Home Authoritarianism
Category

Authoritarianism

AuthoritarianismEconomicsEuropeFeaturedGeopoliticsHuman RightsInternational TradePrint ArticleThe International EconomyUncategorized

Why Liberal Internationalism Can Survive a Global Rise in Autocracy

written by Annabelle Werner

“Will we apply and strengthen the core tenets of the international system, including the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as we seek to shape the emergence of new technologies and deter new threats? Or will we allow those universal principles to be trampled and twisted in the pursuit of naked political power?”

In his first speech before the UN General Assembly, President Biden acknowledged his administration’s sustained commitment to a rules-based order. He affirmed that the fundamental international legal doctrines created in the post-World War II era are not rendered obsolete by the passage of time, “new technologies” or recent grabs for power. Yet Biden’s declaration of support for the international system is far from accepted in the international relations community. In fact, the liberal international order (LIO) is coming under more fire than ever. Because while theorists agree that the world is collectively experiencing democratic decline, scholars and practitioners want to know: can liberal internationalism survive this global rise in autocracy?

According to Freedom House, 2021 was the 15th straight year of an overall rise in global autocracy and the worst single year of democratic deterioration.1 The “overall rise” occurs when more states experience a decrease in democracy than an improvement. This translates to nearly 75% of the world’s population living in a state that experienced democratic backsliding in 2020.2

It is widely accepted that 2020’s drastic deterioration occurred because of state leaders using emergency measures regarding COVID – 19 to postpone elections, indefinitely expand executive power, and erode democratic institutions. Few states were spared in the rise of populism as both struggling democracies like Hungary and secure governments like the United States both felt their democratic safeguards tested. The upcoming Freedom House reports will most likely measure whether political officials relinquish some of this emergency power. But while COVID – 19 may explain the rise in autocracy in 2020, there have still been years of democratic decline before it. Many theorists are claiming that the liberal international order is failing to prevent such decline, and it will not survive further changes in international hierarchy, such as the rise of China.

In order to tackle this argument, let’s first define what the liberal international order is, and what it is not. The LIO is a rules-based system defined by the essential, universal principles of human rights as well as political and economic liberalization that was established following World War II. Many international organizations and treaties were founded on these principles in the post-1945 era. Yet it is key to mention a fundamental idea developed by Professors Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Stephanie C. Hofmann: not anyone international organization defines the entirety of the rules-based order – organizations can come and go as long as the fundamental principles of the LIO remain the same.3 It is also important to understand that the organizations created in the name of these principles were created by and for a handful of western states left after the end of WW2, thus they were designed to facilitate diplomacy between only a few state actors. Thus, it seems only natural for the organizations themselves to change over time in reaction to new events, phenomena, and actors. As long as newly amended or created organizations are upholding the LIO’s key principles, these are to be considered changes within the LIO, not challenges to them.4

Since the post-1945 world, one can see how the LIO has survived developments in world politics. For instance, the post-World War II hierarchy shortly gave way to the bipolar world and international stalemates of the Cold War. And while the LIO and its various international organizations were able to survive the great power competition, many of its functions were blocked throughout this period. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the LIO was essentially run by the U.S. until 2001. This unipolar, U.S.-led system arguably provided stability as the LIO’s agencies and mechanisms functioned unencumbered by the interests of other powers. 

But the U.S.’s unipolar moment ended in 2001 after the attacks on the Twin Towers and President Bush’s declaration of the “War on Terror”. The ensuing failures of unilateral intervention in the Middle East soon became synonymous with the failures of the LIO. Other troubles arose, like the deadlock of the WTO, which has resulted in the stalling of the Doha Round for 20 years, and the deadlock of the UN Security Council (UNSC), which has resulted in the perpetuation of humanitarian disasters in Syria and Yemen. Furthermore, the nature of war has shifted: internal/civil conflicts are more common than state versus state conflicts, and now non-state actors as powerful players in international relations. These changes have brought into question whether the LIO and its structure operating with states as primary actors, can adapt to such new challenges. Some theorists are even questioning if the LIO ever truly existed in the first place.

Despite this laundry list of problems regarding the efficacy of liberal internationalism, the general disillusionment with its ability to quell the rise of autocracy, and the doubt that our rules-based system can live through a change in the international hierarchy like the rise of China, the LIO is not obsolete and can survive in the 21st century. Rather than abandon our core principles, lower our standards for the quality of life, and abandon the pursuit of sustainable development, I argue that the LIO can stave off this rise in autocracy. Although in order to do so, the international community needs to apply new, innovative mechanisms to actualize the LIO’s core principles of multilateralism, and its international organizations need to adapt to a broader view of global governance and the reality of a multipolar world. The good news? In some ways, these adaptions have already started.

Although the Doha Round has been stalled since 2001 due to conflicts between the US and China, trade liberalization and the average global lowering of tariffs have continued exceptionally well; the average world import tariff remains below 5% (as of 2019).5 Economist Richard Baldwin argues that this is due to the increase in bilateral investment treaties and regional trade agreements (RTAs), which are innovative adaptions to a world that is far more globalized and complex than the one that existed at the conception of the WTO in 1995; he argues that such complex and nuanced solutions will be a part of the future multilateralism in the global economy.6 And while we still need to work with and reform the WTO in order to actualize its benefits, such as its dispute settlement body, we can pair this necessary reform with utilizing other innovative, solutions to promote key principles of the LIO: multilateralism and economic liberalization. And while we will still have yet to see the outcome of the current trade war between the US and China, I mention these localized adaptions to argue that despite the trade war, tariffs globally have been kept low. Thus, these aforementioned adaptations and suggested reforms can occur within the rules-based order despite periods of great power contention and stalemates between powerful actors.7

Another application of Sangiovanni and Hofmann’s theory to the WTO can be explored through the transition from the GATT (the former tariff lowering practice) to the very creation of the WTO in 1995. The WTO was created in order to adapt to the end of the Cold War as well as better incorporate so many of the newly decolonized states at the end of the 20th century. This development occurred without the claims that the end of the LIO was upon us, thus showing how there have been historical changes in our international economic systems within the liberal international order in order to adapt to new events. And while it is important to mention that agreements like RTAs could be used to facilitate protectionist policies, they also have the potential to “pave the way for deeper multilateral integration”.8 OCED describes RTA’s as having the ability to establish “deep and comprehensive market integration” while covering pressing issues such as intellectual property and environmental regulation.9 In summation, as long as the LIO’s key principles like economic liberalization and multilateralism are being actualized (which can be measured by analyzing tariff rates), the prominence of regional agreements should not be used as evidence that the end of LIO is here.

While innovative adaptations are already happening, our international organizations themselves still need to adjust to a multipolar international hierarchy. The reality is that we are no longer in a world that operates at the will of U.S. hegemony, and our current IO’s are struggling to operate because they were designed around an essentially unipolar world. They also face significant bureaucratic red tape in the pursuit of any reform. If some of the LIO’s structures can be amended to reflect an expanded system of global governance, and its mechanisms are better equipped to learn from their own shortcomings, the LIO can propel a recession of autocracy without reconceptualization or a retreat from our principles. 

