Interview with Prof. Emeritus of Political Science at GW Uni Dr. John Logsdon was last modified: February 29th, 2024 by thegeneration
Dr. Fiona Hill is a former official at the U.S. National Security Council specializing in Russian and European affairs. She was a lead witness in the November 2019 House hearings regarding the impeachment of President Trump. She currently serves as a senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution.
On October 6th, I and Taylor Fairless had the pleasure of interviewing Dr. Fiona Hill. My angle of the interview focused on engaging her expertise to explore the role that social media plays in Russian meddling in the U.S. electoral process. My question centered on the challenge of how the United States can effectively thwart Russian disinformation on social media when many argue that they simply exploit vulnerabilities inherent to the platforms themselves. Dr. Hill agreed with this assessment, which makes it an issue she believes we will be grappling with for “some time to come.”
In a recent article where I questioned if social media can undermine democracy, I broadly noted that these vulnerabilities included their content curation algorithms, targeted digital advertising, and much of the toxic psychology that guides engagement on them. These varying facets enable foreign actors like Russia to engineer content that compounds polarization and saturates feeds with misleading or false information. Facebook estimates that Russian actors managed to generate 80,000 posts that reached nearly 126 million people over the span of two years in the United States.
Information has always been a blessing and curse
Dr. Hill noted that information, regardless of the way it is delivered, has always been susceptible to deception, falsehoods, and lies. She argues that these are issues that are part of human nature. “Humans have always had a propensity for spreading rumors.” In preliterate times, this occurred via word-of-mouth and town criers, then pamphlets, print news, and eventually the digital realm. To her, this dynamic is simply part of a larger information commons, making it unsurprising that the same phenomena that we have seen over the sweep of history are now playing out on Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms.
Dr. Hill believes the main difference is that social media platforms are “speeding up” the personal interactions that we have as human beings. Indeed, much of this information and interaction is distributed through highly sophisticated algorithms and is instantly engaged with by millions of people each day. Furthermore, no single person receives the same information experience. Each person is curated content that reflects what these platforms and actors believe an individual will be receptive to. This is what can make deception, falsehoods, and lies become so effective and formidable in the digital realm.
I stated before that the advent of targeted digital advertising enables actors, malicious or not, to engineer and formulate content that it believes their targeted audience would likely react and engage with. In 2018, the House Intelligence Committee released 3,500 Russian Facebook ads that were designed to target and polarize specific portions of the population. In some cases, Russian-owned pages created and promoted political rallies where they hoped people would violently clash. Russia’s sophisticated and broad utilization of data-centered advertising demonstrates the dystopian implication social media can have on the political process when users are reduced to data points for sale.
The Path Forward
Dr. Hill believes that self-regulation is the most practical way to thwart Russian disinformation on these platforms. She makes it clear to acknowledge the flip-side of social media, stating that the “leveling out and leveling up” of information has enabled more people than ever to have access to critical, informative information. Her reasoning for self-regulation is that a draconian, heavy-handed government approach to regulating these highly complicated platforms runs the risk of squashing free speech. “We thrive on free speech, free engagement, and freedom of assembly,” which increasingly takes place on the internet and these platforms within our societies.
Considering this, disinformation is something we will have to accept and grapple with for some time. “We will have to be creative in how we handle it for the foreseeable future because what is a strength is also often a vulnerability,” Dr. Hill says. She argues that this balancing act will largely rely on self-regulation and creating close working partnerships with the government, the private sector, and the entirety of society. “We ourselves as consumers and users of the platforms […] have to also be aware that part of the responsibility is ours to be more careful of the information that we propagate, verify, and cross-reference.” She concludes: “we have to be active consumers, not just passive recipients of information.”
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.
For years, Pakistan, a ‘shadowy hand’ in Central Asian politics, has covertly aided the Afghan Taliban while nominally maintaining its status as a US lynchpin in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Obfuscated by bureaucratic red tape, Islamabad’s infidelity was only brought to the public eye after the raid on Usama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, which was suspiciously just around the corner from the Pakistani Military Academy. It is clear that Pakistan suffers from its share of devastating terrorist attacks, and for those who adhere to the liberalist school of political thought, or the diametric Cold War perception of America and its allies versus all things evil, this begets the question: Why does Pakistan play both sides? Perhaps fatalistic to some, the answer lies within neorealism and its conception that states are primarily concerned with the balance of power, and will engage in self-help behavior to not only preserve the status quo but will exploit ‘allies’ to acquire it, as long as the cost-benefit calculus reports a favorable outcome.
