Russia

Europe Geopolitics Russia Security and Conflict Vladimir Putin

Will Putin Rescue Lukashenko from the Jaws of Death?

Authoritarian leader of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, is currently confronted with massive protests over accusations of winning a rigged election. Previously praised by Belarusians for bringing stability to their former Soviet republic, as Lukashenko enters his sixth consecutive term in office, Belarusians rallied by political challenger Svetlana Tikhanovskaya have demanded new, free and fair elections.

In response, an embattled Lukashenko announced that protesters would have to kill him first.

Mr. Lukashenko, often referred to as Europe’s last dictator, was elected in 1994 as part of Belarus’ first national election post-Soviet dissolution. A year after taking office, he won a questionable referendum that gave him the power to dissolve the legislature, and in the following year, created a legislature and judiciary subordinate to himself, essentially giving his decrees the force of law. As a result, except for the 1994 election, Belarusian democracy has not seen the light of day.

Not only did Lukashenko consolidate his power domestically early on, but he also sought closer ties with Russia. In 1999, Lukashenko and then Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a treaty intended to reintegrate the two nations by creating a confederation known as the Union State, in which the two nations would remain sovereign but would share a government. Although the date when full integration would occur was left unspecified, on a visceral level, the Belarusian flag and national seal had already been altered to reflect Soviet-era designs, borders were opened, and the Russian language was elevated, while Belarusian was suppressed. In the power-political arena, ‘oil was traded for kisses,’ as Russia granted Belarus significant energy subsidies to prop up its anemic economy, in exchange for its geopolitical loyalty as a strategic buffer against NATO.

However, let us get one thing straight: Belarus is not a Russian client state, at least not from Lukashenko’s perspective. He has long played Russia and NATO against each other, taking part in NATO programs to alleviate Western sanctions, while welcoming Russian assistance, much to Putin’s dismay. As a result, Belarusian-Russian relations have soured. The Union State remains unfulfilled, and as Lukashenko continues to demonstrate his willingness to stray from the Kremlin’s expectation that he be a willing Russian stooge, Putin’s frustration towards him has naturally increased.

For instance, concerning Russia’s ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Lukashenko has refused to side with Russia, citing Article 18 of the Belarusian Constitution, which stipulates Belarus’ goal of neutrality. In retaliation, Putin slashed subsidies, making their return contingent on the Union State’s fruition. Recently, Lukashenko has accused Russia of attempting to bully Belarus into full integration, and in July, Russian mercenaries were arrested in Minsk, accused by Lukashenko of being a part of a Kremlin plot to install Tikhanovskaya in power. However, Lukashenko’s accusations are nonsensical, since Tikhanovskaya herself opposes closer ties with Russia.

So why is Putin so interested in creating a Union State?

Previously, the fruition of the Union State would have created a new powerful leadership post, a position that Putin, who was barred by term limits from remaining as Russia’s President after 2024, could have filled legally, thereby exerting dominance over both nations. However, in July, Putin was able to win a questionable referendum, allowing him to skirt the term limit restriction and remain in power until 2036.

From a balance of power standpoint, his interest lies in creating a consolidated Russian Eurasia, a motive in line with Russia’s previous annexations of Crimea and Georgia. Consequently, having secured access to the Black Sea, Putin set his eyes on the Baltics and the strategic Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is cut off from Belarus, and by extension, the Russian mainland; by a narrow sliver of the Polish-Lithuanian border known as the Suwalki Gap. Should Putin attempt to forcefully ‘bridge the Suwalki Gap’ to reconnect Kalinigrad to the Russian mainland, Russian troops would have to travel through Belarusian territory. Therefore, such a scenario is contingent on Belarusian acquiescence, or Russian ability to ensure compliance through a unified government.

Regarding the Suwalki Gap, LTGEN (Ret.) Ben Hodges, former Commander of US Army Europe, asserts: “Deterring any potential action [by Russia] — or even the threat of action — against Suwalki is therefore essential for NATO’s credibility and Western cohesion.” Through a military Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics and Poland, NATO can reassure its defensive commitment while deterring Russia. On the other hand, should NATO fail to counter Russia’s move to ‘bridge the gap,’ such a scenario would drastically undermine NATO’s credibility to provide collective security, essentially rendering the alliance meaningless. This in turn, would invite further brazen Russian aggression. Therefore, the risk of Russia’ bridging the gap’ not only lies with the Baltics being cut off from the rest of NATO, but threatens the very existence of the organization itself; a possibility which no doubt entices Putin.

As part of EFP, the Trump Administration recently announced the redeployment of 1000 soldiers, and the relocation of V Corps Headquarters from Germany to Poland. In response, Lukashenko placed his military on ‘high alert,’ citing the ‘threat’ to Belarusian territorial integrity. According to Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, Lukashenko’s efforts are “to divert attention from Belarus’s internal problems … with totally baseless statements about imaginary external threats.”

As boasted by Belarusian state news media, Lukashenko was able to secure Putin’s promise that “comprehensive [military] assistance will be provided to “ensure the security of Belarus in the event of external military threats.” However, it is essential to note that this ‘comprehensive assistance’ falls under the premises of Belarus’ membership in The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led military alliance, and Putin has not explicitly expressed his endorsement of Lukashenko remaining in power if he cannot deliver on the Union State.

But the real question remains: Given the imminent risk posed to the Lukashenko, will Putin intervene in Belarus?

