Tag

middle east

Image from Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kingdom_Tower_at_night.JPG.

Clouded Vision: The Flawed Economic Policy of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030

1. Introduction and Background

Oil is the core of the Saudi Arabian economy. The country is the largest exporter of oil in the world, and it typically derives about 90 percent of its government revenue from it. Thus, Saudi Arabia can be classified as a rentier state – defined by Hossein Mahdavy as a state that derives a majority of revenue from rents on natural resources like oil. Oil rents, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), have typically consisted of between a quarter and two thirds of total Saudi Arabian GDP.

Revenue from oil, however, is not reliable as it once was for Saudi Arabia. Between 2010 and 2014, a barrel of oil sold at an average of 100 dollars, but between 2015 and 2018, the price dropped to an average of 50 dollars per barrel and has only slighted rebounded in 2023 to 70 dollars. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned rich Arab Gulf countries, like Saudi Arabia, about the risks of relying on oil to support citizen and government income. Additionally, the IMF has encouraged the diversification of oil-dependent economies to better support and stabilize economic growth.

In response to the decline in world oil prices and concerns about economic stability, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud (MBS) launched an economic redevelopment plan in 2016. Based on a report from the American consulting firm McKinsey & Company, this plan – named Vision 2030 – aims to diversify the country’s economy and reduce dependance on oil. Vision 2030 plans to transform the Saudi Arabian oil-based economy to one based on knowledge instead. A knowledge economy recognizes the role that knowledge and technology have in economic development and emphasizes progress in human capital, education, employment, information and communications technology, and innovation. Saudi Arabian citizens would have access to better education and career opportunities without the risk of economic downturn due to fluctuating oil prices.

But, Vision 2030 and its current trajectory will fail. As is, it overpromises and will underdeliver. The plan can be successful, though, if three major components are implemented: greater input from Saudi Arabian citizens, non-exploitative economic roles for women, and extensive education reform. MBS has the power to refine Vision 2030 into a feasible plan – one that can actually be completed by 2030. He can break the failed streak of five previous economic development plans for Saudi Arabia that began in 1970. Furthermore, the Saudi Arabian government has a duty to ensure a stable economy and competitive opportunities for its people in an increasingly globalized world.

2. Vision 2030’s Underwhelming Policies and Progress

Vision 2030 has made little progress since its introduction in 2016. Coupled with this disappointing start, the plan’s budget is ambitious. The projected budget is 2 trillion dollars (a decrease from the initial McKinsey estimate of 4 trillion dollars), which is supposed to double Saudi Arabia’s GDP. However, the ability to raise such an amount of money is “practically next to impossible, unless crude oil prices see a significant appreciation, or Saudi Arabia plans to sell a higher portion of Aramco,” the national oil company. Additionally, the Saudi Arabian budget is notably opaque, ranking 107^th of out 115^th in the world in transparency levels – which does not inspire faith in budget reform or accountability. Saudi Arabia already spent billions of dollars on several failed 5-year reform plans, which resulted in 90 percent of its annual budget still dependent on oil revenues.

The plan’s underwhelming record – and near impossible budget – foretells a corresponding underwhelming outcome for the Saudi Arabian economy and its people. In fact, the three main sections of Vision 2030 – the Privatization Program, the Public Investment Fund Program, and the National Industrial Development and Logistics Program – are particularly behind schedule in their goals. And, the lack of economic growth under these three programs must be interpreted by the Saudi Arabian government as a call to action.

2.1 The Privatization Program

The Privatization Program aims to increase employment in the private sector while reducing the number of citizens reliant on government income. Seventy percent of the Saudi Arabian workforce is employed by the public sector, mainly in bureaucratic positions, where they are accustomed to relatively high and stable salaries. Saudi Arabia has recruited foreign nationals to work in the private sector; they consist of more than 80 percent of the privatized workforce. These private sector jobs are often in the industrial or retail sectors or in private households– jobs that the average Saudi Arabian citizen does not want. Rather, they prefer the security, longevity, and high income of a government post. Paradoxically, greater privatization could actually increase foreign skilled labor, for many Saudi Arabians currently “lack the necessary skills and motivation to do [the private sector’s] manual or strenuous work.” The government has attempted to create “favorable conditions” to encourage private sector job growth through teleworking policies and an online job-seeking platform. But, there is little evidence that these policies have supported growth.

Thus far, the Privatization Program has not met its goal of increasing employment in the private sector. It has, however, privatized four milling companies, finalized agreements for two water desalination projects, and completed Phase 1 of an initiative to “attract private investment to finance the construction of education buildings.” These accomplishments are vague and have not realistically contributed to increasing private employment levels. In 2019 alone, the number of private-sector jobs – both for foreign and domestic workers – dropped by more than 200,000. Moreover, the number of Saudi Arabians employed in the private sector only increased by 36,000 during 2015-2019 even when two million foreign workers left the economy since 2016.

2.2 The Public Investment Fund Program

The goal of the Public Investment Fund (PIF) Program is to become the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund and to transfer ownership shares of Aramco to the Saudi Arabian public. The program plans to reinvest the wealth it has accumulated into the Saudi Arabian economy to fund technology and infrastructure, hopefully creating jobs. For example, it committed to investing 150 billion Saudi Arabian riyals (equal to about 40 billion U.S. dollars) into the economy each year from 2021 to 2025. Yet, no data from the government has been released to substantiate the commitment, and instead, the PIF’s money is instead invested in Uber (3.5 billion dollars) and Softbank’s technology fund (100 billion dollars). Without transparency, the PIF is in danger of becoming a “political tool” rather than an economic one; it can also be vulnerable to corruption if the public cannot check the government’s power.

To raise money for the PIF Program, Saudi Arabia has decided to offer an initial public offering (IPO) of state-owned Aramco. Aramco is valued at 2.5 trillion dollars, and this IPO, at 5 percent, is worth approximately $125 billion dollars. Saudi Arabian policymakers hope that by selling shares of Aramco to the public, the PIF can become the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund and replenish the Saudi Arabian economy with its profits derived from citizens’ personal wealth. To be able to fund Vision 2030, however, the government will likely have to sell up to 49 percent of Aramco’s shares, which is a divergence from its initial 5 percent IPO. No data of Saudi Arabian citizens buying shares has actually been recorded or released. Oil, particularly the Aramco company, is still the backbone of the Saudi Arabian economy because Vision 2030 in its present state has not been successfully implemented. So, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to relinquish almost half its ownership of Aramco.

2.3 The National Industrial Development and Logistics Program

The National Industrial Development and Logistics Program’s objective is to diversify industry through the development of the energy, logistics, manufacturing, and technology sectors. It focuses on “unlocking the full potential” of “local content” and the “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” which is driven by technology advances and digitalization of information. Specifically, it aims to raise gas production, grow renewable energy sources, and improve the local, regional, and international “connectivity of trade and transport networks.” Technology is alluring to Saudi Arabia and its policymakers for modernization purposes. But, the country cannot become a center of industry under its current structure because its citizens do not have many of the necessary skills to adapt to a technology-driven workforce. Because of the underperforming education system, many Saudi citizens are unprepared to take on jobs like these that require training and critical thinking.

Increasing access and quality of education is crucial to economic success. The Saudi Arabian education system, though, is lacking in teaching critical thinking skills that spur innovation in students. Rather, rote learning methods, such as memorization, are implemented. To make the National Industrial Development and Logistics Program successful, the Saudi Arabian government must invest in education reform – and in their citizens.

3. A Tripartite Policy Recommendation

Vision 2030 can be successful. The Saudi Arabian government, however, must address three significant issues: the lack of citizen input, the exploited role of women, and the underachieving education system.