One area that needs such reform is the UN Security Council. The P5 shaped the Security Council to reflect the victors of WW2, and it doesn’t even include a single state from South America, Africa, or Southeast Asia. The UNSC has been deadlocked, even during genocides, leading to a failure to halt such atrocious crimes. But an expanded and reformed Council could include more world powers and reforms such as where “permanent members shall not exercise the right to veto in the event of mass atrocities”, which is an idea proposed by a P5 member themselves, France.10  The stakes regarding the UNSC reform are particularly high as this is the only international mechanism that can legally sanction the use of force, which is one of the most powerful functions of the international community.

Yet the stakes are also high for many issues we face in the 21st century, and success cannot be achieved by regression to unwavering reverence to state sovereignty: we cannot simply give up on the principles or current mechanisms of liberal internationalism. Global pandemics and climate change do not occur in vacuums that individual states can solve on their own. Large swaths of our planet will become uninhabitable due to rising temperatures and sea levels, and massive levels of migration are inevitable. Resorting to isolationism and dismissing the fundamental principles of the LIO will only lead to more suffering. Accepting the inevitability of conquest and war will only lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. The only sustainable solutions to collective action problems will involve the just principles of equality and collaboration defined in a rules-based order.

So, if there’s broad consensus that the world is inevitably moving towards a multipolar world, shouldn’t we also ask ourselves what the benefit could be to 1) having our international organizations match the current international hierarchy and 2) having a multipolar world that also falls along the with LIO? Because couldn’t “a multifaceted world order based on complex and polycentric governance arrangements among a wider community of national governments, international organizations and non-state actors” better lead to more accountability and efficacy in our diplomatic practices? 

Overall, instead of rejecting the LIO on the grounds that it has failed to quell a rise in autocracy, we should focus on adapting these institutions to a world that is no longer unipolar while ensuring that our principles remain the same. Because it is not our guiding principles of equality, peace, and multilateralism that have allowed for autocracy to develop, but rather a lack of reform that has hindered our global governance and accountability mechanisms from being used, or for being used as vehicles to serve other interests. Ultimately, the LIO can outlast this rise in autocracy. But in order to tackle these modern dilemmas, we need to apply nuanced solutions and update our structures to fit the modern international arena while upholding the principles of the rules-based order.

Endnotes:

1. “Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy Under Siege.” Freedom House, 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege.

2. ibid.

3. M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and S.C. Hofmann. “Is the Liberal International Order in a state of terminal decline?” London School of Economics, January 7, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/07/is-the-liberal-international-order-in-a-state-of-terminal-decline/.

4. ibid.

5. “International Trade in Goods – tariffs. International trade in goods – tariffs – Statistics Explained.” Eurostat, July 21, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_goods_-_tariffs.

6. R. Baldwin. “The World Trade Organization and the future of multilateralism.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2016, 30(1), 95-116.

7. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Stephanie C. Hofmann. “Of the contemporary global order, crisis, and change,” Journal of European Public Policy, 2020, 27:7, 1077-1089, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1678665.

8. “Regional Trade agreements,” OECD, https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/regional-trade-agreements/. 

9. ibid.

10. “Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères,” France and the United Nations, France Diplomacy – Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/.

11. M. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and S.C. Hofmann. “Is the Liberal International Order in a state of terminal decline?” London School of Economics, January 7, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/01/07/is-the-liberal-international-order-in-a-state-of-terminal-decline/.

February 16, 2022 0 comment
0 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
AuthoritarianismEconomicsEuropeFeaturedNational SecurityPrint ArticleRussiaUncategorizedVladimir Putin

Why Angela Merkel’s Tenure has Emboldened Authoritarians

written by Andreas Papoutsis

Angela Merkel has often been likened to the replacement leader of the free world in the absence of active American leadership, particularly during the isolationist years of the Trump administration. Logically, her departure from the international stage is considered an imminent loss for the prosperity and security of the free world, though her legacy on the international stage should not be remembered fondly by those who truly support global democracies. Despite the occasional victory notched for neighboring democracies or domestic German society, Merkel’s legacy as a diplomat should be defined by the several inconsistencies in the values she chose to defend and the failures she has notched when standing up to autocrats.

Despite a whopping 16 years spent in office as the German Chancellor, Merkel has failed to raise German defense spending to the 2% of GDP threshold as required by NATO doctrine, instead of shrugging off the disregard for defense expenditures as a matter that should not be the worry of NATO allies. She will have left public office with a military budget that amounts to a meager 1.36% of the country’s GDP in 2019 before the pandemic-induced recession led to a sharp downtick in GDP that raised the figure to 1.57% in 2020.1 Indifference to defense expenditures has forced the issue of foreign NATO missions to be disproportionately shouldered by other allies such as the United States. The issue of German defense spending has also left Europe in a strategically vulnerable position in the face of a revanchist Russian adversary in Vladimir Putin, whom she has seemingly cozied up to. What meaningful military response can be taken by Berlin in the event that the Kremlin’s juggernaut military invades Finland or Ukraine? At this point, the answer is clear: hardly anything of consequence. If Putin’s 2014 invasion of Crimea or repeated scares of Russian military buildup along Europe’s borders isn’t convincing enough of the very real possibility of an attack orchestrated by Moscow, we could simply turn to the leaders of Russia’s neighboring democracies, who constantly warn of the threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship.2

Perhaps one of the most disruptive and troublemaking authoritarian governments in the world, Russia has relied largely on its oil economy to project power and support the financial needs of its military proliferation. Amid a decline in European demand for fossil fuels, the Kremlin has been handicapped by a changing energy environment. Where would the Kremlin possibly find a lifeline? Perhaps from like-minded authoritarian governments such as the one seen in Beijing? Contrary to what logic would dictate, the helping hand was instead extended by Germany under the leadership of Angela Merkel, against the wishes of close allies such as the United States and the frantic warning of Eastern European countries like Ukraine.3 No amount of diplomacy, sanctions, or common sense could convince Germany otherwise of completing the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline despite its blatantly conspicuous strategic repercussions.

Trying to rationalize such a decision by pointing out political technicalities or lauding economic conveniences simply implies an apathetic attitude towards NATO security and laziness when configuring Germany’s energy structure. Even when Alexei Navalny was intentionally poisoned by the Kremlin for being an anti-corruption advocate, Berlin responded with inconsequential statements and sanctions that ignored the crown jewel of Putin’s objective in Europe: the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline.4 Norbert Roettgen, the conservative party’s leader on the German foreign affairs committee, correctly assessed the seriousness of the situation by suggesting Germany, “must pursue hard politics, we must respond with the only language Putin understands – that is gas sales.”5 Despite calls from several Western countries and numerous politicians within her own country, Merkel decided against implicating the pipeline in any response levied by Germany. 

