributions to the women’s movement must still be recognized and appreciated. She garnered respect in boardrooms dominated by men as she led Europe through the Eurozone Crisis and continues to tackle the Refugee Crisis; thus she has expanded respect for female voices in important international policy discussions. Ultimately, Merkel can serve as both an inspiration and a sobering lesson to other aspiring female leaders. She is an example to women everywhere of strong female leadership that has risen above sexist criticism and “macho men”. However, her legacy is riddled with the double-edged swords that have prevented many other women from achieving the same success. Hopefully, America’s aspiring first-female-presidents will learn a lesson from Merkel and shatter the highest glass ceiling once and for all.

February 9, 2017 0 comment

Donald Trump Supporters Source

Featured Security

Globalization and the Power of a Hollow Promise

written by Katie Linder

The outcome of the European Union (EU) referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) has ushered in a period of geopolitical and economic uncertainty. As the UK grapples with the transition, the Obama administration has vowed to uphold the “special relationship” between the two countries. Maintaining strong ties with the UK is imperative to preserving a stable international system, and it is only appropriate for the United States (US) to respect the democratic processes that led to the Brexit victory. However, the implications of its success must not be ignored. Brexit serves as definitive proof that fears and frustrations resulting from new trends in globalization are a powerful force. Propelled by those same forces, Donald Trump’s campaign has a real shot at securing him a spot in the oval office.

UK involvement in the EU is a multi-faceted issue deserving of debate, however the anti-immigration misinformation spread by Leave campaigners undermined efforts to engage in informed dialogue. The core of the campaign was an appeal to xenophobic sentiment and the belief that EU immigration is harmful to the economic prospects of UK nationals. However, studies indicate there is no correlation at either the national or local level between immigration and unemployment or lower wages. Furthermore, there is no guarantee leaving the EU will curb immigration. The UK will likely maintain relatively unrestricted immigration policies within the EU in order to negotiate favorable trade deals, much like Norway and Switzerland. By shifting the focus of the campaign to an argument with a shaky factual basis, the success of the referendum hinged on cultivating a climate of fear in which facts were eclipsed by impassioned rhetoric. The anger which fueled Brexit has not dissipated after the vote, and as time goes on, the Leave leaders’ inability to deliver on their promises will only exacerbate social and political tensions.

The events in the UK may seem inconsequential to the US electorate, but the parallels between the rise of Donald Trump and the success of Brexit are important to consider as the presidential election approaches. Trump’s movement shares a reliance on nostalgia and intense nationalism, as well as the tendency to blame outsiders—both foreign powers and immigrants—for the troubles of the nation. His no-nonsense stance on immigration has become one of his strongest selling points, but poses the same problems as Brexit by oversimplifying and manipulating facts. Trump claims that immigrants usurp US jobs. However, this idea relies on the assumption that there is a finite supply of jobs in the country. In reality, the economy is more complex than that. A growing immigrant population not only creates a larger labor force, it also creates a larger consumer base, which stimulates economic growth. Studies show that immigrants do not displace native workers, rather they allow for labor specialization. Unskilled immigrants fill less desirable manual-labor jobs and create opportunities for native-born workers to take up more managerial level positions where strong English skills are required. Furthermore, some sectors of the economy are heavily dependent on immigrant labor, such as agriculture where nearly half of those employed are undocumented immigrants. Trump’s proposed deportation of 11 million undocumented immigrants would result in the loss of many jobs for US citizens whose industries are reliant on immigrant labor and lead to a private-sector decline amounting to billions of dollars.

Trump’s movement is rooted in the same conditions that propelled the success of Brexit: an environment where fear and anger cloud judgement. He exploited fear during the Republican National Convention, in which the night’s theme was “make America safe again.” The nation’s insecurity was blamed in part on undocumented immigrants with criminal histories who “roam free to threaten peaceful citizens”. Trump failed to mention that the national crime rate has been dropping steadily over the years and that undocumented immigrants are no more likely to commit crimes than native born citizens. The lack of context offered by his claims fuels hostility towards all undocumented immigrants, including the vast majority who hold no criminal record. By demonizing immigrants, Trump is promoting divisive rhetoric and intensifying cultural and ethnic schisms at a time when the US is already polarized. The consequences of this campaign tactic are evident in the UK, which has experienced an uptick in hate crimes towards immigrants since the referendum. Similarly, the prevalence of violence at Trump’s rallies will likely escalate as the election continues. His failure to adequately address the hostility surrounding his campaign and his active encouragement of violence should be a red flag; he is a candidate that thrives on chaos.