3.1 Input from Citizens: The Saudi Center for Opinion Polling

MBS recruited the American consulting firm McKinsey & Company to construct Saudi Arabia’s economic development plan – notably without input from ordinary Saudi Arabian citizens. McKinsey’s Vision 2030 did not fully account for the people’s reluctance to leave higher-paying, public-sector work. Without understanding Saudi Arabian citizens’ perspective on economic reform, Vision 2030 cannot truly meet their needs. Thus, to make Vision 2030 more achievable, the Saudi Arabian government must survey its people to understand their realistic views.

The Saudi Center for Opinion Polling (SCOP) must adopt a greater role in surveying the Saudi Arabian people for Vision 2030 to reflect their economic needs more accurately. Previously, SCOP polled Saudi Arabian citizens above age 15 through a randomly generated list of phone numbers regarding women’s ability to drive. It was expected that passing a law to allow women to drive would be unpopular with the general public, but it was overwhelmingly popular – with over two-thirds of those surveyed in support. Policymakers were bolstered by the strong response and ultimately passed a law allowing for women to drive.

SCOP’s data has power and should be utilized by policymakers to devise and implement Vision 2030’s economic policy. Citizen engagement is “key to improve trust between government and citizen” and is “vital for improved evidence-based policymaking.” Too often, citizens’ voices are not heard. The anthropologist Fernando Coronil argues in his book The Magical State that oil-rich state planners, such as those from Saudi Arabia, often undertake developmental projects “beyond the limits of reality;” they overestimate their state’s capacity for “wholesale change.” MBS and McKinsey have manufactured an overly ambitious agenda. For example, increased private employment is a foundation of Vision 2030’s Privatization Program, yet many Saudi Arabian citizens do not want to leave their secure public sector jobs. I propose that SCOP must be considered as a crucial tool of the Saudi Arabian government to adapt Vision 2030 into a more realistic vision.

The main barrier to a greater role for SCOP is logistical. The government has already given the program its approval: SCOP was utilized in surveying Saudi Arabian public opinion before on single issues (for example, women and the right to drive). Now, SCOP’s abilities and technology must be expanded to survey Saudi Arabian adults, who comprise 75 percent of the country’s population, on the multitude of issues addressed in Vision 2030. SCOP may need to increase its size and hire more employees, which has the added benefit of adding jobs to the economy, one of Vision 2030’s main goals. The center’s research capability can grow if expanded and given access to greater funding and technology by the government.

3.2 Women as Equal Economic Partners: An Unexploited Role

Vision 2030 is not truly transformative in all respects because it plans to exploit female labor. While Vision 2030 proposes greater access to the public sphere for women, women are still denied agency in other areas of their lives. For example, women cannot open a bank account without permission from a male, thus preventing them from economic independence. Their interests are frequently neglected by Saudi leadership in an attempt to placate the country’s hardline Wahhabi Muslim clerics. From a Wahhabi religious perspective, women are seen as the “guardians of the moral integrity of the nation, producers of the future pious generation, keepers of tribal and Arab purity, and markers of the nation’s commitment to Islam.” Economic participation is not included in their role defined by the powerful religious leadership; the Wahhabi perspective conflicts with Vision 2030’s plans.

Vision 2030 claims that women are an integral part of the economy. It “alludes” to increasing the percentage of women in the workforce from 22 percent to 30 percent by 2030. How, though? Women are often banned from working in unsegregated places, and opponents persistently advocate for placing limits on how late they can work or how they can be employed. Thus, these limits must be repealed by the Saudi Arabian government to allow women to freely exercise their economic power. Women must be treated as equal economic partners rather than an influx to the labor force.

To create sustainable development for women as part of the labor force, Vision 2030 must implement measures to decrease influence of social and religious norms that prevent women from economic participation. The plan must break with traditionally conservative Wahhabi expectations of women as primarily the caretaker of the household.

The Saudi Arabian government can enact several measures to help women achieve their full economic potential. First, it can eliminate the gender pay gap between women and men to demonstrate that it understands the value of women in the workplace. Women currently earn about 56 percent of a man’s wages. The Saudi Arabian government could direct money from the PIF Program to reducing and eliminating the pay gap. Equal pay is an investment in their labor force, after all. Second, it can allow women to be employed in any profession – as of now, certain opportunities, such as becoming a judge, are restricted to men only. Third, it must penalize employers who require a male guardian’s permission for a woman to work, for it is technically legal – although Vision 2030 claims that women are equal economic partners to men.

Increasing female economic participation in Saudi Arabia will receive pushback. Even though MBS’s Vision 2030 aims to modernize the economy (and Saudi Arabia as a whole), Wahhabi doctrine and traditional gender norms are ingrained in the country. For instance, women were only allowed to drive beginning in 2018. And, it is not expected that Saudi Arabia will achieve full gender equality in its economy by 2030. However, the country will achieve no progress if it does not at least try to integrate more women in the workforce. My proposals can be viewed as starting points in the pursuit of economic equity that can one day lead to a long-term solution.

3.3 Education Reform: Implementing Critical Thinking Skills

Saudi Arabia requires a trained and educated citizenry to form a knowledge-based economy. But, there is a lack of knowledge and implementation of critical thinking in the Saudi Arabian education system. Thus, the education system must be reformed by the state to produce skilled workers in a knowledge-based economy and allow its National Industrial Development and Logistics Program to succeed.

The World Bank and the McKinsey Global Institute advised Saudi Arabia even before Vision 2030 was created to reform its education policy to avoid future economic decline. A majority of Saudi Arabian teachers interviewed in a recent study added that there is a “lack of trained professionals [in the system,] and many schools are now staffed by employees ill-equipped to implement reform or improve quality.” Additionally, the education system has been criticized for giving “less importance to the social and hard sciences” while “emphasizing religious studies at all levels of education.” Saudi Arabia was one of the lowest performing countries for mathematics, performing below the low benchmark scores. Vision 2030 needs to make education reform a priority for the country.

Teachers must be trained in depth to replace rote learning methods, common in Saudi Arabia, with a more collaborative, thoughtful, and critical approach to develop students’ higher-order thinking skills. School curricula must include opportunities for students to practice critical thinking, often practiced in liberal arts courses. Schools must teach critical thinking and other higher-order cognitive skills that can encourage creativity. To that end, Saudi Arabia can establish more universities and/or programs that focus on the social and hard sciences and the liberal arts. For example, there are no institutions in Saudi Arabia that teach business or political science, which is deeply hurting the country’s attempt to transform into a knowledge-based, industrious economy. Education is connected to the economy, for a citizen’s education prepares them for their life’s work. Put simply, knowledge is required for a knowledge-based economy.

Education reform in Saudi Arabia is related to Vision 2030’s labor goals. The country wants to strengthen the manufacturing, energy, and technology sectors, among others, and in return needs an educated citizenry to fill those jobs. Reform will also increase employment among Saudi Arabia’s indigenous population and reduce the needs for expatriate labor. The teaching standards in Saudi Arabia must be raised to create a skilled workforce that can strengthen and diversify the economy.

The Saudi Arabian education system cannot be transformed quickly. Like my proposal to increase female economic participation, education reform will be met with criticism, perhaps even disapproval. Teaching critical thinking in schools will lead to an educated public, and an educated public has the power to strategically organize and lobby against the government for increased rights. To an authoritarian government, such as Saudi Arabia, an educated public is a threat, for it can demand reform across society. So, to obtain government support for an education system founded on honing critical thinking skills, reforms must be framed mainly – if not solely – as economically beneficial. Future economic prosperity through a learned citizenry must be at the forefront of the campaign for economic reform.

4. Conclusion

Currently, Vision 2030’s plans to revitalize the economy are unrealistic and have made underwhelming progress thus far. But, Vision 2030 can be made feasible if the tripartite policy solution – greater citizen input, increased female economic participation, and education reform – is implemented by the Saudi Arabian government.