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas merely questioned and offered hollow consternation surrounding the future of the project in the aftermath of the Navalny poisoning, essentially demonstrating to one of the world’s most notorious authoritarians that his efforts to snuff out and assassinate pro-democracy advocates was entirely acceptable by Berlin’s standards.6 Germany seemed more enraged by American sanctions against the project than the assassination attempt undertaken by the Kremlin. Merkel instead figured that the wishes of her democratic allies were secondary to the desires of Vladimir Putin and the misconceived economic expediency he offered.

The decision to finalize the pipeline despite the Navalny poisoning now puts Ukraine and several other European partners at risk, as Kiev fears that Moscow could once again cut off oil supply to the region in an attempt to punish or coerce neighboring democracies. There does not even appear to be a surefire guarantee that implementation of the pipeline would be able to increase the volume of oil transported to Europe; we only know for certain that it would change the source of said oil. Likewise, neighboring Poland finds itself incredibly vulnerable and downright shocked in this situation, since repairs to the Ukrainian-Polish pipeline would have been significantly cheaper than the construction of the Nord-Stream 2.7 Since the pipeline will run through the Baltic Sea, NATO allies in the area should expect additional Russian naval assets in the region, an opportunity that Moscow will surely take advantage of to intimidate its neighbors.

All of the details and nuances of the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline, however, can be boiled down to a simple rhetorical question: why would Merkel want a sizable share of Germany’s energy supply to be in the hands of one of the world’s most notorious enemies of democracy? Considering that disdain for the project emanated not just from allies, but from domestic German lawmakers and a wide array of members of Merkel’s own party, there is no valid justification. 

In recent weeks, the possibility of a Russian attack on Ukraine has grown. Despite a drawdown of troops along the Ukrainian border in April this year, Russian military assets have once again accumulated in the region, alarming officials in Kiev and causing many security officials from NATO countries to warn of an invasion. With over 100,000 troops in position, defense officials in Kiev project an attack before the end of the winter. Many American officials consider it a “high probability,” including Fiona Hill, who described Putin as “deadly serious” about commencing an incursion into Ukraine.8 In response to what could devolve into a major European war, Merkel has merely suggested imposing sanctions against the Kremlin. Levying sanctions against Moscow after allowing the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline to be constructed, however, seems like a rather hollow threat.

Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis expects the Kremlin to divert NATO’s attention away from Ukraine by fomenting unrest along the Polish border.9 Over the last few months, asylum seekers and migrants primarily originating from the Middle East have flooded the Polish border after being escorted by Belarusian security forces. Moscow has employed the strategy of attempting to create a refugee crisis within a NATO country by using the Belarusian government as a smuggler of vulnerable migrants. The predicament at the Polish border has been met with condemnation from Merkel, who rightly demonstrated solidarity with her counterparts in Warsaw. This solidarity, however, has not been consistently extended to other European democracies that have experienced similar hybrid attacks by authoritarian governments.

When standing up for European Union allies, Merkel has picked and chosen when to exhibit a commitment to democratic values. Merkel has often been perceived as the de facto leader (or co-leader alongside France’s Macron) of the European Union, especially with the departure of the United Kingdom. The Union’s mission statement includes promises of promoting peace, freedom, and security, yet it has been rendered virtually useless in acting on such promises in instances where Merkel’s leadership has deemed it as inexpedient, particularly as it relates to Turkey. For 47 years now, Ankara has militarily occupied the northeastern portion of Cyprus. Seventeen years ago, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union, which means that, for 17 years, a foreign nation has militarily occupied European territory with little to no backlash whatsoever from Berlin. Last summer, when Turkish warships were escorting oil surveying vessels in Greek and Cypriot waters, leading to a tense situation that nearly devolved into armed conflict between two NATO allies, Merkel framed the situation as if it were an incidental and natural dispute between two neighbors rather than an aggressive incursion of EU territorial waters. Instead of explicitly siding with a European partner and a country committee to good neighborly relations, Merkel chose neutrality, further emboldening the strongman residing in Ankara.

The aforementioned “hybrid attacks” that entail the intentional funneling of asylum seekers into a neighboring country to overwhelm their immigration infrastructure is a tactic that has been regularly utilized by Turkey when confronting neighboring democracies like Greece. In fact, many of the migrants attempting to cross the Polish border made their way to Belarus through Turkish flights to Minsk, which were eventually stopped once the European Union and the United States agreed to sanction third-country airlines involved in flying asylum seekers to Belarus.10

In March 2020, several thousands of migrants attempted to cross into Greece’s Evros region after President Erdogan announced he would allow their passage into the European Union despite no mutual agreement from the Greeks. The Turkish president’s intentions were clear: to threaten Greece with an unsustainable influx of migrants while unethically generating leverage to exact a more financially lucrative immigration agreement with the European Union. His efforts were successful in generating more financial assistance from the European Union, and although Merkel condemned Turkey’s actions as unacceptable, her government did little to enact any consequences.

While Turkey has grown increasingly authoritarian, both in how it operates domestically through Erdogan’s consolidation of power and in his militaristic foreign policy that threatens regional democracies, Merkel and her government have rewarded such behavior with new arms sales that include the transaction of new German submarines. The decision lends a strategic advantage for an authoritarian government in its aggression directed towards neighboring democracies. Her indifference on such matters also strengthens Ankara’s disdain for the democratic aspirations of its people, knowing that corruption and authoritarianism will result in little backlash from its longtime German partner.

No leader is perfect, not even some of history’s most respected figures, but Merkel’s vaunted reputation is largely based on the intentional ignorance of her shortcomings in defending global democracy. Her work as a domestic politician has received praise from vast ranges of German society, evidenced by her incredibly long tenure as German Prime Minister, but her work in the international community is not particularly impressive considering the urgency of challenging authoritarianism.

Merkel’s true legacy as a diplomat should instead reflect the inconsistencies in her values and the appeasement she demonstrated to some of the world’s most notorious dictators, the likes of which have utilized Merkel’s support to advance their objectives of consolidating power and tearing down democratic institutions within their own countries while simultaneously lashing out against neighboring democracies that are struggling to ensure the free world’s future. So, when it comes to defending democracy and confronting authoritarianism, Merkel’s record will forever be far from perfect.

Endnotes:

1. Leah Carter. “Germany reports record €53 billion in NATO defense spending.” Deutsche Welle News, February 2, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-reports-record-53-billion-in-nato-defense-spending/a-56491017.

 2. Micheal Phillips and James Marson. “Russian Aggression Spurs Neighbors to Rebuild Defenses.” Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-aggression-spurs-neighbors-to-rebuild-defenses-11609859853.

3. “Ukrainian ambassador calls Nord Stream 2 ‘a stab in Ukraine’s back’.” Ukrinform, March 11, 2021, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3344084-ukrainian-ambassador-calls-nord-stream-2-a-stab-in-ukraines-back.html.

4. “Russia responsible for Navalny poisoning, rights experts say.” United Nations News, March 1, 2021, https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1086012.