Of course, challenging the visions of Trump and the Leave campaigners should not be confused with an attempt to dismiss the concerns of their supporters. We must acknowledge that the anger they have stirred up is legitimate, but misdirected. The troubles of the working class should not be blamed on one specific country or group of people, but rather on the ubiquitous force of globalization. While virtually all economists would agree that an increasingly integrated global economy is beneficial overall, it inevitably creates distinct winners and losers. In wealthy and technology-rich countries like the US and UK, the winners are skilled workers employed in the service and tech sectors, while the losers are the blue-collar manufacturing workers. As a result, many in the working class want to turn back the clock to a time when manufacturing was strong by implementing strict immigration reform and protectionist trade policies. Unfortunately, the costs of an attempt to halt globalization and free trade would outweigh any benefits. It would slow economic growth, raise the price of consumer goods, and likely cause other countries to retaliate by putting tariffs on our exports. Therefore, we should be approaching the concerns of the working class in other ways; perhaps by expanding social welfare programs or promoting subsidized job training programs, like Trade Adjustment Assistance, that aim to get trade-affected workers back on their feet in a more prosperous industry.

Overall, the phenomenon of different classes of people pitted against each other is not a new one. However, globalization has heightened class tensions to a point where demagogues like Trump and Boris Johnson are able to gain influence by capitalizing on these frustrations. The reality is, while Trump’s movement has given a voice to people who need it, his angry vows to “make America great again” are hollow. Devoid of an acceptance of reality, his proposed policies would do more harm than good. We must tread carefully in the upcoming election. No matter what the outcome is, the divisions in US society that Trump has exploited will not go away and should be approached with pragmatism and empathy.

August 21, 2016 0 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics Globalization Humanitarian Aid Immigration Middle East Religion Security Security and Conflict Society and Culture Terrorism Uncategorized

Nationality vs. Humanity: The Stranger’s Case

written by Madison Weil

“It is nationalism which endangers nations, and not the other way round.” –Ernest André Gellner (British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist)

French President Francois Hollande recently issued a statement that his country is prepared to open its borders and welcome 24,000 migrants seeking asylum over the next two years. This statement, issued on September 7, 2015, is part of a new plan designed by the European Union to accept and appropriately distribute the massive exodus of refugees fleeing from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other surrounding nations. When asked to comment on French polls that indicated 55% of the national population was opposed to accepting more refugees, Hollande responded that asylum is a constitutional right and a moral duty, and that “France’s image and standing in the world were at stake.”

In light of the recent terrorists attacks on Paris, and amid reports that one of the attackers held a Syrian passport, Hollande has emphasized the necessity of making proper background checks prior to accepting these refugees. Hollande has declared war on ISIS, but made it clear that France will maintain its “humanitarian duty” and promise to welcome refugees over the next two years.

While many refugees initially identified Germany as the most ideal place to relocate with supposed security and job opportunities abound, other European countries are now offering comparable conditions and welcoming the migrants. In fact, because Germany has been accommodating such a massive influx of individuals in recent months, France has offered to help by offering an expedited asylum application to migrant families arriving in Munich: temporary housing in France along with a two-week approval process as opposed to the usual six-month process.

These recent political and cultural strides made by France are particularly notable given the nation’s sticky history with immigration and ethnic tension. Having just spent a month living and learning in France, I can attest that it is challenging to go more than a day without hearing an allegation that the presence of ethnic minorities, foreigners, and immigrants creates a grave problem for the nation. A commonly held belief among French traditionalists is that these groups directly threaten and compromise the very essence of true “Frenchness.” Many harbor a sense of nationalism that transcends the concept of national pride and actually results in extreme and egregious discrimination—for example, some believe that to be truly “French” is to be white, Catholic, and multi-generationally French. This statement parades as protectionism when in reality it is rooted in racism. This has created an ongoing and very heated dialogue surrounding immigration policy in the last century.

