Already facing economic turmoil and increasingly tarnished diplomatic relationships due to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia suffered a new blow on the international stage when the al-Assad regime fell in December 2024. While President Vladimir Putin has contended that this event does not reflect poorly on the Kremlin, the fall of al-Assad has made it clear that military and bargaining power of Russia is diminishing and that they have potentially lost their only true ally in the Middle East.
The Russian offensive in Ukraine has resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of soldiers, abandonment of numerous military vehicles, and troops facing starvation and freezing conditions—all while failing to advance into Ukrainian territory and even losing newly occupied territory. Not only has Russia’s military been under constant distress, but its essentially failed war has made the state increasingly reliant on foreign aid. Coupled with sanctions from major players on the global stage, such as the United States, it has become clear that the nation has started to struggle economically, diminishing its image of self-sufficiency, both economically and politically, globally.
Russia has not reached a point of complete economic downturn, but rather one of stagnation. For the first two years or so of the war, Russia even saw growth in GDP and low unemployment rates. However, approaching three years in a struggling war, there are active labor shortages, and spending on infrastructure, including social spending and national economic programs, has been cut to accommodate significant military spending. Alongside a 9% inflation rate and 21% key interest rate, it is clear that Russia has increased its attempts to mitigate the costs of its war, although its methods are likely unsustainable. This is further evident through the slowing of GDP growth throughout 2024 from 4.1% to 3.1%.
However, Russia’s impending financial turmoil is not its biggest concern. President Bashar al-Assad, who led Syria for 24 years following the death of his father Hafez al-Assad, whose reign lasted 29 years, was overthrown by Syrian rebel forces on December 8th. Al-Assad fled to Moscow as the rebels entered Damascus, signaling the close relationship between Putin and al-Assad. The larger relationship between Russia and the al-Assad regime in Syria began during the Soviet Union, when military support was provided to Hazed al-Assad’s regime from its early days. Syria also benefited from the Soviet Union through its end, receiving $135 million worth of Soviet military equipment and arms. However, as the Soviet Union came to an end, Syria had to turn to the U.S. for assistance, albeit very reluctantly.
Following Russia’s 2005 forgiveness of $10 billion in Syrian debt, shielding of the al-Assad regime from international sanctions during the Arab Spring, and deployment of military forces in the mid-2010s, the modern relationship between Russia and the al-Assad regime was reborn. Russia’s Syrian military intervention in 2015 was the first intervention they had made since the end of the USSR in a non-former Soviet republic. Russia wanted to rebuild Russia as a true great power on a global scale, and in order to do so, it took into consideration the past relationship the nation held with Syria and the need for allies in the Middle East, likely leading to many of the aforementioned decisions. The close relationship between the two nations was consistent until December’s coup, making the fall of al-Assad a loss for Russia.
Russia’s international image has relied quite heavily on its ability to uphold its allies against internal and external threats, especially since its 2015 Syrian intervention. For example, when riots broke out across Almaty, Kazakhstan in January 2022 when the lift of subsidies by the government led to a sharp increase in gas costs, Russia deployed troops to curb the thousands of protesters. In doing so, President Kossym-Jomart Tokayev was able to maintain his office, and, to some extent, increase both his legitimacy and authority, having been able to put the achievement of curbing one of the nation’s largest rebellions in decades under his belt. This promoted Russia’s image as a powerful asset to its allies. However, Syria’s fall is telling of the fact that, under the many pressures that Russia is currently facing, it may no longer be able to maintain its image as a reliable ally. In the final weeks of the al-Assad regime, Russia attempted to provide reinforcements to the Syrian dictator through the bombing of rebel-held regions, yet it largely failed, with the rebels taking Damascus less than two weeks afterwards. This was the culmination of nine years worth of military and diplomatic support, representing Russia’s inability to have maintained the regime fully, especially given the nation’s current struggles.
Syria is home to the only two military bases in Russia’s possession outside of the former Soviet Union, providing the state with an ideal geopolitical position for both Middle Eastern and African affairs. Syria’s new leadership, which Russian forces targeted for years prior, however, has not yet provided Russia with concrete plans regarding the bases. These bases have been of special importance in Russia’s growing ventures in Africa, which have primarily been pursued through the use of private military companies such as the Wagner Group, which is now known as the Africa Corps. The Council on Foreign Relations has noted that Russia has provided its support to authoritarian regimes in Africa, curbing aspirations around the continent for democracy through the use of militarization. Due to Russia’s airbase in Syria serving as a supply and stopover hub for their African operations, the loss of military power in Russia would prove to be a loss to their aspirations in Africa.
On a more immediate level, the loss of the bases and the strong relationship with the al-Assad regime will make the Middle East a weak point for Russia. Despite the state’s development of relationships with autocratic leaders in the region for years, Russia’s relationship with the al-Assad regime was potentially the strongest that they were able to maintain. However, Putin has also been able to develop a strong relationship with fellow autocrat President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, as well as begun to depend quite heavily on Iran for military and geopolitical support as their military capacity has steadily reduced. Russia’s relationship with Iran has also put a major strain on the relationship between Israel and Russia since October 7th. However, it is very likely that in the event of war breaking out between Israel and Iran, Russia could not truly threaten to intervene on behalf of Iran due to their loss of faith in their capacity globally. Thus, Russia, while not completely unable to achieve their Middle East interests, has lost major partnerships, and, in turn, bargaining power in recent years–a trend which the events on December 8th have exacerbated.
Since December, Russia has slowly and silently pulled its military equipment out of the territory, despite the Kremlin’s previous expressing that they want to maintain their base in Syria. However, in the wake of such a humiliating defeat of not only the al-Assad regime but Russian military power, the new leadership in Syria has expressed its distaste for the Kremlin through its demands of reparations from the nation and its rumored cancellation of the lease which would allow them to maintain their military presence. These demands especially come in the wake of the Russian bombing of opposition-occupied territories in November, the largest of any such attack since a 2020 ceasefire. However, this assault was largely a failure on the end of Russia, further diminishing its position as a powerful military force.
It has also been asserted that the fall of the al-Assad regime will help rid Russia of a problematic partnership. Throughout the final years of the al-Assad regime, the Syrian economy was facing collapse and the public, as well as their military, were facing despair and a loss of faith in the regime, essentially leaving the responsibility of the regime to the hands of the Russians or no one at all. In the wake of all of their hardships, Russia was not able to take on Syria and its regime through financial and military involvement, and the fall of the regime reduced the pressure which Russia was facing to do so.
Additionally, the relationship between the new leadership of Syria and the Kremlin may have a chance of rebuilding, despite Russia’s support for the al-Assad regime. As the transitional government has reportedly begun demanding al-Assad so that Russia can maintain its military bases in the region, which are its only two outside of the former Soviet Union, Russia has not said anything, yet had delegates in Syria almost simultaneously. Reparations, both financial and political, were demanded by the new government as well to help prevent the complete loss of the partnership between the two nations.
For now, it can be said that Russia, whose military power and public image as a global superpower has faced numerous humiliations in recent years, has been adversely affected by the fall of such a close and important ally in the Middle East, despite what the Kremlin has said to the contrary. Isolated, the fall of the al-Assad regime is a loss to Russia’s Middle East policy and geopolitical position. On a global scale, however, it is yet another example of Russia’s losses in terms of military capacity and of being able to uphold its fellow autocracies. Whether this is a representation of the dire standing of autocracies or poor military strategy, it is clear that Russia no longer holds the power it did several years ago.
