“Will we apply and strengthen the core tenets of the international system, including the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as we seek to shape the emergence of new technologies and deter new threats? Or will we allow those universal principles to be trampled and twisted in the pursuit of naked political power?”
In his first speech before the UN General Assembly, President Biden acknowledged his administration’s sustained commitment to a rules-based order. He affirmed that the fundamental international legal doctrines created in the post-World War II era are not rendered obsolete by the passage of time, “new technologies” or recent grabs for power. Yet Biden’s declaration of support for the international system is far from accepted in the international relations community. In fact, the liberal international order (LIO) is coming under more fire than ever. Because while theorists agree that the world is collectively experiencing democratic decline, scholars and practitioners want to know: can liberal internationalism survive this global rise in autocracy?
According to Freedom House, 2021 was the 15th straight year of an overall rise in global autocracy and the worst single year of democratic deterioration.1 The “overall rise” occurs when more states experience a decrease in democracy than an improvement. This translates to nearly 75% of the world’s population living in a state that experienced democratic backsliding in 2020.2
It is widely accepted that 2020’s drastic deterioration occurred because of state leaders using emergency measures regarding COVID – 19 to postpone elections, indefinitely expand executive power, and erode democratic institutions. Few states were spared in the rise of populism as both struggling democracies like Hungary and secure governments like the United States both felt their democratic safeguards tested. The upcoming Freedom House reports will most likely measure whether political officials relinquish some of this emergency power. But while COVID – 19 may explain the rise in autocracy in 2020, there have still been years of democratic decline before it. Many theorists are claiming that the liberal international order is failing to prevent such decline, and it will not survive further changes in international hierarchy, such as the rise of China.
In order to tackle this argument, let’s first define what the liberal international order is, and what it is not. The LIO is a rules-based system defined by the essential, universal principles of human rights as well as political and economic liberalization that was established following World War II. Many international organizations and treaties were founded on these principles in the post-1945 era. Yet it is key to mention a fundamental idea developed by Professors Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Stephanie C. Hofmann: not anyone international organization defines the entirety of the rules-based order – organizations can come and go as long as the fundamental principles of the LIO remain the same.3 It is also important to understand that the organizations created in the name of these principles were created by and for a handful of western states left after the end of WW2, thus they were designed to facilitate diplomacy between only a few state actors. Thus, it seems only natural for the organizations themselves to change over time in reaction to new events, phenomena, and actors. As long as newly amended or created organizations are upholding the LIO’s key principles, these are to be considered changes within the LIO, not challenges to them.4
Since the post-1945 world, one can see how the LIO has survived developments in world politics. For instance, the post-World War II hierarchy shortly gave way to the bipolar world and international stalemates of the Cold War. And while the LIO and its various international organizations were able to survive the great power competition, many of its functions were blocked throughout this period. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the LIO was essentially run by the U.S. until 2001. This unipolar, U.S.-led system arguably provided stability as the LIO’s agencies and mechanisms functioned unencumbered by the interests of other powers.
But the U.S.’s unipolar moment ended in 2001 after the attacks on the Twin Towers and President Bush’s declaration of the “War on Terror”. The ensuing failures of unilateral intervention in the Middle East soon became synonymous with the failures of the LIO. Other troubles arose, like the deadlock of the WTO, which has resulted in the stalling of the Doha Round for 20 years, and the deadlock of the UN Security Council (UNSC), which has resulted in the perpetuation of humanitarian disasters in Syria and Yemen. Furthermore, the nature of war has shifted: internal/civil conflicts are more common than state versus state conflicts, and now non-state actors as powerful players in international relations. These changes have brought into question whether the LIO and its structure operating with states as primary actors, can adapt to such new challenges. Some theorists are even questioning if the LIO ever truly existed in the first place.
Despite this laundry list of problems regarding the efficacy of liberal internationalism, the general disillusionment with its ability to quell the rise of autocracy, and the doubt that our rules-based system can live through a change in the international hierarchy like the rise of China, the LIO is not obsolete and can survive in the 21st century. Rather than abandon our core principles, lower our standards for the quality of life, and abandon the pursuit of sustainable development, I argue that the LIO can stave off this rise in autocracy. Although in order to do so, the international community needs to apply new, innovative mechanisms to actualize the LIO’s core principles of multilateralism, and its international organizations need to adapt to a broader view of global governance and the reality of a multipolar world. The good news? In some ways, these adaptions have already started.