Pakistani interest in Afghanistan is rooted in the Indian-Pakistani power struggle. Fearing encirclement by India and its allies, Islamabad has consistently sought to cultivate a friendly Kabul government. According to former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), sought to cultivate a post-Soviet Afghanistan “so beholden to Pakistan” that no Afghan “would ever question Pakistan’s right to dictate to Afghanistan.” An Afghanistan beholden to Pakistan would not only but would cease long-standing border disagreements, which originated with the 1893 Partition of Afghanistan and former British India, but would also provide strategic depth in the event of an Indian invasion. Therefore, as India ramped up support for more secular Tajik groups such as the Northern Alliance, Pakistan, fearing a potential Afghan-Indian ‘pincer’ that an Afghanistan beholden to India could achieve, countered Indian influence by creating and cultivating the Pashtun Afghan Taliban. Subsequently, by the late 1990’s, with the support of the ISI, the Northern Alliance had been virtually defeated and the Taliban were firmly rooted in Kabul.
Enter 9/11:
On the surface, for Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf, 9/11 marked an opportunity to repair diplomatic relationships with the West that had deteriorated since his ascent to power by military coup, and Pakistan’s crossing of the nuclear threshold. As a result, with his fingers presumably crossed behind his back, Musharraf publicly pledged his country’s “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism” and agreed to provide intelligence and logistical support for Coalition operations in Afghanistan in return for US aid and a normalization of relations. Reciprocally, at a joint press conference held in November 2001, President Bush called Musharraf a “strong leader” of a “strong ally.” However, under the surface, “the way [Musharraf and the ISI] saw 9/11 was that it disrupted their little plan” for altering the regional balance of power in their favor. Because the Afghan Taliban had been elevated to a US enemy on par with al Qaeda for harboring Usama bin Laden, and the Northern Alliance was now a US ally, 9/11 thwarted Pakistan’s ambitions to fill the post-Cold War Afghan power vacuum. As a result, Musharraf’s support for the GWOT would prove to be only nominal.
By November 2001, Musharraf was nervous, and revealed his true intentions regarding Afghanistan when he warned President Bush of the “anarchy and atrocities” that would follow Northern Alliance control of Kabul, insisting “that the Pashtuns … be involved in a postwar political settlement.” While Musharraf was not wrong regarding the negative implications of ‘thuggish’ Northern Alliance warlords, it is clear that his motivations for ‘warning’ the US laid not within helping win the GWOT, but in regional power politics. Consequently, when US SOF and Northern Alliance fighters captured Kabul and encircled the Taliban holdout of Kunduz, Musharraf realized that given the presence of the US, Afghanistan, at least for the time being, could not be beholden to Pakistan. Subsequently, the ISI evacuated hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda leaders from Kunduz in an operation pejoratively termed: ‘The Airlift of Evil.’ As Coalition forces looked on helplessly from afar, what was sold to the Bush Administration by Musharraf as a “minor extraction [of Pakistani ISI personnel], turned into a major air bridge” of US adversaries. In a calculated gamble, Musharraf chose to bide his time.
Prior to the airlift, the Bush Administration was well aware of Pakistani support for terrorists. According to declassified State Department cables that predate 9/11, US foreign policy decision makers were aware that “large numbers of Pakistani nationals [had] recently moved into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban … with the tacit acquiescence of the Pakistani Government.” The existence of such documents raises the questions: Why didn’t the Bush Administration confront Pakistan? Why weren’t they more wary of Musharraf’s true intentions? In reality, while the US was aware of Musharraf’s double-cross, it could not easily address the threat without jeopardizing Pakistan’s cooperation in other areas of greater geopolitical strategic interest, such as the security of Pakistan’s nuclear program or support for covert US operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. At the height of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), if the US were to have taken corrective action, a destabilized Pakistan with nuclear capabilities would have proved disastrous.