Image source: BroadArrow on English Wikipedia

January 24, 2024 0 comment

Middle East Print Article Security and Conflict Terrorism

International Law and Child Soldiers: Yemen’s Civil War

written by Abdus Najmi

This article originally appeared in The Generation Spring 2020 print edition. The theme for this edition is “Youth Voices.” A link to our online version of the print publication can be found here: https://www.flipsnack.com/thegen/the-generation-spring-2020.html

As the majority of Yemen’s population lies on the cusp of starvation and famine, urgent action in the field of international law is critical to set deterrents for future state actors and remedy the already inflicted harms from the current state actors involved in the civil war. My research will attempt to answer the following two questions: What is the status of current trends in international law regarding the use of child soldiers? Can international law offer pragmatic solutions to decrease the likelihood of conflict in Yemen, especially concerning child soldiers?

Part I of this essay will examine current recruitment strategies regarding child soldiers from both the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels. It will also analyze the role of the United States in the conflict, and offer some analysis on potential policy recommendations. Part II will explore the status of international law regarding the use of child soldiers. First, my discussion will engage international law from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence. Then, I will examine Western approaches and norms. Lastly, Part III will delve into potential solutions for domestic reform in Yemen as based on the model of the new Iraqi constitution.

Part I: The Status Quo

Saudi Arabia’s child soldier recruitment strategy in Yemen is an extensive operation. The Kingdom began recruiting children from war-torn Darfur around 2016, telling children that Saudi Arabia would pay “as much as $10,000 if [they] joined its forces.”[i] The statistics are appalling. Some fighters have testified that as much as “40 percent” of their unit has been made up of children. For the residents of financially ravaged Darfur, the offer of ten thousand dollars from Saudi royals could be life changing for residents of financially ravaged residents of Darfur. When one considers the fact that “a Sudanese doctor working overtime at multiple jobs might earn the equivalent of $500 a month,”[ii] ten thousand dollars may be the difference between life and death. Saudi Arabia, along with Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Bahrain, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, and Sudan, has launched operations against the Zaydi Shi’i group known as the Houthis. Ansar Allah, another name the Houthis adopted, gained control of the capital of Yemen, Sana’a, in 2014. This was a devastating blow for former President Hadi.[iii] The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaeda have also been critical actors in the Yemeni Civil War, routinely carrying out attacks against the Zaydi Shias on the basis of sectarian differences. ISIS and Al-Qaeda’s are primarily Sunni, abiding by a Salafist ideology, while Zaydi Shi’ism stands in direct opposition to Salafism theologically. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has attempted to securitize Zaydis as inherently violent, looking at every way to “reestablish a Zaydi Imamate,”[iv] which they believe is crucial to the soundness of political order, though much of this discourse are acts of hyper-securitization and fear-mongering.

However, child soldier recruitment is not a one-sided effort from Saudi Arabia. Though scholars may be quick to blame the Saudi-led coalition for violating international law as a state actor, they quickly forget that the Houthis are still equally guilty under international human rights conventions. The Houthis have “inducted 18,000 child soldiers […] since […] 2014.”[v] The strategy differs with every child, for some, it is promises of “money or the chance to carry a weapon […] But others described being […] abducted from schools or homes or coerced into joining in exchange for a family member’s release from detention.”[vi] The ability to protect one’s family or earn money are enticing opportunities for anyone living in a country with one of the worst humanitarian crises. The Zaydi Houthis have declined these allegations; however, on-the-ground journalism tells a different story.

Before diving into the legal issues at hand, it is critical to understand status quo levels of involvement from different state (and non-state) actors. The United States has an extremely important role in the Yemeni Civil War. Currently, US arm sales to Saudi Arabia total billions of dollars, as the “State Department has approved at least $30.1 billion in Saudi military contracts.”[vii] Saudi Arabia has extensively used these weapons in their coalition against the Houthis. In terms of sheer statistics, US weapons from companies like General Dynamics or Lockheed Martin have directly killed “at least 434 people and injure[d] at least 1,004 in attacks.”[viii] The US can implement a number of policy measures to prevent further carnage and help end the use of child soldiers in the conflict. First, the United States “should end its provision of military aid to Saudi Arabia,”[ix] guaranteeing that the Saudis receive a signal of noncompliance with their behavior in the region. This will signal that the United States no longer exclusively backs Saudi interests in Yemen and will significantly lessen the number of casualties from the conflict. The US may benefit from using a quid pro quo approach, conditioning arm sales and military aid on the end of the use of child soldiers. This can be legally justified under the Child Soldier Prevention Act.[x] Empirically, the conditioning of military aid on the cessation of the use of child soldiers has been very effective – the United States has “in at least three cases, […] been instrumental in securing foreign governments’ agreement to enter into a UN action plan to end their use of child soldiers.”[xi]

In addition, it may be necessary to hold elected officials accountable. While the laws may be in place, political elites like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are able to manipulate moral questions into military ones. Pompeo “blocked the inclusion of Saudi Arabia on a list of countries that recruit child soldiers,”[xii] making it difficult to get the US legally behind any form of arms embargo against the Kingdom. Adding Saudi Arabia to that list may be the first step needed to pursuing conditional military policies with Riyadh. Establishing a quid pro quo relationship with Saudi Arabia bodes well as an effective mechanism in securing the rights of children and ending the use of child soldiers in the Middle East writ large.

Part II: Discussion on International Law

When one discusses customary international law, it is crucial to remember that not all states are as keen to adopt Western legal frameworks when dealing with issues like conduct in warfare. Though most Islamic countries do not follow word for word principles established in Sharia’, which may be broadly defined as Islamic jurisprudence, they still abide by large, overarching principles that can be found in the Quran, the Hadith, and through hermeneutic practices, including others like ijma (scholarly consensus) or qiyas (analogical reasoning). In order to make policy recommendations, it may be critical to examine Islamic law and jurisprudence in regards to child soldiers to better access frameworks that individuals in Yemen may be more inclined to adapt. It is imperative to abide by the frameworks of those who are most affected by the conflict.

Islamic fiqh in the context of family relations holds a deep literature base regarding the rights of children. Primarily, scholars contend that Islam necessitates “that children should be given a protective environment, and […] the right to have sufficient parental care, the right to have education, the right to healthcare, and the freedom of expression and thought.”[xiii] In fact, if a child does not have parents, it is encouraged greatly for the children to be “protected through sponsorship provided by people acting in the role of parents.”[xiv] Even when one looks at commentary concerning jihad from the most famous Muslim scholars, child recruitment for offensive jihad is explicitly denied. Ibn Rushd, known more famously as Averroes, stated that “the collective obligation lies with the freemen and adults.”[xv] Hanafi scholar and jurist al-Marghinani made clear that “jihad is not a requirement for the child.”

Islamic traditions would also contend that there are “two qualifications someone is considered to reach a majority age, namely, ‘âqil and bâligh.”[xvi] Reaching aqil and baligh set the benchmark for what being an “adult” constitutes. Aqil refers to being in possession of one’s mental abilities, while the latter means ‘physically grown up, bodily of age.”[xvii] Both of these benchmarks are hard to quantify; in many Islamic countries such as Indonesia, scholars can find indicators of adulthood in marital law, where it’s legislated to allow marriage without consent at the age of 21.[xviii] However, in Yemen, marital law might tell a different story. There is no formal age of consent in Yemen, and many cases have surfaced regarding child marriages as young as 8 years old.[xix] Theory and practice tell vastly different stories, making it very difficult to set a clear definition of what adulthood really is. Further research may be needed to understand the effect of culture as an alternative explanation for child marriages.

