“Bangladesh: The Cost of Democracy” was originally published in our Fall 2021 Print Edition: Authoritarianism.
When Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan in 1971, most did not expect the nation to become one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Then-U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger went so far as to name Bangladesh a “basket case,” as rampant poverty and deprivation made it seem as though the country could never catch up to its neighbors in South Asia. However, notably in the last few years, Bangladesh’s economic growth has given the country an image of unexpected and exceptional success. Before the COVID-19 pandemic contracted economies worldwide, Bangladesh’s GDP growth rates surpassed 7% for four consecutive years, outpacing Pakistan, India, and even China.1 Even after the onset of the pandemic in 2020, Bangladesh was still able to achieve a 5.24% growth.2
Yet, behind this veil of economic growth, Bangladesh has simultaneously been facing serious challenges to its democracy. Since coming into power, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her party Awami League have been accused of presiding over a slew of human rights violations, including forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary arrests, including those of political opponents. The government is also considerably intolerant of any criticism or dissent, from both the media and the general public. As democratic institutions deteriorate and the nation slowly slips towards authoritarianism under Hasina, it is becoming clear that Bangladesh’s economic success has occurred despite political developments in the country, not owing to it.
An Economic ‘Miracle’
As Kissinger initially predicted, Bangladesh’s economy heavily struggled in the first few decades of independence. Such was the case that when Bangladesh’s GDP growth rate surpassed that of Pakistan’s in 2006, it was dismissed as a fluke.3 Despite the dire expectations, Bangladesh’s GDP growth rate has continued to exceed Pakistan’s, and since 2020, also exceeds India’s. Bangladesh is now classified as a lower-middle-income economy and is set to graduate from the UN’s Least Developed Countries list by 2026, according to the World Bank.4
Bangladesh’s sustained economic growth can be attributed to several factors. One of the most important contributing factors has been the exemplary success of the garment industry, which employs about 4 million people and accounts for 84% of the country’s total exports.5 The garment industry has been a vital source of income and employment, particularly for Bangladeshi women. Unlike India and Pakistan, where cultural conservatism has stood as a long-time barrier to female participation, Bangladesh has made incredible efforts to encourage women to participate in the workforce. Since Bangladesh’s independence, the share of women in the workforce has risen from 3% to 36%.6 Female participation is especially high within garment manufacturing, as 80% of all workers are women.7
A key force for bringing about this effort is Grameen Bank, a renowned NGO that notably decided to give microfinance credits to the senior female member of each household. Investing in the country’s women has proven to be beneficial in many ways. The strides made in educating women and amplifying their voices have helped to redirect household expenditures to child welfare. As such, development factors such as average life expectancy and literacy rates have significantly improved, while malnutrition has decreased.8
Remittances have also served as a critical agent in Bangladesh’s growth. Bangladeshi migrant workers, most of whom work as low-skilled laborers in the Persian Gulf, send an average of $15 billion per year in remittances,9 accounting for over 6% of the nation’s total GDP.10 Remittances have proven to be a crucial source of income to ease both poverty and unemployment rates at home. While Bangladesh’s economic growth has seen abundant benefits as a result of these factors, there is also an imminent danger that progress may be reversed due to deteriorating political conditions in the nation’s government.
Politics is A Dirty Game
The decline in Bangladesh’s democracy began during a two-year political crisis from 2006 to 2008, in which a military-backed caretaker government assumed control to address rampant corruption and political tension occurring during the election cycle.11 Under the 13th Amendment of the nation’s constitution, parliamentary elections are overseen by a non-partisan caretaker government that has power over state affairs for the 90 days in which the elections occur. The head of this caretaker government is the Chief Advisor, who is appointed by the President and is typically given to the last retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.12
During the 2007 election cycle, violence broke out after the Awami League, under Sheikh Hasina, set off a series of protests against the appointment of Justice K.M. Hasan as Chief Advisor. Hasan had a history of affiliation with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), the Awami League’s main political opposition as well as the incumbent party at the time. The Awami League made claims that the BNP had been attempting to sway the election in their favor to maintain their control over the government.13
Because the two parties were not able to agree on a candidate for Chief Advisor, the position devolved to the president at the time, Iajuddin Ahmed.14 Yet, even President Ahmed was unsuccessful in abating the tension between the two parties to hold the elections. In fact, the Awami League eventually boycotted the elections altogether in early January 2007. The dire situation led military representatives to urge, and ultimately convince, President Ahmed to declare a state of emergency, step down from the Chief Advisor position, and relinquish power of the government.