5. Madeline Chambers. “Germany pressed to rethink Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Navalny poisoning.” Reuters, September 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny-germany-nord/germany-pressed-to-rethink-nord-stream-2-pipeline-after-navalny-poisoning-idUSKBN25U0UF.

6. “Germany has alternatives if it abandons Nord Stream 2 over Russia tensions: Experts.” Alarabiya News, September 7, 2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/business/energy/2020/09/07/Germany-has-alternatives-if-it-abandons-Nord-Stream-2-over-Russia-tensions-experts.

7. Mark Temnycky. “The Security Implications of Nord Stream 2 for Ukraine, Poland, and Germany.” Wilson Center, March 17, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/security-implications-nord-stream-2-ukraine-poland-and-germany.

8. John Haltiwanger. “Putin is ‘deadly serious’ about neutralizing Ukraine, and has the upper hand over the West, former US diplomats and officials warn.” Business Insider, November 26, 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/puti-deadly-serious-about-ukraine-has-upper-hand-over-west-2021-11.

9. Lt. Col. Robert Maginnis. “Why it’s better than a 50-50 chance that Russia will attack Ukraine this winter.” Fox News, November 27, 2021, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/russia-attack-ukraine-winter-biden-putin-robert-maginnis.

10. Aykan Erdimir. “Swift trans-Atlantic action kept Turkey from fueling Belarus’ hybrid attacks,” DefenseNews, November 16, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/11/16/swift-trans-atlantic-action-kept-turkey-from-fueling-belarus-hybrid-attacks/.

February 7, 2022 0 comment
0 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
AuthoritarianismEconomicsFeaturedGlobalizationInternational TradePopulismPrint ArticleThe International Economy

The Free-Market Democracy Scam

written by Katherine Jones

“The Free-Market Democracy Scam” was originally published in our Fall 2021 Print Edition: Authoritarianism.

Our story starts in 2000, at the close of Bill Clinton’s second term in office. Clinton, a man who has been known to “see the world through rose-colored glasses,” saw a brighter, more democratic future for China.1 At the eleventh hour of his presidency, Clinton advocated the admission of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the sincere belief that an open and free economy would lead to prosperity, and that prosperity would gradually force an increase in civil liberties.2 History has unfolded quite differently, yet Clinton was not wrong to see a connection between free markets and democracy. 

Where he may have miscalculated is the way in which these phenomena relate- perhaps free markets destroy democracy rather than create it. Perhaps Clinton should have expected that the rise of China, the first genuine competitor to U.S. economic supremacy since WWII, would slowly diminish the relative economic power of the United States. The ensuing “race to the bottom” would force the U.S. to introduce economic reforms that would reduce standards of living in order for our economy to remain internationally competitive. Such reforms would have sociopolitical consequences including increasing Americans’ appetites for authoritarianism. When all was said and done, China’s free-market may have reduced Americans’ civil liberties rather than building up their own.

Free markets, Free Men?

Free markets and democracy exist not as compliments, but largely in opposition to each other. At their core, the motives that govern markets and democracy almost always directly contradict one another. Democracy seeks to find the best outcome for the majority, capitalism seeks to satisfy individual self-interest.3 Democracy relies on the principle that we are all equal, capitalism inherently produces inequality.4 Democracy can break down free markets through punitive redistribution and regulation. Free markets break down democratic systems through poverty and inequality. 

Every “free market democracy” relies on the fragile balance between the interests of citizens and corporations, with the pendulum swinging back and forth depending on the era’s prevailing economic theory. In 1950s America, the more “democratic” Keynesian system of regulation and social welfare was popular. This was an era of strong unions and a robust middle class. By the 1970s, economists such a Milton Friedman interpreted the success of the 1950s and 60s to be due to democracy and capitalism reinforcing one another.5 A more “free market” focused ideology came into vogue. This period was characterized by deregulation, financialization, and an increasing frequency and severity of financial crises. Since the 1970s, this trend has only continued to intensify.

In modern-day America, we have levels of inequality that rival the pre-WWI era, stagnating wages, a breakdown in labor unions, and large-scale political discontent.6 However, our domestic economy tells only a fraction of the story. All other Western liberal democracies have, to some extent, suffered a similar fate. Globalization would have deteriorated regulatory and social welfare frameworks even if strong national policies had been maintained.

Globalization’s Caused Much More Than Discontent 

Free-market globalization has contributed to a breakdown in democratic accountability and produced instead governments accountable to, and run by, corporations, banks, and international organizations.

International trade has insidiously contributed to the breakdown of democratic accountability, by forcing countries to undercut the needs and best interest of their own citizens, in favor of more competitive economic policies. Take for example the corporate tax rate: large corporations pay almost zero tax, however countries are often hesitant to raise their tax rate, as businesses may then choose to base themselves in another country with a lower corporate tax rate. This phenomenon   is further applicable to labor rights, environmental protections, and many other components of the “ease of doing business.” Within this framework, there are more extensive rights granted to corporations than to people with respect to free movement and migration, the movement of capital, law enforcement, and more. 

Countries grant these special rights and privileges to not only corporations but often to international organizations and banks as well. Such was demonstrated during the Euro crisis when all of the countries within the Eurozone were accountable to the European Union over their individual sovereign governments. This policy required the Germans to pay the debts of the Greeks, and the Greeks to undergo harsh austerity, despite that neither of these policies would have been democratically feasible in their respective countries.7 In addition, the very premise that the Northern European countries were bailing out “The Greeks” or “The Irish,” veils that everyday citizens were required to bail out international financial institutions, demonstrating nation’s loyalties to banks over citizens.8

In tandem with this, banks, corporations, and International Organizations have all contributed to the direct deterioration of democratic systems, particularly in the global south. Countries within the global south have less developed economies than countries in the global north. For the last several centuries “free markets” in the global north have been subsidized by the imposition of exploitative and extractive policies in their “colonies,” then former “colonies.” These policies have resulted in structures of economic and political dependence that encumber many countries in the global south from maintaining free and open democracies. As an illustration, let’s say there’s an election in Latin America, and Western banks may favor one candidate over the other. Voters essentially must choose to pick the banks’ candidate or choose to undergo a painful recession.9 Any “choice” is an illusion. 

The Allure of Authoritarianism

As the global economy continues to erode democracy, many countries shift towards the authoritarian model. Authoritarianism’s growth in popularity in recent years could be due to its perceived superior ability to ensure economic growth. Authoritarian governments can execute the most favorable economic policies without winning elections, compromising with opposition parties, or contending with unfortunate voter decisions (such as Brexit.) In many ways, these authoritarian regimes have experienced unprecedented success. A 2009 IMF study shows that economic growth in capitalist authoritarian nations averaged 6.28% over the previous 15 years, whereas growth only averaged 2.62% in liberal democracies.10 In addition, there are individual case studies, such the China, boasting growth rates as high as 19.3%, which make authoritarianism appear as a guarantor of success.11

The growth of authoritarianism speaks to countries, and perhaps people, valuing economic prosperity over freedom. For those that have never known either this deal with the devil may be worth the price, yet what about those that already have both?