Even if we wanted to adopt a more conservative view of Islamic law regarding jihad for children, the story of ibn Umar would set the limit of child participation in war at fifteen years old. During the Battle of Badr, ibn Umar asked to fight alongside the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, who then forbade it. The hadith goes as such: “‘The messenger of God reviewed me the day [of the battle] of Uhud, when I was just a boy of 14 years, and I was not allowed [to fight]. Then he reviewed me the [day of the battle] of the Trench, I was 15 years old and he agreed.”[xx] This is strikingly similar to the age limit set in international law as well; “the age limit is set at fifteen in Article 38”[xxi] in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Both Western, international law and Islamic law hold the age of fifteen as the proper age of participation in warfare.

Current trends in international law have attempted to raise the minimum age of child soldiers globally. Article 38 did not suffice, so in 1993, committee members attempted to push for the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. On “May 25, 2000,”[xxii] the United Nations ended up taking on the new changes, raising the minimum age of child warfare “from fifteen to eighteen years.”[xxiii] There are loopholes to this though – states may still be able to benefit from the voluntary participation of children in the armed forces, “so the notion of a “straight-eighteen rule” has yet to be fully accomplished.”[xxiv] Though Saudi Arabia and Yemen are parties to the Optional Protocol, it is clear that both of these countries do not abide by the rules they have agreed to. The Optional Protocol lacks an enforcement mechanism, effectively negating the power behind international law.

Part III: Potential Solutions

Yemen may be able to model domestic laws in Iraq in regards to children in armed conflict to further ensure the safety of children. The new Iraqi constitution, which was drafted post US invasion in 2003, incorporates both Western legal doctrines and the Sharia’. It holds in Article 29 that “family is the foundation of society… and the state guarantees the protection of […] childhood.”[xxv] Articles 33 and 37 were home runs for legal innovation regarding the use of child soldiers. This article contains provisions and statutes that are critical to “children who have become child soldiers in armed conflict,” prohibiting the use of force on any “person to join any party, society or political entity or force him to continue his membership in it.”[xxvi] It is critical for Yemeni policymakers to examine the new Iraqi constitution as a potential model for future laws regarding conduct of warfare. Though the efficacy of the new Iraqi constitution has not yet been determined, as witnessed with the rise of ISIS and political instability, the constitution still provides a base frame for Yemen to build upon domestically. Due to the impending humanitarian disaster, it is crucial that policymakers not focus on the small details of legal innovations, but rather adopt a framework quickly to resolve status quo harms as fast as possible. An external agency that monitors enforcement may need to be established to ensure productive results. Without external enforcement mechanisms, Yemen may fall into the same paradigms of failure and noncompliance that Iraq has witnessed.

In addition, Yemen is unique from Iraq since Yemen is home to the Zaydi Shia group. Preservation of Zaydi identity, or at least an attempt at negotiation of it, is critical to ensure the freedom of worship and minority rights. In the new Iraqi constitution, it was held that the “holy shrines and religious sites in Iraq are religious and civilizational entities […] the State is committed to assuring and maintaining their sanctity, and to guaranteeing the free practice of rituals in them.”[xxvii] This did not matter whether the minority was a Chaldean Christian or a Yazidi, Iraq attempted to maintain the ability for its citizens to uphold the freedom of religion. However, in Yemen, the idea of freedom of religion is a different story, at least post-Saudi airstrikes. Saudi Arabia has deliberately attacked Zaydi sites, such as Al-Hadi mosque, “the final resting place of Imam al-Hadi ila’l-Haqq Yahya, the first Shiite Zaydi imam of Yemen.”[xxviii] The destruction of Shiite religious and cultural sites is a clear violation of international law, and begs the question: What Islamic principles can be maintained in a future negotiation between the Houthis and Saudis? If both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have different notions of Islam, then the potential for finding common ground severely diminishes. Adopting Iraq’s notions of religious freedom must be the stepping stone in Houthi-Saudi negotiation.

However, this conflict is much more difficult than it seems. Though sectarian differences regarding Zaydi Shi’ism and Sunni Islam are tantamount concerns, they are not the main drivers of the conflict. For one, Zaydi Shi’ism is actually considered “closer to Sunni Islam rather than to Twelver Shiism, which is the form of Shiism practiced in Iran.”[xxix] Theologically, there are critical differences regarding the status of the fifth Imam Zayd ibn Ali, but overall, Zaydi Shi’ism holds much more tolerant views of the earlier Sunni caliphs, granting them openness “towards other interpretations of Islam.”[xxx] The notion that this conflict is a new Cold War along sectarian lines between Iran and Saudi Arabia must be rejected and analyzed further. Economics, power politics, and the drive for natural resources may very well serve as alternative explanations for the ongoing proxy wars throughout the Middle East.

As examined in this essay, the recruitment of children as soldiers in Yemen goes against Islamic principles contained in the hadith and Western norms of international law broadly. As the Saudi-led coalition gains momentum and continues to pay children in Darfur to participate in war crimes, the world must attempt to restrain Saudi Arabia through means of coercion, whether that be economic sanctions or hardline military force. States must look at empirical examples and attempts at peace negotiations, such as the Stockholm agreement and the Riyadh agreement. Further research needs to examine the factors and conditions that led the Southern separatists to “have pulled out”[xxxi] of the Riyadh agreement near the beginning of this year. However, it is clear that an agreement that precludes any discussion regarding the use of child soldiers is problematic and destined to continue the suffering of many. The United States has a clear position in the conflict as Saudi Arabia’s guarantor of arms sales, and will need to serve a crucial role in diplomatic efforts with Saudi Arabia if it wants to see any resolution of the ongoing tragedies in Yemen.

[i] Kirkpatrick, David. “On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur.” New York Times, December 2018. Accessed 4 February 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html.

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Waseem A. Qureshi, The Crisis in Yemen: Armed Conflict and International Law, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 227 (2020).

[iv] King, James. “Zaydī revival in a hostile republic: Competing identities, loyalties and visions of state in Republican Yemen.” Brill, Arabica 59 (2012) 404-445.

[v] Associated Press. “Children as young as 10 fight, kill and die in Yemen’s war.” NBC News, December 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/children-young-10-fight-kill-die-yemen-s-war-n949721.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Kane, Alex. “Here’s Exactly Who’s Profiting from the War on Yemen.” In These Times, June 2019 Issue, https://inthesetimes.com/features/us-saudi-arabia-yemen-war-arms-sales.html

[viii] Ibid.

[ix] Lena Mizrahi, “The U.S. Must End Military Aid to Saudi Arabia – Berkeley Political Review”, Berkeley Political Review, https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/11/12/the-u-s-must-end-military-aid-to-saudi-arabia/, accessed 11-19-2019.

[x] Becker, Jo. “From Opponent to Ally: The United States and Efforts to End the Use of Child Soldiers, 22 Mich. St. Int’l L. Rev. 595 (2013), Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/ilr/vol22/iss2/5

[xi] Ibid.

[xii] Seligman, Lara. “The Child Soldier Crisis: ‘Kids Are Cheap’,” Foreign Policy, November 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/08/child-soldier-crisis-kids-are-cheap-yemen-isis-my-star-sky/

[xiii] Anna-Liisa Jacobson, “Lambs into Lions: The Utilization of Child Soldiers in the War in Iraq and Why International and Iraqi Laws are Failing to Protect the Innocent,” Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 161-194

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/sharia-law-does-not-call-child-soldiers

[xvi] https://media.neliti.com/media/publications/157450-EN-the-issue-of-child-soldiers-in-islamic-p.pdf

[xvii] Ibid.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/after-years-civil-war-child-marriage-rise-yemen/33762

[xx] https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/sharia-law-does-not-call-child-soldiers

[xxi] Anna-Liisa Jacobson, “Lambs into Lions: The Utilization of Child Soldiers in the War in Iraq and Why International and Iraqi Laws are Failing to Protect the Innocent,” Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8, no. 2 (Winter 2008): 161-194

[xxii] Ibid.