As a result, to avoid national embarrassment, the Bush Administration refused to placate Pakistan, and publicly denied any such evacuation. From that point on, Musharraf and the ISI were confident that they could ‘hedge their bets’ between US and terrorist demands, because President Bush did not “ask the hard questions, and frankly, neither did the people working for him.” For the duration of the Bush and Obama Administrations, it seems that despite intermittent demands that Pakistan cease and desist its assistance to the Afghan Taliban, the US accepted the relationship as a necessary evil. Subsequently, for the duration of OEF, the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents were given sanctuary in Pakistan, as the nation itself, funded by US dollars, fought its own internal war on terror against an ‘unfriendly’ Taliban: the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP). For too long, the US has allowed Pakistan to have its cake and eat it too.
In 2018, the Trump Administration suspended 1.3 billion dollars in security assistance to Pakistan, citing its support for terrorists. In 2019, with the entrance of a new Pakistani government, led by Prime Minister Imran Khan, bilateral talks between the US and Pakistan were held in the Oval Office. When asked by a reporter if he would restore aid to Pakistan, President Trump replied: “The problem was Pakistan — this is before you [Khan] — Pakistan was not doing anything for us. They were really … subversive. They were going against us … To be honest, I think we have a better relationship with Pakistan right now than we did when we were paying that money. But all of that can come back, depending on what we work out.” With a new rapport established, four days later, $125 million in military aid was re-pledged to Pakistan.
It is essential to recognize the actor-observer bias. While it is easy to simply denounce Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror, which it is, one must recognize the root causes of its actions. To reiterate: Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban because it understands that a Kabul beholden to Islamabad shifts the balance of power in its favor, or at the very least, helps it maintain the status-quo against a much larger India. Therefore, winning the GWOT depends on relieving tensions between India and Pakistan as much as it does by preventing the Taliban from overthrowing the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA). At the same bilateral talks, when asked by Prime Minister Khan if he would serve as a mediator between India and Pakistan, regarding territorial conflict in Kashmir, President Trump replied: “It’s impossible to believe two incredible countries … can’t solve a problem like that. But if you want me to mediate … I would be willing to do that. In response, Prime Minister Khan thanked President Trump and expressed his sincere desire for triadic talks.
In retrospect, with the planned US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and recent peace talks with the Taliban, it is clear that by evacuating Taliban and al Qaeda leadership in 2001, Musharraf and the ISI were correct in their assertion of the US’s limited resolve, and have kept the Afghan Taliban on retainer, ready to pounce. One can only hope that for the sake of Afghanistan, the GIRoA can withstand a reinvigorated Taliban offensive, this time without direct help from Coalition ground forces. President Trump’s use of an unconventional mixed bag of carrots and sticks on a new Pakistani Government will hopefully be enough to exact a real change in Pakistani foreign policy towards Afghanistan; following a reduction in tensions between India and Pakistan. While India has since rejected offers of mediation, it is in the US’s interest to sell such offers, perhaps through linkage, with vigor.
Introduction
Following the momentous events of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-2011, pundits have looked across the Middle East in search for explanations of how protests erupted and spread across the region in such a swift fashion.
One popular hypothesis commonly floated around has been centered around a perceived intersection between a formidably tech savvy youth and a technologically inept line of ageing dictators out of touch with the organizational power of social media. It was in this environment, so the idea goes, that protests were able to effectively materialize and evade preemptive suppression by domestic security forces.
Regardless of the validity or appropriateness of distilling the Arab Spring down as a “Facebook Revolution,” the decade ahead promises a sharp reversal in the technological power gap once held between the state and the individual with the rise of digital authoritarianism.
The current revolution in surveillance technology has one overarching implication for authoritarian rule: it will likely make it more formidable, pervasive, and effective.
The very technology that once enabled people to organize mass demonstrations and disseminate images of state-sanctioned brutality at a speed quicker than security forces could react is now being used to keep tabs on virtually every citizen. The intricacies of their daily lives, their beliefs, who they talk to, what they ate for lunch, and even which store they visited the night before may eventually be a click away for autocratic states currently investing in this budding technology. China, perhaps the poster child of digital authoritarianism, is a leading innovator, deployer, and exporter of technology that uses the power of high technology and the internet to surveil citizens to a degree unfathomable to many. Their trailblazing in this regard provides observers with a prophetic glimpse at what the future may hold as more authoritarian regimes get their hands on such tools.
Defining Digital Authoritarianism
In a broad respect, digital authoritarianism is “the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations.”