To the Republic, for which it stands…

People like authoritarianism; even in Western Democracies. Political theorist Robert Kuttner warns that support for right-wing extremists in Western Europe is even higher today than it was in the nineteen-thirties.12 According to a 2021 study from the Morning Consult, 26% of Americans are in favor of right-wing authoritarianism.13 The increase in authoritarian sentiment seems to be linked to the failures of free-market globalization, particularly the decline in voter power and the growth of inequality. According to economist Dani Rodrik, the issues that draw supporters to populism (authoritarianism more palatable precursor) are the same on both sides of the aisle: voters are “anti-globalization, anti-free trade, anti-immigration, and anti-Wall Street,” though it usually manifests in opposing ways.14 Rodrik explains that “When mainstream politicians are unable to generate meaningful responses to inequality, social exclusion and insecurity, populists of various ilk gain ground.”15 However, what’s interesting, and sad, is that this feeling of powerlessness leads people to cede even more power to strongmen. And there is a precedent for democracies developing in authoritarian regimes. Take for example ancient Rome, Hitler in Weimar Germany, Chavez in Venezuela, Papa Doc in Haiti, Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Erdogan in Turkey, and many more. As Socrates stated, “tyranny is probably established out of no other regime than democracy.”16

Potential Solutions 

What can we do to save the world’s democratic capitalist system? There are more ways in which we can reimagine the relationship between our economic and political systems to produce more favorable outcomes. 

On the international scale, The most desirable, and perhaps most unrealistic solution would be to establish democratically accountable global regulatory bodies to effectively create a fair and even playing field. We currently have organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) constructed to fulfill this role, that have in some respects fallen short and may be improved by democratic accountability and enhanced enforcement power. We additionally have national organizations such as the Securities and Exchanges Commission that are relatively effective and would be valuable to be expanded on a global scale.

However, in reality, compliance on a global scale would be near impossible to achieve. Worldwide solutions, in general, will be difficult to implement; it is possibly more productive to put forward domestic solutions. 

If our problem is globalization, the natural reaction may be to tend towards isolation. Yet, complete isolation is not feasible in the modern world due to global issues including cyberattacks, pandemics, terrorism, and climate change. The closest examples we see to isolation are pariah states such as Iran and North Korea. However, the world, and the United States, may be ready for a period of American withdrawal. A 2019 poll shows that “a plurality of Americans want the country’s role in the world to shrink or end altogether.”17 An American retreat could allow for more resources to be directed to education, cybersecurity, and social welfare, all of which would likely aid our ailing democracy. On the other hand, a retraction is risky as it could damage alliances, leave a power vacuum, and allow us to fall behind other countries. 

Perhaps we should instead abandon democracy altogether to save global capitalism. There are relatively more attractive forms of authoritarianism such as technocracy that may allow for a smooth transition. We have already experienced a huge growth in independent agencies unaccountable to the voter, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC.18 This is potentially an interesting proposal in light of the many modern Americans who believe in ceding individual rights and freedoms for the collective good, for example removing the individual right to choose in terms of guns, abortions, or vaccines, for the sake of public health and safety. Should people give up the right to vote for the collective good? Should we all? 

Endnotes:

1. Joel Roberts. “Bill Clinton: The Optimist.” CBS News, June 25, 2004, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bill-clinton-the-optimist/.

2. Brian Stauffer. “When the World Opened the Gates of China.” Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-the-world-opened-the-gates-of-china-1532701482.

3. Wolfgang Merkel. “Is capitalism compatible with democracy?” Harvard University, July 26, 2014, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/mobilized_contention/files/merkel_-_is_capitalism_compatible_with_democracy.pdf.

4. ibid.

5. John Weeks. “Free Markets and the Decline of Democracy.” Open Democracy, July 18, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/free-markets-and-decline-of-democracy/.

6. Michael Hirsh. “Why Trump and Sanders Were Inevitable.” Politico, February 28, 2016, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/why-donald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-were-inevitable-213685/.

7. Joseph Stiglitz. The euro: how a common currency threatens the future of Europe. WW Norton & Company, Inc. 2016.

8. Wolfgang Streek. “The Crises of Democratic Capitalism.” New Left Review, September 2011, http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/StreeckNLR2011.pdf.

9. Joesph Stiglitz. “Decades of free market orthodoxy have taken a toll on democracy.” The Guardian, November 5, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/nov/05/decades-of-free-market-orthodoxy-have-taken-a-toll-on-democracy.

10. John Lee. “Western v. Authoritarian Capitalism.” The Diplomat, June 18, 2009, https://thediplomat.com/2009/06/western-vs-authoritarian-capitalism/.

11. “GDP growth (annual %)- China.” The World Bank, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN.

12. Caleb Crain. “Is Capitalism a Threat to Democracy?” The New Yorker, May 7, 2018,  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/05/14/is-capitalism-a-threat-to-democracy.

13. Cameron Easley. “U.S. Conservatives Are Uniquely Inclined Toward Right-Wing Authoritarianism Compared to Western Peers.” Morning Consult, June 28, 2021, https://morningconsult.com/2021/06/28/global-right-wing-authoritarian-test/.

14. Michael Hirsh. “Why Trump and Sanders Were Inevitable.” Politico, February 28, 2016, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/why-donald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-were-inevitable-213685/.

15. ibid.

16. Andrew Sullivan. “Democracies end when they are too democratic.” New York Magazine, May 1, 2016, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2016/04/america-tyranny-donald-trump.html.

17. Charles Kupchan. “Isolationism Is Not a Dirty Word.” The Atlantic, September 27, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/virtue-isolationism/616499/.

18. Yascha Mounk. “America is Not a Democracy.” The Atlantic, March 2018,  https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/03/america-is-not-a-democracy/550931/.

January 31, 2022 0 comment
1 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
AuthoritarianismEuropeFeaturedHistoryPrint Article

When in Rome: How the Romans Fell to Autocracy and Their Connection to Our World

written by Joshua Potter

“When in Rome: How the Romans Fell to Autocracy and Their Connection to Our World” was originally published in our Fall 2021 Print Edition: Authoritarianism.

In the wake of recent political events, there has been greater worry and focus on autocracies. Though there was an increase in democracies due to decolonization and the end of the Cold War in the 20th century, today 54% of the world’s population lives under an autocracy.1 This is not limited to small unstable states either, as larger, more established democracies are not as free as they once were.2 While this is concerning it’s not that surprising, as autocracies are one of the oldest forms of government around the world and will continue to exist. Even though every state  is different, there are general patterns that allow for an autocratic government to take over that can be traced to the first major autocracy, The Roman Empire. 