Although the Doha Round has been stalled since 2001 due to conflicts between the US and China, trade liberalization and the average global lowering of tariffs have continued exceptionally well; the average world import tariff remains below 5% (as of 2019).5 Economist Richard Baldwin argues that this is due to the increase in bilateral investment treaties and regional trade agreements (RTAs), which are innovative adaptions to a world that is far more globalized and complex than the one that existed at the conception of the WTO in 1995; he argues that such complex and nuanced solutions will be a part of the future multilateralism in the global economy.6 And while we still need to work with and reform the WTO in order to actualize its benefits, such as its dispute settlement body, we can pair this necessary reform with utilizing other innovative, solutions to promote key principles of the LIO: multilateralism and economic liberalization. And while we will still have yet to see the outcome of the current trade war between the US and China, I mention these localized adaptions to argue that despite the trade war, tariffs globally have been kept low. Thus, these aforementioned adaptations and suggested reforms can occur within the rules-based order despite periods of great power contention and stalemates between powerful actors.7
Another application of Sangiovanni and Hofmann’s theory to the WTO can be explored through the transition from the GATT (the former tariff lowering practice) to the very creation of the WTO in 1995. The WTO was created in order to adapt to the end of the Cold War as well as better incorporate so many of the newly decolonized states at the end of the 20th century. This development occurred without the claims that the end of the LIO was upon us, thus showing how there have been historical changes in our international economic systems within the liberal international order in order to adapt to new events. And while it is important to mention that agreements like RTAs could be used to facilitate protectionist policies, they also have the potential to “pave the way for deeper multilateral integration”.8 OCED describes RTA’s as having the ability to establish “deep and comprehensive market integration” while covering pressing issues such as intellectual property and environmental regulation.9 In summation, as long as the LIO’s key principles like economic liberalization and multilateralism are being actualized (which can be measured by analyzing tariff rates), the prominence of regional agreements should not be used as evidence that the end of LIO is here.
While innovative adaptations are already happening, our international organizations themselves still need to adjust to a multipolar international hierarchy. The reality is that we are no longer in a world that operates at the will of U.S. hegemony, and our current IO’s are struggling to operate because they were designed around an essentially unipolar world. They also face significant bureaucratic red tape in the pursuit of any reform. If some of the LIO’s structures can be amended to reflect an expanded system of global governance, and its mechanisms are better equipped to learn from their own shortcomings, the LIO can propel a recession of autocracy without reconceptualization or a retreat from our principles.
One area that needs such reform is the UN Security Council. The P5 shaped the Security Council to reflect the victors of WW2, and it doesn’t even include a single state from South America, Africa, or Southeast Asia. The UNSC has been deadlocked, even during genocides, leading to a failure to halt such atrocious crimes. But an expanded and reformed Council could include more world powers and reforms such as where “permanent members shall not exercise the right to veto in the event of mass atrocities”, which is an idea proposed by a P5 member themselves, France.10 The stakes regarding the UNSC reform are particularly high as this is the only international mechanism that can legally sanction the use of force, which is one of the most powerful functions of the international community.
Yet the stakes are also high for many issues we face in the 21st century, and success cannot be achieved by regression to unwavering reverence to state sovereignty: we cannot simply give up on the principles or current mechanisms of liberal internationalism. Global pandemics and climate change do not occur in vacuums that individual states can solve on their own. Large swaths of our planet will become uninhabitable due to rising temperatures and sea levels, and massive levels of migration are inevitable. Resorting to isolationism and dismissing the fundamental principles of the LIO will only lead to more suffering. Accepting the inevitability of conquest and war will only lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. The only sustainable solutions to collective action problems will involve the just principles of equality and collaboration defined in a rules-based order.
So, if there’s broad consensus that the world is inevitably moving towards a multipolar world, shouldn’t we also ask ourselves what the benefit could be to 1) having our international organizations match the current international hierarchy and 2) having a multipolar world that also falls along the with LIO? Because couldn’t “a multifaceted world order based on complex and polycentric governance arrangements among a wider community of national governments, international organizations and non-state actors” better lead to more accountability and efficacy in our diplomatic practices?
Overall, instead of rejecting the LIO on the grounds that it has failed to quell a rise in autocracy, we should focus on adapting these institutions to a world that is no longer unipolar while ensuring that our principles remain the same. Because it is not our guiding principles of equality, peace, and multilateralism that have allowed for autocracy to develop, but rather a lack of reform that has hindered our global governance and accountability mechanisms from being used, or for being used as vehicles to serve other interests. Ultimately, the LIO can outlast this rise in autocracy. But in order to tackle these modern dilemmas, we need to apply nuanced solutions and update our structures to fit the modern international arena while upholding the principles of the rules-based order.
Endnotes:
1. “Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy Under Siege.” Freedom House, 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege.
2. ibid.
3. M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and S.C. Hofmann. “Is the Liberal International Order in a state of terminal decline?” London School of Economics, January 7, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/07/is-the-liberal-international-order-in-a-state-of-terminal-decline/.
4. ibid.
5. “International Trade in Goods – tariffs. International trade in goods – tariffs – Statistics Explained.” Eurostat, July 21, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_goods_-_tariffs.
6. R. Baldwin. “The World Trade Organization and the future of multilateralism.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2016, 30(1), 95-116.
7. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Stephanie C. Hofmann. “Of the contemporary global order, crisis, and change,” Journal of European Public Policy, 2020, 27:7, 1077-1089, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1678665.
8. “Regional Trade agreements,” OECD, https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/regional-trade-agreements/.
9. ibid.
10. “Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères,” France and the United Nations, France Diplomacy – Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/.
11. M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and S.C. Hofmann. “Is the Liberal International Order in a state of terminal decline?” London School of Economics, January 7, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/07/is-the-liberal-international-order-in-a-state-of-terminal-decline/.