Steven Feldstein, the Frank and Bethine Church Chair of Public Affairs at Boise State University, and a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance program, notes that digital repression contains six broad techniques. These include “surveillance, censorship, social manipulation and harassment, cyber-attacks, internet shutdowns, and targeted persecution against online users.”
This piece focuses on data-driven mass surveillance. More specifically, advances in mass surveillance technologies and their link to internet suppression, censorship, and manipulation. As more people’s lives are bound-up in the digital realm, advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), new data analytic tools, and cutting-edge innovation in facial recognition are enabling autocratic regimes to unite the physical and digital domain in their repressive endeavors. Analyzing China’s current actions and vision in this regard paints a clearer image of this dystopian reality.
The China Model
China has shown itself to be a trailblazer in utilizing high technology to construct a formidable and pervasive domestic surveillance apparatus. This likely stems from China’s deep concern about maintaining domestic stability. Between 2007 and 2016, domestic security spending across all provinces and regions increased by 215%. In more sensitive provinces, such as that of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, there has been an increase of 411%.
Much of this widening investment has gone into rolling out a new generation of data-driven surveillance technology. This means outfitting China with high-tech surveillance cameras that utilize AI-driven facial recognition and advanced data analytics to effectively surveil citizens to unprecedented degrees. In 2018, the Chinese government had already deployed 170 million of these CCTV cameras. By 2021, the number is expected to reach 570 million (around 1 for every 2.3 people). This new data-driven surveillance technology is augmented by the fact that it is fused with data gathered by an individual’s digital activity. With this new power, the Chinese government aims to effectively surveil its nearly 1.4 billion people by weaving together the intricacies of their digital and physical lives into an easily accessible intelligence package.
AI’s strength in revolutionizing surveillance to this degree is that it can observe and analyze countless seemingly insignificant/unnoticeable actions and compile them into a concise piece of usable information. It is so effective at this that China’s ambition even includes the eventual nationwide introduction of citizen scores through “ranking people by ‘trustworthiness’ and their value to society.”
As developments in AI, 5G, and other facets of advanced technology continue to progress at such rapid speeds, the prospects of this dystopian scenario will only become more pronounced. In an August 2019 Brookings Institution policy briefing titled Exporting Digital Authoritarianism, fellows Alina Polyvakova and Chris Meserole state that “with 5G networks on the horizon,” illiberal and hybrid regimes will likely “build out the next generation of their domestic telecommunications and surveillance systems over the coming decade.”
Is this technology being adopted beyond China?
The adoption and proliferation of data-driven surveillance technology is spreading across the globe. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that 75 out of 176 countries are actively using AI technologies for surveillance. The research paper also noted that “governments in autocratic and semi-autocratic countries are more prone to abuse A.I. surveillance than governments in liberal democracies.” Oftentimes, the technology is adopted for a wide range of policy objectives. Three common ones include smart city/safe city platforms, facial recognition systems, and smart policing. For example, Brookings Institution fellows Alina Polyvakova and Chris Meserole note that the city of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates has already begun deploying Chinese technology under its “Police without Policeman” program that seeks to replace conventional law enforcement with video surveillance and facial recognition technology. As data-driven surveillance technology becomes more refined, ubiquitous, and cheaper to adopt, it will likely spread on a quicker and broader scale. Saudi Arabia’s video surveillance industry market is estimated to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 3.7% between 2020 and 2026. Over the next five years, the global market for video surveillance alone is expected to expand by USD 31.1 billion.
What is China’s role in its global proliferation?
China’s tech firms and personal experience in constructing a robust data-driven surveillance network make it a leading adopter, innovator, and exporter of repressive technology. For example, Huawei Technologies supplies AI surveillance technology to nearly 50 countries worldwide. Beyond deploying repressive surveillance technology abroad, Huawei has even directly assisted governments in Uganda and Zambia by intercepting encrypted communications and cell data to spy on political opponents. The Chinese government’s indifference towards privacy, freedom, and human rights records abroad make it an attractive patron for prospective authoritarian clients. The government has even promoted its model of digital authoritarianism through explicit, large-scale training sessions for foreign officials.
What role does the West play and what can it do to curtail the global proliferation of data-driven surveillance technology?
The West has also played an important role in the global proliferation of advanced data-driven surveillance technology. For example, U.S. technology alone has been deployed in 32 countries.
