The growing reliance on end-to-end encryption by decentralized terrorist groups in the Sahel undermines intelligence efforts, complicating counterterrorism strategies and allowing these groups to remain elusive and continue their operations with greater ease. In today’s digital age, the battle between privacy and security is playing out on a much larger global stage, with tools like end-to-end encryption (E2EE) proving both an asset and a liability. While these technologies ensure private communication for individuals, they produce significant obstacles for intelligence agencies that aim to track and disrupt terrorist networks. This challenge is particularly evident in the Sahel, a vast arid region of Africa below the Sahara, where decentralized terrorist groups like Boko Haram, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) exploit limited digital infrastructure and encryption monitoring systems to evade detection.
Tracking and tackling terrorist plans and communications becomes easier in large-scale, comprehensive operations compared to smaller, unregulated, and localized activities, like those typically conducted by Sahelian terrorist groups, like Boko Haram, JNIM, and ISGS. For one, large scale operations require more extensive coordination, planning, and communication which can increase the likelihood of detection by intelligence agencies. Bruce Don, a Senior Policy Researcher at RAND, argues that these large-scale operations provide opportunities to intercept messages, track financial transactions, or monitor any suspicious movements. These tools are less effective in smaller-scale or fragmented efforts due to the lack of integrated resources, infrastructure, and data-sharing frameworks. These groups often operate in decentralized cells with limited communication to avoid detection, making interception much more difficult. In many cases, they often exploit the lack of digital infrastructure, making traditional surveillance methods less effective. For example, Boko Haram operates through a network of 50-60 independent cells, deliberately limiting communication and coordination. Professor Thomas Winston argues that, particularly after 9/11, non-state actors like terrorists have utilized the rise of distributed networks, creating a new landscape of intelligence collection, where traditional methods struggle to adapt. For example, cyber-based attacks exploit anonymity tools like encryption and masked identities, making it harder to trace individuals or intercept communication, on top of a newly decentralized system of communication.
Dr. Eitan Azani, at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, discussed that initially Osama Bin Laden’s 1998 declaration of war extended the conflict beyond the Middle East, targeting Western ideas globally. Then, Al-Qaeda began setting up training and recruitment networks worldwide, including regions like Africa, Europe, and Southeast Asia. After significant losses of infrastructure following the US-led campaign against terrorism, Al-Qaeda and ISIS shifted to local jihadist decentralized affiliates in the Middle East and Africa, aiming to permanently alter their command structure to avoid direct destruction they faced post 9/11. The rise of decentralized African terrorist groups have been linked to the strategy of Al-Qaeda. By establishing affiliates across regions like the Sahel, Maghreb, and Somalia, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have been able to leverage local resources and knowledge, to enhance resilience and exploit regional conflicts for recruitment, funding, and operations.
This shift in strategy has made encrypted communication a crucial tool for terrorist groups operating in regions like the Sahel. Encrypted communication refers to the practice of using algorithms to convert readable data into an unreadable format, ensuring that only authorized parties with the correct decryption key can access the original message. This method is widely used to safeguard sensitive communications, particularly in hostile environments where interception by governments or security agencies is a concern. In the context of Sahelian terrorist groups, encryption allows them to communicate securely across vast territories in order to coordinate attacks, manage resources, or spread propaganda without detection by local or international security forces.
Many of these groups in the Sahel have utilized apps such as WhatsApp and Telegram to facilitate the exchange of information across the continent with minimal risk of detection. WhatsApp, a free cross-platform messaging app, utilizes E2EE to ensure that messages, calls, photos, and videos shared between users are encrypted from the sender’s device to the recipient’s device. This is applied automatically and cannot be turned off by users. Moreover, only the sender and recipient have the decryption keys to read messages, ensuring that nobody, not even WhatsApp, can access the content of the communication. However, WhatsApp can still access metadata, such as the timing, duration, and recipients of messages. In 2017, WhatsApp faced scrutiny for its role in enabling terrorist groups to communicate securely due to its E2EE. While it emphasizes that its encryption protects user privacy, critics argue that it impedes security agencies’ ability to monitor and prevent terrorist activities.
Governments, like the UK, have pressed WhatsApp to create backdoors that would allow law enforcement to access encrypted communications, but WhatsApp and other tech companies have resisted these requests, citing privacy concerns. WhatsApp responded arguing that encryption is crucial for protecting users’ privacy globally and the weakening of encryption would harm ordinary users more than it would help counterterrorism efforts. This debate has intensified since 2017, as many terrorists have used encrypted communications to plan attacks without detection since. While governments continue to seek ways to access encrypted data for investigation and continue to face resistance, Sandberg emphasizes that metadata can still be used for intelligence gathering in a similar way to the triangulation of messaging used after 9/11, in which intelligence centers search for repeated triangular patterns of communication with individuals.
