The official dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 was a watershed moment in global affairs celebrated by many in the Western world. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the spread of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, the proud secessions of the Baltic States: all were events which served as catalysts in the early 1990s to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hence, to international eyes, it had seemed as though the Iron Curtain had opened once and for all, paving the way for a new world order free from the previous fifty-odd years of contention between the Eastern bloc led by Russia and the Western bloc spearheaded by the United States. However, as Russia now enters its third year of war with Ukraine, backed by alliances with the neighboring authoritarian Belarus and a variety of states in the Global South, questions begin to arise: are we facing a tangible resurgence of east-versus-west tensions? Is the era of globalization, in which the two twentieth-century superpowers even learned to conduct business with each other, finally over? Political theory and empirical evidence seem to answer with a concerning yes.
Political philosophers did not previously think that the world would have become as globalized as it is today. In 1990, scholar John J. Mearsheimer wrote a rather pessimistic article detailing what he believed would happen if the Cold War ended, namely that Europe would descend into violence without the rigid order provided by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. looming. Mearsheimer is a prime example of a “realist” thinker—someone who subscribes to the school of thought which posits that international affairs are characterized by states’ needs to survive or dominate through raw power. Mearsheimer’s predictions, though, did not come to fruition: the Cold War ended relatively peacefully, and the world did not witness a conventional interstate war in Europe since then (barring the Yugoslavian conflict) until the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Hence, the dominant school of thought in the late twentieth/early twenty-first century switched from realism to “liberalism,” which emphasizes the importance of economic factors, the spread of democracy, state-to-state cooperation, and international institutions in propelling global affairs.
However, Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly driving world politics towards a realist paradigm. Russia’s belligerent moves in Eastern Europe, from the 2008 Russo–Georgia War to the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, indicate that Putin will not back down under current world conditions: he seeks to reestablish Russia’s unquestionable Cold War-era authority through the domination of any country in the region perceived as aligning itself with Western powers. Indeed, the fact that Putin invaded Ukraine—which had been strengthening its ties to the EU and NATO—while staying tightly allied with Belarus (a nation ruled by a man frequently called “Europe’s last dictator”) implies that the invasion may have been preemptive, with the goal of stopping Ukraine from joining the West. Vladimir Putin seems to be a realist, and his actions in Eastern Europe seem to be contributing to the reconstruction of a power bloc that is diametrically opposed to the integrated state relations that are so characteristic of a liberal globalized world.
Specifically, Putin has been manually creating allies in Eastern Europe and the Global South in order to back Russia’s military actions. These countries have continued to import Russian oil and goods despite the U.S.’s frequent calls for sanctions. According to the New York Times, Putin has courted the support of countries in the Global South through country-specific strategies such as sending 34,000 tons of free fertilizer to Nigeria. These still developing states reciprocate Russia’s support through importing a variety of goods, namely oil; in December of 2023, Russia exported around 7.8 million barrels of oil per day—a number only slightly below pre-war export levels despite current sanctions by the U.S. and other Western nations. While the Global South could be used by some as an example of globalization, in that LDCs (least-developed countries) clearly have the autonomy to trade with whoever they want and ignore calls-to-action by the U.S., the fact that Russia is actively vying for these countries’ support indicates that Putin is trying to construct a new power bloc. The funds received from the Global South are channeled directly into Russia’s military machine, allowing Putin to perpetually wage war as Western support for Ukraine begins to wear thin.
Aside from the economic aspects of bloc-building, regional supporters like Belarus provide Russia with a political power base. “Belarus, from a country that three years ago played the role of something between a buffer and a front-line state in regional geopolitics, is now defined by its extreme dependence on Russia,” argues the non-profit Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The Atlantic Council, an American think tank, goes so far as to claim that Putin is planning for a “new Russian Empire” that includes both Ukraine and Belarus. Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has already allowed Putin to place nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil—a move that clearly demonstrates the impact of Russia’s tight control over Eastern Europe.
Perhaps the greatest evidence that Putin is intentionally re-directing the world toward Soviet-era realist dynamics lies within the rhetoric of Putin himself. In 2022, the dictator compared himself to Peter the Great, who in the eighteenth century embarked on a quest to “reclaim” Russian lands from Sweden. In 2021, Putin wrote an extensive open letter in which he claimed, among other things, that Russians and Ukrainians are “one people” rather than two different nations with different histories and cultures. In order to absorb Ukraine into Russia, Putin needs his international political and economic friends to back his military and country against the West, and those friends haven’t been stingy in providing money and support.
The existential threats that plagued the globe during the Cold War must be prevented from occurring again. The United States must take immediate action, through preventing trade between Russia and the Global South and interrupting Russia’s bonds with countries in Eastern Europe, in order to chip away at Russia’s ever-growing base. If not, then the world must reckon with a geopolitical landscape marked once again by competing Russian and Western blocs—only this time, with more advanced weaponry, volatile leaders, and higher costs to us all.
Image source: DimitroSevastopol on Pixabay