The short answer is, probably not, unless a change in Belarusian leadership involves an abrupt shift towards the West and away from Russia. The current spate of protests are primarily anti-Lukashenko and lack the anti-Russian sentiment present during the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. While Putin has leveraged hyper-nationalist ethnic Russian ‘compatriots abroad’ to undermine sovereignty in ex-Soviet Bloc nations in the past, given the existing semi-union, it is far less costly for Putin to achieve a Union State through soft power alone, rather than through military force. Therefore, if Putin chooses to send his ‘little green men’ to Belarus to prop up the existing government, Belarusian public opinion will turn solidly against Russia, viewing such an attempt as an effort to silence the voice of the people.

Having said that, should Tikhanovskaya continue to rise in popularity and place the possibility of a Union State in jeopardy, Putin’s best option would not be to intervene militarily, and certainly not to call for new elections (that Tikhanovskaya could win). Instead, he should attempt to back a transfer of power from Lukashenko to a member of the Belarusian elite, such as pro-Russian Viktor Babariko. Babariko, who intended to run for president in the 2020 Election, was arrested by Lukashenko in July. According to an unofficial internet poll conducted by popular Belarusian news site Tut.by, over half of respondents were ready to support Babariko over Lukashenko.

On the off chance that Putin chooses to intervene militarily and back Lukashenko, there is no doubt that he will expect Lukashenko’s full and unbridled cooperation towards achieving Belarusian-Russian integration. Putin certainly has not been subtle in signaling these wishes, recently telling Lukashenko: “I expect that your statesmanship will facilitate the further development of mutually beneficial Russian-Belarusian relations … as well as the further enhancement of cooperation within the Union State.”

Given his motivations, Putin’s cost-benefit calculus is no doubt firing on full cylinders. As a result, as events continue to unfold, one can only wonder if he will choose his course of action wisely, and if he does not; how NATO forces will counter if faced with a potential Suwalki Gap scenario.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

September 4, 2020 0 comment

China Global Health History Russia

Is Xi’s Coronavirus Gorbachev’s Chernobyl?

written by Taylor Fairless

On December 31st, the government in Wuhan confirmed they had been treating dozens of cases of an unknown virus. By January 20th, other cases of this pathogen appeared in the United States, South Korea, and Thailand. Three days later, President Xi Jinping closed off Wuhan when 570 more cases had been confirmed.

The initial, negligent handling of the coronavirus and official’s delayed response is analogous to the disasters that unfolded with the 1986 Chernobyl incident, and is severe enough that Xi should be worried.

At 1:23 a.m. on April 26, 1986, almost exactly thirty-four years ago today, a routine test of the Chernobyl nuclear power station located in Kiev, Ukraine caused control rods to enter into the nuclear core. This created an unprecedented power surge that blew the 1,000 ton roof off of the reactor and caused radiation to spill into the air for 10 days.

At 2 p.m. on April 27th, some 36 hours later, Soviet officials finally proclaimed there had been an accident and began evacuating citizens for a “temporary” restabilization period. All the while, radiation was spilling so quickly that air monitors 2,577 km away in Sweden detected large amounts of iodine-131 the day after the evacuation. Despite this, Soviet officials falsely stated that “everything is under control.” People unknowingly carrying radiation on their bodies were migrating around the Soviet Union, with the government’s knowledge.

“It was a sunny Saturday, and I had spent most of the day outside, playing with other kids from our apartment building…We collected wildflowers and jagged clay pieces that we thought treasures until our mothers hollered our names through open windows, summoning us to dinner…As I ate my dinner, the sky was blue outside the wide-open window of the kitchen. I didn’t learn about Chernobyl for several days.”
Sophia Moskalenko, 10 years old at the time of the incident

Within weeks, 54 people died from radiation exposure. Another 4,000 civilians would get cancer, and some 120,000 clean-up workers would pass away from radiation poisoning. Today, these figures continue to rise.

Today’s threat is different from a nuclear explosion. Radiation is not a pathogen; during the 1980’s, the spread of radiation went only so far as available transportation could carry it. And this occurred at a much slower rate. On the other hand, the coronavirus has spread across the globe at incredible speeds through modern transportation and increased interconnectivity.

What parallels is individual reaction. There is an omnipresent feeling of vulnerability to an invisible threat. Trying to distinguish fact from propaganda and truth from deceitful words of relief raises questions about the trustworthiness of the government. To be sure, questions are proliferating in all realms and, the matter is, scientists are working with the unknown and political leaders across the globe have intentions that may vary from our own.

The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl struck a critical juncture in Gorbachev’s rule, just following his promise of transparency and reconstruction through glasnost and perestroika. Yet, it took weeks before Gorbachev stood in front of the public to discuss the incident for the first time. His promises were quickly overturned as the Soviets reverted back to their ways of secrecy and self-serving interests.

Xi’s authoritarian regime had many of the same initial responses, and subsequent strategies. As of last week, China’s propaganda blitz has focused on pivoting the blame of COVID-19 away from China, saying that it had nothing to do with its spread. Similar to the Kremlin, the Chinese government let the virus go unchecked for weeks from its initial start in Wuhan earlier last December. Despite cases emerging across Southeast Asia, as in Thailand and Singapore, Chinese officials muzzled scientific reporting and rejected visits from American health authorities in the earliest stages of the epidemic.

Chinese officials also lied about the seriousness of the situation. One of China’s more esteemed epidemiologists (a person who studies the accumulation and spread of diseases) said that if the government had acted sooner, “the number of sick would be greatly reduced.”

“The false information released by the relevant departments — claiming the disease was controllable and would not spread from human-to-human — left hundreds of doctors and nurses in the dark, doing all they could to treat patients without knowing about the epidemic.”
Said by an anonymous Central Hospital department head in Wuhan, China

As was the case with the Soviets, Chinese authorities failed to critically address the burgeoning issue, making claims that the virus could not spread from human contact. Social media discourse about the virus was heavily censored, even when propagated by doctors and health officials. And like Gorbachev, it took Xi weeks before he finally acknowledged the crisis on January 20th. A full three days later, he declared Wuhan to be on lockdown. But by that time, some 5 million Wuhan residents had traveled across China and overseas.