Under the military-backed caretaker government, several fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution were suspended and various politicians were arrested on suspicion of involvement in corruption.15 This included Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was arrested on charges of extortion, as well as former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, head of the BNP, who was arrested on charges of corruption. Hasina was eventually released on parole in 2008 and went on to run in the 2009 elections after the military had relinquished power over the caretaker government. Prime Minister Hasina and the Awami League went on to win a landslide victory, winning 288 of the 300 seats in parliament, though this came along with widespread accusations of voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, and restrictions on opposition polling agents.16
The Awami League in Power
Since the conclusion of the 2006-2008 political crisis, the rivalry between the Awami League and the BNP has only intensified. The tactics utilized during the crisis to undermine the elections have not only set a precedent for all succeeding elections but also have enabled the Awami League to maintain its power over Bangladesh.
Since assuming office, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has removed almost all checks to her power. Amongst the greatest changes that she has made is her abolishment of the impartial caretaker government in 2011.17 Hasina claimed that the system was no longer beneficial to the Bangladeshi democracy, for the preceding military-backed caretaker government remained past the three months it was originally mandated. However, many viewed her actions as a method for which she and her party could directly intervene in the outcome of the elections. The lack of a caretaker government intensified political tensions during the 2014 parliamentary elections when the Awami League and the BNP could not agree on the appropriate mechanism to hold the election. As a consequence, the BNP boycotted elections, leaving more than half of the nation’s parliamentary seats uncontested. Voter turnout hit a record low due to the boycott and resulting violence. In the end, the Awami League won 232 of the 300 seats in parliament.18
Following the 2014 elections, the Awami League has also cracked down on its political opposition. Law enforcement officers have illegally detained, tortured, and killed thousands of activists from the opposition party, many times in secret for weeks at a time before formally arresting them. The government has also jailed many of its political opponents; most notably, the former prime minister and leader of the BNP, Khaleda Zia, was arrested once again on charges of corruption in 2018.19 This action severely damaged the BNP during the 2018 elections, when the party could not find an alternative candidate to run against Hasina. Consequently, the Awami League was able to once again achieve a landslide victory, winning 288 of the 300 seats.20
Alongside the crackdown of political opponents, the Awami League has also denied freedom of expression and association. In 2018, the government passed the Digital Security Act, granting law enforcement officials to arrest any individual that they believe has been or has the possibility of committing a crime or destroying evidence of a crime.21 The law also allows up to 10 years of imprisonment for digitally disseminating propaganda against Bangladesh’s Liberation War, the national anthem, or the national flag. Bangladeshi authorities have utilized the law to harass journalists, activists, and any other individual that criticizes the current government.22 In one case, a writer was arrested, denied bail six times, and finally died in prison when he criticized the Bangladeshi government for its response to the COVID-19 pandemic on his social media.23
Developments made in women’s rights are also at risk. While Bangladesh’s constitution provides religious freedom, Islamic fundamentalist groups within the country have continuously pressured the government to make strides towards becoming a “theo-democracy.” Particularly, BNP has a deep history of alliance with the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, notorious for encouraging sexual separation.24 Although the ruling Awami League is founded upon the principles of secularism, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has, nonetheless, also been seen cozying up to other fundamentalist groups like Hefazat-e-Islam, which does not support the secularism that the Awami League supposedly advocates for.25 Adding onto this is the fact that the increase in women’s participation in the workforce has slowed in recent years. Women’s participation in the workforce increased by an average of 1.7% per year between 2005 and 2010, but that number has decreased to a 0.7% increase since then.26
Looking Ahead…
So what does this shift towards authoritarianism mean for Bangladesh’s economic growth? Given the fierceness of the rivalry between the Awami League and the BNP, and the overall disregard the government has in upholding democratic values, Bangladesh’s economy is at serious risk.