Before simply casting blame on China, Western nations must assess domestic loopholes and construct sound, robust policies that limit the exportation of advanced surveillance technology. This entails working to attain that objective while not harming the free exchange of research and commercial programs vital to the development of emerging technologies. A good first step is the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA). Signed into law in 2018, the ERCA “requires the government to examine how it can restrict the export of emerging technologies essential to the national security of the United States.” In the first restriction enacted under this law, the Department of Commerce instituted a ban on the export of software for neural networks with graphical user interfaces, a “feature that makes programs easier for non-technical users to operate.”
The possible future challenge to confronting China abroad
On the international front, the United States and its allies should work from a multilateral angle to confront and hinder China’s exportation of repressive digital surveillance technology. By default, it seems logical to simply advise that Western governments utilize diplomacy, targeted sanctions, export controls, and the like to confront the issue at hand. But, as I have noted in a previous article, coordinated strategic action of this nature may become less effective if a “digital iron curtain” descends upon the globe. The term refers to the prospect of the formation of two distinct global digital ecosystems brought on by Chinese – U.S. contention in the technology sector. Societies around the world would be divided via the internet and devices they use rather than walls and barbed wire. In the near future, this could make Western and Chinese technology so divorced from one another that leveraging export controls would do little to hobble China’s ability to develop, adopt, and export data-driven surveillance technology. In this scenario, I have previously argued that two distinct digital orders may incorporate and draw themselves along ideological boundaries. Democracies sharing the United States’ values of a free and open internet promoting freedom of speech and expression will be more inclined to work with Western firms over Chinese ones. Authoritarian countries may find it more attractive to simply work with the latter to satiate, rather than challenge, their desire to consolidate political power.
Conclusion
A decade ago, then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that the development and spread of communications technology would facilitate the free flow of information and advance freedom and democracy around the globe. This optimistic assessment of the power of such technology has not aged well. Although modern communication technology has served as a force for greater freedom and democracy in some respects, it has also demonstrated a disturbing dark side with the advent of digital authoritarianism.
If the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring a decade ago were deemed a “Facebook Revolution” advanced by 21st-century technology, the world of today is witnessing the realization of a highly repressive technological counterrevolution that will likely make authoritarian rule more formidable, pervasive, and effective in the years ahead.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.
The post-WWII international order has seen the relationships between states become more numerous, complex, and interdependent. In this new age, international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the Geneva Conventions have attempted to regulate how wars are initiated and fought. Naturally, these efforts have caused considerable friction with members of the international community, such as the United States, where many believe that the ‘right’ to go to war is an extension of state sovereignty. However, in recent decades, despite a hawkish foreign policy, the US has stopped issuing formal declarations of war. This change is not due to the domestic electoral costs of declaring war; rather, it is the result of the beneficial legal flexibility the US gains when it intentionally fails to formally classify hostilities as war while operating under the constraints of international law.
One outdated argument suggests that the lack of declarations of war is because domestic electoral costs are too high; politicians shy away from declaring war in fear of not being reelected. Proponents of this argument believe that the human cost of losing loved ones will translate into a negative voter opinion towards those who declared war. However, the fact of the matter is that whether America’s conflicts are declared or not, the majority of voters do not take into account foreign policy when placing their ballots. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara once mused about going “to war without … arousing the public ire.” In recent decades, his musings have become a reality. New technology and advances in medicine have minimized the domestic human toll of conflict. For instance, in ongoing conflicts, 10 % of US soldiers have died from their wounds, compared to 30% during the Second World War. Additionally, the overall number of soldiers exposed to direct combat has decreased, given the proliferation of unmanned drone strikes. The US’s ability to wage limited war has resulted in a constituency that is detached from American foreign policy. Therefore, an argument solely based on the electoral costs of declaring war is not sufficient.
Regarding the jus ad bellum conditions under which states may declare war, the UN Charter prohibits the use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” except in cases of individual or collective self-defense. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) enforces this through punitive resolutions that impose compliance costs ranging from economic sanctions to the use of force. However, given that the US is a permanent ‘P5’ member of the Security Council with veto power, UNSC resolutions regarding alleged US aggression are thereby nullified. Therefore, to hold the US accountable, less powerful nations can supersede the authority of a US veto by convening a special emergency session of the UN General Assembly.