Beijing has tried to project the lackluster response to the virus onto local officials, as the Kremlin did to devoid themselves from the growing reprisal. But in both cases, the blame lies within the penchant for praise funneled through censorship, misinformation, and dystopic control.

The world should look towards the handling of both the nuclear disaster and the coronavirus outbreak as an example of the need for more transparent, intimate, and regular collaboration between governmental officials and health personnel to act earlier and more decisively in a globalized world. There needs to be an open, international forum for discussion that leverages the work of impartial IGOs and NGOs, such as the WHO and Doctors Without Borders. This is especially true for underdeveloped countries who are shouldering immense burden from the outbreak. A decisive plan for recovering from the fragmentation of the economy and society and strategizing ways to prevent its further dismembering needs to be reached.

With Chernobyl capturing the world’s attention almost 40 years ago, perhaps the current world was myopic when it came to the coronavirus outbreak. In the aftermath of the pandmeic, Xi needs to acknowledge his government’s failure to respond to the initial outbreak and subsequent disregard for its spread.

March 30, 2020 1 comment

Russia

Putin’s Crimea, Five Years Later

written by Alex Choy

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect any official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or the US Army.

Surrounded by patriotic pomp and splendor, Russian President Vladimir Putin led thousands to chant “Russia” during a visit to the historic Crimean capital of Simferopol earlier this year. Putin’s visit marks the fifth anniversary of the Russian annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, an action which NATO has continued to strongly condemn, citing Russian actions to be a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and a serious breach of international law. Recent Russian expansionism is directly correlated with Putin’s obsession with creating a Russiky Mir. This reflects a strategy Putin has utilized to leverage the soft power of self-identified and often hyper-nationalist ethnic Russian ‘compatriots abroad’ to undermine the sovereignty of former Soviet Bloc nations. Proclaiming that “in patriotism, [lies] the basis” for a consolidated Russian Eurasia, Putin’s Russiky Mir lays the groundwork for Russian hard power occupation.

While Putin continues to paint himself as a national hero, the jingoistic fervor that bolstered his popularity following Crimea’s “reunification” has since waned as Russia continues to suffer under Western sanctions. With his latest excursion into Crimea, it seems that Putin’s imperialistic aspirations have dug himself into a hole. Military expansion to “Make Russia Great Again,” while initially strategically promising, has proven to be both economically and politically unviable.

Since its annexation from the Ottoman Empire in 1783, Crimea has been at the forefront of Russian strategy. The peninsula’s deep sea port at Sevastopol, transferred to Ukraine in 1954 in a gesture of good faith by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, remained the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet post-Soviet dissolution, due to a (now defunct) 1997 treaty that permitted leasing of the port to Russia. While the treaty preserved Moscow’s ability to project regional power, Ukrainian participation was contingent on the rather vague Russian promise to “respect the sovereignty of Ukraine” while operating forces off base. Manifested by the continued presence of the Black Sea Fleet, Russia’s ability to fulfill its role as regional hegemon is dependent on maintaining a force in Crimea at all costs, since their port at Novorossiysk continues to lack the infrastructure required to support the full-scale naval operations that grant Russia access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits.

Given the existential importance of power projection to Russia, it did not take a foreign affairs expert to register Putin’s feelings towards Viktor Yushchenko during the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Race. In contrast to Putin’s marionette; the Russophile Yanukovych, Yushchenko was a pro-Western politician who ran on an anti-corruption platform. Understanding that victory for Yushchenko would mean closer ties to NATO and the possible abrogation of a Russian military presence in Sevastopol, Putin did his best to turn public opinion in favor of Yanukovych, vilifying Yushchenko on Russian State Television. In response, when it was announced that Yanukovych had won, massive protests erupted, denouncing the election’s legitimacy and calling for a rerun, where Yushchenko was ultimately found to be the victor. These “Color Revolutions,” which also occurred in other post-Soviet Republics, signaled a desire for autonomous and fair regional representation. To Putin however, they only reinforced his resolve to preserve Russian hegemony.

Efforts to maintain Russian preeminence, previously characterized by subtle political subversion, grew increasingly violent with a series of provocative land grabs; most notably during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War when Russia’s Sevastopol based forces were utilized to help separatist Georgian states gain their “independence,” before promptly subjugating them to de-facto Russian control. Fearing (correctly) that Putin’s blatant violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity was an ominous foreshadowing of what to come, Yushchenko publicly reaffirmed Ukraine’s push for NATO membership and condemned the intervention, threatening to increase the rent on Russia’s Sevastopol lease. Sensing Ukraine’s increasing intolerance towards the Russian presence in Crimea, Putin intensified his combative rhetoric, denouncing NATO expansion into Ukraine as a “direct threat to Russian security” and vowed resistance to any such moves.

To the delight of Putin, Ukraine’s promising pro-Western trajectory was abruptly halted with the legitimate election of Viktor Yanukovych in 2010. However, when Ukraine erupted into revolution once more, Putin decided to intervene on his pro-Russian counterpart’s behalf, recognizing an opportunistic chance to secure Crimea once and for all. On February 27^th, 2014, unmarked Russian soldiers, colloquially referred to as the “little green men,” seized the Crimean Parliament building in Simferopol. Cut off from Kyiv, members of Parliament ‘voted’ Russian nationalist; Sergey Aksyonov into office who promptly requested Russian military intervention to ensure “peace and tranquility” in the face of civil unrest. Three weeks later, with a stroke of his pen, Putin formally annexed Crimea under the guise of self-determination, viewing Crimeans and Russians as a singular people, momentarily separated by the collapse of the USSR, but now finally reunited.