For one, the economic progress that the nation has made, while extraordinary, is not sustainable. Although the garment industry has been successful, extreme dependence on a single category of exports poses a dangerous risk to the economy. If any nation that imports garments were unable to continue purchasing from Bangladesh, the industry as a whole would suffer significant losses. Moreover, remittances are dependent on the availability of work for migrant workers. As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, work availability can decline rapidly according to the job environment. Finally, Bangladesh has faced difficulty in attracting foreign direct investment, which is key for sustainable growth. According to the World Bank, Bangladesh does not perform well in terms of compliance, quality, and reliability, which it considers to be essential for attracting foreign investment.27
The solution to these issues lies in attracting foreign direct investment, which would expedite the process of diversification into more complex products and decrease Bangladesh’s reliance on remittances, but this might be difficult given the political circumstances of the nation. This is because the act of silencing dissent, as the current government has done, often gives way to corruption and cronyism. News outlets may fear to report on suspicious practices, providing those willing to cozy up to the government countless opportunities to find protection despite not necessarily following ethical standards. With such great inequities in the system, the country risks losing all reliability, warding off foreign direct investment, and threatening to stunt the momentum that Bangladesh has accomplished in its economy.
There is already evidence that demonstrates that such inequities exist in the current system. While the Awami League has been silencing its opposition, the party has simultaneously been providing its cronies with various benefits. Those with close ties to the party are easily able to secure bail, even for serious crimes, and are almost guaranteed to win if a case were to go to court. Moreover, the tax code is skewed in favor of rich and well-connected individuals, even though it is intended to depend on consumption rather than wealth. Corruption is so rampant in the nation that Transparency International gave Bangladesh a score of 26 out of 100 in its Corruption Perception Index in 2020, a measure that indicates the level of corruption within the public sector.28
Economic data is beginning to reflect these inequities. The wealth gap has been exceptionally exacerbated by corruption under the Awami League, providing additional evidence that the economy is in jeopardy under the party. Between 2010 and 2016, the income of the richest households increased by a quarter, whereas the poorest household found theirs to decrease by a third.29 Large wealth gaps not only inhibit social mobility and equal opportunity but are also indicative of health and social problems. Nations that have severe class disparities also experience inequalities in public health and education, as these resources are more readily available to the rich than the poor.
Wealth disparity is also associated with lower GDP growth rates in the long term. It is estimated that corruption knocks off an average of two percentage points from Bangladesh’s GDP growth every year.30 Considering the Awami League’s tight grasp on the government and the unjust practices it has utilized to maintain this power, cronyism can only be expected to worsen, leading to greater inequality and larger losses to Bangladesh’s growth.
Democratic Backsliding in Asia
The phenomenon of declining democracy is not limited to Bangladesh, however. This event seems to be a part of a larger trend observable in democracies throughout Asia. While Asia experienced widespread democratization during the 1980s and 1990s, the region has experienced an apparent shift away from democracy and towards rising authoritarianism in recent years. Even while general support for democracy and democratic principles continues to be high, forces such as inequality and elite corruption, domestic polarization, and restrictions on civil liberties are affecting democratic institutions in many contemporary Asian democracies.31
As seen in Bangladesh, rising wealth in countries such as Malaysia and South Korea has been accompanied by inequality and corruption. Not only has this led to a decay in the perceived legitimacy of democratic institutions throughout the Indo-Pacific, but it has also encouraged a rise in populist leaders that undermine democratic principles to consolidate power. Domestic polarization is also not limited to Bangladesh. Throughout Asia, polarization is observable across religious, ethnic, and political lines, which has increasingly been used by national leaders for their own political advantages. Lastly, civil liberties, such as freedom of assembly, formation of civil society organizations, religious institutions, and freedom of the press, have been heavily restricted.32 A 2018 study of the civil society sustainability in nine Asian democracies, which included Bangladesh, found that all similarly had recently passed restriction laws on the formation of new NGOs, arrested local activists, and had placed tight restrictions on freedom of speech.33
This trend is a serious cause for concern for democracy in Asia. Because democratic backsliding has been gradual rather than sudden, it often fails to ignite a call to action from the general public.34 Furthermore, this phenomenon occurs where opposition forces are already weakened by the party in power, which makes it increasingly difficult to gather a majority and fight back against the controlling party. For Bangladesh, this puts at stake not only the rights of its citizenry but also its economic development. The lack of available options to oppose the Awami League means that the Bangladeshi people may completely lose a voice in their government. Simultaneously, if power continues to consolidate under the current government, this leaves the nation’s economic development in grave danger of reversal.