Given the implications of blatantly violating the Charter, to fly under the proverbial radar of the UN, the US has altered the way it advertises military intervention to the international community. The precedent for doing so was established when President Truman sent US troops to Korea without a declaration of war and under the authority of an international UN treaty instead. Terming the conflict, a police action, Truman explained that under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, international treaties “are laws of the land, and it becomes the President’s duty” to execute them faithfully.The distinction created between war and police action is poignant. While a declared war is “designed to crush and conquer another nation,” a police action is simply a limited military intervention to punish perceived aggressors and to restore the status quo.
To this day, the US has continued to use the convenient ‘police action’ model to justify military intervention abroad. For instance, when questioned about the lack of a war declaration in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense McNamara explained that doing so would imply a “dedication to the total destruction of the enemy,” when US forces were only concerned with restoring the status quo established by the 1954 Geneva Accords. In the same interview, he also acknowledges that doing so would “significantly reduce the flexibility” of US forces to bring North Vietnam to the bargaining table, given the illicit insertion of US special forces into neutral Cambodia to disrupt Viet Cong supply lines.
Post-Vietnam, with the introduction of the War Powers Resolution, which enables the presidential deployment of troops for up to 90 days before seeking a Congressional Authorization of Military Force (AUMF), these so-called police actions became even easier to conduct. Conflicts such as the 1983 invasion of Grenada, the 1990 invasion of Panama, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq have been authorized in this manner, claiming target nation noncompliance with existing international treaties. Concerning these operations, US officials have maintained that the absence of a formal declaration of war is not what makes military intervention unlawful. Rather, “the only relevant legal question is whether … [intervention] is justified.” Therefore, by painting its military incursions as ‘police actions’ and refraining from official declarations of war, the US generates the plausible deniability necessary to justify that it is not waging war, but merely ‘policing’ to enforce international treaties.
Regarding jus in bello conduct during hostilities, the 1949 Geneva Convention regulates the actions, strategies, and weaponry of military personnel during armed conflict. It does this by establishing standards of international human rights law (IHL). For example, captured military personnel are classified as prisoners of war (POWs) and cannot be tortured. In this context, the wording is critical since the existence of a state of war between two nations determines whether or not the Geneva Conventions apply, and therefore, whether or not war crimes have occurred. Consequently, in non-interstate conflicts, IHL does not apply to insurgents, since they are classified as unlawful combatants instead of military personnel. The useful implications of this distinction are illustrated by the US’s controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility.
At Guantanamo, captured insurgents were subjected to ‘enhanced interrogation techniques,’ during the post-9/11 scramble to bring its perpetrators to justice. Due to their classification as unlawful combatants, the insurgents occupied a legal gray area. In the context of IHL, declaring war is akin to crossing a line of no return. On the one hand, if a state issues a formal declaration of war, then it is forced to abide by IHL. On the other hand, when a state does not, it retains the legal flexibility necessary to justify noncompliance. Accordingly, if the US had issued a formal declaration of war against terrorists, it would have implicitly acknowledged their political legitimacy and, thereby, their POW status. However, because it did not, military and government interrogators were able to implement techniques that would have otherwise been illegal in the context of IHL.
With the recent killing of Quasem Solemani and subsequent Iranian missile strikes, the AUMF has again come under attack, with Representative Joe Kennedy III calling for its repeal. Kennedy reasons that by repealing the AUMF, legislators can redeem themselves by rescuing the power to wage war from Presidential abuse. However, while Representative Kennedy’s qualms are valid, it is essential to recognize that in the modern age, a world where insecurity is generated by threats from non-state actors, Congress is institutionally incapable of the celeritous decision making that such threats require. On the other hand, the President, by nature of his office, possesses the resources necessary to gather and analyze intelligence via his National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff, and therefore can act and respond to national security threats expeditiously.
Crises have illustrated that small, simple working groups focused solely on foreign affairs; i.e., the President and his Cabinet are better suited to address threats to national security than large, complex bureaucracies; i.e., Congress, which is primarily focused on domestic concerns. In addition, the introduction of the War Powers Resolution by Congress implicitly acknowledges the Congressional shortcomings regarding use of force decision making, and was designed to remedy Congressional indecision. Therefore, on top of the legal leeway that waging undeclared war affords, official declarations of war are anachronistic and only serve as a national security risk.