Since the annexation, five years of sustained Russian aggression have revealed that Putin’s imperialist ambitions have cost his country dearly. Despite the often unpredictable nature of the Trump Administration, the United States has not only upheld, but has increased Obama-era sanctions and NATO operations in the region, emphasizing deterrence through joint training exercises and mutual defense. Since 2014, U.S. and E.U. sanctions have targeted more than 700 Russian entities; waging a war of economic attrition against Russian corporations, state banks, and oligarchs. Such punitive measures have taken a great toll on the Russian economy, which as of 2018 is “10% smaller [than] what might have been expected at the end of 2013,” according to a study performed by Bloomberg Analytics. A testament to the effectiveness of the Western sanctions, public trust in Putin has fallen to a historic 13 year low, bottoming out at a measly 33.3%. Compared to the popularity Putin enjoyed during the post-annexation wave of national euphoria, lack of public trust can be attributed to not only the faltering economy but to the institution of pension reform due to the Kremlin’s shrinking purse. Pension reform has raised the retirement age, denying benefits to hundreds of thousands of workers who have since taken to the streets in protest, denouncing Putin and his United Russia Party.

If Putin does not curb his combative rhetoric, Western sanctions will endure and the Russian economy will continue to atrophy, further degrading Putin and his United Russia Party in the eyes of voters. While Putin is ineligible for a third consecutive term as President, he may attempt to retain power through a ‘castling’ maneuver, similar to what was done with Dmitry Medvedev. However, given Putin’s current downward trajectory, it is uncertain if castling or a 2030 presidential run will even be feasible. While the future may see Putin attempt another small yet victorious war to momentarily revitalize the public trust, such a decision would only further perpetuate a vicious cycle of aggression and sanctions. Putin’s attempts to “Make Russia Great Again” through subversion and military expansionism have only contributed to the gradual decline of his party’s dominance. As United Russia loses popularity, opposition parties such as the Communists and Liberal Democrats stand poised to take its place.

January 2, 2020 1 comment

Cartoon Donald Trump Featured Geopolitics Human Rights Populism Russia United States Vladimir Putin

Conservatives and the Kremlin: An Emerging Alliance

written by Zach Emanuel

This past summer while leading a Congressional delegation to Moscow, Republican Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama proclaimed in a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that the United States and Russia “don’t necessarily need to be adversaries” and that “the world is better off…if Russia and the U.S. have fewer tensions.” While it is tough to disagree with Shelby, such statements are often expected from the perpetrators of cyber-warfare and election interference, not the victims.

Among fellow Republicans, Shelby is not alone in his conciliatory and even flattering tone towards our former Cold War enemy. Vice President Mike Pence said that it was “inarguable” that Russian President Vladimir Putin “has been a stronger leader in his country than Barack Obama has been in this country.” Likewise, President Donald Trump has gone from calling Putin a “strong leader” and “very smart” to asking “wouldn’t it be nice if we actually got along with Russia”.

Ronald Reagan would recoil and reject his fellow Republicans’ words. In 1983, Reagan declared the Soviet Union to be an “evil empire” and “the focus of evil in the modern world.” Indeed, these recent statements are a far cry from the hawkish tone Republican leaders used under Reagan. They also differ tremendously from the way Republicans spoke about Russia just a few years ago when Barack Obama still occupied the Oval Office, such as when 2012 Republican Presidential nominee Mitt Romney famously called Russia our “number one geopolitical foe.”

To what can we attribute this sudden, yet strong change of perspective within the GOP leadership?

It might be that former Russia hawks who have reversed their positions have done so out of political necessity. In just four years, the percentage of Republicans who consider Russia an ally has nearly doubled to 40 percent, while just 10 percent now consider Russia the greatest immediate threat to the United States. Russia, like Trump, is popular with the GOP base and Senators, like Shelby, want to keep their jobs.

But if politics can answer the question of why Republican elected officials have changed their minds on Russia, then what can possibly explain the Republican base’s change of heart?

Surprisingly, the Republican base’s pivot towards Moscow began well before Trump entered the political arena, let alone the Oval Office. In August of 2013, Matt Drudge, the conservative pundit and founder of the right-wing Drudge Report, called Putin the “leader of the free world.” Later that year, Pat Buchanan, the same Pat Buchanan who was a senior advisor to both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, penned a column defending both Putin’s leadership and conservative record. And in 2014, evangelist Franklin Graham, long a prominent face on the religious right along with his father, Billy Graham, defended Putin on a host of issues ranging from LGBT rights to military engagement in Syria. What gives?

While Buchanan and Graham’s respective defenses of Putin have been tied to his crackdown on gay rights in Russia, the right-wing obsession with Russia extends beyond “homosexual marriage,” (Buchanan’s words) and into the broader culture war taking place in the U.S. and across the Western world. On issues such as racial diversity and multiculturalism, immigration, LGBT rights, and abortion, the left and right in America and in Europe are increasingly divided.

Where does Putin stand on multiculturalism, gay rights, abortion rights, and immigration? Firmly in the conservative camp.

When it comes to racial diversity and immigration, Russia represents a Trump-Republican’s dream. While whites in the U.S make up 61% of the population, in the next 20 to 25 years, the U.S will become a majority-minority nation. Russia’s population on the other hand is still over 82% white– and not shrinking. And there is no immigration to Russia. As of January of 2018, Russia has granted only one Syrian national refugee status since the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011. To quote HBO’s “Real Time” host Bill Maher, “Russia is a honky oasis and Republicans love it.”