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] Constitute Project, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005.” https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en

[xxviii] Craig, Iona. “The Agony of Saada”: U.S. and Saudi Bombs Target Yemen’s Ancient Heritage.” The Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2015/11/16/u-s-and-saudi-bombs-target-yemens-ancient-heritage/

[xxix] Perteghella, Annalisa. “Yemen: the Sectarianization of a Political Conflict.” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, March 2018. https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/yemen-sectarianization-political-conflict-19933

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] Reuters, “Yemen’s southern separatists pull out of Riyadh agreement committees,” Reuters, January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/yemens-southern-separatists-pull-out-of-riyadh-agreement-committees-idUSKBN1Z01ZE

June 1, 2020 0 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics Globalization Humanitarian Aid Immigration Middle East Religion Security Security and Conflict Society and Culture Terrorism Uncategorized

Nationality vs. Humanity: The Stranger’s Case

written by Madison Weil

“It is nationalism which endangers nations, and not the other way round.” –Ernest André Gellner (British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist)

French President Francois Hollande recently issued a statement that his country is prepared to open its borders and welcome 24,000 migrants seeking asylum over the next two years. This statement, issued on September 7, 2015, is part of a new plan designed by the European Union to accept and appropriately distribute the massive exodus of refugees fleeing from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other surrounding nations. When asked to comment on French polls that indicated 55% of the national population was opposed to accepting more refugees, Hollande responded that asylum is a constitutional right and a moral duty, and that “France’s image and standing in the world were at stake.”

In light of the recent terrorists attacks on Paris, and amid reports that one of the attackers held a Syrian passport, Hollande has emphasized the necessity of making proper background checks prior to accepting these refugees. Hollande has declared war on ISIS, but made it clear that France will maintain its “humanitarian duty” and promise to welcome refugees over the next two years.

While many refugees initially identified Germany as the most ideal place to relocate with supposed security and job opportunities abound, other European countries are now offering comparable conditions and welcoming the migrants. In fact, because Germany has been accommodating such a massive influx of individuals in recent months, France has offered to help by offering an expedited asylum application to migrant families arriving in Munich: temporary housing in France along with a two-week approval process as opposed to the usual six-month process.

These recent political and cultural strides made by France are particularly notable given the nation’s sticky history with immigration and ethnic tension. Having just spent a month living and learning in France, I can attest that it is challenging to go more than a day without hearing an allegation that the presence of ethnic minorities, foreigners, and immigrants creates a grave problem for the nation. A commonly held belief among French traditionalists is that these groups directly threaten and compromise the very essence of true “Frenchness.” Many harbor a sense of nationalism that transcends the concept of national pride and actually results in extreme and egregious discrimination—for example, some believe that to be truly “French” is to be white, Catholic, and multi-generationally French. This statement parades as protectionism when in reality it is rooted in racism. This has created an ongoing and very heated dialogue surrounding immigration policy in the last century.

This French perception of nationalism (hopefully) seems foreign to us in the United States. Our nationality law is based on the principles of jus soli (Latin for “right of soil”), meaning that individuals gain immediate citizenship upon being born in the U.S. This has subsequently created the notion that America is a mixing pot of racial identities—our sense of national pride comes from being united as American, not from being one united race. In contrast, most states in Europe, Asia, and Oceania grant citizenship based on principles of jus sanguinis (Latin for “right of blood”) or a restricted version of jus solis—as is the case in France. Under this philosophy, individuals become citizens depending on their parents’ citizenship and not by birthplace. This has fostered and accentuated the cultural division in France between natives and immigrants which has resulted in the emergence of a perceived social hierarchy. Because of this heated history and conflicting cultural dynamic, President Hollande’s decision to welcome refugees in spite of opposition (and in spite of recent events) deserves recognition.

France’s situation forcibly evokes a particularly challenging set of questions: at what point should international leaders place a greater emphasis on obligations to humanity than on obligations to their own national interests? How do leaders of the Western community in particular negotiate or reconcile national interests with moral duty? Is there such a thing as a moral duty to the international community? According to the UNHCR: “Since, by definition, refugees are not protected by their own governments, the international community steps in to ensure they are safe and protected.” In fact, in the past few decades 142 nations have signed on to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol. By signing this international treaty and its 1967 amendment, the UNHCR states nations are essentially agreeing that “refugees deserve, as a minimum, the same standards of treatment enjoyed by other foreign nationals in a given country and, in many cases, the same treatment as nationals.”

While we have historically seen that most national actions, even humanitarian ones, are often out of self-interest, it is my sincere hope that international authorities will continue to improve and open their borders to those in need. Afterall, those of us born in Western nations with relatively safe conditions could have just as easily been born into a nation experiencing a crisis. Wouldn’t we then hope and pray for assistance and asylum in the E.U.? In the U.S.?

This debate reminded me of an excerpt from Shakespeare’s play “Sir Thomas More.” Sir Thomas More is a lawyer, sent to address an angry crowd of individuals rioting to get rid of “those immigrants” or “strangers.” Shakespeare delivers a powerful message that transcends time and place when More challenges the natives to consider what they would do if they had to flee their home country:

“Whether would you go?

What country, by the nature of your error,

Should give you harbor? go you to France or Flanders,

To any German province, to Spain or Portugal,

Nay, any where that not adheres to England,–

Why, you must needs be strangers: would you be pleased

To find a nation of such barbarous temper,

That, breaking out in hideous violence,

Would not afford you an abode on earth,

Whet their detested knives against your throats,

Spurn you like dogs, and like as if that God

Owed not nor made not you, nor that the elements

Were not all appropriate to your comforts,

But chartered unto them, what would you think

To be thus used? this is the strangers case;

And this your mountanish inhumanity.”

(Sir Thomas More, Act II, Scene IV)

This is the stranger’s case—the immigrant’s case. For many, it’s near impossible to fully comprehend the plight and experiences of today’s refugees, but so important to try. While it’s challenging to reconcile national interests with humanitarian needs, our nationality shouldn’t supersede our humanity.

November 20, 2015 0 comment

Africa Middle East Security and Conflict Society and Culture Uncategorized

Understanding the American Image in the Middle East: A Conversation with Political Activists from North Africa and the Middle East

written by thegeneration

By: Tina Kim, Trisha Parikh, & Sara Pilgreen

As news reports poured in everyday, detailing the fighting between Syrian rebel forces, the Israel and Palestine conflict, and the bloodshed, it all came to a screeching reality on November 5^th. We had the privilege of interviewing 16 representatives of North African and Middle Eastern countries who were part of an international visitor leadership program sponsored by the U.S. Department of State. This was an eye-opening experience. As we listened to what the young political leaders and activists had to say, we were captivated. The room was filled with disagreements, a mixture of perspectives, and a palpable underlying energy. Rarely are representatives from these various countries together in one room, in a feeling of shared empathy.

Americans have long heard their leaders refer to the Middle East with rhetoric such as “bring our troops home” and the “war on terrorism.” Through these representations in the media, many Americans single out the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars and the September 11 attacks when thinking about the Middle East. Rarely do we evaluate the immense diversity and differential stances individual countries in the Middle East have with the United States and with each other. We listen to reports of what one leader said to another, or what foreign policy stance the U.S. will take, or the death toll of a revolution or war. But how often do we hear about how an event affects the people of these countries, what history they have with one another, and what that event will mean for them and their future?

This interview allowed us to realize the encapsulated and largely monolithic view we have of the Middle East. Contrary to the image of the Middle East that is plagued by violence and destruction, the 16 delegates focused on diplomacy, conflict settlements, peaceful processes, and methods of democracy to employ in the future. It also became apparent that the Arab world had been closely following U.S. politics and accurately understood Americans’ ignorance of the complexity of their region. As one Palestinian representative noted, “(The) greatest deception for Palestinians, generally Arabs, but at least for Palestinians is to know that foreign policy is not important inside America for elections. Because back home the U.S. is very present at all levels, whether it is at the internal politics or the regional politics.”