Altogether the term Autocracy can be traced back to the ancient Greeks in the 5th century, the Romans were the first major power in history to practice the system. It’s  a system of government where one man holds power. Also, they can happen in many ways; from a democratically elected ruler slowly taking control, instability within the nation, or through assassinations.3 Regardless of how autocrats obtain power, it’s important that they maintain the facade of the past state that they took over, in order to make the transition of power look legitimate and to create stability. This is why after decades of civil war and instability within the late Roman Republic, the victorious Octavian  did not disband the  Roman Senate, nor did he become Emperor immediately.4 Furthermore, only candidates loyal to Octavian were allowed to run, and all of this was done  to consolidate his power. Octavian made many good decisions to ensure his power, and he learned from the mistakes of his adopted father, Julius Caesar. 

By the year 45 BC, Julius Caesar had won the civil war and firmly established himself as the most powerful man in Rome. With no major political opponents left, Caesar worked quickly to test the limits of his power. He was declared Dictator Perpetuo (Dictator for life) and had almost unlimited power.  In addition, he wore purple-the color of royalty, had a special “chair” in the senate building that was just for him, and would be dead the following year.5 These major changes scared the Roman senate and they were worried that he would declare himself king.  The Roman Republic had been around since 509 BC and was strongly against the idea of a monarchy, and this contributed to his assassination.6 Due to these events, Octavian,  having seen the short-sighted decisions of his uncle, took over two years to declare himself emperor in 27 BC  after winning the second civil war in 29 BC.  He went through  great lengths to increase his powers “legally” by making the senate that he controlled grant him absolute power. Another one of his ideas was  the reformation of the Praetorian Guard. During the days of the republic, the Guards’ purpose was to protect Roman Generals. However, Octavian changed them into his personal bodyguards. They did much more than this though and often acted as secret police, through intimidation, conducting arrests and executions.7 The Guards’ existence was paradoxical, as they both protected the emperor and were his biggest threat as only they could carry weapons inside the  pomerium (capital). Due to this, they received better pay than other units.  Through this period in time, we see the first historical example of keeping the appearance of a republic intact in order to further the pursuits of an autocratic government, and this is one of the most common forms of government today.8

The Romans showed that stability and the appearance of representative government were essential after a power struggle. President Erdogan of Turkey is one of the few that have pulled this feat off. The modern state of Turkey came into existence after the end of World War One, with its leader Kemal Ataturk pushing for a secularist and industrialized state. However, Erdogan has been using Islamic rhetoric since the 1990s.9 Due to this, he became  Prime Minister in 2003 and drew controversy in 2014. He was elected President, which was a ceremonial role, but then took the powers of prime minister, making him the undisputed  leader of Turkey. However, he almost lost power in 2016 as there was an attempted coup by his generals. This coup resulted in the deaths of 240 people, and in 2017 a referendum was  passed to drastically increase Erdogan’s power.  Once the extra powers were passed to him, his journey to an autocrat was officially complete. Another more well-known example of this changing power dynamic can be seen with Vladimir Putin and the Russian state. 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Republic was devastated throughout the ‘90s and Boris Yeltsin had to pick a successor for President. He picked Putin, the former KGB operative and current prime minister in late 1999, and he won a democratic election the following year. He was able to get the oligarchs on his side, won reelection in 2004, and was appointed prime minister in 2008. In 2012  Putin won a controversial election for president and was accused of voter fraud, and the legality of a third term was questioned as well.10 From this point on Russia’s rise to autocracy was complete. When analyzing all these examples, it’s clear that all three rulers were able to capitalize off of political instability to secure their political positions. Furthermore, they did not drastically change society so that their opponents did not oppose them in any significant way. They have also entrenched themselves so deeply in their states that it would be very difficult to remove them through legal means. When people do try to change the status quo, these rulers are quick to unleash state power. 

Political violence was very common in Rome during the end of the late republic, with senators and politicians being threatened or outright murdered. The most obvious example of this was with Caesar, but there are many other examples during this period. Rome had this tradition of proscriptions, which is where the government puts out a list of names, and each person listed is an enemy of the state. If someone that was proscribed was killed, the person that killed them would be allowed to confiscate some of their property.11 This was a brutal affair, and its purpose was two-fold, as it allowed rulers to kill political dissents, as well as gain valuable property for their own benefit. There were also purges, but many, including Caesar, tried to avoid this due to its destructive nature. In cases where Roman rulers wanted to avoid bloodshed, citizens had the choice to be banished.12  if they wanted to avoid forced labor or death. The concept of prison was not normalized, but when comparing the past and present the same principles of preserving political power are applied.  While most autocracies do not have the same extreme methods as the Romans did, many autocracies today imprison or commit violence against political prisoners so that they are not a threat to the current regime.  

Currently, we see similarities between the past and present of autocracies today. Turkey in July 2016 had an attempted coup, and hundreds of  activists, politicians, journalists,  and others are being held due to suspected links to terrorist organizations, regardless of how flimsy the evidence is.13  Not only is this a potential human rights violation, but due to the pandemic, many of those imprisoned are at risk. Furthermore, President Erdoğan has a personal security detail called Turkey’s Presidential Security Department (TPSD). This department spent $35.9 million last year  for his protection, which is more than double what the whole parliament of Turkey received after the events of 2016.14 The TPSD has also been involved in numerous acts of political violence. One infamous event was when they attacked anti-Erdogan protestors in D.C.15   We are now seeing similar events happening in Russia. Currently, there  are around 400 political prisoners throughout the country, and likely there are many more.16  In addition, at the start of 2021, there were major protests around the country because Alexei Navalny (a prominent opposition politician)  was arrested. This resulted in five thousand people being arrested, the restriction of freedom of movement, and increased the risk of covid-19 for many people throughout the country.17  Autocracies have either been punishing, imprisoning, or killing political prisoners for thousands of years, and some of the earliest examples in history can be traced  back to the fall of the Roman Republic. There was also the issue of bribery and corrupt officials. 

During the late republic, corruption was widespread. Though bribery was illegal it was practiced by almost every senator except for Cato, one of Caesar’s major political rivals. It was not until 171 B.C. that the first bribes were recorded.18 This was due to the state nearly being bankrupt after the Punic Wars, and wealthy citizens realized they could gain influence if they loaned the government money. As the republic grew through conquest, the need for money increased, and this only exacerbated the issue. From 67 BC to 50 BC, (the civil war started in 49 BC) there were major incidents of bribery every year, and it was no secret.19 It would be foolish to say that corruption started with the Roman republic, but it’s the first time that we see a major republic tearing itself apart due to corruption and leading to a new government. 

There is some form of corruption within every country on earth, and it is found most frequently in autocratic states. Since the fall of the Soviet Union,  Russians have made billions from corruption within the state that the government pays little attention to.20 This can contribute to an ever-widening wealth gap between the rich and poor, where the autocracy can further its control of the state. There is also widespread corruption within both the public and private sections of Turkey.21 In autocracies, it’s difficult to stop corruption, and it can lead to an increase in suffering. This is just another unfortunate link between past and present. 

While many may not think about the Roman republic when discussing the autocracies of today, both possess corruption and attacks on political dissent, as well as a need to consolidate power so they are not overthrown. While history doesn’t repeat itself  it certainly rhymes, and by looking at the past maybe it’s possible to find answers for the future. 