Putin’s record on gay and abortion rights is similar. In advance of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia famously passed a law banning “the propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations,” and threatening stiff penalties for those who “promote homosexuality to anyone under 18.” Same-sex couples in Russia are ineligible for a number of legal protections available to heterosexual couples and there are no laws banning discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Finally, in the Russia republic of Chechnya in 2017, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov was accused of rounding up and detaining over 100 men suspected of being gay, three of whom were killed. In the aftermath Kadyrov denied the claims and Putin appeared to back him up.

Restrictions on abortion are similarly harsh. In 2011, the Russian Parliament passed a law banning abortions after the twelfth week of pregnancy and instituted a mandatory waiting period of two to seven days to allow the woman to “reconsider her decision.” Moreover, the law mandates that abortion providers devote “10 percent of any advertising to describing the dangers of abortion to a woman’s health” while making it illegal to “describe abortion as a safe medical procedure.”

With bans on public expressions of homosexuality and restrictive abortion laws, its no wonder Christian conservatives in the United States like Franklin Graham and Mike Pence find Vladimir Putin to be a strong and admirable leader. Many Republican voters overlooked Trump’s anti-democratic tendencies when voting for him in 2016 simply so they could finally overturn Roe v. Wade. It’s not a leap to say that those same Republicans could overlook Putin’s despotism for similar reasons.

The Republican base no longer views Russia as an “evil empire” but rather as the “leader of the free world” because the battle lines dividing our world are no longer ideological, but cultural. Communists and dictators are no longer the enemy, liberals are.

The consequences of viewing the world through a cultural lens rather than an ideological one are nothing short of profound. If the features that unite people with one another are their race or policies on abortion and gay marriage rather than their commitment to American values, then it’s no wonder Republicans view Russia, rather than Democrats, as a more natural ally.

At the summit meeting between Russia and the United States in Helsinki this past July, President Trump was asked whether or not he believed America’s intelligence agencies or Vladimir Putin when it came to Russian meddling in the 2016 election. He sided with Putin. While even GOP leaders chastised Trump for his comment and came to the defense of the FBI and CIA, his decision to believe and defend the Russians over fellow Americans is a sign of what’s to come if cultural values continue to supersede democratic ones. To avoid this fate, Americans must again find a way to replace partisanship with patriotism, and commitment to our causes with a commitment to our country.

October 23, 2018 0 comment

Europe Featured Geopolitics History Military Russia Security and Conflict Territorial disputes Vladimir Putin

The Russo-Georgian War, 10 Years Later

written by Conor McDonald

On August 7th, 2008, the leaders of the Russian Federation shocked the world and made the controversial decision to mobilize and invade Georgia, a small, sovereign nation located in the Caucasus Mountains just south of Russia. The Georgian military had been engaged with separatists from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for just under a week, yet by the time a large batch of Russian military personnel entered their territory through the mountainous Roki tunnel at 11:00 PM, it was too late. Despite what any news outlets would later report, the international community knew that Georgia had just lost a major chunk of its territory to this aggressor from the north. What no one knew, however, was that this seemingly minor excursion would begin a decade’s worth of continued Russian belligerence and adventurism toward its neighbors. But why start with Georgia?

Historically, the strained relations between Russia and Georgia are nothing new, and can be traced back as early as the year 1785 when the Russian Empire violated a treaty and refused to defend the eastern Georgian Kingdom during a Persian invasion. Some decades later, in 1801, Georgia joined the Russian Empire, and it remained a protected member up until 1918 when the independent Democratic Republic of Georgia was established following the Russian Revolution and the abdication of the Russian Tsardom. This was short-lived, however, as the Bolsheviks and the Red Army overthrew the Georgian government in 1921 and forcibly annexed the region into the newly-established United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1922.

The USSR forced an era of tension, fear and powerlessness upon the citizens of Georgia. Under the first three years of Soviet control alone, approximately 50,000 Georgians were executed by the government, while an insurmountable 150,000 were purged up through 1951 by Joseph Stalin, a native Georgian himself. Additionally, basic rights to citizenship were stripped; according to Michael Parrish in The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953, Stalin forced entire Ingush, Chechen, Balkarian and Karachay populations, all native to Georgia, into deportation. Georgian territories were seized and distributed amongst various states, including Armenia and Turkey, and nearly half of the 700,000 soldiers that the country was forced to contribute toward the Red Army were killed over the course of World War II. Even when relatively progressive leaders like Nikita Khrushchev took control of the Soviet Union — “progressive” in that he succeeded Stalin — Georgian protests promoting independence from the USSR resulted in the massacring of hundreds of college students and demonstrators.

Thus, it should surprise no one that, upon the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Georgian officials were quick to declare sovereignty and begin holding democratic elections. Unfortunately, the radical and autocratic Georgian presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia prompted some to lose faith in their nation, and pro-Russian separatist groups gained prominence in certain regions — most notably in South Ossetia and Abkhazia — leading to a short-lasting civil war in the latter. Somewhat ironically, this forced Georgia to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in order to receive Russian military support, and, in 2001, Abkhazia and Georgia co-signed “an accord pledging not to use force against each other.”

After the accord’s ratification, a shaky sense of peace was established between Georgia and the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was clearly imperfect, though, as protests and skirmishes continued to break out while political tensions rose unwaveringly; South Ossetia even went so far as to hold an unofficial referendum in which 99% of the public voted in favor of independence, an act ignored by the European Union but supported by the Russia Duma. Two years later, after hearing direct pleas for support from Abkhazian and South Ossetian officials, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev stated that allying with the separatist regions “is not an easy choice, but it is the only way to save the lives of people,” and pledged both political and military support to both. Several months later, after the Georgian military responded to another South Ossetian attack, Russia launched its now-infamous military invasion.