During the interview, we asked the representatives whether the outcome of the U.S. presidential election would make a difference in their country. The answers to this question alone surprised us, and they revealed insider perceptions regarding U.S. bipartisanship and leadership styles.

The Palestinian representative articulated the popular perception that party affiliation (Republican or Democrat) did not make a difference in foreign policy. Rather it was more about the “person and President Obama, when he came 4 years ago, [and] placed the bar very high” with his speech in Cairo. The representative also noted that many Palestinians have expressed “frustration now, coming out of that,” due to unaddressed promises and disappointed hopes.

In contrast, an Algerian representative stated that on a personal level, he wanted President Obama to win re-election because Algeria’s relationship with the U.S. “was based on combating terrorism and promoting human rights. President Obama is a symbol of how the United States went from slavery to having a black president.” The underlying preference in Algeria was for President Obama to be re-elected; however, for reasons that many Americans probably never consider, including Obama’s African heritage. They also considered his promises of peace and diplomacy as important factors.

The Moroccan participant expressed his view quite differently, stating that the country had “an excellent historical relationship with the United States of America, with both parties—Republicans and Democrats. Morocco was the first country in the world to accept the United States as a country when it was first established.” It was unexpected and surprising to hear a representative base the country’s relationship with the U.S. on a historical fact unknown to many Americans. Our ignorance of such important information then poses a question: how many other facts and issues – that we are unaware of – are presently impacting our relationships with other countries?

Listening to the delegation, we were struck by the diversity of lenses employed by these different countries in their assessment of the United States. The unique cultures, varying issues, and different political systems with fluctuating degrees of freedoms could not be summed up by the simple term the “Arab world,” a term so liberally used by the western media. The unique history and cultural environments caused individual countries in Middle East to react and participate differently in response to the Arab Spring and other recent events. Therefore, when a country such as ours intervenes in internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries, have we stressed the need for differentiated U.S. policy approached in the region and the repercussions of not doing so? What would the image we project in these countries and how would our relations with them change? For instance, the United States has historically supported civilian protests for greater democracy. However, even though these countries with protests and revolutions may gain greater freedom, the representatives highlighted that this was not the case for some of the neighboring countries.

A Lebanese representative stated that, “There was a lot of security and political pressure and oppression and those people that the U.S. supported (came) into power…Before these revolutions, we had political and security oppression but now after we have political, security, and also religious oppression.” Another representative from Saudi Arabia also highlighted an unforeseen development that, “oppression has become more severe and armed than before. People are using weapons. Maybe they are afraid that the revolution in Bahrain will happen in Saudi Arabia.” The oppression even extends to individuals who are taken in “custody because of their opinions, not political opinions, their regular opinions.”

Moreover, what is even more striking is the lack of U.S. response to the oppression. How can a country that prides itself on expanding individual freedoms possibly permit an ally such as Saudi Arabia to suppress the freedom of its citizens? If the U.S. promotes freedom and peace within its own borders, it should use foreign policy as a tool to employ these ideals beyond its borders as well.

While it became clear that the “one size fits all” view does not describe the Arab world, the interview also helped us understand the role U.S. foreign policy plays in creating the “American” image in the Middle East. The American media, scholarly articles, and public opinion polls have all established that the U.S. is not gaining popular support in the region. Yet, listening to the representatives shed light on how our foreign policy has created this negative trend, forced us to view our foreign policy priorities in a new perspective. While U.S. policies have ranged from providing humanitarian aid to engaging in full-scale war, the people of the Arab world, not surprisingly, are most affected by the indirect costs that war has imposed on them. These costs range from the increase violent political oppression to decreases in freedom of speech.

The impact is that these unanticipated costs hinder the facilitation of conflict settlements and dialogue among the people of these countries, resulting in a negative portrayal of America. Even though our intentions are good, they are often lost in the damage and destruction that can be a byproduct of U.S. foreign policy. Civilians experience both emotional and physical pain, livelihoods are destroyed, and the American image is reduced to that of a destroyer or occupier. It comes as no surprise that when discussing the policies of the American president, there was a clear preference for the diplomacy of Obama over the war-oriented policies employed under the Bush Administration as well as Romney’s proposed foreign policy.

What struck us as interesting was that the representatives were very comfortable with assigning a black and white ideological distinction between the two candidates. As politically conscious individuals living in the U.S., we perhaps do not see our policies in such a dichotomous manner. As a delegate from Morocco pointed out, Obama’s diplomacy is “very calm and reassuring to the people in that region and it also calls for having dialogue.” Diplomacy is not only a more important and tactical action, but it also resonates well across the region and this would strengthen U.S.-Arab relations. Thus, it is vital to remember that a nuanced assessment, by Americans, of policies employed overseas can give us great insight into how the U.S. image is constructed in the Arab world.

The Palestinian delegate shared this sentiment in his discussion of U.S. policy towards Israel and Palestine. He remarked that Obama’s “present[ing] himself as promoting dialogue over war” is a driving force in the Palestinian people’s support for Obama. He strongly believed that “if you want to see a peaceful political process between Palestinians and Israelis…it would be [in] our interest if President Obama gets re-elected.” Once again, there is obvious support for a leader associated with “peace” and a “peace settlement” processes.

When understanding how diplomacy and war in the Arab world shape the image of America, the U.S. should keep the following in mind: the Moroccan representative pointed out that under the presidencies of “George Bush Jr. and George Bush Senior…they tried to resolve many of the problems around the world with the language of war and not the language of peace.” This one statement resonated in the room, among the representatives and among the three of us. Although it is easier said than done, what the U.S. government needs to do in order to ensure the success of American foreign policy is to actively pursue peace. “The language of peace” will allow the American government and population to win the “hearts and minds” of the Arab people, and to achieve its greater goals in the region. With Obama’s reelection, the President now has another chance to utilize “the language of peace” through changes in U.S. foreign policy. As these policies continue to affect the Arab people’s lives, they will remember Obama’s promises and watch for developments that can restore relations between our two worlds. However, until American policymakers adopt this stand and actively uphold their promises, it is unlikely that the U.S. can succeed in its campaigns to win the support of the Arab population or improve the “American” image around the world.

On a more personal level, discussing these questions with the delegation gave us a more nuanced understanding of countries in the North African and Middle East region. Just as the participants had a different experience upon interacting with Americans during their trip to the U.S., during which they realized that their views of Americans were incorrect, our prior views of political activists in the Arab world changed. This firsthand experience provided us with a set of views that are often buried in the media, but speak more truth on how each individual is affected by and deserves to be differentiated in U.S. foreign policy. It was an insightful conversation that has already affected the way we understand and interpret the Arab world in various contexts—in the media, in politics, and in the classroom.

Tina Kim, Trisha Parikh, and Sara Pilgreen are co-editors and writers for The Generation.

December 3, 2012 0 comment

Middle East Security and Conflict

Does Collective Paranoia Shape Foreign Policy?

written by thegeneration

by Gabrielle Cherney

A few months ago I wrote an article riddling the political, social, and moral implications of Argo, the recent motion picture about a Central Intelligence Agency exfiltration mission in the midst of the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979. The primary consequence I dreaded was the perpetuation of an emboldened, vilified Iran, riling up an ill-informed American public by reminding it of the event that marked the sudden disintegration of relations with the country that was previously its greatest ally in the Middle East.

But the underlying assumption of these concerns is related to the power of creative pursuits. Art and expression are such vague, yet powerful concepts, and at times, they appear to pit freedom of cultural expression against other types of freedom.

The film has seen major success, ranking number one in the box office into its third week running. Movie reviews out of Iran complain that the portrayal of Iranians lacks nuance, and the one-sided nature of the movie’s portrayal does not do justice to the depth of warranted grievances felt by the Iranian public.