Telegram, a cloud-based messaging app, emphasizes privacy and encryption for secure communication and multimedia support. Telegram also uses E2EE in its Secret Chats feature, where even Telegram itself cannot decrypt the messages. Moreover, in the Secret Chat, users can set a timer for messages to disappear after they’ve been read, further increasing privacy. The 2015 Paris attacks sparked a renewed debate over the role of encrypted communication in terrorism as well. Officials like CIA Director John Brennan responded, expressing frustration with terrorists’ growing operational security and their ability to hide communications. According to James Bandler at ProPublica, while Telegram promotes itself as free speech, it has attracted violent right-wing extremists, white supremacists, and militias, making it a hub for extremists activity. More recently, the NYT reported in 2024 that the platform is still often used by groups like Hamas, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and ISIS for attack coordination, propaganda dissemination, and recruitment. Although Telegram does not store much data about users and often resists cooperation with authorities, it does promise to disclose information like IP address and phone numbers if legally compelled by a court order, however this has never occurred in practice.
In addition to encrypted messaging apps, media platforms also play a significant role in how terrorist groups operate in the digital space, offering an open yet vulnerable avenue for communication and recruitment. Media platforms refer to digital or physical channels that facilitate the sharing, dissemination, and consumption of information, entertainment, or communication. This can include social media, news, and video streaming platforms. These platforms serve as powerful tools for communication and networking but their open nature can also make them vulnerable to misuse such as spreading misinformation, extremist ideologies, or facilitating illicit activities. Media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have emerged as critical tools for modern communication, with the ability to disseminate information and connect with large audiences across the globe. In the Sahel, terrorist groups exploit these platforms to achieve various objectives such as spreading propaganda, recruiting members, coordinating logistics, and amplifying their narratives. Unlike encrypted messaging apps, these platforms operate in the public area, allowing terrorist groups to shape perceptions, incite violence, and foster support among sympathizers.
Alongside encrypted messaging, platforms like Facebook have become critical tools for terrorist groups, providing a wide-reaching space to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize individuals across the globe. Facebook is a social media platform that enables users to connect with friends, family, and communities by sharing content such as messages, photos, videos and links. Facebook reaches over 1 billion users and while it has been used for a variety of reasons, violent extremists, gangs, and terrorist groups also have a significant presence and following. Terrorist organizations on Facebook largely work to achieve three things. (1) Recruitment: Many Facebook users are young and vulnerable to the dangers and freedoms of the platform. Extremists take advantage of the fact that parents or law enforcement are often not aware of the dangers to create lines of communication and connect with young people world wide, aiding their decentralized attacks. (2) Radicalization: These platforms allow anyone to read information, view videos, or see propaganda. Terrorists utilize this to bring propaganda to a wider audience as well as serve as a gateway to other extremists websites where more radical and desensitizing content is available. (3) Mobilization: Terrorists groups may post tips and guidance about operational and tactical info regarding gathering counterintelligence or to counter attacks. Moreover they may gather or spread information regarding various explosives, commonly used weapons, or tips about avoiding suspicion.
A report by IVolunteer showed that nearly two thirds, 65%, of extremists used Facebook to communicate their views and encourage actions between 2005 and 2016. On top of this, a Pew Research Study found that while in 2008 less than 12% consumed news on social media, in 2019 it was more than 70%. As terrorist content increased from 2017 to 2024, so did the percent of US adults who consumed news on social media, highlighting the concern of a growing reliance on social media news feeds. In fact, Terrorism-related content has seen a sharp increase between 2017 and 2024, with 2024 predicted to hit approximately 15 million.
Similarly to Facebook, Twitter serves as a powerful tool for terrorist organizations, enabling them to further their agendas through radicalization, mobilization, and misinformation. Twitter (now called X as of 2023) is a social media platform that allows users to post and interact with messages known as “tweets”. Home to over 500 million users, Twitter is controversially known as a hub for violent extremists, gangs and terrorist groups who use it to connect with their supporters. Similar to facebook; Twitter is used by terrorist organizations to achieve three main goals. (1) Radicalization: Terrorist organizations often use twitter to issue various statements, press releases, disseminate propaganda, and even justify attacks. (2) Mobilization: These terrorist organizations also leverage the ability to tweet near real time messages to numerous people to organize demonstrations and simulate and plot attacks. (3) Response: Extremists also use Twitter after successful attacks to spread misinformation and hamper the ability of first responders. For example, in 2008 after a bombing at a hotel in Mumbai, the governments of India and Pakistan requested that tweets about the incident stop due to the fact that the perpetrators were monitoring Twitter for real time updates about the search and response efforts. Again, highlighting the need for stronger oversight and more effective measures to address the misuse of Twitter by terrorist groups, while continuing to balance the platform’s role as a space for free speech and expression.