Conclusion
Once dubbed a ‘basket case,’ Bangladesh has dramatically improved its prospects and seen incredible economic achievements for several years. Though the economy has incredible potential, the government’s shift towards authoritarianism leaves the future of Bangladesh’s development extremely vulnerable. Intense political competition between the Awami League and the BNP has produced continuous violations of democratic ideals, a pattern that has now become standard in their fight for political power. This has opened the door for immense corruption, a direct indicator of long-term economic contraction. Furthermore, because Bangladesh’s growth is not yet sustainable, a slide towards authoritarianism means that their economic successes are likely to be reversed. If the government proceeds to undermine its democracy in favor of bolstering the political elite without allowing any space for opposition voices, this will almost certainly come at the expense of all of its economic achievements and future development.
Endnotes:
1. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.
2. Vaishali Basu Sharma. “Bangladesh’s Economy: What Did It Do Differently To Ride Out the Pandemic?” The Wire, July 18, 2021, https://thewire.in/south-asia/bangladesh-economy-pandemic-gdp.
3. Kaushik Basu. “Why Is Bangladesh Booming?” The Brookings Institution, May 1, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/why-is-bangladesh-booming/.
4. “The World Bank in Bangladesh: Overview.” The World Bank, October 3, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview#1.
5. Sahid Yusuf. “Bangladesh: Growth Miracle or Mirage?” Center For Global Development, June 16, 2021, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/bangladesh-growth-miracle-or-mirage.
6. “Bangladesh’s Growth Has Been Remarkable, But Is Now At Risk.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/03/27/bangladeshs-growth-has-been-remarkable-but-is-now-at-risk.
7. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.
8. Kaushik Basu. “Bangladesh at 50.” The Brookings Institution, March 26, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/bangladesh-at-50/.
9. Jason Beaubien. “They Pump $15 Billion A Year Into Bangladesh’s Economy — But At What Cost?” NPR, June 3, 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2019/06/03/722085193/they-pump-15-billion-a-year-into-bangladeshs-economy-but-at-what-cost.
10. Sahid Yusuf. “Bangladesh: Growth Miracle or Mirage?” Center For Global Development, June 16, 2021, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/bangladesh-growth-miracle-or-mirage.
11. “Background Note: Bangladesh.” U.S. Department of State, August 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm.
12. “Bangladesh.” U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/bangladesh/74099.htm.
13. “Background Note: Bangladesh.” U.S. Department of State, August 2008, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm.
14. ibid.
15. ibid.
16. “Bangladesh Election: PM Sheikh Hasina Wins Landslide in Disputed Vote.” BBC, December 31, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46718393.
17. “Bangladesh Ends Caretaker Government Arrangement.” BBC, June 30, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13973576/.
18. “Bangladesh Election Violence Throws Country Deeper Into Turmoil.” The Guardian, January 6, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/06/bangladesh-election-violence-awami-league.
19. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.
20. ibid.
21. “Bangladesh: New Digital Security Act Imposes Dangerous Restrictions on Freedom of Expression.” Amnesty International, September 20, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/bangladesh-new-digital-security-act-imposes-dangerous-restrictions-on-freedom-of-expression/.
22. “Bangladesh: Repeal Abusive Law Used in Crackdown on Critics.” Human Rights Watch, July 1, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/01/bangladesh-repeal-abusive-law-used-crackdown-critics#.
23. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.
24. K. Anis Ahmed. “Bangladesh’s Choice: Authoritarianism or Extremism.” The New York Times, December 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/opinion/bangladesh-election-awami-bnp-authoritarian-extreme.html.
25. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.
26. ibid.
27. Gladys Lopez-Acevedo and Raymond Robertson. “Stitches to Riches? Apparel Employment, Trade, and Economic Development in South Asia.” The World Bank., https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/publication/stitches-to-riches-apparel-employment-trade-and-economic-development-in-south-asia.
28. “Bangladesh.” Transparency International, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/bangladesh#.
29. “As It Turns 50, Bangladesh Is Doing Well, Despite Its Politicians.” The Economist, March 27, 2021, https://www.economist.com/asia/2021/03/27/as-it-turns-50-bangladesh-is-doing-well-despite-its-politicians.
30. ibid.
31. Lindsey W. Ford and Ryan Hass. “Democracy in Asia.” The Brookings Institution, January 22, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-in-asia/.
32. ibid.
33. ibid.
34. Nancy Bermeo. On Democratic Backsliding: Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (2016): 5-19. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0012.