By not formally declaring war in an environment governed by carefully worded international guidelines, the US can afford itself flexibility when dealing with threats. As a result, when the US engages in hostilities without prior UN approval, it attempts to disguise its violations of the UN Charter by labeling its military intervention as something other than war, such as a ‘police action.’ While this is a risky endeavor, it has paid off tremendously, allowing the accomplishment of policy objectives and ensuring national security while walking the fine line between violation and compliance of international law.
As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in the Milwaukee Democratic Debate last February, “When people go to vote in primaries or caucuses, they are voting not only for the president, they are voting for the commander-in-chief. And it’s important that people really look hard at what the threats and dangers we face are, and who is best prepared for dealing with them.” Although a clear plug for her past experience, Clinton highlights a crucial element to the presidency that can easily be lost in the media circus surrounding the 2016 election. A time meant to showcase credentials and visions for the future has quickly turned into the spectacle and squabble of entertainment television. The media has succumbed to treating this race for the presidency as just another reality TV show MTV would proudly stream alongside The Real World. With the most recent GOP debate spotlighting personal banter rather than prevailing issues, it is time for us as audiences but most importantly as voters, to make ourselves informed and conscious of the power that one of these presidential hopefuls will soon attain. One of these lucky selected few will soon run this country and the US armed forces, inheriting what can arguably be deemed as the most powerful position in the world. In the wise words of Uncle Ben, “with great power comes great responsibility,” and the power in this case, among an extensive list of others, comes from the role of Commander in Chief.
In the digital age, remarks on the campaign trail spread like wildfire across news platforms having immediate impacts on citizens nationally and on the perception of the United States internationally. Case in point: Trump’s rhetoric inciting violence against immigrants with the recent assault of a homeless hispanic man by two brothers, one of which stated, “Donald Trump was right, all these illegals need to be deported,” and Trump responded with “I will say that people who are following me are very passionate. They love this country and they want this country to be great again.” Conversely government heads such as former President Fox of Mexico, in an interview with CNN, voiced that Donald Trump reminds him of Hitler. Although this is but one candidate’s views, it foreshadows the extremely real mindset a presidential frontrunner will take as President and as Commander in Chief and the international denunciation of his views.
These comments and plans for US interaction with the world demand a great deal of attention considering the vast foreign policy challenges that currently exist. The new president will be stepping into a world plagued by terrorist attacks —al-Shabab claiming the most recent bomb attack on a Somalian airplane in reaction to the Turkish airline’s state affiliation to Western operations; will have to face the escalating hodgepodge of civil war against President Bashar al-Assad and proxy war against IS in Syria, along with the snowballing refugee crisis they have kindled; the budding international rivalry with Russia; and the augmenting threat of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, to name a few. As the primaries are in full swing, positions on these international aspects may be greatly impacted by the scrimmage for votes, but they do paint a very real picture of how these candidates will espouse this role. A depiction of this can be quickly processed by simply viewing the way each candidate has titled these issues on their respective websites. Hillary Clinton: “National Security.” Bernie Sanders: “War and Peace.” Donald Trump: “The Military.” Ted Cruz: “Defend Our Nation.” Marco Rubio: “Build American Strength.” These headlines show clear distinctions, with Republicans siding for a militaristic approach and the Democrats opting for diplomatic engagement. To elaborate on a few of the frontrunners’ perspectives, Clinton’s platform seeks to establish a strong economic foundation for diplomatic influence and military defense, aims to disrupt terrorist infrastructure on the ground and online, and hopes to strengthen current partnerships and work to build new ones. Sanders views the role of Commander in Chief as defending this nation, but seeking diplomatic solutions before military action, stating, “war must be a last resort, not the first option.” Trump asserts the military as a primordial force, declaring,—and I quote— “I will make our Military so big, powerful and strong that no one will mess with us.” Following a similar path, Cruz views rebuilding America’s military as key in maintaining national safety and exerting our leadership on the global stage, because “what is best for America is best for the world.”