Propaganda, a common terrorist tactic that is difficult to monitor, refers to the use of information, ideas, or media to promote a specific cause, political ideology, or agenda. Often, it is designed to manipulate emotions, attitudes, or beliefs, shaping public perception in a way that benefits the propagator. It can be spread through various forms such as newspapers, radio, television, social media, and leaflets. In the context of terrorism, propaganda is primarily used to achieve several key objectives such as recruitment, radicalization, and the legitimization of violence. It often dehumanizes enemies, glorifies violence, and creates narratives of victimhood and resistance.
By disseminating their messages through various encrypted communications, social media, and other dispersed platforms, they create a decentralized environment where intelligence agencies further struggle to monitor and intercept these groups and their recruitment effectively. Traditional intelligence methods such as signal intelligence or human surveillance are less effective when dealing with these highly dispersed and decentralized cells as they are able to operate independently.
While the decentralized nature of these groups poses significant challenges for intelligence agencies, another tactic that exacerbates the situation is the deliberate use of disinformation. Disinformation is the deliberate spread of false or misleading information with intention to deceive, manipulate, or confuse the public. Unlike misinformation, which can be spread without malicious intent, disinformation is purposefully created and disseminated to serve political, ideological, and strategic goals. Disinformation campaigns often involve manipulation of facts, fabrication of news, or the distortion of reality to create confusion. These can occur through various channels such as media, social media platforms, and even directly manipulated events or crises. In some cases, disinformation campaigns are part of a border proxy warfare where foreign actors use terrorism and conflict to achieve strategic objectives without direct involvement where powers like Russia, China, and Iran support insurgent or anti-Western groups by spreading disinformation.
The spread of disinformation confounds the intelligence process, particularly when false narratives align with or amplify tensions. It can create confusion about events, obscure the true identities of attackers, and divert resources into investigating false leads rather than real threats. Moreover, it may mislead local populations and international media, decreasing public support for counterterrorism efforts and making it more difficult to enact effective policies. Thus, it is important to highlight how decentralized terrorist groups in the Sahel utilize propaganda and disinformation to remain elusive, evade traditional intelligence, and mobilize support.
Terrorist groups in the Sahel use various forms of media like videos, social media posts, and printed materials to recruit vulnerable individuals. They use these digital interactions to target local grievances, promising solutions to societal issues such as poverty, government corruption and neglect. For example, Boko Haram used video propaganda in 2014 showing the kidnapping of Chibok girls served not only as an act of terror but also a tool to gain global attention and recruit more militants. Moreover, JNIM works to utilize local dialects and culturally resonant narratives in their videos to appeal to local populations, presenting themselves as protectors of Islam against Western influence and local corrupt governments.
Propaganda often portrays the terrorists group as anti-colonial forces, framing their fight as a defense of Islam against Western or African government oppression. ISGS present themselves as liberators from state institutions they frame as corrupt, using religious ideologies to appeal to disenfranchised youth, especially in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Moreover, terrorist propaganda is often tailored towards young, marginalized communities, focusing on grievances that are local in nature, such as ethnic tensions, economic inequalities, or human rights abuses by state actors. Boko Haram and JNIM often exploit existing ethnic divisions, framing their battle as between Muslims and non-Muslims, or Arabs vs Africans. They also use graphic images or videos of attacks such as bombings, assassinations, or public executions, to create fear and celebrate victories in order to spread their ideology. This works to intimidate their enemies, but also bolster their support and change the view of who is winning the war among local communities and governments.
Disinformation campaigns are largely influenced by outside international forces. Russia’s role in spreading disinformation has been increasingly noted in African conflicts, Particularly in the Sahel. Russian-linked mercenary groups like Wagner and other entities have been involved in disinformation campaigns that support terrorist factions like Boko Haram, JNIM, and ISGS. They often aim to undermine the legitimacy of Western-backed governments in the Sahel and bolster their influence of groups more sympathetic to Russia’s stance. Media outlets like Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik News stage state-sponsored campaigns framing conflicts in the Sahel as a fight against Western imperialism, aligning with the rhetoric of groups like Boko Haram and ISGS. These campaigns exploit local grievances and ethnic tensions as well, supporting narratives with fake news and propaganda on a much larger scale, portraying governments as ineffective ro complicit in human rights abuses which helps terrorist groups recruit local populations disillusioned by the governments’ perceived failure. On top of this, they work to undermine counter-terrorism efforts by French, US, and other Western entities by accusing military forces of violating local sovereignty or committing atrocities. These narratives turn public opinion against counterterrorism efforts, leading to civil unrest or anti-West protests making it harder to partner and operate in the region.
Looking ahead, the role of technology in both facilitating and combating terrorism in the Sahel and beyond will likely continue to evolve. Rapid advancements with AI, machine learning, and encryption technologies will continue to advance and thus decentralize groups leading to traditional intelligence methods looking even less attractive. On the other hand, governments and tech companies will also be pushing for more robust forms of surveillance and AI driven detection technologies in order to tackle this issue. Thus, the key to success in the future will depend on how groups choose to utilize such developments as well as how well the international community and domestic governments can work together to limit and hopefully end the violence in the Sahel.
Image Source: Openverse