Russia’s 2008 seizure of the Ossetian and Abkhazian territories provided eerie foreshadowing for what the Federation’s neighbors had in store. Six years later, in 2014, a near-identical crisis transpired in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions, disputes which continue to the time of this article’s publication. The primary characteristic that both the Georgian and Ukrainian annexation attempts had in common is that they highlighted deep, pervading insecurities from within the highest ranks of Russian leadership. These insecurities are two-pronged, with stress placed on both military and political pressures. From a military perspective, the intimidating reach of NATO expansion is obviously considered to be a pervading, existential threat; Georgia and Ukraine were invaded while the United States and the West considered their bids to enter NATO. However, the more alarming insecurities are political, and they continue to grow increasingly problematic as democracy gains popularity within Russian spheres of influence.

During a 2005 visit, President George W. Bush proudly referred to Georgia as a beacon of liberty in a region where freedom is not always to be taken for granted. He spoke glowingly about the 2003 Georgian Rose Revolution, in which a peaceful change of power allied Georgia more strongly with the West. This revolution preceded and arguably inspired Ukraine’s 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, which forced the overturning of then-President Viktor Yanukovych and his corrupt, Russophilic administration in favor of the more Western-oriented candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. These so-called Color Revolutions, which also took place in post-Soviet Yugoslavia and Kyrgyzstan, sent a message to their former occupier that these nations were now independent and desirous of fair domestic representation. Seeing that his neighbors were quickly working to distance themselves from the influence of a relatively weakened Russia, it would not take a foreign affairs specialist to understand that Vladimir Putin, a longstanding disbeliever in the promises of democracy, was far from pleased with the symbolism of these revolts.

Following the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko began to indirectly lay the groundwork for his own country’s invasion by publicly voicing his support for Georgian independence. It is no coincidence that this controversial anti-Russian stance hurdled Ukraine toward further political crisis in November of that year, a window which Russia seized to further exacerbate political troubles. When Yanukovych successfully regained his presidency in 2013, Ukraine spiraled into yet another revolution, and this time Putin chose to involve himself on his pro-Russia counterpart’s behalf. Shortly after, the autonomous region of Crimea was annexed by Russian soldiers.

Russia had been guilty of testing Western resolve all throughout the 21st century, particularly in Eastern Europe, but the dramatic actions against Georgia in 2008 marked a critical shift in Russian foreign policy. Long gone were the days of press releases or discrete political subversion, and ushered in was an era of violent military intervention and territorial seizures. The only thing protecting Russia’s other Western-oriented, post-Soviet neighbors is their NATO membership, and the United States and its allies should not be surprised to see Russian intervention on behalf of other separatist groups from non-member states in the coming years. Ten years after the events in Georgia, the world still waits to see who will be next.

September 26, 2018 8 comments

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Condoleeza Rice and Amy Zegart: A Lecture on Political Risk and US Foreign Policy

written by Andrea Zachrich

Earlier this month, Condoleezza Rice and Amy Zegart visited UCLA to speak about their newly published book, “Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurities” and about other foreign policy issues. While a number of topics were covered, Rice and Zegart’s comments regarding North Korea’s nuclear program, Russia and its president Vladimir Putin, and nuclear and cyber risk trends were the most striking.

Personally, I found the discussion about the book fascinating because it takes a unique approach in that it focuses on how political risk can affect businesses. Both Rice and Zegart are extremely qualified to discuss this topic. Condoleezza Rice served as the 20th National Security Advisor and the 66th Secretary of State under George W. Bush. She is also a professor of political science and business at Stanford University. In the private sector, Rice headed the committee for public policy for Chevron and has also been on the board of directors for companies such as the Carnegie Corporation, the Charles Schwab Corporation, and Chevron, among others. Similarly, Zegart has a background in international security. She currently serves as co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford. Zegart is considered a leading expert on the US Intelligence Community and national security. She has a PhD in political science from Stanford and has published three books on this topic. She also has private sector experience, and worked for the consulting firm McKinsey & Company where she advised Fortune 100 companies.

Political risk, as defined by the speakers in an article for the Harvard-Review is “essentially the probability that a political action will significantly affect their business—whether positively or negatively”. During the discussion, the speakers emphasized that while political risk has always been a factor for multi-national businesses, it is a more pressing issue today due to several recent trends around the world. One example the speakers discussed was social media. Social media makes collective action such as protests and boycotts by ordinary citizens much easier and more effective. Using social media can decrease the costs of coordination and spreads messages around the globe quickly. Small groups of people can have much larger effect in their communities and the world than ever before. This collective action may increase political risk by disrupting normal business functions such as shipping of materials and goods or governmental oversight functions. These effects were seen in the Arab Spring which began in 2010. This series of revolutions resulted in government overthrows in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and civil war in Syria. Many of the protests were organized on sites like Facebook, and protesters used social media as a platform to share their stories and generate awareness for their cause on a global scale. Social media use in this time was so prolific among users who had access to it that the Arab Spring has been dubbed both the “Facebook Revolution” and “Twitter Revolution”.