This French perception of nationalism (hopefully) seems foreign to us in the United States. Our nationality law is based on the principles of jus soli (Latin for “right of soil”), meaning that individuals gain immediate citizenship upon being born in the U.S. This has subsequently created the notion that America is a mixing pot of racial identities—our sense of national pride comes from being united as American, not from being one united race. In contrast, most states in Europe, Asia, and Oceania grant citizenship based on principles of jus sanguinis (Latin for “right of blood”) or a restricted version of jus solis—as is the case in France. Under this philosophy, individuals become citizens depending on their parents’ citizenship and not by birthplace. This has fostered and accentuated the cultural division in France between natives and immigrants which has resulted in the emergence of a perceived social hierarchy. Because of this heated history and conflicting cultural dynamic, President Hollande’s decision to welcome refugees in spite of opposition (and in spite of recent events) deserves recognition.

France’s situation forcibly evokes a particularly challenging set of questions: at what point should international leaders place a greater emphasis on obligations to humanity than on obligations to their own national interests? How do leaders of the Western community in particular negotiate or reconcile national interests with moral duty? Is there such a thing as a moral duty to the international community? According to the UNHCR: “Since, by definition, refugees are not protected by their own governments, the international community steps in to ensure they are safe and protected.” In fact, in the past few decades 142 nations have signed on to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol. By signing this international treaty and its 1967 amendment, the UNHCR states nations are essentially agreeing that “refugees deserve, as a minimum, the same standards of treatment enjoyed by other foreign nationals in a given country and, in many cases, the same treatment as nationals.”

While we have historically seen that most national actions, even humanitarian ones, are often out of self-interest, it is my sincere hope that international authorities will continue to improve and open their borders to those in need. Afterall, those of us born in Western nations with relatively safe conditions could have just as easily been born into a nation experiencing a crisis. Wouldn’t we then hope and pray for assistance and asylum in the E.U.? In the U.S.?

This debate reminded me of an excerpt from Shakespeare’s play “Sir Thomas More.” Sir Thomas More is a lawyer, sent to address an angry crowd of individuals rioting to get rid of “those immigrants” or “strangers.” Shakespeare delivers a powerful message that transcends time and place when More challenges the natives to consider what they would do if they had to flee their home country:

“Whether would you go?

What country, by the nature of your error,

Should give you harbor? go you to France or Flanders,

To any German province, to Spain or Portugal,

Nay, any where that not adheres to England,–

Why, you must needs be strangers: would you be pleased

To find a nation of such barbarous temper,

That, breaking out in hideous violence,

Would not afford you an abode on earth,

Whet their detested knives against your throats,

Spurn you like dogs, and like as if that God

Owed not nor made not you, nor that the elements

Were not all appropriate to your comforts,

But chartered unto them, what would you think

To be thus used? this is the strangers case;

And this your mountanish inhumanity.”

(Sir Thomas More, Act II, Scene IV)

This is the stranger’s case—the immigrant’s case. For many, it’s near impossible to fully comprehend the plight and experiences of today’s refugees, but so important to try. While it’s challenging to reconcile national interests with humanitarian needs, our nationality shouldn’t supersede our humanity.

November 20, 2015 0 comment

Environmental Change

Ensuring the Sustainability of Multinational Cap and Trade Policy

written by thegeneration

Cap and Trade

by Trisha Parikh

Climate change may have taken a backseat to other issues in the United States, but around the world, countries and states are collaborating to ease their footprint on the global climate. With an increase in extreme weather patterns, droughts, food shortages, and the threat of rising sea levels, the effects of climate change are a reality. Regulation has finally manifested itself in many countries around the world as cap and trade measures. Cap and trade is known to be a more aggressive form of climate change policy, but its effectiveness when applied on a multinational scale has been questioned by policy makers, environmentalists, and economists.

Cap and trade, also known as emissions trading, is a market-based solution to global warming that transforms the right to “pollute” into a commodity that can be traded in the free “carbon” market. In contrast to carbon taxes, which are a form of carbon pricing levied on producers in direct proportion to their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, cap and trade policies place an upper limit, or “ceiling,” on the quantity of emissions. An important distinction is that while cap and trade might be better suited for some regions, carbon taxes or other price-based regulations might be more effective in others. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) states that cap and trade is well-suited for local and regional emissions since it must be tailored to a specific area’s economic characteristics and demand for pollution. Some places that are currently pursuing or employing cap and trade regulation include Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, China, the European Union, parts of Canada, and California.