Endnotes:

1.Shelley Inglis et al. “Autocrats in the 21st Century Aren’t like Past Dictators – Just Look at Putin.” ThePrint, April 11, 2021, https://theprint.in/world/autocrats-in-the-21st-century-arent-like-past-dictators-just-look-at-putin/637577/. 

2. “Autocratization Surges–Resistance Grows .” V-Dem, March 2020, https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/de/39/de39af54-0bc5-4421-89ae-fb20dcc53dba/democracy_report.pdf.

3. Barbara Geddes, et al. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 12, no. 2, [American Political Science Association, Cambridge University Press], 2014, pp. 313–31, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43279909.

4. S, Alen. “Octavian Augustus Reign in Roman Empire (27 BC – 14 AD) – Principate.” Short History Website, February 22, 2019, https://www.shorthistory.org/ancient-civilizations/ancient-rome/octavian-augustus-reign-in-roman-empire-27-bc-14-ad/. 

5. Elizabeth Rawson. “Caesar’s Heritage: Hellenistic Kings and Their Roman Equals.” The Journal of Roman Studies, vol. 65, [Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies, Cambridge University Press], 1975, pp. 148–59, https://doi.org/10.2307/370068.

6. “Roman Republic.” National Geographic Society, July 3, 2018, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/roman-republic/.

7. Evan Andrews. “8 Things You May Not Know about the Praetorian Guard.” History.com, July 8, 2014, https://www.history.com/news/8-things-you-may-not-know-about-the-praetorian-guard.

8. Jonathan Eaton. “The Praetorian Guard.” The Classical Review, vol. 64, no. 1, [The Classical Association, Cambridge University Press], 2014, pp. 234–36.

9. “Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey’s Pugnacious President.” BBC News, October 27, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679. 

10. Pamela Engel. “How Vladimir Putin Became One of the Most Feared Leaders in the World.” Business Insider, February 14, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/how-vladimir-putin-rose-to-power-2017-2.

11. Frank N. Magill, et al. “Life’s Work .” Dictionary of World Biography, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, Chicago, IL, 1998, pp. 1208–1209.

12. Reitzenstein Ronning. “The Development of Exile and Banishment from the Roman Republic to the Early Empire.” The Development of Exile and Banishment from the Roman Republic to the Early Empire – Ancient History – LMU Munich, https://www.en.ag.geschichte.uni-muenchen.de/research/exilium/index.html. 

13. “Turkish Court Jails Hundreds for Life over 2016 Coup Attempt.” The Guardian, November 26, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/nov/26/turkish-court-jails-hundreds-life-2016-coup-attempt.  

14. “Turkey Spent $35.9 Million to Protect Erdoğan in 2020 .” Turkish Minute, March 2, 2021, https://www.turkishminute.com/2021/03/02/ankara-spent-35-9-million-protect-erdogan-in-2020/.

15. Nicholas Fandos and Christopher Mele. “Erdogan Security Forces Launch ‘Brutal Attack’ on Washington Protesters, Officials Say.” The New York Times, May 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/turkish-embassy-protest-dc.html.

16. Vladimir Kara-Murza. “Opinion | Russia Has Hundreds of Political Prisoners in Geneva, President Biden Can Help Free Some of Them.” The Washington Post, June 14, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/14/biden-putin-free-russian-political-prisoners/. 

17. Kgalalelo Gaebee. “Russia: Stop Violence against Peaceful Protesters.” CIVICUS Global Alliance, February 1, 2021, link unavaliable.

18. Howard Troxler. “Electoral Abuse in the Late Roman Republic.” Digital Commons, April 2, 2008, https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1536&context=etd.

19. Andrew Lintott. “Electoral Bribery in the Roman Republic.” The Journal of Roman Studies, vol. 80, [Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies, Cambridge University Press], 1990, pp. 1–16, https://doi.org/10.2307/300277.

20. Anne Applebaum. “The Disturbing New Hybrid of Democracy and Autocracy.” The Atlantic, June 9 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/06/oligarchs-democracy-autocracy-daniel-obajtek-poland/619135/.

21. “Turkey Corruption Report.” GAN Integrity, November 5, 2020, https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/turkey/.

January 24, 2022 0 comment
1 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest
AuthoritarianismEuropeFeaturedGeopoliticsPrint ArticleRussiaUnited States

Bulgaria’s Rising Autocrats and Their EU Enablers

written by Manon Snyder

“Bulgaria’s Rising Autocrats and Their EU Enablers” was originally published in our Fall 2021 Print Edition: Authoritarianism.

Whereas Poland and Hungary have taken a front seat in 2021 autocracy news, Bulgaria, alongside other Balkan nations, has been quietly slipping back into autocracy itself, at a less noticeable but nonetheless important pace. Bulgaria’s Democracy Score declined from 4.61 to 4.54 during 2019.1 The numerical decline can specifically be attributed to the decline in the electoral process rating (from 5.75 to 5.50) and the independent media rating (from 3.75 to 3.50). Bulgaria is slowly undoing the democratic progress it has made since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.2 Several trends indicate democratic deterioration: an unreliable legal system, illegal seizures of territories on its borders, top party officials who threaten businesses to rob Bulgarians of aid package money, police brutality towards protestors, and the continuing oppression of journalists and free press are chief culprits.3

Why has this decline been occurring? Bulgaria suffers from high levels of corruption stemming from the recycling of top officials from the Cold War period, with the most notorious example being ex-Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, who served as a bodyguard to Bulgaria’s last communist leader before climbing the civil service ranks.4 The corrupt judiciary is another major reason for the decline of democracy in Bulgaria: judges across the country frequently practice arbitrary judgment, and are easily bribed. At the highest level, Chief Prosecutor Ivan Geshev protects Borisov despite mounting evidence of his corruption and extortion.5 According to Hristo Ivanov, former justice minister turned leader of the anti-corruption Yes Bulgaria party, the judicial branch “has been weaponized for intra-oligarch turf wars and extortion of businessmen.”6

As Bulgaria’s government pushes the fragile boundaries of democracy, international liberal organizations which were partly instituted to ensure the proliferation of democracy after the Cold War are failing to hold parties accountable. Despite Borisov’s clear violations of democracy, abuses of power, and murky ties to over three hundred political deaths, Angela Merkel–as both the largest player in the European Union and as the German Chancellor–and the European People’s Parliament (EPP) continue to express their support of Borisov.7 Despite deepening internal turmoil and increasing reports of corruption and mafia-like behavior in its government, the EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism on judicial reform provided suspiciously “rosy reports” on Bulgaria, according to Ivanov.8 Given that there is little that citizens of Bulgaria can do to improve domestic judiciary problems, the EU’s inaccurate reports on Bulgarian rule-of-law make the problem difficult to subsequently remediate.