Although this is largely a product of the expectedly American-focused nature of the film, I would agree with the majority of this criticism. The filmmakers attempted to set the film in a historical context within the opening couple minutes of storytelling, but that sentiment was easily subsumed by the graphic scenes of the violent Iranian reaction for the following two hours.

Some aspects of the film were exaggerated or entirely fabricated, including the stroll through the bazaar, the American government suddenly deciding to backpedal out of the mission, and the Iranian government being right on Tony Mendez’s tail. These are perhaps inevitable consequences of Hollywood, but are nevertheless significant.

There was of course no visibly perceptible shift or reinforcement of the American understanding of Iran, and the effect that the film may or may not have on the public’s collective consciousness will only be seen through eventual action.

But at the most basic level, Argo is a reminder of an event that traumatized the United States. It has virtually defined our foreign policy toward Iran, and has helped drive our generally suspicious approach to other Islamic regimes. After all, the Iranian Hostage Crisis was the United States’ first real experience with Radical Islam.

Since this moment in history, mutual caricaturing of the United States and the Muslim World has been occurring, reinforced directly and indirectly, purposely and inadvertently, through media of all kinds, on some level even with films such as Argo. This caricaturing is defined by paranoia and conspiracy, which both sides have historically demonstrated an inclination toward and only accelerated after 9/11.

Paranoia on the American front has lent itself to approaching Islamic states with skepticism and a blanket expectation of backwardness. The apparent obsession with “top secret” information often trumps common knowledge; a phenomenon that I think can be attributed to deep-rooted distrust that makes even basic facts suspicious.

Instead of reading the most basic, readily available history of, for example, Iraq in the nineteenth century, to determine whether or not the country has weapons of mass destruction, the top officials of this country were smitten with “secret reports” that amounted to unfounded conspiracy theories.

The degree to which these tendencies dictate political decisions is alarming, such as when the then-newly elected Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrote then-President George W. Bush an eighteen-page letter in 2006. The letter was dismissed, characterized by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as unimportant on the basis that it was merely an account of history, religion, and philosophy. As the first leader-to-leader outreach between the U.S. and Iran in 27 years, the contents of this letter could have provided context conducive to rebuilding something resembling US-Iranian relations.

The longer-term and ever-growing paranoia about American anti-Islam sentiment from the Muslim community has been increasing simultaneously. Ironically, as the United States began viewing the Muslim world as a threat, this paranoia became more and more legitimized, and this cycle continues even within the United States itself.

A worst-case scenario of the consequences of this cycle, and its perpetuation through various creative mediums, is seen beginning last month with the diplomatic missions attacks. The embassy attacks, riots, and demonstrations were sparked by the proliferation of the YouTube trailer for The Innocence of Muslims, a crude, cheaply made movie mocking Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. The question of the potential implications of “creative expression” at the expense of another group has unfortunately been answered.

Regardless of whether or not those orchestrating this violence had purely political concerns under a mere guise of religious uprising, at least 687 people have died as a result of this trailer and the misinformation surrounding it. Despite President Barack Obama coming forward to reject the content of the video, rumors about the film being shown in major movie theatres all over America were believed by the outraged groups.

Without an informed understanding of historical context and the sociopolitical lens through which your counterpart is seeing you, there is no hope for genuine relations beyond “rational” political and economic exchanges. There is only a risk of further distorting the truth with paranoia and bias, and making poor decisions at human society’s cost.

Gabrielle Cherney is a senior at Indiana University Bloomington studying Near Eastern Language & Culture and Political Science. She is a founding member of the IU Debate Team and pursuing Language and Area Certification in Iranian Studies.

November 18, 2012 1 comment

Middle East Security Security and Conflict Terrorism

If Afghanistan Were a Television Show

written by thegeneration

by Reza Hessabi

In the 1990s Afghanistan was a hodgepodge country, made up of many different lands, each owned, operated, and lorded over by thick-bearded men with little patience for luxuries like compassion, mercy and beneficence. The country already divided by ethnicity and languages had become stratified by guns and dope. These warlords became the centerpieces of political, economic, and societal power during the heyday of the Afghan Civil War. But that name, the Afghan Civil War, is a misnomer. It was more like an unorganized fracas. It was more like Game of Thrones.

If you’ve seen the television show Game of Thrones (GoT), or read the Song of Ice and Fire series of novels it is based on, you’ll see where I’m going with this. Just like the five Kings of Westeros (the fictional setting of the novel and TV series) pitted their armies against each other from all corners of the continent, so too did the warlords of Afghanistan pit their ragtag bands of guerrilla fighters against each other. Instead of the Iron Throne, they were fighting for the city of Kabul. And instead of swords, they had AK-47s. But the damage to the surrounding countryside, civilians, and ultimately the soul of Afghanistan was the same as the fictionalized trauma suffered in the novels.

Evidence is abundant that this has continued despite the best efforts of the 2001 invasion by the Coalition Army. And the potential comparisons between Game of Thrones haven’t stopped growing either. The former rulers of Westeros were the Valyrians, a brutal, high-minded people with a severe superiority complex. The former rulers of Afghanistan were the Taliban, a vicious, hypocritical bunch with an often violent holier-than-thou mentality. Both were driven out by the current rulers, the Baratheons in GoT and the clunky Kabul government in Afghanistan, and both are making plays to regain their power – the Taliban’s resurgence in the south and the Valyrians machinations in the later novels of the series.

When one searches for some semblance of nobility in the novels of GoT, the only place you’ll find it is in the North with the Starks of Winterfell. Strangely enough, the most ennobled group of violent miscreants in Afghanistan is the much lauded Northern Alliance. The similarities are uncanny. The reigning lord of House Stark, Ned Stark, was wrongfully killed by the ruling clan of Westeros. Ahmad Shah Massoud, the beloved leader of the Northern Alliance, was assassinated by the rulers of Afghanistan – the Taliban. The Northern Alliance has grown in stature and prominence, but just like the Starks in the novels, they haven’t quite grasped the seat of power in Afghanistan.

Yet there is one difference between the novels and the current situation in Afghanistan. Instead of fighting with a specific goal in mind, the Kings of Afghanistan seem to be killing for killing’s sake. Or rather, for Islam’s sake. Or for the Pashtun’s sake. Or for their fallen brothers. Or for their families. Really, they’re all fighting for whatever reason is most expedient at the time. Which begs the question, what is truly driving this bloodshed? It’s not money, that’s too easy of an answer and it’s become clichéd at this point. No, everyone in Afghanistan right now is fighting for their survival. In every sense of the word, the Graveyard of Empires has become the most primordial place on Earth.

This doesn’t bode well for the Coalition forces that will be staying in Afghanistan for the next few years, unless the withdrawal is sped up drastically. The chaos that is the true ruler of Afghanistan, and Westeros, will go on for the foreseeable future. The abject poverty will continue. The desecration of human rights, life, and happiness won’t stop. And all because a few bearded men with too many guns, too much money, and very little decency think that survival is equal to murder. It’s sad that a novel that has so many deprave characters is actually being acted out in real life. It’s sad that nothing so far has been able to stop this tide of suffering.

If ever there was a time for the Afghan diaspora to finally stand up and repopulate the braintrust of Afghanistan, it is now. Repatriation is not the goal, rejuvenation of a broken land is. And as a people, Afghans don’t have to suffer the fate of fictional characters. Pride must be foregone; lust for power must be tamed. With all of these comparisons, hopes for peace seem futile. GoT doesn’t have any good endings. Then again, Game of Thrones isn’t real. Afghanistan is.

Reza Hessabi is a recent graduate of UCLA and former co-editor of The Generation. He runs the blog Common Sense, where for the past three years he has written over sixty essays discussing life in America as a Muslim.