International cooperation on climate change has taken place since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Many countries have since pledged to decrease their GHG emissions and cut down on the use of nonrenewable energy sources. The U.S. EPA has pledged to decrease GHG emissions by 25% of 2010 levels by 2020. The EU has a similar goal of reducing emissions by 20% of 1990 levels by 2020. The advancement of cap and trade policies to achieve these goals shows a different side of international cooperation. Countries are using each other as models for the implementation of cap and trade and integrating their carbon markets with neighboring regions. The most recent example is the California and Canada partnership, in association with the Western Climate Initiative. The California Air Resources Board (ARB) is working with its equivalents in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba to create a program through which pollution permits can be bought and sold on the carbon markets of international partners (projected to begin in 2013).

Thus, the real concern that arises is whether cap and trade is sustainable when these carbon permits are traded in large, global carbon markets—which are more difficult to regulate. Cap and trade on a national scale has been successful in the past. The EPA’s Acid Rain Program to control sulfur dioxide emissions in 1990 was widely successful and resulted in social savings of over $70 billion per year, with the benefits outweighing costs at a 40:1 ratio. The trading of permits for sulfur dioxide emissions only occurred nationwide under this policy. However, when employed on a larger scale, the carbon market can be volatile and subject to the influence of external forces such as politics and differences in trade regulations between countries.

The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) demonstrates how a well-functioning policy can turn into chaos when applied on an international scale, where prices and quantities are not carefully regulated. First, the EU failed to accurately estimate how many permits would be necessary and issued a surplus of carbon offset permits leading to a price collapse (permits were bought at almost no cost). Trying to set a quantity limit for 30 nations that differ in their industrial composition and emissions is a complex task. Second, the quantity of the permits issued has been under significant political influence by lobbyists asking for more offsets than initially allocated as a “subsidy” to certain energy sector firms (estimated to account for £20 billion or $32.2 billion through 2012). This defeats the primary purpose of having a cap and trade mechanism: to set limits on carbon permits. Yet, when applied in a smaller setting, the policy is relatively safe from extensive political involvement, it accounts for differences between regions, and price volatility can be monitored carefully.

The success of cap and trade policies, as they begin to link together countries and span across larger regions, will rely heavily on learning from previous experiences such as the EU ETS. Cap and trade policies that are implemented with precision, transparency, and regulation have the potential to generate changes in the climate that can set the world back on course to reducing GHG emissions. The economic incentives generated by successful cap and trade policies are unparalleled in that they maintain competition between firms and thus, encourage green investment. Countries that are in the early stages of creating their emissions trading programs, such as Japan and China, should construct the program with mechanisms built within it to adjust quantities regionally and to carefully monitor the market. Cap and trade has empirically proven to reduce GHG emissions, but, what remains to be seen is how these various international carbon markets will interact with each other in the future, and whether or not they will spur the use of “greener” energy sources to create sustainability of the policy and the global environment in the long term.

Facts and figures from the California Air Resources Board, the Carbon Trade Watch, Council on Foreign Relations, Environmental Protection Agency, and Western Climate Initiative.

Photograph from the Wikimedia Commons

Trisha Parikh is an undergraduate student at UCLA majoring in Economics and Political Science. She is a co-editor with The Generation.

November 2, 2012 2 comments

Mexico and Latin America The International Economy

Spain’s Labor Markets: The Disregarded Solution of Economic Recovery

written by thegeneration

by Tina Kim

Despite the anti-austerity protests from thousands of unemployed Spaniards in recent months, Spain is moving towards cutting social programs in its most severe austerity budget plan in history in order to receive bailouts for its banks and government debt. Spain is considering to apply for the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL), a euro-zone bailout fund that would grant money to Spain’s government with the condition that it imposes more fiscal austerity. More than $50 billion worth of budget cuts in education, healthcare, welfare, and pensions are expected and unemployment benefits and civil servant wages have already frozen.

However, as long as the labor market in Spain remains uncompetitive, Spain has little hope in recovering from its economic crisis in the long term. Restoration of the labor market, rather than its banks and bond market, is what will ultimately bring Spain out of its suffering. With nearly a 25% unemployment rate, Spain is making a serious mistake in cutting the social programs that are the lifeline of thousands of unemployed people. Moreover, borrowing money from the rest of the world to grant these bailouts to banks does not consider the future of its youth in the job market. According to the Wall Street Journal, “workers ages 16 to 24 face an astronomical 53.3% unemployment rate and for 25- to 34-year-olds, the rate is 27%.”