When asked about the drivers of the changes in political risk, Rice and Zegart gave a number of possible explanations. One is the changing geopolitical landscape. The speakers asserted that we all have taken for granted the liberal world order established after World War II. Over the last 70 years, there has been a general and almost worldwide belief in the benefits of free trade, capitalism, and open economies that more and more countries bought into. The post-war period saw the establishment of international regulatory committees such as the International Monetary Fund in 1945 whose stated goal is to “build a framework for economic cooperation” among countries. The idea was that countries who trade with one another and have diplomatic relations are less likely to go to war. According to the speakers, this liberal worldview is being challenged globally by what Rice and Zegart jokingly called the “four horsemen of the apocalypse”: Populism, nationalism, isolationism, and protectionism. These ideological shifts are exemplified by the recent unilateral tariffs placed on steel and aluminum by President Trump, an unprecedented move in today’s globalized economy. These tariffs raise the possibility of a trade war with China and possibly the EU, threatening businesses with supply chains running through these countries. In a world that is so undeniably and irreversibly connected, these four ideologies, and the policies they bring with them, do indeed seem apocalyptic.

Another reason for the changing “political risk landscape” identified by the speakers is that we are witnessing the emergence of great power rivalry between the United States and Russia in a way the world has not seen since the Cold War. The speakers asserted that as great powers behave badly, they substantially increase political risk. One example of this is Russia’s spread of fake news and propaganda in support of then-presidential candidate Donald Trump on Facebook and other social media outlets during the 2016 presidential election. While it is unclear if this propaganda affected the election results, Russian interference with the US on this scale has not been seen since the height of the Cold War. Russian meddling in US elections is a huge political risk for social media and technology companies, and one that is incredibly difficult to anticipate or prevent.

Another particularly insightful aspect of the conversation on political risk came from Rice and Zegart’s analysis of the different kinds of hazards associated with doing business in countries with authoritarian versus democratic governments. The speakers avoided giving a moral judgement on whether or not companies should conduct business in places with authoritarian regimes, and instead focused on the practicalities of it, stating that there are both advantages and disadvantages to doing business in each system of governments. In authoritarian states, companies can often do business efficiently, but they tend to lack both transparency and rule of law, which can be bad for business due to a lack of security and the threat of asset seizures. There is also no peaceful transfer of power, which can become an issue for companies if violence disrupts business. In contrast, doing business in a country with a democratic government typically ensures transparency and retention of property, but business may be less efficient due to burdensome regulations and large bureaucracies. While Rice and Zegart avoided making a determination as to which type of government was better for business, and instead emphasized that it is vital for businesses to understand the risks that are associated with both.

In addition to discussing their book, the speakers also discussed current foreign policy issues. Both Rice and Zegart had suggestions as to how the U.S should move forward regarding the upcoming nuclear negotiations with North Korea. Surprisingly, they don’t think that the US should try to negotiate with Kim Jong Un because such attempts have not been successful in the past. During Rice’s tenure as secretary of state, she tried to negotiate a nuclear deal with North Korea, which was unsuccessful. The speakers did however acknowledge that the current situation is unique because no previous president has had to negotiate with a nuclearized North Korea, and that negotiating with Kim Jong Un, while not recommended, may be necessary. They believe that there is a possibility that a deal could be struck, but that it will require nuanced and detailed discussions that need to be handled well with minimal negotiations. Rice, however, did not place much confidence in President Trump stating, “our President is someone whose first job in government is President”. Regardless, the speakers advocated for the US to take this opportunity, but for the administration not to forget that they are still dealing with Kim Jong Un. Rice also stated that she does not believe the US should pull their troops out of the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea because she believes that withdrawing military support would encourage Japan to remilitarize, causing even more tension in the region and possibly leading to an arms race between North Korea, China, and Japan.

The speakers also discussed recent happenings in Russia. Rice scrutinized Russian president Vladimir Putin as a leader, saying that, based on her past conversations with him, he believes that Russia has only been successfully ruled by “great men”, such as the czars of the past. He believes himself to be one of them in his quest to reestablish Russian influence worldwide. Rice stated, however, that Russia may attempt to offset their declining power by reasserting their military dominance. An example of this can be seen in Putin’s invasion of the Ukrainian region of Crimea and sending troops to support the Assad regime in Syria. In 2014, Putin invaded the Crimea, claiming that Crimeans wanted to separate from Ukraine while acting in defense against the spread of NATO. Despite the International Criminal Court calling this action a crime, Putin continues to keep troops in the region, perhaps as a way to display his military might in a world where Russia retains little diplomatic power. Similarly, Russia continues to send troops and military support to President Assad’s regime in Syria despite allegations of chemical weapon use and war crimes. Supporting Syria’s militarily allows Russia to maintain influence in the Middle East. Both actions demonstrate Russian attempts to display military power and influence at a time when Moscow has little diplomatic leverage.

Finally, Rice and Zegart discussed the four countries most likely to produce political risk in the form of nuclear development and cyber security issues. Rice called China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran the “Big Four” due to these countries’ threats to both company security and a country’s national security. Most of these state are sophisticated adversaries in cyber security. As discussed earlier, Russia, for example, has already displayed some of their cyber warfare capabilities during the 2016 election with a massive disinformation campaign. North Korea hacked Sony Picture Entertainment in 2014 to attempt to block the release of a movie that satirized Kim Jong Un. Their cyber attacks have only gotten more sophisticated since; in 2015 the country stole millions of dollars from the New York Federal reserve. In addition, when compared with countries such as North Korea and Iran, the US is asymmetrically vulnerable due to the number of internet users and the country’s digital connectivity. In North Korea, for example, only 10 percent of their population uses the internet compared to 89 percent in the US. In regards to nuclear threats, Rice and Zegart were concerned about all the countries mentioned above, but noted Iran in particular due to speculation at the time of the lecture that Trump would pull the U.S out of the Iran nuclear deal (He has since done so). With Trump withdrawing from this deal, there is a possibility that Iran could restart their nuclear program immediately, leading to a potential nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The speakers asserted that businesses that operate in or run supply chains through these four countries must be wary of potential tariffs and sanctions due to actions such as cyber hacking or nuclear escalation.