August 20, 2012 4 comments

Middle East Security Security and Conflict Terrorism

Does American Film’s Portrayal of Iran Shape Public Perception?

written by thegeneration

I recently saw the trailer for Ben Affleck’s upcoming film Argo, set during the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 1979-81. It follows an unorthodox exfiltration attempt by the CIA of six American hostages who managed to hide from Iranian authorities and take shelter with the Canadian ambassador to Iran.

As I watched strategically integrated clips of angry Iranian mobs harassing a bus carrying Americans and the Revolutionary Guard marching in the streets with guns, I couldn’t help but wonder how much the public perception of Iran played into the timing of the film’s release. That is to say—does the fact that many politicians and media outlets have recently been vilifying Iran guarantee higher public interest and, in turn, profit for the movie-makers?

Now for all I know the film may have a message that somehow paints the Iranian people in a pacifistic light, emphasizing the distinction between the people and the government. But regardless, it appears that advertent or not, these filmmakers are fueling the vilification of a country by means of trailers that look like news clips.

That is to say, vilifying the Iranian people through reminding the public of a crisis that took place thirty years ago seems like a morally questionable act at a time when relations between Iranians and Americans are at an extremely dangerous place.

The proposal of denying or altering historical reality to protect people from skewed opinions or perceptions is a way this article might be misinterpreted, but I assure you this is not my intention—I’m merely attempting to weigh the moral obligation of filmmakers (or any artist for that matter) in playing off of the popular perception of “other” people. It seems filmmakers sometimes forget that though these perceptions may help their work be successful, it also has the cyclical effect of feeding into that perception and, in a sense, confirming it.

So while I do not have a prescription for how long someone should wait to remind people of atrocities that question the character of a group or country, I think it’s important to keep in mind that filmmakers are not necessarily more educated on current events than the average American, and that their work being played very loudly on a large screen in front of a lot of people gives them artificial authority in terms of broader things like politics and current events.

While it may be argued that the movie’s timing is appropriate since it is, in theory, only vilifying the Iranian government which, now more than ever is disconnected from its own people, this argument assumes prior knowledge of this disconnect. The reality of the American public’s knowledge on Iran, let alone the silenced tensions between the government and the people, is that it is simply lacking.

A CNN Gallup poll from February of this year showed 71 percent of Americans think that Iran currently possess a nuclear bomb, and another poll shows roughly 25 percent want to take action to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The sentiment reflected by these numbers is one that does not mesh with an understanding of the complex state of Iranian politics, nor the history surrounding Iranian resources.

For most of Iran’s recent history, great powers have forced themselves into the country, calling themselves “business partners,” but functionally acting as bullies. Specifically, beginning in the early nineteenth century the Great Game took place, during which Great Britain and Russia were in competition with one another for control over Central Asia. During this period the two countries fought over the resources of the Iranian Plateau and took over the Persian Empire’s most lucrative industries, including that of oil. This continued into the twentieth century and the Iranian people suffered mass inflation and starvation.

For Iran, nuclear energy means independence at last, looking toward France as a model, a country that gets over 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Petroleum exports are the main source of economic surplus for the Iranian government, and abandoning the development of its nuclear power projects means risking using up all oil for potential exports domestically. No oil exports means no economic surplus for the government, a huge incentive to maintain nuclear development.

Furthermore, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khameini reiterated afatwah (a religious ruling by an authority on Islam) in April of this year that deemed nuclear weapons haram (forbidden in Islam) on the basis that they necessarily kill innocent civilians. He explicitly forbade the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons, meaning his pursuing nuclear weapons would entirely undermine his own religious authority—which is, of course, the basis for his claim to political authority.

Logically, signs thus do not necessarily point to Iranian desire to create a nuclear weapon to strike the United States. Actually, it seems almost vain to assume such motive. Iran is acting rationally in its own best interest on the nuclear question, and until the International Atomic Energy Agency reports say something more than the informal equivalent of “hey, it could happen!” the risks involved in a strike on Iran cannot conceivably be outweighed by much of anything.

Though Argo features the rise of what is technically the same government that maintains power in Iran today, it also perpetuates the idea of this government as a resolute one, which emboldens it in the minds of watchers and makes it seem much more threatening.

But the reality of the current dynamics at play in Iran is one of great complexity that involves cleavages within the government itself. And if people continue to assume the Iranian government exists as one cohesive, strong entity, they are missing an extremely important element of Iranian state of affairs that could, almost ironically, be the key to taking down the unpopular, abusive regime.

At a time when waging war on this country is currently being seriously discussed by many unenlightened politicians, it is unquestionably risky to increase vilification of Iran in the minds of American moviegoers. They are, after all, citizens with voting power.

Cheney’s one percent doctrine, the idea that war against Iraq was justified by even a “one percent risk” of their possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction, played off of the fears of a public that did not know anything about their new so-called enemy, which is a testament to the fact that bad things happen when the public doesn’t know any better and looks to assumed authorities for wisdom. Thousands have been killed in a war that should never have taken place, as it was justified by fabricated facts and flawed logic.

If nothing else, this piece is intended to remind people that every country has a dark past and, often, even a dark present, but that there are also competing perspectives and complicating factors at play that are often neglected out of ignorance or convenience. Though there is surely not malicious intent on the part of the Argo creators, they may be inadvertently helping to shift public opinion in such a way that creates undesirable outcomes.

After all, the fact is that the goal of movie makers is to make money, and sometimes reality doesn’t sell.

June 27, 2012 5 comments

Middle East Security and Conflict UCLA and the World

The Generation Interview with Senator George Mitchell

written by David Taylor

The Generation co-editors, Jennifer Ching and Brad Rowe, caught up with Senator George Mitchell on March 1, 2012 during his visit to UCLA’s Burkle Center for International Relations to share his experience and thoughts on the art of negotiation and peacemaking.

Mitchell is a veteran of several administrations and famously served as the key negotiator during the peace talks in Northern Ireland that led to the Good Friday peace accord. From 2009-2011 he served as President Barack Obama’s Special Envoy to the Middle East to negotiate an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian territories. Mitchell also served as U.S. Senator from Maine from 1980-1995.

Daniel Melling, an undergraduate intern at the Burkle Center, had this to say about the special day:

Before taking the lectern to deliver the Bernard Brodie Distinguished Lecture, international problem-solver and Democratic legislator Sen. George Mitchell met at Schoenberg Hall with a small group of Burkle Center interns and graduate students to answer questions about his career and the prospects for peace in the Middle East. With the Burkle Center’s Alexandra Lieben and UCLA Vice Provost Judi Smith observing, Sen. Mitchell took the head of a seated circle to begin the discussion.

Answering a question about public service, Sen. Mitchell encouraged students to use their careers to embrace a cause larger than themselves. As the conversation progressed, Sen. Mitchell warned of the danger overpopulation could pose to governments. Sen. Mitchell fielded a variety of questions from how negotiations can legitimize odious factions to what role ambiguous terms can play in peace accords. When asked about how negotiating parties use religion to further their cause, Sen. Mitchell quoted himself as a senator reprimanding Col. Oliver North in the Iran-Contra hearings: “Although he is frequently asked to do so, God does not take sides in American politics.” With the time elapsed and the main lecture approaching, Sen. Mitchell rose to leave, but not before a group photograph to remember a conversation with one of the United States’ foremost statesmen.

Click here to watch Senator Mitchell’s speech and conversation with NPR’s Renee Montagne.

Brad Rowe is a Master of Public Policy graduate student at the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs. He is working toward influencing drug and crime policies in the United States and abroad.

Jennifer Ching is a senior at UCLA, double majoring in Communication Studies and Political Science. After graduating, Jennifer plans to pursue a career either in news media, features journalism, or international diplomacy.

Daniel Melling is a senior history major at UCLA. At the Burkle Center, Daniel has revised historical archives and planned for upcoming conferences.

—

Images and videos are the author’s own.

April 8, 2012 1 comment