UCLA Economics Professor Aaron Tornell explains that high unemployment in Spain’s youth is due to a situation of “insiders” and “outsiders.”

“An insider is someone who is ensured a job for life; many insiders are union members,” said Dr. Tornell. “An outsider, particularly a young person, is someone who will not have a job regardless of whether the person is educated or not. The power of unions is protecting the insiders from getting fired. In order to fix unemployment, you have to weaken the power of the unions to make sure companies can hire younger, more productive people.”

Another problem that the Spanish youth faces stems from the housing bubble that burst in 2008. When Spain joined the euro in 1999, low interest rates brought banks to lend an unprecedented number of property loans and the boom years of this period caused wages to rise quickly within the labor market. As a result, Spain has been exporting less of its own, more expensive goods and importing more of cheaper products from its European counterparts. This trend resulted in Spain’s government overspending, but more importantly, Spain’s labor market became highly uncompetitive.

In the long term, giving salvation only to banks with bailouts all the while punishing the Spanish people through austerity measures serves in no interest of the Spanish people, government, or even banks. Nobel Peace Prize Laureate in Economics, Paul Krugman wrote in a New York Times op-ed article that fiscal austerity in Spain’s current economic state is simply, “just insane.”

“Europe has had several years of experience with harsh austerity programs, and the results are exactly what students of history told you would happen: such programs push depressed economies even deeper into depression,” said Mr. Krugman. “And because investors look at the state of a nation’s economy when assessing its ability to repay debt, austerity programs haven’t even worked as a way to reduce borrowing costs.”

However, the general trend throughout the world, not just in Spain, has been that bailing out banks has preceded the need to support social programs. The banking system has become monopolized so that banks are too large to fail when they are in trouble. Smaller banks around the world have merged together into larger banks in order to increase their assets to a point where defaults in these banks can risk a financial collapse. In addition, the risk of having these banks default could lead to a greater catastrophe of foreign investors pulling out their money from banks and government bonds. No investments cause reserves of banks to shrink, which would in turn increase interest rates and stiffen lending to consumers. Therefore, the banking system has become so essential to capital of the economy that bailouts have become the insurance banks can rely on when their loans are in trouble.

As a prime example, Spain’s government is applying for an ECCL to bring foreign investors, or at least keep the ones it already has, and maintain its credibility to repay debt. Moreover, if there are no foreign investors, there is a risk that Spain will default on its loans to France and Germany, which can spread Spain’s economic crisis into an epidemic throughout Europe. Consequently, further downgrades of Spain’s bonds—which are currently one notch above junk status according to Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s—will not only drive foreign investors further away from its bond market, but also bring other European Union countries down with it.

For these reasons, although banks are responsible for the housing bubble, they will receive the aid that they need even though austerity measures will make taxpayers’ lives harder. Since big banks are nearly guaranteed bailouts, there are no incentives to prevent banks from issuing out risky loans when the economy recovers and interest rates are low again. But for how long can this vicious cycle last? Already there are violent protests of hundreds of thousands all around the world. If governments wish to ensure the future of its citizens, the cries of the poor, young, and unemployed must be heard.

A strong, competitive labor market is what will bring revenue and ultimately restore the economy. Spain can start with not cutting social programs that are the support systems for the thousands of unemployed and struggling citizens. Secondly, laws must be set in place to prevent unions from not hiring the unemployed youth in Spain. Thirdly, although bailouts must be administered, social programs should take priority before banks are given aid. Finally, there must be laws or a set of incentives that will prevent banks from giving out such toxic loans that start such housing bubbles and financial crises. The people of Spain have been hurting long enough and it is time the government supports and invests in the people who can restore the economy for what it once was.

Tina Kim is a second year Communications major and Public Policy and Urban Planning double minor. She is a co-editor and writer for The Generation.

October 23, 2012 1 comment

Security and Conflict The International Economy

Greece: Why Exiting the European Union is not the Solution

written by thegeneration

By Trisha Parikh

“Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough,” Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), stated on July 26, 2012. What was once a question of Greece leaving the European Union (EU), commonly known as “Grexit,” has now evolved into the question of breaking up the entire EU. The ramifications of multiple countries leaving the EU, or even one country leaving, would be felt in economies around the world. But, as Draghi states, European leaders are looking beyond this possibility to continue to work towards healing the crises in Europe.