One of the biggest issues affecting the international sphere, as previously mentioned, is the ongoing war against terrorism primordially sparked by the Islamic State and its affiliates. With a new attack emerging at an almost weekly basis and the scope of these organizations reaching the United States with the most recent San Bernardino shooting, the threat of terrorism has once again reached a security level on par with the period immediately following 9/11. A line connecting the candidates, both Democrat and Republican, is the defeat of IS. However, their projected methods of accomplishing this and tackling its interconnected aspects differentiate their stances. Journalists have outlined the candidates’ positions from accepting refugees, to instituting a no-fly zone, to declaring war. The divide seems clear between the two parties on accepting refugees, but when it comes to military action party lines begin to blur. The Republican candidates have been clear in opposing any further acceptance of Syrian refugees in light of the recent domestic terror attacks, while Democrats have protested anti-refugee and anti-muslim rhetoric in supporting increases in refugee acceptance. Now in the logistics of the war: Cruz and Sanders are both against sending in more US ground troops, while Trump, Clinton and Rubio agree that more troops are needed—with Clinton and Rubio specifying their support for the sending a special ops team. Clinton and the Republicans also both advocate for instituting a no-fly zone in Syria, while Sanders stands alone in his opposition of it. Additionally in terms of invoking NATO Article 5 (the principle of collective defence, requiring all parties to assist in collective action, including the use of armed force, when one or more signatories is attacked), Rubio has favored invoking it, while the rest of the candidates remain unclear In their position for it. IS must be eliminated, they all hail, but how they will achieve this is where divisions come into play.
Another key issue headlining foreign policy talks is US-Russian relations. The ongoing rivalry is no secret, regarding the presence of both forces in Syria particularly and the Middle East in general. Despite the rivalry, there is distinction in how the presidential candidates will interact with Putin. On this gradient of views, Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio stand strongest in condemning Russia’s President declaring him as “a bully and a dictator” and “a gangster and a criminal” respectively. Cruz calls for asserting US strength in Syria by expanding missile defenses in Eastern Europe while highlighting the country’s human rights violations to deter Russian resurgence. Rubio has accused Putin of “trying to destroy NATO” in challenging US dominance in the Middle East in addition to his support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In the middle of the gradient lies Hillary Clinton, who has gone head to head with Putin in her past role of Secretary of State. She affirms her belief that Russia has aimed to undermine and confront American power and that the US must counter this; however she admits that when it comes to Syria, the solution must comprise Russian participation. Diverting even further into a diplomatic approach, Sanders promotes a collaborative actions with allies against Russian aggression in placing economic sanctions and international pressure on Putin as “an alternative to any direct military confrontation.” Now on the far side of the gradient is the very pro-Putin candidate Donald Trump who, unlike his peers, seems to be carrying on a friendly relationship stating, “I’ve always felt fine about Putin,” and that “Russia and the United States should be able to work well with each other towards defeating terrorism and restoring world peace, not to mention trade and all of the other benefits derived from mutual respect,” in response to Putin’s endorsing him.
This breakdown is only a soundbite of the extensive decisions one of these frontrunners will take on. Domestic goals are undeniably a prevailing aspect of this race, but do not let the emphasis on the domestic distract you. We are about to elect a new Commander in Chief. Foreign affairs vastly impact the national, and one Presidential hopeful will inherit the power to overhaul world order as hegemon in the international sphere. It is easy to get caught up in the drama and, more recently, outright brawls, between the presidential hopefuls on the debate floor. However, this election can no longer serve as mere entertainment. Voters must watch debates with critical minds and must investigate what candidates best align with their views. Candidates’ platforms are not a mystery. Answers are literally a click away. There is no excuse for ignorance. Use the Internet. Let it be your informant, let it be your voice. The proliferation of information is our greatest strength in this election. Whether you “feel the Bern”, want to “make America great again,” see “Hillary for America,” believe in “A New American Century” or remain undecided, keep yourself informed and vote for who you believe can best represent this nation as not just President, but further as Commander in Chief.
What are the major terrorist threats not yet on our radar? How are New York and other cities around the world adjusting to modern security threats? Just ask Mitchell Silber.
He sat down with The Generation co-editor Brad Rowe in UCLA’s Murphy Sculpture Garden to discuss his new book The Al Qaeda Factor, terrorist threats in the Western Hemisphere, and his inspiring personal journey from Wall Street to NYPD (which he has served for seven years).
Silber is the Director of both the NYPD Intelligence Division’s Analytic and Cyber Units. He supervises the analysis of the portfolio of terrorism-related investigations within the Intelligence Division.
Please both join us for a captivating interview and share your thoughts on The Generation comments page.
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Image is the author’s own.