It was captivating to be able to listen to individuals with as much as experience as Rice and Zegart discuss business risks and foreign policy. Many thanks to both of them for visiting UCLA and giving this lecture.

May 24, 2018 0 comment

Donald Trump Europe Featured Military Russia Security and Conflict United States Vladimir Putin

The Connection Between Putin’s Chef, Global Political Interference and a Ukrainian Invasion

written by Conor McDonald

If the American dream consists of starting from scratch and, through tireless labor, building one’s assets up to formidable quantities, then it should be easy for Western capitalists to understand how certain individuals were able to take advantage of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 to attain the status that they have today. Boris Yeltsin’s oligarchs with insider connections, of course, are exceptions to this; instead, the individuals being referred to include middle class contractors, mid-tier managers, and even hot dog stand owners. One stand owner in particular, Yevgeny Prigozhin, provides a particularly dramatic case study for economic success following modest origins. Prigozhin used to rob banks and sell street snacks just to pay his bills, but today, he owns a number of bustling enterprises and can be seen driving a blue Lincoln Continental. However, all is not as picture perfect as it seems for this Gatsby-esque individual.

In 2016, the United States congress imposed economic sanctions against Prigozhin alongside several other Russian political elites in an attempt to strike back at the heart of Putin’s inner circle. Just under a month ago, Prigozhin was indicted by Robert Mueller, special counsel overseeing the alleged Russian interference in the United States’ 2016 presidential election, for playing a major role in the digital manipulation of public opinion. Similarly, the international community has expressed repeated disdain toward Prigozhin for his establishment of the Wagner Group, which today stands as Russia’s premier private military corporation acting in Syria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. So, how exactly did a humble, bank-robbing hot dog stand owner such as Prigozhin manage to gain such prestige and controversy in Russia’s government?

As Russian political rebel Aleksei Navalny stated in a recent interview, Prigozhin “didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In 1998, Prigozhin opened his most famous conventional business to date: New Island, a buoyant restaurant that lies atop an adorned ferry in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Two years later, in 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. Coincidence or not, Putin took a liking to Prigozhin, and the very next year he brought Jacques Chirac, the former President of France, to the very same restaurant. He also brought United States President George W. Bush in 2002, and he hosted his personal birthday party there in 2003. Putin and Prigozhin rapidly formed a unique friendship, the shady personal and economic perks of which would be seen in the years to follow.

Some of these perks included contracts to provide food for Russian public schools and the Russian military — at his peak, Prigozhin was feeding 90% of Russian service-members, a job which Vox News reports earned him over a billion dollars. Perhaps it is because of Prigozhin’s humble origins as a hot dog stand owner that he is not afraid of doing President Putin’s dirty work. Perhaps he was enraptured by the economic benefits, or perhaps he was simply too afraid to say no. Regardless, with economic favors from Putin came political and social responsibility for Prigozhin to serve his leader’s interests. A decade after Putin’s birthday party, Prigozhin was presumably advised by government sources to use his funds to create the Internet Resource Agency — also known as Glavset — a Saint Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. Glavset’s campaigns initially sought to put down domestic protests by creating fake social media accounts advocating on behalf of President Putin and disparage the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny, but, according to Mueller, it allegedly expanded to the point of interference in international elections, including the United States’ in 2016. The most prominent evidence citing Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling pertains to his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times from 2015-2016 to discuss the work being done. It’s also important to note that Glavset’s Project Lakhta, a so-called “disinformation campaign,” received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Prigozhin in 2016 alone.

Following dramatic success countering protests and slandering rivals with Glasvet, Prigozhin used his immense wealth in 2014 to found and develop ChVK Wagner, a private military corporation which has, as of late, become one of President Putin’s primary sources for military operations that Russia cannot formally be involved in. Commanded by Dmitry Utkin, an ex-Russian Special Forces brigade commander, ChVK Wagner has been involved in both the conflicts in Syria and in Ukraine’s Luhansk region. Perhaps most infamously, it was recently discovered that the Wagner Group shot down the Ukrainian Air Force’s Ilyushin Il-76 in 2014, an act which was originally attributed to rogue Russian nationalists in Ukraine and killed all 49 of the plane’s passengers. ChVK Wagner has also been involved in the recent conflict in Crimea, where their innocuous green uniforms earned them the title of “little green men.” Prigozhin’s decision to fund military bases in Ukraine’s Donbas region has been a critical component of the success of Russian encroachment. In Syria, ChVK Wagner’s shady activities include serving as “shock troops” to President Bashar al-Assad, as well as seizing ISIS-held oil fields for Russian companies, including the newly made conglomerate Evro Soyuz. The Wagner Group’s economic and military influence is easily one of the most valuable assets that Prigozhin is bringing to Putin and his oligarchs’ table.

In everywhere but Putin’s Russia, it is positively bizarre for one to imagine a world in which a hot dog stand owner with a vast criminal record can rise to a point of such prominence in one of the world’s most powerful political and military systems. Prigozhin himself once said that “Vladimir Putin saw how I built up my business from nothing,” but the roots of his success lie not in his hard work — they instead lie in the fact that Putin was a personal witness and catalyst to it. This is precisely how modern Russia has operated since Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar’s disastrous economic reforms in the early 1990s. Regardless, President Putin’s crony-infested inner circle will continue to thrive on loyalty and trust above all else, proving that even the bank robber putting mustard on a hot dog has a valid chance at fulfilling his wildest dreams.

March 24, 2018 0 comment

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