The common belief thus far, shared by economists, leaders, and the public, has been that Greece would be the first to leave. Greece, the first EU country to suffer drastic economic setbacks, had accumulated large government debts prior to the economic downturn in 2008. The weak fiscal policies could not generate enough revenue to cover the high rate of borrowing. In 2009, its debt was 113% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), putting it in a weak position to overcome the hit to its markets.

Elsewhere in the EU, Spain is trying to avoid becoming a second Greece by announcing harsher austerity measures that will increase taxes and cut spending at the local levels. Spain is in a risky position—the interest rate for its 10 year government bonds is passing 7%, signaling investor hesitation and long term instability. If investors are reluctant to put money into bonds, Spain will not get the money it needs to bail out banks. While some options are still on the table for countries like Spain, the actions taken in Greece will set an important precedent.

The idea of Greece potentially leaving the EU raises three questions: (1) Will Greece leave the EU? (2) Should Greece leave the EU? (3) If Greece leaves the EU, does it pave the way for progress?

The Greek elections on June 18, 2012 indicated a positive sign for Greece with the victory of the New Democracy. The party is in support of bailouts and implementing austerity measures to ensure that a “Grexit” does not take place. Even though the win represents a positive political shift in Greece, strong fiscal measures will be needed to lift Greece out of the economic depression. The two bailouts Greece has received amounted to more than 250 billion euros and aid continues to flow in the form of loans. Thus, in the short term, Greece is safe. The new government and new measures put into place will test how much longer Greece can sustain its EU membership.

Although some economists and analysts believe that Greece leaving the EU could be beneficial, an exit will be costly for Greece and its neighboring countries. If Greece leaves the EU, the first hurdle it will face is a drastic devaluation of its currency. With the euro, the currency valuation rests on the economic well being of 17 countries—out of which a few still show signs of economic growth. Without this buffer, the Greek currency will be extremely weak and vulnerable to hyperinflation. Greece’s primary industries of tourism and shipping are insufficient to support Greece on their own. Second, as seen in the past, drastic devaluation of currencies results in shortages, inflation, and eventually, political fallout. Economic instability has historically been a cause of political shifts and unrest. This will only lead to rebellion and violence, endangering Greek citizens and citizens of neighboring countries.

What really lies at the core of the crises? A more basic change that needs to occur in order to prevent these economic problems. Amongst the countries using the euro, we see many fiscal divisions that will not be solved by Greece leaving the EU. The fundamental problem lies in the way fiscal policies are implemented. A central bank, like the European Central Bank (ECB), has two main responsibilities: monetary policy and fiscal policy. The ECB carries out monetary policy but it lacks consistent fiscal policy—taxing and spending. The root cause of the Greek crisis was the increasing debt due to a small influx of taxes that was not enough to cover the excessive spending attributed to Greek wage and pension requirement. Thus, the ECB should maintain greater oversight over the types of tax policies and spending policies put into place by individual governments. If multiple countries are employing the same currency and some countries are undermining its value through ineffective fiscal policy, it can create a harmful domino effect.

The answer to all three questions stated earlier seems to be a “No.” Furthermore, an exit from the EU would set a bad precedent for other countries. An exit does not guarantee economic progress or serve as hope of calm in the midst of chaos. Economic recovery due to large budget deficits and extensive borrowing requires intensive reform that imposes strict consequences for excessive deficit spending. Draghi establishing his stance on this issue is an important step in not only giving investors hope that Europe has not given up in its fight, but also hope for the people of Greece and the EU that their government and the ECB will continue to support their needs in a time of crisis.

Figures obtained from BBC News, Forbes, and the Wall Street Journal.

Trisha Parikh is an undergraduate student at UCLA majoring in Economics and Political Science. She is a co-editor with The Generation.

August 6, 2012 3 comments

UCLA's Foreign Affairs Magazine since 2010

European Union

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The Malignancy of Multinational Currency

The Double-Edged Sword of Female Leadership

Globalization and the Power of a Hollow Promise

Nationality vs. Humanity: The Stranger’s Case

Ensuring the Sustainability of Multinational Cap and Trade Policy

Spain’s Labor Markets: The Disregarded Solution of Economic Recovery

Greece: Why Exiting the European Union is not the Solution