At the heart of Borisov’s apparent immunity to EU scrutiny are Angela Merkel and Borisov’s protectorate relationship. Borisov puts on a “golden boy”, pro-EU, anti-Moscow attitude, and in return Merkel, alongside the EPP, turns a blind eye to corruption in Bulgaria.9 Instead of holding the government accountable for their actions and condemning corruption in leadership, the EPP continues to funnel money into aid packages to alleviate poverty in Bulgaria, which the government, in turn, mishandles and partially pockets.10 Recently, a GERB party member used money from a hundred million euro EU aid package intended to help rural poverty to instead build himself a mansion. Despite proof of collusion, the former minister retains his house and remains free.11 The misuse of EU aid packages is causing many protests to erupt in the capital, Sofia, and throughout the country.12

This begs the question of how the EU is actually helping. Instinctively, aid packages may appear to help; however, because of rampant corruption, the aid is almost always mishandled.  The European Union’s strategy of pumping money into increasingly autocratic countries (see the EU’s COVID-19 packages to Hungary and Poland €5.6 and €7.4 billion euros respectively, in contrast to Italy’s €2.3 billion) while leaving too much discretion to the autocratic leadership of each country only enriches those anti-democratic leaders.13 What is behind the European Union’s moral paradox? The short-term benefit for the EU’s protection of autocratic regimes in Southern Europe is monetary: Germany, a creditor to southern European states, has made billions of dollars in interest off of loans to those countries during the ongoing eurozone debt crisis.14 Long-term, however, it is clear that empowering autocratic regimes can only corrode the European Union’s power and standing, and it would serve the EU to utilize the tools it has at its disposal to suspend bailout payments and aid packages to countries violating rule of law.

The murder of anti-corruption journalist Viktoria Marinova in 2018 demonstrates another consequence of enabling autocratizing regimes. Marinova covered corruption in the EU and Bulgaria, and her death, which is thought to have been politically orchestrated, sent the message that governments can silence independent media and get away with it.15 Bulgaria holds the lowest press freedom ranking in Europe, and the lack of a charge linking the Bulgarian government to Marinova’s murder further indicates how its flawed justice system enables media corruption.16 Even more alarmingly, international institutions are doing little concretely to effectively condemn and prevent further targeting of journalists. The European Commission has provided recommendations to ensure media safety, but they are non-binding, like many multinational legal frameworks. The protection of journalists’ lives, and thus the preservation of freedom of speech and the right to criticize one’s government, must go beyond teethless recommendations and half-hearted attempts at justice.

The European Union is perhaps Bulgaria’s last chance at backtracking on its mafia-like government and rampant corruption. Bulgaria’s citizens know; they protest in the hopes that other, more powerful governments than their own will hear and apply pressure accordingly. However, the EU has left the citizens of Bulgaria frustrated. If the Bulgarian government is able to chip away at the shell of a democracy which governs its state today, the slope to autocracy is slippery, as is the European Union’s ability to enforce its legal codes and recommendations across the board. “If the EU is unable to guarantee minimal standards of rule of law in a member state as weak…as Bulgaria, what is it good for?” points out Ivanov.17 As the expression goes, a parliament is only as good as its weakest link, and currently the weakest link—Bulgaria—is being wholly neglected.

As Bulgaria heads towards its third election, it is attempting to re-establish a ruling party which will address corruption and re-democratize. Severe divisions amongst the Bulgarian populace and a political system that allows room for a seemingly endless political tug-of-war is setting Bulgaria up for a power vacuum, which would likely allow a dictator-like figure to rise and continue to consolidate power in one party. In combination with widespread misinformation, Bulgaria’s electoral integrity has also been declining, showing little promise for a more democratic future.18

Autocratization in Bulgaria and Eastern Europe reflects a larger pattern of increasing autocratization globally.19 This autocratization is largely due to domestic failures, but if the international liberal institutions put in place to prevent nations from returning to autocracy and totalitarianism are not doing their job, what gives?

Endnotes:

1. Emilia Zankina and Boris Gurov. “Nations in Transit 2020: Bulgaria.” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/nations-transit/2020.

2. Nikolay Nikolov. “It’s been 30 years since the fall of communism, and now we’re all facing similar challenges.” Independent, November 10, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/bulgaria-communism-democracy-anniversary-brexit-trump-a9197126.html.

3. Christian Oliver. “How Bulgaria became the EU’s mafia state.” Politico, September 9, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-how-it-became-mafia-state-of-eu/.

4. “Bulgaria: At the Crossroads.” Al Jazeera English, August 19, 2021, Youtube video, 0:00 to 25:00, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mvjyh8Z-D4Q.

5. ibid.

6. Christian Oliver. “EU’s credibility is at stake over Bulgaria, says reformist leader.” Politico, August 10, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-hristo-ivanov-eu-credibility-at-stake/.

7. ibid.

8. “Commission reports on progress made in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.” European Commission, October 22, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6136.

9. Alexander Andreev. “Bulgarian prime minister is Brussels’ ‘golden boy’.” DW, May 26, 2016, https://www.dw.com/en/bulgarian-prime-minister-is-brussels-golden-boy/a-19285290.

10. Daniel Keleman and Jacob Soll. “The EU is undermining its democracies while funding its autocracies.” Politico, May 13, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/the-eu-is-undermining-its-democracies-while-funding-its-autocracies-coronavirus-covid19-rule-of-law/.

11. “Bulgaria: At the Crossroads.” Al Jazeera English, August 19, 2021, Youtube video, 0:00 to 25:00, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mvjyh8Z-D4Q.

12. Christine Milenova. “What the Bulgarian protesters mean by “EU, are you blind?” The Political Economy Review, November 26, 2020, https://medium.com/the-political-economy-review/what-the-bulgarian-protesters-mean-by-eu-are-you-blind-48caea04b6ba.

13. Daniel Keleman and Jacob Soll. “The EU is undermining its democracies while funding its autocracies.” Politico, May 13, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/the-eu-is-undermining-its-democracies-while-funding-its-autocracies-coronavirus-covid19-rule-of-law/.

14. ibid.

15. “Bulgarian journalist Viktoria Marinova killed in Ruse.” BBC, October 8, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45777948.

16. Emilia Zankina and Boris Gurov. “Nations in Transit 2020: Bulgaria.” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria/nations-transit/2020.

17. Christian Oliver. “EU’s credibility is at stake over Bulgaria, says reformist leader.” Politico, August 10, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-hristo-ivanov-eu-credibility-at-stake/.

18. Andrea Fumarola and Nikolay Marinov. “Bulgaria’s new voting reforms risk undermining the country’s electoral process.” London School of Economics, May 3, 2016, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/05/03/limiting-the-vote-from-abroad-erodes-bulgarias-democracy-evidence-from-the-electoral-integrity-project/.

19. Daniel Keleman. “Curing the virus of autocracy in Europe: Q+A with Daniel Keleman.” UCL Europe Blog, December 7, 2020, https://ucleuropeblog.com/2020/12/07/curing-the-virus-of-autocracy-in-europe-qa-with-daniel-kelemen/.

January 14, 2022 0 comment
0 Facebook Twitter Google + Pinterest